[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73B2BDGADQK2WDXGNKA1VD8":3,"skill-same:01M73B2BDGADQK2WDXGNKA1VD8":111},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":53,"commitSha":54,"skillDirectory":55,"forksCount":56,"repositoryHtmlUrl":57,"repositoryHomepageUrl":58,"ownerHtmlUrl":59,"ownerBlogUrl":60,"ownerDescription":61,"updatedAt":62,"install":63,"resources":76},"01M73B2BDGADQK2WDXGNKA1VD8","detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism",null,"Detect abuse of elevation control mechanisms including UAC bypass, sudo exploitation, and setuid\u002Fsetgid manipulation by monitoring registry modifications, process elevation flags, and unusual parent-child process relationships.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: detecting-t1548-abuse-elevation-control-mechanism\ndescription: Detect abuse of elevation control mechanisms including UAC bypass, sudo\n  exploitation, and setuid\u002Fsetgid manipulation by monitoring registry modifications,\n  process elevation flags, and unusual parent-child process relationships.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- uac-bypass\n- privilege-escalation\n- mitre-t1548\n- elevation-control\n- windows-security\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Restore Access\n- Password Authentication\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1548.002\n- T1548.001\n- T1548.003\n- T1548.004\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n\n# Detecting T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for privilege escalation via UAC bypass in Windows environments\n- After threat intelligence indicates use of UAC bypass exploits by active threat groups\n- When investigating how attackers achieved administrative access without triggering UAC prompts\n- During security assessments to validate UAC bypass detection coverage\n- When monitoring for setuid\u002Fsetgid abuse on Linux systems\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 1 with command-line and parent process logging\n- Windows Security Event ID 4688 with process tracking\n- Registry auditing for UAC-related keys (HKCU\\Software\\Classes)\n- Sysmon Event ID 12\u002F13 (Registry key\u002Fvalue modification)\n- EDR with elevation monitoring capabilities\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor UAC Registry Modifications**: Many UAC bypasses modify registry keys under `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command` or `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command`. Track Sysmon Events 12\u002F13 for these changes.\n2. **Detect Auto-Elevating Process Abuse**: Certain Windows binaries auto-elevate without UAC prompts (fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, eventvwr.exe). Hunt for these being launched by non-standard parent processes.\n3. **Track Process Integrity Level Changes**: Monitor for processes escalating from medium to high integrity level without corresponding UAC consent events.\n4. **Hunt for Elevated Process Spawning**: Detect when auto-elevating processes spawn unexpected children (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) -- indicating UAC bypass exploitation.\n5. **Monitor Linux Elevation Abuse**: Track sudo misconfiguration exploitation, setuid binary abuse, and capability manipulation.\n6. **Correlate with Privilege Escalation Chain**: Map elevation abuse to the broader attack chain, identifying what was done with escalated privileges.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1548.002 | Bypass User Account Control |\n| T1548.001 | Setuid and Setgid (Linux) |\n| T1548.003 | Sudo and Sudo Caching |\n| T1548.004 | Elevated Execution with Prompt (macOS) |\n| UAC Auto-Elevation | Windows binaries that elevate without prompt |\n| fodhelper.exe | Common UAC bypass vector via registry hijack |\n| eventvwr.exe | MSC file handler UAC bypass |\n| Integrity Level | Windows process trust level (Low\u002FMedium\u002FHigh\u002FSystem) |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- UAC Bypass via Registry Modification\n```spl\nindex=sysmon (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13)\n| where match(TargetObject, \"(?i)HKCU\\\\\\\\Software\\\\\\\\Classes\\\\\\\\(ms-settings|mscfile|exefile|Folder)\\\\\\\\shell\\\\\\\\open\\\\\\\\command\")\n| table _time Computer User EventCode TargetObject Details Image\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Auto-Elevating Process Abuse\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(Image, \"(?i)(fodhelper|computerdefaults|eventvwr|sdclt|slui|cmstp)\\.exe$\")\n| where NOT match(ParentImage, \"(?i)(explorer|svchost|services)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n```\n\n### KQL -- UAC Bypass Detection\n```kql\nDeviceRegistryEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where RegistryKey has_any (\"ms-settings\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\", \"mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\")\n| where ActionType == \"RegistryValueSet\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule\n```yaml\ntitle: UAC Bypass via Registry Modification\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: registry_set\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetObject|contains:\n            - '\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command'\n            - '\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command'\n            - '\\exefile\\shell\\open\\command'\n    condition: selection\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.privilege_escalation\n    - attack.t1548.002\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **fodhelper.exe Registry Hijack**: Attacker sets `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command` to a malicious executable, then launches fodhelper.exe which auto-elevates and executes the hijacked command.\n2. **eventvwr.exe MSC Bypass**: Modifying `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command` to intercept Event Viewer's auto-elevation behavior.\n3. **sdclt.exe Bypass**: Leveraging the Windows Backup utility's auto-elevation to execute arbitrary commands.\n4. **CMSTP.exe INF Bypass**: Using Connection Manager Profile Installer with a malicious INF file to bypass UAC via `\u002Fs \u002Fni` flags.\n5. **DLL Hijacking in Auto-Elevate**: Placing malicious DLLs in search paths of auto-elevating executables.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-UAC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nBypass Method: [Registry hijack\u002FDLL hijack\u002FToken manipulation]\nAuto-Elevate Binary: [fodhelper.exe\u002Feventvwr.exe\u002Fetc.]