hermes-tool-guardrails
Yana AI-native (not hermes-agent-derived — see Provenance correction below) command allowlist + approval-gate pattern for safe tool execution. Block dangerous commands by default, prompt for approval on risky ones, auto-deny in non-interactive subagents. Complements YAMTAM's safe-run.sh at the agent decision level. Distinct from [[hermes-tool-loop-guard]], which detects within-turn tool-call failure loops.
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-14
- Stars
- ★ 13
- Forks
- 2
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- hermes-tool-guardrails
- description
- Yana AI-native (not hermes-agent-derived — see Provenance correction below) command allowlist + approval-gate pattern for safe tool execution. Block dangerous commands by default, prompt for approval on risky ones, auto-deny in non-interactive subagents. Complements YAMTAM's safe-run.sh at the agent decision level. Distinct from [[hermes-tool-loop-guard]], which detects within-turn tool-call failure loops.
03 SKILL.md 正文
Provenance correction (2026-06-20)
This skill was originally tagged license: MIT / source: https://github.com/NousResearch/hermes-agent
when imported (commit 98f1d51b). After the real upstream source was vendored
and read (vendor/hermes-agent/_upstream/), a full grep for this skill's
content (allowlist, auto_approve, require_approval, always_block,
"Approval needed") found zero matches anywhere in the actual hermes-agent
source. The real agent/tool_guardrails.py is loop-detection logic only —
ported verbatim as core/lib/hermes_adapted/tool_guardrails.py and documented
correctly in [[hermes-tool-loop-guard]]. The attribution on this file was
false provenance, not a real hermes-agent pattern. Source/license header
removed; content below is Yana AI-native guidance, kept because it doesn't
duplicate the cited rule files below — not because it came from hermes-agent.
Hermes Tool Guardrails
Defense-in-depth for shell command execution. Works alongside YAMTAM's hook layer — hooks block at the OS level, this skill enforces at the agent decision level before the call is even made.
Trigger phrases: "command approval", "allowlist", "safe commands", "guardrails", "restrict tools", "auto-deny subagent", "command safety"
Three Execution Modes
| Mode | Context | Behavior |
|---|---|---|
| Interactive | CLI session with human present | Prompt for approval on risky commands |
| Non-interactive subagent | Spawned worker agent | Auto-deny anything not in allowlist |
| Cron/batch | Scheduled, unattended | Allow only explicitly approved patterns |
Default for subagents: non-interactive (safe). Never pass --allow-all when spawning a worker.
Allowlist Config
# .yana/tool-guardrails.yaml
approval:
auto_approve:
- "git status"
- "git diff *"
- "git log *"
- "npm test *"
- "cargo test *"
- "cat *"
- "ls *"
require_approval:
- "git push *"
- "npm publish *"
- "cargo publish *"
- "gh release *"
- "kubectl apply *"
- "terraform apply *"
always_block:
- "rm -rf *"
- "git push --force *"
- "chmod 777 *"
- "curl * | bash"
- "eval *"
Approval Gate Logic
def check_command(cmd: str, interactive: bool) -> bool:
if matches_always_block(cmd):
print(f"[BLOCKED] {cmd}")
return False
if matches_auto_approve(cmd):
return True
if not interactive:
# Subagent: deny anything not pre-approved
print(f"[DENIED — non-interactive] {cmd}")
return False
# Interactive session: ask human
print(f"\n⚠ Approval needed:\n {cmd}\n")
answer = input("Allow? [y/N] ").strip().lower()
return answer == 'y'
Subagent Tool Restriction
Give subagents only what they need:
delegate_task(
goal="Run the test suite and report failures",
toolsets=["terminal"],
disabled_tools=[
"write_file", # cannot modify files
"delegate_task", # no further delegation
"web_search" # no internet
]
)
Minimum toolset by role:
| Role | Needs | Does NOT need |
|---|---|---|
| Reviewer | Read, Grep | Write, Bash |
| Tester | Read, Write, Bash | Web, Delegate |
| Documenter | Read, Write | Bash, Web |
Dangerous Pattern Detection
Beyond the allowlist — always suspicious:
DANGEROUS_PATTERNS = [
r"rm\s+-[rf]{1,2}\s", # destructive delete
r"\|\s*(ba)?sh", # pipe to shell interpreter
r"eval\s+['\"`$]", # eval with dynamic content
r"base64\s+-d.*\|", # decode and pipe
r"curl.*\|\s*(ba)?sh", # remote script execution
r"sudo\s+", # privilege escalation
r"chmod\s+[0-7]*7[0-7]*\s+",# world-writable permission
]
Mutation Verification
After write operations, confirm the change happened:
before=$(sha256sum src/auth.ts | cut -d' ' -f1)
# ... write operation ...
after=$(sha256sum src/auth.ts | cut -d' ' -f1)
[ "$before" != "$after" ] && echo "VERIFIED" || echo "WARNING: no change"
YAMTAM Defense Layers
| Layer | Enforces |
|---|---|
safe-run.sh (hook) |
Hard-blocks dangerous shell patterns |
guard-destructive.sh (hook) |
PreToolUse hook for Bash tool |
| This skill (agent level) | Decision before tool is called |
| Subagent toolset restriction | Structural prevention at spawn time |
Anti-Fake-Pass
❌ Config defined but not checked before execution
❌ Interactive mode in cron job — hangs forever
❌ Same allowlist for orchestrator and workers — workers need tighter restrictions
❌ "Approve everything in dev" — bad habit that leaks to prod
❌ Skipping mutation verification on critical writes
See Also
core/rules/02-terminal-validator.md— YAMTAM hard-block patternscore/scripts/safe-run.sh— shell-level enforcementcore/hooks/guard-destructive.sh— PreToolUse hook
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