[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73BXMTC7XYE7P65AWY6WPQG":3,"skill-same:01M73BXMTC7XYE7P65AWY6WPQG":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M73BXMTC7XYE7P65AWY6WPQG","ios-security",null,"Harden iOS and macOS apps against the platform-specific failure modes. Covers Keychain accessibility tiers, App Transport Security, certificate pinning tradeoffs, file protection classes, biometric authentication, jailbreak detection as a signal rather than a defense, and third-party SDK review. Invoke when shipping a native app that holds credentials, before App Store submission, or after a mobile security advisory.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--ios-security\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: ios-security\ndescription: Harden iOS and macOS apps against the platform-specific failure modes. Covers Keychain accessibility tiers, App Transport Security, certificate pinning tradeoffs, file protection classes, biometric authentication, jailbreak detection as a signal rather than a defense, and third-party SDK review. Invoke when shipping a native app that holds credentials, before App Store submission, or after a mobile security advisory.\n---\n\n# iOS \u002F macOS App Security\n\niOS gives you sandboxing, code signing, and Keychain for free. The work is around them: storing the right thing in the right place, validating remote connections, and resisting the runtime tampering that happens once an app is in the hands of someone willing to jailbreak.\n\nThis skill is for native (Swift \u002F Objective-C \u002F SwiftUI) iOS and macOS apps. Cross-platform frameworks (React Native, Flutter) share most of the principles but have their own specifics.\n\n## When to invoke\n\n- Shipping a native iOS \u002F macOS app that holds credentials, tokens, or sensitive data\n- Before App Store submission (where some checks are enforced; others are not)\n- After a mobile-app security advisory affecting your stack\n- Reviewing a third-party SDK before integration\n- Investigating an in-the-wild abuse report on a mobile app\n\n## Keychain — use it, but understand the tiers\n\nKeychain is the right place for tokens, passwords, refresh tokens, and small secrets. It is not the right place for large data or files. Pick the right accessibility constant for each item.\n\n```swift\nimport Security\n\nlet token = \"...\"\nlet data = token.data(using: .utf8)!\n\nlet query: [String: Any] = [\n    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,\n    kSecAttrService as String: \"com.example.MyApp\",\n    kSecAttrAccount as String: \"auth_token\",\n    kSecValueData as String: data,\n    \u002F\u002F Choose the right accessibility:\n    kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly,\n]\n\nSecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)\nlet status = SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)\n```\n\nAccessibility constants — pick the strictest that works for your flow:\n\n| Constant | When the item is readable |\n|---|---|\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly` | Only while unlocked, never restored to another device. **Default for sensitive items.** |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly` | After first unlock since boot — useful for background tasks |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` | Only if user has a device passcode set — strongest |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked` | Same as above but restorable to another device via backup — avoid for tokens |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` | Deprecated — do not use |\n\nThe `ThisDeviceOnly` suffix prevents the item from being restored to a different device via iCloud backup. For auth tokens, you usually want this.\n\n## SecAccessControl — biometric or passcode gate per item\n\nFor high-value items, require the user to authenticate at access time:\n\n```swift\nlet access = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(\n    nil,\n    kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly,\n    [.biometryCurrentSet, .or, .devicePasscode],\n    nil\n)!