[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73C1HCFPG5ST6Y5PNVTWMJW":3,"skill-same:01M73C1HCFPG5ST6Y5PNVTWMJW":50},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":26,"commitSha":27,"skillDirectory":28,"forksCount":29,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":31,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":33,"ownerDescription":34,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M73C1HCFPG5ST6Y5PNVTWMJW","healthcare-phi-compliance",null,"Protected Health Information (PHI) and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) compliance patterns for healthcare applications. Covers data classification, access control, audit trails, encryption, and common leak vectors.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fhealthcare-phi-compliance\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: healthcare-phi-compliance\ndescription: Protected Health Information (PHI) and Personally Identifiable Information (PII) compliance patterns for healthcare applications. Covers data classification, access control, audit trails, encryption, and common leak vectors.\norigin: Health1 Super Speciality Hospitals — contributed by Dr. Keyur Patel\nversion: \"1.0.0\"\n---\n\n# Healthcare PHI\u002FPII Compliance Patterns\n\nPatterns for protecting patient data, clinician data, and financial data in healthcare applications. Applicable to HIPAA (US), DISHA (India), GDPR (EU), and general healthcare data protection.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Building any feature that touches patient records\n- Implementing access control or authentication for clinical systems\n- Designing database schemas for healthcare data\n- Building APIs that return patient or clinician data\n- Implementing audit trails or logging\n- Reviewing code for data exposure vulnerabilities\n- Setting up Row-Level Security (RLS) for multi-tenant healthcare systems\n\n## How It Works\n\nHealthcare data protection operates on three layers: **classification** (what is sensitive), **access control** (who can see it), and **audit** (who did see it).\n\n### Data Classification\n\n**PHI (Protected Health Information)** — any data that can identify a patient AND relates to their health: patient name, date of birth, address, phone, email, national ID numbers (SSN, Aadhaar, NHS number), medical record numbers, diagnoses, medications, lab results, imaging, insurance policy and claim details, appointment and admission records, or any combination of the above.\n\n**PII (Non-patient-sensitive data)** in healthcare systems: clinician\u002Fstaff personal details, doctor fee structures and payout amounts, employee salary and bank details, vendor payment information.\n\n### Access Control: Row-Level Security\n\n```sql\nALTER TABLE patients ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;\n\n-- Scope access by facility\nCREATE POLICY \"staff_read_own_facility\"\n  ON patients FOR SELECT TO authenticated\n  USING (facility_id IN (\n    SELECT facility_id FROM staff_assignments\n    WHERE user_id = auth.uid() AND role IN ('doctor','nurse','lab_tech','admin')\n  ));\n\n-- Audit log: insert-only (tamper-proof)\nCREATE POLICY \"audit_insert_only\" ON audit_log FOR INSERT\n  TO authenticated WITH CHECK (user_id = auth.uid());\nCREATE POLICY \"audit_no_modify\" ON audit_log FOR UPDATE USING (false);\nCREATE POLICY \"audit_no_delete\" ON audit_log FOR DELETE USING (false);\n```\n\n### Audit Trail\n\nEvery PHI access or modification must be logged:\n\n```typescript\ninterface AuditEntry {\n  timestamp: string;\n  user_id: string;\n  patient_id: string;\n  action: 'create' | 'read' | 'update' | 'delete' | 'print' | 'export';\n  resource_type: string;\n  resource_id: string;\n  changes?: { before: object; after: object };\n  ip_address: string;\n  session_id: string;\n}\n```\n\n### Common Leak Vectors\n\n**Error messages:** Never include patient-identifying data in error messages thrown to the client. Log details server-side only.\n\n**Console output:** Never log full patient objects. Use opaque internal record IDs (UUIDs) — not medical record numbers, national IDs, or names.\n\n**URL parameters:** Never put patient-identifying data in query strings or path segments that could appear in logs or browser history. Use opaque UUIDs only.\n\n**Browser storage:** Never store PHI in localStorage or sessionStorage. Keep PHI in memory only, fetch on demand.\n\n**Service role keys:** Never use the service_role key in client-side code. Always use the anon\u002Fpublishable key and let RLS enforce access.