[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73BWCB5S95ZMBG477G9BNCR":3,"skill-same:01M73BWCB5S95ZMBG477G9BNCR":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M73BWCB5S95ZMBG477G9BNCR","dependency-supply-chain",null,"Audit and defend against malicious dependencies in npm, pnpm, PyPI, and similar ecosystems. Covers lockfile hygiene, the limits of npm audit, behavior-level scanning with socket.dev, postinstall script review, typosquat and slopsquat detection, and minimum-permission CI runs. Invoke when adding a new dependency, after a supply-chain incident, or as periodic audit.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--dependency-supply-chain\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: dependency-supply-chain\ndescription: Audit and defend against malicious dependencies in npm, pnpm, PyPI, and similar ecosystems. Covers lockfile hygiene, the limits of npm audit, behavior-level scanning with socket.dev, postinstall script review, typosquat and slopsquat detection, and minimum-permission CI runs. Invoke when adding a new dependency, after a supply-chain incident, or as periodic audit.\n---\n\n# Dependency \u002F Supply-Chain Security\n\nThe supply chain is the part of your stack you trust by default and rarely review. npm, PyPI, RubyGems, Maven, Go modules — they have all hosted malicious packages, typosquats, and compromised maintainer accounts at scale.\n\nThis skill is the working developer's defense — pragmatic checks that fit in a normal workflow, not a software bill-of-materials regulatory program.\n\n## When to invoke\n\n- Adding a new dependency to a project (especially a small \u002F new \u002F single-maintainer one)\n- After a publicized supply-chain incident affecting your ecosystem\n- Quarterly audit of `package.json` \u002F `requirements.txt` \u002F `go.mod`\n- Inheriting a project with a large `node_modules` and no obvious hygiene\n- CI\u002FCD just leaked a secret — start here to find which dep grabbed it\n\n## The threat model\n\nWhat can a malicious dependency actually do?\n\n- **Read environment variables \u002F files during install** (postinstall script)\n- **Read environment variables \u002F files at runtime** (any code path)\n- **Exfiltrate via outbound HTTPS** to any host\n- **Modify other dependencies** (link-stage tampering, build-script monkey-patching)\n- **Hide payloads in transitive deps** so your `package.json` looks clean\n\nYou cannot inspect every line of every dependency. You can raise the cost of attacks and detect them when they happen.\n\n## Lockfile hygiene\n\nA lockfile is the only thing standing between \"I added one dep\" and \"my install grabbed 1,200 transitive deps any of which can be swapped tomorrow\".\n\n- **Commit the lockfile.** Always: `package-lock.json`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, `yarn.lock`, `poetry.lock`, `Pipfile.lock`, `go.sum`. No exceptions.\n- **`npm ci` (or `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`) in CI**, not `npm install`. `install` can mutate the lockfile silently; `ci` errors if the lockfile and `package.json` disagree.\n- **Lockfile drift alerts.** A PR that touches `package-lock.json` but not `package.json`, or vice versa, deserves a review comment. Add a CI check.\n- **Pin direct dependencies tightly** when the dep is small \u002F new \u002F sketchy. `\"left-pad\": \"1.3.0\"` rather than `\"left-pad\": \"^1.3.0\"`. The caret invites unattended updates.\n\nFor high-stakes apps consider `npm install --omit=dev` in production builds — dev deps are a huge attack surface that production runtime does not need.\n\n## Built-in audit — useful, limited\n\n```bash\nnpm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high\npnpm audit --audit-level=high\nyarn npm audit\npip-audit\n```\n\nWhat `npm audit` does well:\n\n- Catches known CVEs against installed versions\n- Fast, no extra tooling\n- Good signal-to-noise at `--audit-level=high` or `critical`\n\nWhat it misses:\n\n- **Malicious-by-design** packages (the package is doing what it's \"supposed to do\", which happens to be evil)\n- **Unreported issues** — many compromised packages are not in any CVE feed\n- **Behavior-level analysis** — `audit` doesn't know that this package suddenly started making outbound HTTPS calls\n\nTreat `npm audit` as the first line of defense, not the only one.