\n\nlet query: [String: Any] = [\n    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,\n    kSecAttrService as String: \"com.example.MyApp\",\n    kSecAttrAccount as String: \"vault_master_key\",\n    kSecValueData as String: secretData,\n    kSecAttrAccessControl as String: access,\n]\n```\n\n`.biometryCurrentSet` invalidates the item if the user adds\u002Fremoves a biometric enrollment — closes the \"attacker enrolls their own fingerprint, then unlocks\" hole.\n\n## App Transport Security (ATS)\n\nATS forces HTTPS with TLS 1.2+. Defaults are good — keep them. **Do not** add `NSAllowsArbitraryLoads = true` to `Info.plist`. Per-domain exceptions exist (`NSExceptionDomains`) but each is a written-down compromise; document why and review periodically.\n\nFor domains you control, ATS-compatible TLS is table stakes: TLS 1.2+, modern ciphers, valid cert. ATS will reject your own backend if you ship a misconfigured server (which is a feature).\n\n## Certificate \u002F public-key pinning\n\nPinning hardcodes the expected server cert or public key into the app. Without pinning, an attacker with a fraudulent (CA-issued or device-installed) cert can MITM the app. With pinning, the app rejects anything not matching the pin.\n\n**Pros**: stops MITM via rogue CAs, stops corporate-proxy interception, stops user-installed root CAs.\n\n**Cons**: if your server cert expires or rotates and you didn't ship an update first, every pinned app version is bricked until users update. Pin rotation is operationally painful.\n\nPinning is high-leverage for banking, payments, identity, and similar. Lower-stakes apps often don't pin and that's a reasonable choice.\n\n```swift\n\u002F\u002F Sketch — URLSession delegate pinning to a public-key hash\nfunc urlSession(_ session: URLSession,\n                didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge,\n                completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void) {\n    guard challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodServerTrust,\n          let serverTrust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust else {\n        completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil); return\n    }\n\n    \u002F\u002F Pin to public-key SHA-256 of leaf or intermediate\n    if isPinned(serverTrust) {\n        completionHandler(.useCredential, URLCredential(trust: serverTrust))\n    } else {\n        completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Pin to the intermediate or to a primary+backup leaf key**, not a single leaf. Ship multiple pins so cert rotation is graceful. Have a \"kill pin\" remote-config switch to disable pinning in an emergency (with logging).\n\n## Data on disk — file protection\n\niOS encrypts disk at rest, but the encryption-key availability depends on the **Data Protection class** per file. For app-created files, set the class explicitly:\n\n```swift\nlet url = FileManager.default.urls(for: .documentDirectory, in: .userDomainMask)[0]\n    .appendingPathComponent(\"sensitive.json\")\n\nlet data: Data = ...\ntry data.write(to: url, options: [.atomic, .completeFileProtection])\n\u002F\u002F Equivalent to NSFileProtectionComplete — readable only when device is unlocked\n```\n\nProtection classes:\n\n- `.complete` (`NSFileProtectionComplete`) — readable only while device is unlocked. Default for new files in most app templates.\n- `.completeUnlessOpen` — file stays readable through a lock if open; otherwise like `.complete`\n- `.completeUntilFirstUserAuthentication` — readable after first unlock since boot (good for background tasks)\n- `.none` — readable as soon as the device boots — avoid for anything sensitive\n\nVerify by inspecting on a device — there is no compile-time check that you set the right class.\n\n## Jailbreak \u002F tampering detection — and its limits\n\nJailbreak detection exists, but on a determined adversary's device it can always be bypassed (Frida, Liberty Lite, dynamic-library injection). Use it as **signal**, not as **defense**:\n\n- Log the detection result with your telemetry (privacy-respectingly)\n- Adjust risk score on the server (require extra verification for sensitive ops from jailbroken devices)\n- Do NOT pretend the local check is a security boundary — sensitive logic stays server-side\n\nCommon heuristics (none individually conclusive):\n\n- Existence of paths like `\u002FApplications\u002FCydia.app`, `\u002Fprivate\u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fapt\u002F`, `\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fsshd`\n- Ability to fork or write outside the sandbox\n- Suspicious environment variables (`DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES`)\n- Modified entitlements \u002F unsigned binaries loaded\n- Suspicious symbolic links\n\nCombine 3+ checks and treat as a risk signal, not a binary verdict.