[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73B26PTMBVV0W72SSQSGF7D":3,"skill-same:01M73B26PTMBVV0W72SSQSGF7D":112},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":54,"commitSha":55,"skillDirectory":56,"forksCount":57,"repositoryHtmlUrl":58,"repositoryHomepageUrl":59,"ownerHtmlUrl":60,"ownerBlogUrl":61,"ownerDescription":62,"updatedAt":63,"install":64,"resources":77},"01M73B26PTMBVV0W72SSQSGF7D","detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",null,"Detect process injection techniques (T1055) including classic DLL injection, process hollowing, and APC injection by analyzing Sysmon events for cross-process memory operations, remote thread creation, and anomalous DLL loading patterns.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\ndescription: Detect process injection techniques (T1055) including classic DLL injection,\n  process hollowing, and APC injection by analyzing Sysmon events for cross-process\n  memory operations, remote thread creation, and anomalous DLL loading patterns.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- process-injection\n- sysmon\n- mitre-t1055\n- defense-evasion\n- dll-injection\n- process-hollowing\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Executable Denylisting\n- Execution Isolation\n- File Metadata Consistency Validation\n- Content Format Conversion\n- File Content Analysis\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1055.001\n- T1055.002\n- T1055.003\n- T1055.012\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n\n# Detecting T1055 Process Injection with Sysmon\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes\n- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation\n- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants\n- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25\n- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection\n- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters\n- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection\n- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+\n- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8)**: Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.\n2. **Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10)**: Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.\n3. **Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7)**: Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.\n4. **Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25)**: Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).\n5. **Correlate with Process Creation**: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.\n6. **Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity**: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).\n7. **Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques**: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |\n| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |\n| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |\n| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |\n| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |\n| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |\n| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |\n| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |\n| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |\n| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |\n| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |\n| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed\u002Finjected code |\n| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=8\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\\.exe$\"), \"high_value_target\", \"normal_target\")\n| where suspicious=\"high_value_target\"\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadId\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where match(GrantedAccess, \"(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)\")\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\\.exe$\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### KQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType == \"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\"\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (\"csrss.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"services.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")\n| where FileName in~ (\"svchost.exe\", \"explorer.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"winlogon.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n    FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection\n```yaml\ntitle: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: create_remote_thread\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith:\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n            - '\\explorer.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\winlogon.exe'\n    filter_legitimate:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\services.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1055\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Classic DLL Injection**: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.\n2. **Process Hollowing (RunPE)**: Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.\n3. **APC Injection**: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.\n4. **Reflective DLL Injection**: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.\n5. **Process Doppelganging**: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSource Process: [Injecting process path]\nSource PID: [Process ID]\nTarget Process: [Target process path]\nTarget PID: [Process ID]\nInjection Type: [DLL\u002FShellcode\u002FHollowing\u002FAPC]\nSysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]\nAccess Mask: [Granted access value]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]\n```\n","# Detecting T1055 Process Injection with Sysmon\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques that hide malicious code inside legitimate processes\n- After EDR alerts for suspicious cross-process memory access or remote thread creation\n- When investigating malware that injects into svchost.exe, explorer.exe, or other system processes\n- During purple team exercises testing detection of process injection variants\n- When validating Sysmon configuration coverage for injection detection\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration capturing Events 1, 7, 8, 10, 25\n- Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread) enabled for remote thread detection\n- Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess) configured with appropriate access mask filters\n- Event ID 7 (ImageLoaded) for DLL injection detection\n- Event ID 25 (ProcessTampering) for process hollowing on Sysmon 13+\n- SIEM platform for correlation and alerting\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor CreateRemoteThread (Event 8)**: Detect when one process creates a thread in another process's address space. This is the primary indicator of classic DLL injection and shellcode injection.\n2. **Analyze ProcessAccess (Event 10)**: Track cross-process handle requests with PROCESS_VM_WRITE (0x0020), PROCESS_VM_OPERATION (0x0008), and PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD (0x0002) access rights. Legitimate processes rarely need these on other processes.\n3. **Detect Anomalous DLL Loading (Event 7)**: Identify DLLs loaded from unusual paths (user temp directories, download folders) into system processes.\n4. **Hunt Process Hollowing (Event 25)**: Sysmon 13+ generates ProcessTampering events when the executable image in memory diverges from what was mapped from disk -- a hallmark of process hollowing (T1055.012).\n5. **Correlate with Process Creation**: Link injection events to the originating process creation (Event 1) to build the full attack chain from initial execution to injection.\n6. **Filter Known-Good Cross-Process Activity**: Exclude legitimate software that performs cross-process operations (debuggers, AV products, accessibility tools, RMM agents).\n7. **Map to ATT&CK Sub-Techniques**: Classify detected injection as classic injection (T1055.001), PE injection (T1055.002), thread execution hijacking (T1055.003), APC injection (T1055.004), thread local storage (T1055.005), process hollowing (T1055.012), or process doppelganging (T1055.013).