\n\n## Behavior-level scanning\n\nTools that look at *what a package does*, not just *which CVE it has*:\n\n- **socket.dev** — flags new packages, packages that gained network\u002Finstall-script behavior, typosquat-shaped names. GitHub integration that comments on PRs. Free tier covers most personal use.\n- **deps.dev** (Google) — package metadata, transitive graph, advisory feed\n- **OSV-Scanner** — open-source scanner against the OSV database, broader than npm audit\n- **Snyk \u002F GitHub Dependabot security alerts** — overlap with audit but include curated advisories\n\nA reasonable stack: GitHub Dependabot (free, native) + socket.dev (free, behavior-aware) + `npm audit` in CI.\n\n## Reviewing a new dependency before `npm install`\n\nWhen adding a new dep, especially a small or unfamiliar one, take 60 seconds first.\n\n```bash\n# What is this package, who maintains it, what's the install footprint?\nnpm view \u003Cpkg>\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> dependencies         # transitive count\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> repository.url        # is there a public repo?\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> maintainers           # who can publish a new version?\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> time                  # when was each version published?\n\n# How popular is it? (huge install counts don't prove safety, but obscure single-digit downloads warrant scrutiny)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.npmjs.org\u002Fdownloads\u002Fpoint\u002Flast-week\u002F\u003Cpkg>\" | jq\n\n# Red flags in the publish history\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> time --json | jq 'to_entries | sort_by(.value) | reverse | .[0:5]'\n```\n\nRed flags:\n\n- **Single maintainer with no other notable packages** + the package handles auth\u002Fcrypto\u002Fpayments\n- **Recently transferred ownership** (new maintainer's other packages look unrelated)\n- **Sudden version jump** with a vague changelog (`\"bug fixes\"` and a 1k-line diff)\n- **No public repo**, no homepage, no README\n- **Typosquat-shaped name** — `lodash-utils` vs `lodash`, `colors-js` vs `colors`\n- **Postinstall script** (see next section)\n- **Network calls during install** (you can sandbox install to detect — see CI section)\n\n## Postinstall scripts\n\n`postinstall`, `preinstall`, `install`, `prepare` scripts run on `npm install`. They are the most common malware delivery vector.\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate every package with an install-time script\nfind node_modules -name package.json -not -path '*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*' \\\n  -exec grep -l '\"postinstall\"\\|\"preinstall\"\\|\"prepare\"' {} \\; \\\n  | xargs -I {} dirname {} | sed 's|node_modules\u002F||'\n\n# Block ALL install scripts globally — most packages do not need them\nnpm config set ignore-scripts true\n# Or per-install\nnpm install --ignore-scripts\n```\n\n`--ignore-scripts` breaks some legitimate native-module builds (`node-sass`, `sharp`, `better-sqlite3`). Allow scripts only for the specific packages that need them — yarn 2+ and pnpm have allowlists.\n\nIn `pnpm`:\n\n```yaml\n# .npmrc\nignore-scripts=true\n\n# package.json\n\"pnpm\": {\n  \"onlyBuiltDependencies\": [\"sharp\", \"better-sqlite3\"]\n}\n```\n\n## Typosquat detection\n\nCommon substitutions: `i` ↔ `l` ↔ `1`, `0` ↔ `o`, missing\u002Fextra dashes, plural\u002Fsingular. Run:\n\n```bash\n# Cheap typosquat heuristic — flag packages with very similar names to well-known ones\nnpm ls --depth=0 --json | jq -r '.dependencies | keys[]' | while read p; do\n  echo \"$p\"  # human review or feed to socket.dev\ndone\n```\n\nsocket.dev \u002F npq do this systematically; for a manual pass, just eyeball your direct deps with `cat package.json | jq '.dependencies | keys'`.\n\n## CI \u002F build sandbox\n\nDon't let your install run with prod credentials sitting in env.\n\n```yaml\n# GitHub Actions\n- name: Install dependencies\n  run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n  env: {}                 # no env vars passed in\n# Then run the few allowed install scripts intentionally\n- name: Run build scripts for native deps\n  run: npm rebuild sharp better-sqlite3\n```\n\nSee [`github-actions-security`](..\u002Fgithub-actions-security\u002FSKILL.md) for the broader CI story (pinned action SHAs, OIDC, secret scoping).\n\n## Audit `node_modules` for an inherited project\n\n```bash\n# How many packages did this single npm install actually install?