[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73ATMWJ6D8KE0S3E2DEPKA7":3,"skill-same:01M73ATMWJ6D8KE0S3E2DEPKA7":88},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":48,"commitSha":49,"skillDirectory":50,"forksCount":51,"repositoryHtmlUrl":52,"repositoryHomepageUrl":53,"ownerHtmlUrl":54,"ownerBlogUrl":55,"ownerDescription":56,"updatedAt":57,"install":58,"resources":71},"01M73ATMWJ6D8KE0S3E2DEPKA7","detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs",null,"Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory by analyzing Kerberos TGT anomalies including mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures in domain controller event logs.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs\ndescription: Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory by analyzing Kerberos\n  TGT anomalies including mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes,\n  non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures in domain controller event logs.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- golden-ticket\n- kerberos\n- active-directory\n- mitre-t1558-001\n- credential-abuse\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1003\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n\n# Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks in Kerberos Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction\n- When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access\n- After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level\n- When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)\n- During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers\n- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)\n- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations\n- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768)**: Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ\u002FAS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.\n2. **Detect Encryption Type Anomalies**: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.\n3. **Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies**: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.\n4. **Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs**: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.\n5. **Detect TGS Without Prior TGT**: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP\u002Faccount, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.\n6. **Monitor KRBTGT Password Age**: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.\n7. **Validate PAC Signatures**: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- RC4 Encryption in Kerberos TGS\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType=\"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName!=\"krbtgt\"\n| stats count by TargetUserName ServiceName IpAddress TicketEncryptionType Computer\n| where count > 5\n| sort -count\n```\n\n### Splunk -- TGS Without Prior TGT\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\n| stats earliest(_time) as first_tgt by TargetUserName IpAddress EventCode\n| eventstats earliest(eval(if(EventCode=4768, first_tgt, null()))) as tgt_time by TargetUserName IpAddress\n| where EventCode=4769 AND (isnull(tgt_time) OR first_tgt \u003C tgt_time)\n| table TargetUserName IpAddress first_tgt tgt_time\n```\n\n### KQL -- Golden Ticket Indicators\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType == \"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName != \"krbtgt\"\n| summarize Count=count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, ServiceName\n| where Count > 5\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Post-DCSync Golden Ticket**: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.\n2. **RC4 Downgrade**: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.\n3. **Cross-Domain Golden Ticket**: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains\u002Fforests.\n4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-GOLDEN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nSuspected Account: [Account using forged ticket]\nSource IP: [Client IP]\nTarget Service: [SPN accessed]\nEncryption Type: [RC4\u002FAES128\u002FAES256]\nAnomaly: [No prior TGT\u002FRC4 in AES environment\u002FExtended lifetime]\nKRBTGT Last Reset: [Date]\nRisk Level: [Critical]\n```\n","# Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks in Kerberos Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction\n- When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access\n- After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level\n- When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)\n- During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers\n- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)\n- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations\n- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768)**: Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ\u002FAS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.\n2. **Detect Encryption Type Anomalies**: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.\n3. **Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies**: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.\n4. **Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs**: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.\n5. **Detect TGS Without Prior TGT**: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP\u002Faccount, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.\n6. **Monitor KRBTGT Password Age**: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.\n7. **Validate PAC Signatures**: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- RC4 Encryption in Kerberos TGS\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType=\"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName!=\"krbtgt\"\n| stats count by TargetUserName ServiceName IpAddress TicketEncryptionType Computer\n| where count > 5\n| sort -count\n```\n\n### Splunk -- TGS Without Prior TGT\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\n| stats earliest(_time) as first_tgt by TargetUserName IpAddress EventCode\n| eventstats earliest(eval(if(EventCode=4768, first_tgt, null()))) as tgt_time by TargetUserName IpAddress\n| where EventCode=4769 AND (isnull(tgt_time) OR first_tgt \u003C tgt_time)\n| table TargetUserName IpAddress first_tgt tgt_time\n```\n\n### KQL -- Golden Ticket Indicators\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType == \"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName != \"krbtgt\"\n| summarize Count=count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, ServiceName\n| where Count > 5\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Post-DCSync Golden Ticket**: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.\n2. **RC4 Downgrade**: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.\n3. **Cross-Domain Golden Ticket**: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains\u002Fforests.\n4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-GOLDEN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nSuspected Account: [Account using forged ticket]\nSource IP: [Client IP]\nTarget Service: [SPN accessed]\nEncryption Type: [RC4\u002FAES128\u002FAES256]\nAnomaly: [No prior TGT\u002FRC4 in AES environment\u002FExtended lifetime]\nKRBTGT Last Reset: [Date]\nRisk Level: [Critical]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":32,"domain":33,"source":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":41,"source_commit":47},[26,27,28,29,30,31],"threat-hunting","golden-ticket","kerberos","active-directory","mitre-t1558-001","credential-abuse","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0",[37,38,39,40],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[42,43,44,45,46],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1003","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d","main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":59,"prompt":69,"zipAvailable":70},[60,63,66],{"tool":61,"command":62},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs",{"tool":64,"command":65},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs",{"tool":67,"command":68},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs\u002FSKILL.md",true,[72,76,82],{"path":73,"resourceType":73,"resourceTypeDesc":74,"sizeBytes":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":77,"resourceType":78,"resourceTypeDesc":79,"sizeBytes":80,"sourceHtmlUrl":81},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1679,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":83,"resourceType":84,"resourceTypeDesc":85,"sizeBytes":86,"sourceHtmlUrl":87},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6279,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-golden-ticket-attacks-in-kerberos-logs\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[89,97,104,112,120,128],{"skillNo":90,"name":91,"nameZh":6,"description":92,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":93,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":94,"categories":95,"keywords":96,"publishedAt":20},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; 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