\n\n## URL schemes and Universal Links\n\nCustom URL schemes (`myapp:\u002F\u002F`) are not authenticated — any app can claim them. **Use Universal Links** (`https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F...` opens your app) for security-relevant deep links.\n\nFor OAuth callbacks specifically, Apple recommends `ASWebAuthenticationSession` over custom URL schemes. It runs in an ephemeral, isolated browser context and the result is delivered only to the requesting app.\n\n## App Groups and shared containers\n\nIf you use App Groups to share data between your main app and extensions (Share, Widget, etc.), remember that **anything in the App Group is visible to every member of the group**. Don't share Keychain items more broadly than needed via `kSecAttrAccessGroup`.\n\nExtensions also have their own attack surface — they receive content from arbitrary apps (Share extension), so validate inputs and don't trust the metadata.\n\n## In-app purchases \u002F receipts\n\nValidate receipts server-side, not in the app. The local receipt format is well-known and forgeable on a jailbroken device. Apple provides the receipt validation endpoint specifically for backend use.\n\n## OTA update integrity (for non-App-Store distributions)\n\nFor TestFlight \u002F enterprise \u002F Mac apps shipped outside the App Store:\n\n- **Code-sign with a known certificate**, validate at first run\n- **Sparkle** (macOS) update mechanism — use the EdDSA signing flow; HTTP-only feeds are deprecated, use HTTPS + signatures\n- **Pin update server's TLS cert** if practical\n- **No \"auto-download and run\" from arbitrary URLs**\n\nApp Store and TestFlight handle this for you; for everything else, you build it.\n\n## Third-party SDK review\n\nEvery SDK you embed runs with the app's privileges. Before adopting:\n\n- **What permissions does it access?** Camera, location, contacts, photos — each requires user consent and listing in `Info.plist`\n- **What does it phone home about?** Analytics SDKs can leak surprising telemetry\n- **How is it updated?** Version pin or accept whatever CocoaPods \u002F SPM resolves\n- **Has it had advisories?** Search the SDK + \"vulnerability\"\n- **Does it use private APIs?** App Store rejection risk plus uncertain behavior across iOS versions\n\nSame threat model as a backend dependency — see [`dependency-supply-chain`](..\u002Fdependency-supply-chain\u002FSKILL.md).\n\n## Privacy disclosures (Info.plist + App Privacy)\n\niOS requires usage strings for each privacy-sensitive API. Wrong or missing strings cause rejections and confused users.\n\n```xml\n\u003Ckey>NSCameraUsageDescription\u003C\u002Fkey>\n\u003Cstring>This lets you scan QR codes for...\u003C\u002Fstring>\n\u003Ckey>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription\u003C\u002Fkey>\n\u003Cstring>We use location to show nearby...\u003C\u002Fstring>\n```\n\nPlus the App Store **Privacy \"Nutrition Label\"** must match what the app actually does. Lying here is App Store policy violation territory, plus a regulatory issue under GDPR if you serve EU users.\n\n## Audit checklist before App Store submission\n\n- [ ] Keychain items use `ThisDeviceOnly` accessibility constants\n- [ ] Sensitive Keychain items use `SecAccessControl` with biometric\u002Fpasscode gate\n- [ ] No `NSAllowsArbitraryLoads`; per-domain ATS exceptions documented\n- [ ] Cert\u002Fpublic-key pinning in place for sensitive flows (or documented decision not to)\n- [ ] Files written with `.completeFileProtection` where appropriate\n- [ ] No hardcoded API keys in the app bundle (search `strings YourApp.app\u002FYourApp`)\n- [ ] OAuth uses `ASWebAuthenticationSession`, not custom URL scheme handlers\n- [ ] In-app purchase receipts validated server-side\n- [ ] Universal Links used for security-relevant deep links\n- [ ] Third-party SDKs reviewed and version-pinned\n- [ ] Info.plist privacy strings present, accurate, and match Privacy Nutrition Label\n- [ ] Debug symbols stripped from release builds\n- [ ] App is signed with the correct provisioning profile (manual \u002F automatic)\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- Help bypass iOS code-signing, jailbreak detection, or sandboxing on devices you do not own\n- Recommend disabling ATS or trusting arbitrary certs in production\n- Provide tools or methods for tampering with apps from the App Store\n","# iOS \u002F macOS App Security\n\niOS gives you sandboxing, code signing, and Keychain for free. The work is around them: storing the right thing in the right place, validating remote connections, and resisting the runtime tampering that happens once an app is in the hands of someone willing to jailbreak.