\n\n**Logs and monitoring:** Never log full patient records. Use opaque record IDs only (not medical record numbers). Sanitize stack traces before sending to error tracking services.\n\n### Database Schema Tagging\n\nMark PHI\u002FPII columns at the schema level:\n\n```sql\nCOMMENT ON COLUMN patients.name IS 'PHI: patient_name';\nCOMMENT ON COLUMN patients.dob IS 'PHI: date_of_birth';\nCOMMENT ON COLUMN patients.aadhaar IS 'PHI: national_id';\nCOMMENT ON COLUMN doctor_payouts.amount IS 'PII: financial';\n```\n\n### Deployment Checklist\n\nBefore every deployment:\n- No PHI in error messages or stack traces\n- No PHI in console.log\u002Fconsole.error\n- No PHI in URL parameters\n- No PHI in browser storage\n- No service_role key in client code\n- RLS enabled on all PHI\u002FPII tables\n- Audit trail for all data modifications\n- Session timeout configured\n- API authentication on all PHI endpoints\n- Cross-facility data isolation verified\n\n## Examples\n\n### Example 1: Safe vs Unsafe Error Handling\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F BAD — leaks PHI in error\nthrow new Error(`Patient ${patient.name} not found in ${patient.facility}`);\n\n\u002F\u002F GOOD — generic error, details logged server-side with opaque IDs only\nlogger.error('Patient lookup failed', { recordId: patient.id, facilityId });\nthrow new Error('Record not found');\n```\n\n### Example 2: RLS Policy for Multi-Facility Isolation\n\n```sql\n-- Doctor at Facility A cannot see Facility B patients\nCREATE POLICY \"facility_isolation\"\n  ON patients FOR SELECT TO authenticated\n  USING (facility_id IN (\n    SELECT facility_id FROM staff_assignments WHERE user_id = auth.uid()\n  ));\n\n-- Test: login as doctor-facility-a, query facility-b patients\n-- Expected: 0 rows returned\n```\n\n### Example 3: Safe Logging\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F BAD — logs identifiable patient data\nconsole.log('Processing patient:', patient);\n\n\u002F\u002F GOOD — logs only opaque internal record ID\nconsole.log('Processing record:', patient.id);\n\u002F\u002F Note: even patient.id should be an opaque UUID, not a medical record number\n```\n","# Healthcare PHI\u002FPII Compliance Patterns\n\nPatterns for protecting patient data, clinician data, and financial data in healthcare applications. Applicable to HIPAA (US), DISHA (India), GDPR (EU), and general healthcare data protection.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Building any feature that touches patient records\n- Implementing access control or authentication for clinical systems\n- Designing database schemas for healthcare data\n- Building APIs that return patient or clinician data\n- Implementing audit trails or logging\n- Reviewing code for data exposure vulnerabilities\n- Setting up Row-Level Security (RLS) for multi-tenant healthcare systems\n\n## How It Works\n\nHealthcare data protection operates on three layers: **classification** (what is sensitive), **access control** (who can see it), and **audit** (who did see it).\n\n### Data Classification\n\n**PHI (Protected Health Information)** — any data that can identify a patient AND relates to their health: patient name, date of birth, address, phone, email, national ID numbers (SSN, Aadhaar, NHS number), medical record numbers, diagnoses, medications, lab results, imaging, insurance policy and claim details, appointment and admission records, or any combination of the above.\n\n**PII (Non-patient-sensitive data)** in healthcare systems: clinician\u002Fstaff personal details, doctor fee structures and payout amounts, employee salary and bank details, vendor payment information.\n\n### Access Control: Row-Level Security\n\n```sql\nALTER TABLE patients ENABLE ROW LEVEL SECURITY;\n\n-- Scope access by facility\nCREATE POLICY \"staff_read_own_facility\"\n  ON patients FOR SELECT TO authenticated\n  USING (facility_id IN (\n    SELECT facility_id FROM staff_assignments\n    WHERE user_id = auth.uid() AND role IN ('doctor','nurse','lab_tech','admin')\n  ));\n\n-- Audit log: insert-only (tamper-proof)\nCREATE POLICY \"audit_insert_only\" ON audit_log FOR INSERT\n  TO authenticated WITH CHECK (user_id = auth.uid());\nCREATE POLICY \"audit_no_modify\" ON audit_log FOR UPDATE USING (false);\nCREATE POLICY \"audit_no_delete\" ON audit_log FOR DELETE USING (false);\n```\n\n### Audit Trail\n\nEvery PHI access or modification must be logged:\n\n```typescript\ninterface AuditEntry {\n  timestamp: string;\n  user_id: string;\n  patient_id: string;\n  action: 'create' | 'read' | 'update' | 'delete' | 'print' | 'export';\n  resource_type: string;\n  resource_id: string;\n  changes?: { before: object; after: object };\n  ip_address: string;\n  session_id: string;\n}\n```\n\n### Common Leak Vectors\n\n**Error messages:** Never include patient-identifying data in error messages thrown to the client. Log details server-side only.