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library Injection |\n| T1055.002 | Portable Executable Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call (APC) Injection |\n| T1055.005 | Thread Local Storage |\n| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing |\n| T1055.013 | Process Doppelganging |\n| T1055.015 | ListPlanting |\n| Sysmon Event 8 | CreateRemoteThread detected |\n| Sysmon Event 10 | ProcessAccess with memory write permissions |\n| Sysmon Event 25 | ProcessTampering (image mismatch) |\n| Access Mask 0x1FFFFF | PROCESS_ALL_ACCESS -- full cross-process control |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Sysmon | Primary telemetry source for injection detection |\n| Process Hacker | Manual investigation of process memory regions |\n| PE-sieve | Scan running processes for hollowed\u002Finjected code |\n| Moneta | Detect anomalous memory regions in processes |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of Sysmon events |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics for injection artifacts |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated scan for hollowed processes |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- Remote Thread Creation\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=8\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|services|svchost|MsMpEng|SecurityHealthService|vmtoolsd)\\.exe$\")\n| eval suspicious=if(match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(svchost|explorer|lsass|winlogon|csrss|services)\\.exe$\"), \"high_value_target\", \"normal_target\")\n| where suspicious=\"high_value_target\"\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId TargetImage TargetProcessId StartFunction NewThreadId\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Suspicious ProcessAccess Patterns\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where SourceImage!=TargetImage\n| where match(GrantedAccess, \"(0x1FFFFF|0x1F3FFF|0x143A|0x0040)\")\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)(lsass|svchost|explorer|winlogon)\\.exe$\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(MsMpEng|csrss|services|svchost|taskmgr|procexp)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage TargetImage GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### KQL -- Process Injection via Remote Thread\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType == \"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\"\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (\"csrss.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"services.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")\n| where FileName in~ (\"svchost.exe\", \"explorer.exe\", \"lsass.exe\", \"winlogon.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,\n    FileName, ProcessCommandLine\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- Process Injection Detection\n```yaml\ntitle: Process Injection via CreateRemoteThread into System Process\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: create_remote_thread\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith:\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n            - '\\explorer.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\winlogon.exe'\n    filter_legitimate:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\services.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter_legitimate\nlevel: high\ntags:\n    - attack.defense_evasion\n    - attack.t1055\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Classic DLL Injection**: Malware uses VirtualAllocEx + WriteProcessMemory + CreateRemoteThread to load a malicious DLL into a target process. Detected via Sysmon Event 8.\n2. **Process Hollowing (RunPE)**: Attacker creates a suspended process, unmaps its image, writes malicious PE, and resumes execution. Detected via Sysmon Event 25.\n3. **APC Injection**: Malware queues an Asynchronous Procedure Call to threads of a target process using QueueUserAPC. Harder to detect, requires Event 10 monitoring.\n4. **Reflective DLL Injection**: DLL is loaded directly from memory without touching disk, bypassing ImageLoaded detection. Requires memory-level analysis.\n5. **Process Doppelganging**: Leverages NTFS transactions to replace a legitimate process image. Detected via process integrity checking.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-INJECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nSource Process: [Injecting process path]\nSource PID: [Process ID]\nTarget Process: [Target process path]\nTarget PID: [Process ID]\nInjection Type: [DLL\u002FShellcode\u002FHollowing\u002FAPC]\nSysmon Events: [Event IDs triggered]\nAccess Mask: [Granted access value]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nATT&CK Sub-Technique: [T1055.xxx]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"source":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":42,"source_commit":47,"d3fend_techniques":48},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"threat-hunting","process-injection","sysmon","mitre-t1055","defense-evasion","dll-injection","process-hollowing","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0",[38,39,40,41],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[43,44,45,46],"T1055.001","T1055.002","T1055.003","T1055.012","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d",[49,50,51,52,53],"Executable Denylisting","Execution Isolation","File Metadata Consistency Validation","Content Format Conversion","File Content Analysis","main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":65,"prompt":75,"zipAvailable":76},[66,69,72],{"tool":67,"command":68},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",{"tool":70,"command":71},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon",{"tool":73,"command":74},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002FSKILL.md",true,[78,84,88,94,98,102,108],{"path":79,"resourceType":80,"resourceTypeDesc":81,"sizeBytes":82,"sourceHtmlUrl":83},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",978,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":85,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":87,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":89,"resourceType":90,"resourceTypeDesc":91,"sizeBytes":92,"sourceHtmlUrl":93},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2750,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":95,"resourceType":90,"resourceTypeDesc":91,"sizeBytes":96,"sourceHtmlUrl":97},"references\u002Fstandards.md",3243,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":99,"resourceType":90,"resourceTypeDesc":91,"sizeBytes":100,"sourceHtmlUrl":101},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",3109,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":103,"resourceType":104,"resourceTypeDesc":105,"sizeBytes":106,"sourceHtmlUrl":107},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",5480,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":109,"resourceType":104,"resourceTypeDesc":105,"sizeBytes":110,"sourceHtmlUrl":111},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",6023,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-t1055-process-injection-with-sysmon\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[113,121,128,136,144,152],{"skillNo":114,"name":115,"nameZh":6,"description":116,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":117,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":118,"categories":119,"keywords":120,"publishedAt":20},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; 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Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":129,"name":130,"nameZh":6,"description":131,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":132,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":135,"publishedAt":20},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":137,"name":138,"nameZh":6,"description":139,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":140,"sourceHtmlUrl":141,"categories":142,"keywords":143,"publishedAt":20},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":145,"name":146,"nameZh":6,"description":147,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":148,"sourceHtmlUrl":149,"categories":150,"keywords":151,"publishedAt":20},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":153,"name":154,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":155,"categories":156,"keywords":157,"publishedAt":20},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]