\n\nThis skill is for native (Swift \u002F Objective-C \u002F SwiftUI) iOS and macOS apps. Cross-platform frameworks (React Native, Flutter) share most of the principles but have their own specifics.\n\n## When to invoke\n\n- Shipping a native iOS \u002F macOS app that holds credentials, tokens, or sensitive data\n- Before App Store submission (where some checks are enforced; others are not)\n- After a mobile-app security advisory affecting your stack\n- Reviewing a third-party SDK before integration\n- Investigating an in-the-wild abuse report on a mobile app\n\n## Keychain — use it, but understand the tiers\n\nKeychain is the right place for tokens, passwords, refresh tokens, and small secrets. It is not the right place for large data or files. Pick the right accessibility constant for each item.\n\n```swift\nimport Security\n\nlet token = \"...\"\nlet data = token.data(using: .utf8)!\n\nlet query: [String: Any] = [\n    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,\n    kSecAttrService as String: \"com.example.MyApp\",\n    kSecAttrAccount as String: \"auth_token\",\n    kSecValueData as String: data,\n    \u002F\u002F Choose the right accessibility:\n    kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly,\n]\n\nSecItemDelete(query as CFDictionary)\nlet status = SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)\n```\n\nAccessibility constants — pick the strictest that works for your flow:\n\n| Constant | When the item is readable |\n|---|---|\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlockedThisDeviceOnly` | Only while unlocked, never restored to another device. **Default for sensitive items.** |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAfterFirstUnlockThisDeviceOnly` | After first unlock since boot — useful for background tasks |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly` | Only if user has a device passcode set — strongest |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked` | Same as above but restorable to another device via backup — avoid for tokens |\n| `kSecAttrAccessibleAlways` | Deprecated — do not use |\n\nThe `ThisDeviceOnly` suffix prevents the item from being restored to a different device via iCloud backup. For auth tokens, you usually want this.\n\n## SecAccessControl — biometric or passcode gate per item\n\nFor high-value items, require the user to authenticate at access time:\n\n```swift\nlet access = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(\n    nil,\n    kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly,\n    [.biometryCurrentSet, .or, .devicePasscode],\n    nil\n)!\n\nlet query: [String: Any] = [\n    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,\n    kSecAttrService as String: \"com.example.MyApp\",\n    kSecAttrAccount as String: \"vault_master_key\",\n    kSecValueData as String: secretData,\n    kSecAttrAccessControl as String: access,\n]\n```\n\n`.biometryCurrentSet` invalidates the item if the user adds\u002Fremoves a biometric enrollment — closes the \"attacker enrolls their own fingerprint, then unlocks\" hole.\n\n## App Transport Security (ATS)\n\nATS forces HTTPS with TLS 1.2+. Defaults are good — keep them. **Do not** add `NSAllowsArbitraryLoads = true` to `Info.plist`. Per-domain exceptions exist (`NSExceptionDomains`) but each is a written-down compromise; document why and review periodically.\n\nFor domains you control, ATS-compatible TLS is table stakes: TLS 1.2+, modern ciphers, valid cert. ATS will reject your own backend if you ship a misconfigured server (which is a feature).\n\n## Certificate \u002F public-key pinning\n\nPinning hardcodes the expected server cert or public key into the app. Without pinning, an attacker with a fraudulent (CA-issued or device-installed) cert can MITM the app. With pinning, the app rejects anything not matching the pin.