\nRegistry Key Modified: [Full registry path]\nPayload Executed: [Command or binary path]\nUser Context: [Account]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium]\nATT&CK Technique: [T1548.00x]\n```\n","# Detecting T1548 Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for privilege escalation via UAC bypass in Windows environments\n- After threat intelligence indicates use of UAC bypass exploits by active threat groups\n- When investigating how attackers achieved administrative access without triggering UAC prompts\n- During security assessments to validate UAC bypass detection coverage\n- When monitoring for setuid\u002Fsetgid abuse on Linux systems\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon Event ID 1 with command-line and parent process logging\n- Windows Security Event ID 4688 with process tracking\n- Registry auditing for UAC-related keys (HKCU\\Software\\Classes)\n- Sysmon Event ID 12\u002F13 (Registry key\u002Fvalue modification)\n- EDR with elevation monitoring capabilities\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor UAC Registry Modifications**: Many UAC bypasses modify registry keys under `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command` or `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command`. Track Sysmon Events 12\u002F13 for these changes.\n2. **Detect Auto-Elevating Process Abuse**: Certain Windows binaries auto-elevate without UAC prompts (fodhelper.exe, computerdefaults.exe, eventvwr.exe). Hunt for these being launched by non-standard parent processes.\n3. **Track Process Integrity Level Changes**: Monitor for processes escalating from medium to high integrity level without corresponding UAC consent events.\n4. **Hunt for Elevated Process Spawning**: Detect when auto-elevating processes spawn unexpected children (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) -- indicating UAC bypass exploitation.\n5. **Monitor Linux Elevation Abuse**: Track sudo misconfiguration exploitation, setuid binary abuse, and capability manipulation.\n6. **Correlate with Privilege Escalation Chain**: Map elevation abuse to the broader attack chain, identifying what was done with escalated privileges.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1548.002 | Bypass User Account Control |\n| T1548.001 | Setuid and Setgid (Linux) |\n| T1548.003 | Sudo and Sudo Caching |\n| T1548.004 | Elevated Execution with Prompt (macOS) |\n| UAC Auto-Elevation | Windows binaries that elevate without prompt |\n| fodhelper.exe | Common UAC bypass vector via registry hijack |\n| eventvwr.exe | MSC file handler UAC bypass |\n| Integrity Level | Windows process trust level (Low\u002FMedium\u002FHigh\u002FSystem) |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- UAC Bypass via Registry Modification\n```spl\nindex=sysmon (EventCode=12 OR EventCode=13)\n| where match(TargetObject, \"(?i)HKCU\\\\\\\\Software\\\\\\\\Classes\\\\\\\\(ms-settings|mscfile|exefile|Folder)\\\\\\\\shell\\\\\\\\open\\\\\\\\command\")\n| table _time Computer User EventCode TargetObject Details Image\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Auto-Elevating Process Abuse\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(Image, \"(?i)(fodhelper|computerdefaults|eventvwr|sdclt|slui|cmstp)\\.exe$\")\n| where NOT match(ParentImage, \"(?i)(explorer|svchost|services)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage ParentCommandLine\n```\n\n### KQL -- UAC Bypass Detection\n```kql\nDeviceRegistryEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where RegistryKey has_any (\"ms-settings\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\", \"mscfile\\\\shell\\\\open\\\\command\")\n| where ActionType == \"RegistryValueSet\"\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueData, InitiatingProcessFileName\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule\n```yaml\ntitle: UAC Bypass via Registry Modification\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: registry_set\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetObject|contains:\n            - '\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command'\n            - '\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command'\n            - '\\exefile\\shell\\open\\command'\n    condition: selection\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.privilege_escalation\n    - attack.t1548.002\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **fodhelper.exe Registry Hijack**: Attacker sets `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\ms-settings\\shell\\open\\command` to a malicious executable, then launches fodhelper.exe which auto-elevates and executes the hijacked command.\n2. **eventvwr.exe MSC Bypass**: Modifying `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\mscfile\\shell\\open\\command` to intercept Event Viewer's auto-elevation behavior.\n3. **sdclt.exe Bypass**: Leveraging the Windows Backup utility's auto-elevation to execute arbitrary commands.\n4. **CMSTP.exe INF Bypass**: Using Connection Manager Profile Installer with a malicious INF file to bypass UAC via `\u002Fs \u002Fni` flags.\n5. **DLL Hijacking in Auto-Elevate**: Placing malicious DLLs in search paths of auto-elevating executables.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-UAC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nBypass Method: [Registry hijack\u002FDLL hijack\u002FToken manipulation]\nAuto-Elevate Binary: [fodhelper.exe\u002Feventvwr.exe\u002Fetc.]\nRegistry Key Modified: [Full registry path]\nPayload Executed: [Command or binary path]\nUser Context: [Account]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium]\nATT&CK Technique: [T1548.00x]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":32,"domain":33,"source":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":41,"source_commit":46,"d3fend_techniques":47},[26,27,28,29,30,31],"threat-hunting","uac-bypass","privilege-escalation","mitre-t1548","elevation-control","windows-security","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0",[37,38,39,40],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[42,43,44,45],"T1548.002","T1548.001","T1548.003","T1548.004","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d",[48,49,50,51,52],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Restore Access","Password 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Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. 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