[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73BXFZ0STZ8R7P4DW0GV0AX":3,"skill-same:01M73BXFZ0STZ8R7P4DW0GV0AX":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M73BXFZ0STZ8R7P4DW0GV0AX","incident-response",null,"Run a structured response to a suspected web or server compromise. Follows SANS PICERL — Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, Lessons Learned — and includes a post-mortem template. Invoke when a site is defaced, when malware or webshells appear, when admin accounts arrive unannounced, or when a provider sends an abuse notice.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--incident-response\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: incident-response\ndescription: Run a structured response to a suspected web or server compromise. Follows SANS PICERL — Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, Lessons Learned — and includes a post-mortem template. Invoke when a site is defaced, when malware or webshells appear, when admin accounts arrive unannounced, or when a provider sends an abuse notice.\n---\n\n# Incident Response\n\nA practical IR runbook for small teams and solo operators. Built around the SANS PICERL phases: **Preparation → Identification → Containment → Eradication → Recovery → Lessons Learned**.\n\n## When to invoke\n\nYou are in incident territory if any of these are true:\n\n- A site you operate is defaced, redirecting, or serving content you did not publish\n- A webshell or backdoor file has been found\n- An admin\u002Froot account appeared that nobody on the team created\n- A hosting provider, registrar, or upstream sent an abuse notice\n- A credential you control turned up in a public dump\n- Traffic is being dropped from your IP by major email\u002FDNS providers (sign of being on a blocklist)\n\nIf you only **suspect** something is wrong, treat it as a real incident until you have evidence otherwise. False positives are cheap; missed compromises are expensive.\n\n## Phase 1 — Preparation (before anything happens)\n\nHave these ready before the first incident:\n\n- **Out-of-band contact channel** (Signal\u002FTelegram\u002Fphone) — your primary work tool may itself be compromised\n- **Backup of last-known-good** for every production system, verified restorable\n- **Inventory** of who has access to what (hosting, DNS, registrar, repo, secrets store)\n- **A pre-written holding statement** for customers (\"we are investigating an issue affecting X, more soon\")\n- **A way to reach your registrar fast** — domain hijacks are catastrophic and the registrar is often slowest in real time\n\n## Phase 2 — Identification\n\nGoal: confirm a real incident and scope it.\n\n```bash\n# Webserver: who is hitting unusual paths?\nsudo tail -n 10000 \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fnginx\u002Faccess.log | awk '{print $7}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -30\n\n# Auth log: failed + successful root\u002FSSH activity\nsudo grep -E 'Failed password|Accepted' \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fauth.log | tail -100\n\n# Currently logged-in users + open sessions\nwho -a\nlast -n 30\n\n# Listening processes — anything new?\nsudo ss -tlnp\n\n# Crontabs at every level\nfor u in $(cut -d: -f1 \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd); do sudo crontab -u \"$u\" -l 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | sed \"s|^|[$u] |\"; done\nsudo ls -la \u002Fetc\u002Fcron.* \u002Fvar\u002Fspool\u002Fcron\u002F\n\n# Recently modified files in sensitive trees\nsudo find \u002Fvar\u002Fwww \u002Fetc \u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin -mtime -30 -type f 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\nDocument everything you find as you find it. Timestamps in UTC. Append-only — never edit prior entries.\n\n## Phase 3 — Containment\n\nThe aim is to stop the bleeding **without destroying evidence**. Do not just delete malicious files immediately; snapshot first.\n\n### Short-term containment\n\n1. **Snapshot** the affected filesystem (`tar`, hosting-panel snapshot, VM snapshot) and the database. Store off-host.\n2. **Pull the site off the internet** at the cheapest layer that works:\n   - Cloudflare proxy → site-wide maintenance page (rule)\n   - Webserver → return 503 from the vhost\n   - Last resort → stop the service\n3. **Rotate the credentials you know are exposed** — keep a list of every credential you rotate, when, and by whom.\n4. **Revoke active sessions** on admin panels and force re-login.\n5. **Block known-bad IPs** at the edge if you have a clear indicator.\n\n### Long-term containment (hours\u002Fdays)\n\n- Move the service to a clean host before recovery if root cause is unclear\n- Add WAF rules \u002F CDN rules for the attack pattern\n- If lateral movement is plausible (shared hosting, shared SSH keys, shared CI), assume every adjacent system is at risk and apply the same containment there\n\n## Phase 4 — Eradication\n\nYou cannot eradicate what you have not understood. Before you wipe and reinstall, answer:\n\n- **Entry vector** — how did the attacker get in?\n- **Foothold** — what did they install (webshell, cron, systemd unit, modified binary, DB-resident backdoor)?\n- **Persistence** — would a reboot or a file-restore alone evict them?