\n\n**Pros**: stops MITM via rogue CAs, stops corporate-proxy interception, stops user-installed root CAs.\n\n**Cons**: if your server cert expires or rotates and you didn't ship an update first, every pinned app version is bricked until users update. Pin rotation is operationally painful.\n\nPinning is high-leverage for banking, payments, identity, and similar. Lower-stakes apps often don't pin and that's a reasonable choice.\n\n```swift\n\u002F\u002F Sketch — URLSession delegate pinning to a public-key hash\nfunc urlSession(_ session: URLSession,\n                didReceive challenge: URLAuthenticationChallenge,\n                completionHandler: @escaping (URLSession.AuthChallengeDisposition, URLCredential?) -> Void) {\n    guard challenge.protectionSpace.authenticationMethod == NSURLAuthenticationMethodServerTrust,\n          let serverTrust = challenge.protectionSpace.serverTrust else {\n        completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil); return\n    }\n\n    \u002F\u002F Pin to public-key SHA-256 of leaf or intermediate\n    if isPinned(serverTrust) {\n        completionHandler(.useCredential, URLCredential(trust: serverTrust))\n    } else {\n        completionHandler(.cancelAuthenticationChallenge, nil)\n    }\n}\n```\n\n**Pin to the intermediate or to a primary+backup leaf key**, not a single leaf. Ship multiple pins so cert rotation is graceful. Have a \"kill pin\" remote-config switch to disable pinning in an emergency (with logging).\n\n## Data on disk — file protection\n\niOS encrypts disk at rest, but the encryption-key availability depends on the **Data Protection class** per file. For app-created files, set the class explicitly:\n\n```swift\nlet url = FileManager.default.urls(for: .documentDirectory, in: .userDomainMask)[0]\n    .appendingPathComponent(\"sensitive.json\")\n\nlet data: Data = ...\ntry data.write(to: url, options: [.atomic, .completeFileProtection])\n\u002F\u002F Equivalent to NSFileProtectionComplete — readable only when device is unlocked\n```\n\nProtection classes:\n\n- `.complete` (`NSFileProtectionComplete`) — readable only while device is unlocked. Default for new files in most app templates.\n- `.completeUnlessOpen` — file stays readable through a lock if open; otherwise like `.complete`\n- `.completeUntilFirstUserAuthentication` — readable after first unlock since boot (good for background tasks)\n- `.none` — readable as soon as the device boots — avoid for anything sensitive\n\nVerify by inspecting on a device — there is no compile-time check that you set the right class.\n\n## Jailbreak \u002F tampering detection — and its limits\n\nJailbreak detection exists, but on a determined adversary's device it can always be bypassed (Frida, Liberty Lite, dynamic-library injection). Use it as **signal**, not as **defense**:\n\n- Log the detection result with your telemetry (privacy-respectingly)\n- Adjust risk score on the server (require extra verification for sensitive ops from jailbroken devices)\n- Do NOT pretend the local check is a security boundary — sensitive logic stays server-side\n\nCommon heuristics (none individually conclusive):\n\n- Existence of paths like `\u002FApplications\u002FCydia.app`, `\u002Fprivate\u002Fvar\u002Flib\u002Fapt\u002F`, `\u002Fusr\u002Fsbin\u002Fsshd`\n- Ability to fork or write outside the sandbox\n- Suspicious environment variables (`DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES`)\n- Modified entitlements \u002F unsigned binaries loaded\n- Suspicious symbolic links\n\nCombine 3+ checks and treat as a risk signal, not a binary verdict.\n\n## URL schemes and Universal Links\n\nCustom URL schemes (`myapp:\u002F\u002F`) are not authenticated — any app can claim them. **Use Universal Links** (`https:\u002F\u002Fexample.com\u002F...` opens your app) for security-relevant deep links.\n\nFor OAuth callbacks specifically, Apple recommends `ASWebAuthenticationSession` over custom URL schemes. It runs in an ephemeral, isolated browser context and the result is delivered only to the requesting app.\n\n## App Groups and shared containers\n\nIf you use App Groups to share data between your main app and extensions (Share, Widget, etc.), remember that **anything in the App Group is visible to every member of the group**. Don't share Keychain items more broadly than needed via `kSecAttrAccessGroup`.