\nfind node_modules -name package.json -not -path '*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*' | wc -l\n\n# Largest packages — these are where you'd hide a payload\ndu -sh node_modules\u002F*\u002F  | sort -h | tail -20\n\n# Packages with install scripts (as above)\n\n# Packages with .bin executables\nfind node_modules\u002F.bin -type l -o -type f | head -30\n```\n\nCross-check against `package.json` direct deps. Anything in `node_modules` you cannot trace back to a direct or expected-transitive dep is worth investigating.\n\n## What to do when a dependency is compromised\n\nYou wake up to \"package X version 2.4.5 was compromised, contains a credential stealer\".\n\n1. **Determine if you shipped it.**\n   ```bash\n   # Did you have it installed at the bad version?\n   git log --all -p -- package-lock.json | grep -A2 -B2 'package-x.*2\\.4\\.5'\n   ```\n2. **Assume credentials accessed during install\u002Frun are burned.** That includes `.env` files readable by the user that ran `npm install`, plus anything in process env at runtime.\n3. **Rotate every credential that was in scope.** Order per [`secret-hygiene`](..\u002Fsecret-hygiene\u002FSKILL.md).\n4. **Pin to a known-clean version**, or remove the package entirely if no clean version exists.\n5. **Audit `package-lock.json` for the transitive surface** — the compromised package may be a transitive dep you didn't add directly.\n6. **Check CI logs** for unexplained outbound traffic during recent builds.\n7. **Add the package + version range to a permanent denylist** in your CI (whatever scanner you use) so you don't accidentally re-add it.\n\n## Periodic audit checklist\n\nOnce a quarter:\n\n- [ ] Lockfile present and committed for every project\n- [ ] CI uses `npm ci` \u002F `--frozen-lockfile`, not loose install\n- [ ] Dependabot (or equivalent) enabled, PRs reviewed not auto-merged for major versions\n- [ ] `npm audit --audit-level=high` passes; exceptions documented\n- [ ] socket.dev or equivalent reviews new dependency PRs\n- [ ] Install scripts allowlisted; defaults to ignore\n- [ ] No env vars passed to `npm ci` step in CI\n- [ ] Direct dependencies you don't recognize have been investigated\n- [ ] A known-vulnerable package list is maintained for the project's ecosystem\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- Replace a formal Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) program for regulated environments\n- Provide payloads or attack patterns to publish malicious packages\n- Recommend installing packages without lockfiles \"for now\"\n","# Dependency \u002F Supply-Chain Security\n\nThe supply chain is the part of your stack you trust by default and rarely review. npm, PyPI, RubyGems, Maven, Go modules — they have all hosted malicious packages, typosquats, and compromised maintainer accounts at scale.\n\nThis skill is the working developer's defense — pragmatic checks that fit in a normal workflow, not a software bill-of-materials regulatory program.\n\n## When to invoke\n\n- Adding a new dependency to a project (especially a small \u002F new \u002F single-maintainer one)\n- After a publicized supply-chain incident affecting your ecosystem\n- Quarterly audit of `package.json` \u002F `requirements.txt` \u002F `go.mod`\n- Inheriting a project with a large `node_modules` and no obvious hygiene\n- CI\u002FCD just leaked a secret — start here to find which dep grabbed it\n\n## The threat model\n\nWhat can a malicious dependency actually do?\n\n- **Read environment variables \u002F files during install** (postinstall script)\n- **Read environment variables \u002F files at runtime** (any code path)\n- **Exfiltrate via outbound HTTPS** to any host\n- **Modify other dependencies** (link-stage tampering, build-script monkey-patching)\n- **Hide payloads in transitive deps** so your `package.json` looks clean\n\nYou cannot inspect every line of every dependency. You can raise the cost of attacks and detect them when they happen.\n\n## Lockfile hygiene\n\nA lockfile is the only thing standing between \"I added one dep\" and \"my install grabbed 1,200 transitive deps any of which can be swapped tomorrow\".\n\n- **Commit the lockfile.** Always: `package-lock.json`, `pnpm-lock.yaml`, `yarn.lock`, `poetry.lock`, `Pipfile.lock`, `go.sum`. No exceptions.\n- **`npm ci` (or `pnpm install --frozen-lockfile`) in CI**, not `npm install`. `install` can mutate the lockfile silently; `ci` errors if the lockfile and `package.json` disagree.\n- **Lockfile drift alerts.