\n\n**Console output:** Never log full patient objects. Use opaque internal record IDs (UUIDs) — not medical record numbers, national IDs, or names.\n\n**URL parameters:** Never put patient-identifying data in query strings or path segments that could appear in logs or browser history. Use opaque UUIDs only.\n\n**Browser storage:** Never store PHI in localStorage or sessionStorage. Keep PHI in memory only, fetch on demand.\n\n**Service role keys:** Never use the service_role key in client-side code. Always use the anon\u002Fpublishable key and let RLS enforce access.\n\n**Logs and monitoring:** Never log full patient records. Use opaque record IDs only (not medical record numbers). Sanitize stack traces before sending to error tracking services.\n\n### Database Schema Tagging\n\nMark PHI\u002FPII columns at the schema level:\n\n```sql\nCOMMENT ON COLUMN patients.name IS 'PHI: patient_name';\nCOMMENT ON COLUMN patients.dob IS 'PHI: date_of_birth';\nCOMMENT ON COLUMN patients.aadhaar IS 'PHI: national_id';\nCOMMENT ON COLUMN doctor_payouts.amount IS 'PII: financial';\n```\n\n### Deployment Checklist\n\nBefore every deployment:\n- No PHI in error messages or stack traces\n- No PHI in console.log\u002Fconsole.error\n- No PHI in URL parameters\n- No PHI in browser storage\n- No service_role key in client code\n- RLS enabled on all PHI\u002FPII tables\n- Audit trail for all data modifications\n- Session timeout configured\n- API authentication on all PHI endpoints\n- Cross-facility data isolation verified\n\n## Examples\n\n### Example 1: Safe vs Unsafe Error Handling\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F BAD — leaks PHI in error\nthrow new Error(`Patient ${patient.name} not found in ${patient.facility}`);\n\n\u002F\u002F GOOD — generic error, details logged server-side with opaque IDs only\nlogger.error('Patient lookup failed', { recordId: patient.id, facilityId });\nthrow new Error('Record not found');\n```\n\n### Example 2: RLS Policy for Multi-Facility Isolation\n\n```sql\n-- Doctor at Facility A cannot see Facility B patients\nCREATE POLICY \"facility_isolation\"\n  ON patients FOR SELECT TO authenticated\n  USING (facility_id IN (\n    SELECT facility_id FROM staff_assignments WHERE user_id = auth.uid()\n  ));\n\n-- Test: login as doctor-facility-a, query facility-b patients\n-- Expected: 0 rows returned\n```\n\n### Example 3: Safe Logging\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F BAD — logs identifiable patient data\nconsole.log('Processing patient:', patient);\n\n\u002F\u002F GOOD — logs only opaque internal record ID\nconsole.log('Processing record:', patient.id);\n\u002F\u002F Note: even patient.id should be an opaque UUID, not a medical record number\n```\n",{"name":5,"origin":24,"version":25,"description":7},"Health1 Super Speciality Hospitals — contributed by Dr. Keyur Patel","1.0.0","main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fhealthcare-phi-compliance",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill healthcare-phi-compliance",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill healthcare-phi-compliance",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill healthcare-phi-compliance","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fhealthcare-phi-compliance\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[51,59,66,74,82,90],{"skillNo":52,"name":53,"nameZh":6,"description":54,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":55,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":56,"categories":57,"keywords":58,"publishedAt":19},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":19},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. 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Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":86,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":19},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":91,"name":92,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":93,"categories":94,"keywords":95,"publishedAt":19},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]