\n- **Lateral movement** — did they reach other systems?\n\nOnly then:\n\n1. Rebuild from known-good (golden image, fresh OS install, fresh CMS install).\n2. Restore data from a backup taken **before** the foothold timestamp. If you cannot determine when the foothold was placed, treat all backups as suspect and restore data selectively (export rows, not full dumps).\n3. Patch the entry vector specifically. If you do not know the vector, you have not finished investigating.\n4. Re-issue all secrets that touched the compromised system.\n\n## Phase 5 — Recovery\n\n1. Bring the service back up in a staged way — internal first, then a small percentage of traffic, then full.\n2. Watch the logs you set up in Phase 2 for repeat indicators.\n3. Keep elevated monitoring for at least 30 days. Attackers often return.\n4. Notify users if their data may have been exposed. Be honest about what you know and do not know. In most jurisdictions personal-data breaches have legal notification deadlines (e.g. 72 hours under GDPR Art. 33) — check your jurisdiction.\n\n## Phase 6 — Lessons learned\n\nWrite the post-mortem within a week, while the details are fresh. Structure:\n\n```\n# Post-Mortem — \u003Cincident name> — \u003Cdate>\n\n## Summary\nOne paragraph: what happened, impact, current state.\n\n## Timeline (UTC)\n- 2026-MM-DD HH:MM — first indicator observed\n- 2026-MM-DD HH:MM — confirmed incident, containment started\n- ...\n\n## Impact\n- Systems affected\n- Data potentially exposed\n- Users notified, regulators notified, etc.\n\n## Root cause\nThe single technical reason this was possible. Be specific.\n\n## Contributing factors\nProcess \u002F monitoring \u002F staffing gaps that let it reach production or stay undetected.\n\n## What worked\nThings to keep doing.\n\n## Action items\nEach with an owner and a due date. Track them somewhere durable (issue tracker).\n\n## Indicators of compromise (IOCs)\nFile hashes, IPs, user-agents, domain names. Keep these — they are useful for next time.\n```\n\nThe post-mortem is for learning, not blame. Name what failed; do not name who failed.\n\n## A note on legality and ethics\n\n- Only run this against systems you own or have explicit written authorization for.\n- Notify affected users where required by law and where it is the right thing to do regardless.\n- Do not \"hack back\" — it is illegal in most jurisdictions and unhelpful in all of them.\n- Preserve evidence in a way that would stand up if law enforcement gets involved.\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- It will not help you cover up a breach or delay required notifications.\n- It will not perform offensive actions against any system, including ones attacking you.\n- It is not a substitute for a qualified IR firm for serious incidents. Know your limits and call for help.\n","# Incident Response\n\nA practical IR runbook for small teams and solo operators. Built around the SANS PICERL phases: **Preparation → Identification → Containment → Eradication → Recovery → Lessons Learned**.\n\n## When to invoke\n\nYou are in incident territory if any of these are true:\n\n- A site you operate is defaced, redirecting, or serving content you did not publish\n- A webshell or backdoor file has been found\n- An admin\u002Froot account appeared that nobody on the team created\n- A hosting provider, registrar, or upstream sent an abuse notice\n- A credential you control turned up in a public dump\n- Traffic is being dropped from your IP by major email\u002FDNS providers (sign of being on a blocklist)\n\nIf you only **suspect** something is wrong, treat it as a real incident until you have evidence otherwise. False positives are cheap; missed compromises are expensive.\n\n## Phase 1 — Preparation (before anything happens)\n\nHave these ready before the first incident:\n\n- **Out-of-band contact channel** (Signal\u002FTelegram\u002Fphone) — your primary work tool may itself be compromised\n- **Backup of last-known-good** for every production system, verified restorable\n- **Inventory** of who has access to what (hosting, DNS, registrar, repo, secrets store)\n- **A pre-written holding statement** for customers (\"we are investigating an issue affecting X, more soon\")\n- **A way to reach your registrar fast** — domain hijacks are catastrophic and the registrar is often slowest in real time\n\n## Phase 2 — Identification\n\nGoal: confirm a real incident and scope it.\n\n```bash\n# Webserver: who is hitting unusual paths?\nsudo tail -n 10000 \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fnginx\u002Faccess.log | awk '{print $7}' | sort | uniq -c | sort -rn | head -30\n\n# Auth log: failed + successful root\u002FSSH activity\nsudo grep -E 'Failed password|Accepted' \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fauth.log | tail -100\n\n# Currently logged-in users + open sessions\nwho -a\nlast -n 30\n\n# Listening processes — anything new?\nsudo ss -tlnp\n\n# Crontabs at every level\nfor u in $(cut -d: -f1 \u002Fetc\u002Fpasswd); do sudo crontab -u \"$u\" -l 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull | sed \"s|^|[$u] |\"; done\nsudo ls -la \u002Fetc\u002Fcron.