** A PR that touches `package-lock.json` but not `package.json`, or vice versa, deserves a review comment. Add a CI check.\n- **Pin direct dependencies tightly** when the dep is small \u002F new \u002F sketchy. `\"left-pad\": \"1.3.0\"` rather than `\"left-pad\": \"^1.3.0\"`. The caret invites unattended updates.\n\nFor high-stakes apps consider `npm install --omit=dev` in production builds — dev deps are a huge attack surface that production runtime does not need.\n\n## Built-in audit — useful, limited\n\n```bash\nnpm audit --omit=dev --audit-level=high\npnpm audit --audit-level=high\nyarn npm audit\npip-audit\n```\n\nWhat `npm audit` does well:\n\n- Catches known CVEs against installed versions\n- Fast, no extra tooling\n- Good signal-to-noise at `--audit-level=high` or `critical`\n\nWhat it misses:\n\n- **Malicious-by-design** packages (the package is doing what it's \"supposed to do\", which happens to be evil)\n- **Unreported issues** — many compromised packages are not in any CVE feed\n- **Behavior-level analysis** — `audit` doesn't know that this package suddenly started making outbound HTTPS calls\n\nTreat `npm audit` as the first line of defense, not the only one.\n\n## Behavior-level scanning\n\nTools that look at *what a package does*, not just *which CVE it has*:\n\n- **socket.dev** — flags new packages, packages that gained network\u002Finstall-script behavior, typosquat-shaped names. GitHub integration that comments on PRs. Free tier covers most personal use.\n- **deps.dev** (Google) — package metadata, transitive graph, advisory feed\n- **OSV-Scanner** — open-source scanner against the OSV database, broader than npm audit\n- **Snyk \u002F GitHub Dependabot security alerts** — overlap with audit but include curated advisories\n\nA reasonable stack: GitHub Dependabot (free, native) + socket.dev (free, behavior-aware) + `npm audit` in CI.\n\n## Reviewing a new dependency before `npm install`\n\nWhen adding a new dep, especially a small or unfamiliar one, take 60 seconds first.\n\n```bash\n# What is this package, who maintains it, what's the install footprint?\nnpm view \u003Cpkg>\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> dependencies         # transitive count\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> repository.url        # is there a public repo?\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> maintainers           # who can publish a new version?\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> time                  # when was each version published?\n\n# How popular is it? (huge install counts don't prove safety, but obscure single-digit downloads warrant scrutiny)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.npmjs.org\u002Fdownloads\u002Fpoint\u002Flast-week\u002F\u003Cpkg>\" | jq\n\n# Red flags in the publish history\nnpm view \u003Cpkg> time --json | jq 'to_entries | sort_by(.value) | reverse | .[0:5]'\n```\n\nRed flags:\n\n- **Single maintainer with no other notable packages** + the package handles auth\u002Fcrypto\u002Fpayments\n- **Recently transferred ownership** (new maintainer's other packages look unrelated)\n- **Sudden version jump** with a vague changelog (`\"bug fixes\"` and a 1k-line diff)\n- **No public repo**, no homepage, no README\n- **Typosquat-shaped name** — `lodash-utils` vs `lodash`, `colors-js` vs `colors`\n- **Postinstall script** (see next section)\n- **Network calls during install** (you can sandbox install to detect — see CI section)\n\n## Postinstall scripts\n\n`postinstall`, `preinstall`, `install`, `prepare` scripts run on `npm install`. They are the most common malware delivery vector.\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate every package with an install-time script\nfind node_modules -name package.json -not -path '*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*' \\\n  -exec grep -l '\"postinstall\"\\|\"preinstall\"\\|\"prepare\"' {} \\; \\\n  | xargs -I {} dirname {} | sed 's|node_modules\u002F||'\n\n# Block ALL install scripts globally — most packages do not need them\nnpm config set ignore-scripts true\n# Or per-install\nnpm install --ignore-scripts\n```\n\n`--ignore-scripts` breaks some legitimate native-module builds (`node-sass`, `sharp`, `better-sqlite3`). Allow scripts only for the specific packages that need them — yarn 2+ and pnpm have allowlists.