\n\nExtensions also have their own attack surface — they receive content from arbitrary apps (Share extension), so validate inputs and don't trust the metadata.\n\n## In-app purchases \u002F receipts\n\nValidate receipts server-side, not in the app. The local receipt format is well-known and forgeable on a jailbroken device. Apple provides the receipt validation endpoint specifically for backend use.\n\n## OTA update integrity (for non-App-Store distributions)\n\nFor TestFlight \u002F enterprise \u002F Mac apps shipped outside the App Store:\n\n- **Code-sign with a known certificate**, validate at first run\n- **Sparkle** (macOS) update mechanism — use the EdDSA signing flow; HTTP-only feeds are deprecated, use HTTPS + signatures\n- **Pin update server's TLS cert** if practical\n- **No \"auto-download and run\" from arbitrary URLs**\n\nApp Store and TestFlight handle this for you; for everything else, you build it.\n\n## Third-party SDK review\n\nEvery SDK you embed runs with the app's privileges. Before adopting:\n\n- **What permissions does it access?** Camera, location, contacts, photos — each requires user consent and listing in `Info.plist`\n- **What does it phone home about?** Analytics SDKs can leak surprising telemetry\n- **How is it updated?** Version pin or accept whatever CocoaPods \u002F SPM resolves\n- **Has it had advisories?** Search the SDK + \"vulnerability\"\n- **Does it use private APIs?** App Store rejection risk plus uncertain behavior across iOS versions\n\nSame threat model as a backend dependency — see [`dependency-supply-chain`](..\u002Fdependency-supply-chain\u002FSKILL.md).\n\n## Privacy disclosures (Info.plist + App Privacy)\n\niOS requires usage strings for each privacy-sensitive API. Wrong or missing strings cause rejections and confused users.\n\n```xml\n\u003Ckey>NSCameraUsageDescription\u003C\u002Fkey>\n\u003Cstring>This lets you scan QR codes for...\u003C\u002Fstring>\n\u003Ckey>NSLocationWhenInUseUsageDescription\u003C\u002Fkey>\n\u003Cstring>We use location to show nearby...\u003C\u002Fstring>\n```\n\nPlus the App Store **Privacy \"Nutrition Label\"** must match what the app actually does. Lying here is App Store policy violation territory, plus a regulatory issue under GDPR if you serve EU users.\n\n## Audit checklist before App Store submission\n\n- [ ] Keychain items use `ThisDeviceOnly` accessibility constants\n- [ ] Sensitive Keychain items use `SecAccessControl` with biometric\u002Fpasscode gate\n- [ ] No `NSAllowsArbitraryLoads`; per-domain ATS exceptions documented\n- [ ] Cert\u002Fpublic-key pinning in place for sensitive flows (or documented decision not to)\n- [ ] Files written with `.completeFileProtection` where appropriate\n- [ ] No hardcoded API keys in the app bundle (search `strings YourApp.app\u002FYourApp`)\n- [ ] OAuth uses `ASWebAuthenticationSession`, not custom URL scheme handlers\n- [ ] In-app purchase receipts validated server-side\n- [ ] Universal Links used for security-relevant deep links\n- [ ] Third-party SDKs reviewed and version-pinned\n- [ ] Info.plist privacy strings present, accurate, and match Privacy Nutrition Label\n- [ ] Debug symbols stripped from release builds\n- [ ] App is signed with the correct provisioning profile (manual \u002F automatic)\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- Help bypass iOS code-signing, jailbreak detection, or sandboxing on devices you do not own\n- Recommend disabling ATS or trusting arbitrary certs in production\n- Provide tools or methods for tampering with apps from the App Store\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--ios-security",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill ios-security",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill ios-security",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill ios-security","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--ios-security\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,64,72,80,88],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":53,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":68,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":76,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":19},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]