* \u002Fvar\u002Fspool\u002Fcron\u002F\n\n# Recently modified files in sensitive trees\nsudo find \u002Fvar\u002Fwww \u002Fetc \u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin -mtime -30 -type f 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\nDocument everything you find as you find it. Timestamps in UTC. Append-only — never edit prior entries.\n\n## Phase 3 — Containment\n\nThe aim is to stop the bleeding **without destroying evidence**. Do not just delete malicious files immediately; snapshot first.\n\n### Short-term containment\n\n1. **Snapshot** the affected filesystem (`tar`, hosting-panel snapshot, VM snapshot) and the database. Store off-host.\n2. **Pull the site off the internet** at the cheapest layer that works:\n   - Cloudflare proxy → site-wide maintenance page (rule)\n   - Webserver → return 503 from the vhost\n   - Last resort → stop the service\n3. **Rotate the credentials you know are exposed** — keep a list of every credential you rotate, when, and by whom.\n4. **Revoke active sessions** on admin panels and force re-login.\n5. **Block known-bad IPs** at the edge if you have a clear indicator.\n\n### Long-term containment (hours\u002Fdays)\n\n- Move the service to a clean host before recovery if root cause is unclear\n- Add WAF rules \u002F CDN rules for the attack pattern\n- If lateral movement is plausible (shared hosting, shared SSH keys, shared CI), assume every adjacent system is at risk and apply the same containment there\n\n## Phase 4 — Eradication\n\nYou cannot eradicate what you have not understood. Before you wipe and reinstall, answer:\n\n- **Entry vector** — how did the attacker get in?\n- **Foothold** — what did they install (webshell, cron, systemd unit, modified binary, DB-resident backdoor)?\n- **Persistence** — would a reboot or a file-restore alone evict them?\n- **Lateral movement** — did they reach other systems?\n\nOnly then:\n\n1. Rebuild from known-good (golden image, fresh OS install, fresh CMS install).\n2. Restore data from a backup taken **before** the foothold timestamp. If you cannot determine when the foothold was placed, treat all backups as suspect and restore data selectively (export rows, not full dumps).\n3. Patch the entry vector specifically. If you do not know the vector, you have not finished investigating.\n4. Re-issue all secrets that touched the compromised system.\n\n## Phase 5 — Recovery\n\n1. Bring the service back up in a staged way — internal first, then a small percentage of traffic, then full.\n2. Watch the logs you set up in Phase 2 for repeat indicators.\n3. Keep elevated monitoring for at least 30 days. Attackers often return.\n4. Notify users if their data may have been exposed. Be honest about what you know and do not know. In most jurisdictions personal-data breaches have legal notification deadlines (e.g. 72 hours under GDPR Art. 33) — check your jurisdiction.\n\n## Phase 6 — Lessons learned\n\nWrite the post-mortem within a week, while the details are fresh. Structure:\n\n```\n# Post-Mortem — \u003Cincident name> — \u003Cdate>\n\n## Summary\nOne paragraph: what happened, impact, current state.\n\n## Timeline (UTC)\n- 2026-MM-DD HH:MM — first indicator observed\n- 2026-MM-DD HH:MM — confirmed incident, containment started\n- ...\n\n## Impact\n- Systems affected\n- Data potentially exposed\n- Users notified, regulators notified, etc.\n\n## Root cause\nThe single technical reason this was possible. Be specific.\n\n## Contributing factors\nProcess \u002F monitoring \u002F staffing gaps that let it reach production or stay undetected.\n\n## What worked\nThings to keep doing.\n\n## Action items\nEach with an owner and a due date. Track them somewhere durable (issue tracker).\n\n## Indicators of compromise (IOCs)\nFile hashes, IPs, user-agents, domain names. Keep these — they are useful for next time.\n```\n\nThe post-mortem is for learning, not blame. Name what failed; do not name who failed.\n\n## A note on legality and ethics\n\n- Only run this against systems you own or have explicit written authorization for.\n- Notify affected users where required by law and where it is the right thing to do regardless.\n- Do not \"hack back\" — it is illegal in most jurisdictions and unhelpful in all of them.\n- Preserve evidence in a way that would stand up if law enforcement gets involved.\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- It will not help you cover up a breach or delay required notifications.\n- It will not perform offensive actions against any system, including ones attacking you.\n- It is not a substitute for a qualified IR firm for serious incidents. Know your limits and call for help.\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--incident-response",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill incident-response",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill incident-response",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill incident-response","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--incident-response\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,64,72,80,88],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":53,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":68,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":76,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":19},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]