\n\nIn `pnpm`:\n\n```yaml\n# .npmrc\nignore-scripts=true\n\n# package.json\n\"pnpm\": {\n  \"onlyBuiltDependencies\": [\"sharp\", \"better-sqlite3\"]\n}\n```\n\n## Typosquat detection\n\nCommon substitutions: `i` ↔ `l` ↔ `1`, `0` ↔ `o`, missing\u002Fextra dashes, plural\u002Fsingular. Run:\n\n```bash\n# Cheap typosquat heuristic — flag packages with very similar names to well-known ones\nnpm ls --depth=0 --json | jq -r '.dependencies | keys[]' | while read p; do\n  echo \"$p\"  # human review or feed to socket.dev\ndone\n```\n\nsocket.dev \u002F npq do this systematically; for a manual pass, just eyeball your direct deps with `cat package.json | jq '.dependencies | keys'`.\n\n## CI \u002F build sandbox\n\nDon't let your install run with prod credentials sitting in env.\n\n```yaml\n# GitHub Actions\n- name: Install dependencies\n  run: npm ci --ignore-scripts\n  env: {}                 # no env vars passed in\n# Then run the few allowed install scripts intentionally\n- name: Run build scripts for native deps\n  run: npm rebuild sharp better-sqlite3\n```\n\nSee [`github-actions-security`](..\u002Fgithub-actions-security\u002FSKILL.md) for the broader CI story (pinned action SHAs, OIDC, secret scoping).\n\n## Audit `node_modules` for an inherited project\n\n```bash\n# How many packages did this single npm install actually install?\nfind node_modules -name package.json -not -path '*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*\u002Fnode_modules\u002F*' | wc -l\n\n# Largest packages — these are where you'd hide a payload\ndu -sh node_modules\u002F*\u002F  | sort -h | tail -20\n\n# Packages with install scripts (as above)\n\n# Packages with .bin executables\nfind node_modules\u002F.bin -type l -o -type f | head -30\n```\n\nCross-check against `package.json` direct deps. Anything in `node_modules` you cannot trace back to a direct or expected-transitive dep is worth investigating.\n\n## What to do when a dependency is compromised\n\nYou wake up to \"package X version 2.4.5 was compromised, contains a credential stealer\".\n\n1. **Determine if you shipped it.**\n   ```bash\n   # Did you have it installed at the bad version?\n   git log --all -p -- package-lock.json | grep -A2 -B2 'package-x.*2\\.4\\.5'\n   ```\n2. **Assume credentials accessed during install\u002Frun are burned.** That includes `.env` files readable by the user that ran `npm install`, plus anything in process env at runtime.\n3. **Rotate every credential that was in scope.** Order per [`secret-hygiene`](..\u002Fsecret-hygiene\u002FSKILL.md).\n4. **Pin to a known-clean version**, or remove the package entirely if no clean version exists.\n5. **Audit `package-lock.json` for the transitive surface** — the compromised package may be a transitive dep you didn't add directly.\n6. **Check CI logs** for unexplained outbound traffic during recent builds.\n7. **Add the package + version range to a permanent denylist** in your CI (whatever scanner you use) so you don't accidentally re-add it.\n\n## Periodic audit checklist\n\nOnce a quarter:\n\n- [ ] Lockfile present and committed for every project\n- [ ] CI uses `npm ci` \u002F `--frozen-lockfile`, not loose install\n- [ ] Dependabot (or equivalent) enabled, PRs reviewed not auto-merged for major versions\n- [ ] `npm audit --audit-level=high` passes; exceptions documented\n- [ ] socket.dev or equivalent reviews new dependency PRs\n- [ ] Install scripts allowlisted; defaults to ignore\n- [ ] No env vars passed to `npm ci` step in CI\n- [ ] Direct dependencies you don't recognize have been investigated\n- [ ] A known-vulnerable package list is maintained for the project's ecosystem\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- Replace a formal Software Bill of Materials (SBOM) program for regulated environments\n- Provide payloads or attack patterns to publish malicious packages\n- Recommend installing packages without lockfiles \"for now\"\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--dependency-supply-chain",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill dependency-supply-chain",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill dependency-supply-chain",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill dependency-supply-chain","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--dependency-supply-chain\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,64,72,80,88],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":53,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":68,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":76,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":19},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]