[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73AT8BJVAYA8PC9A8R2P4MH":3,"skill-same:01M73AT8BJVAYA8PC9A8R2P4MH":107},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":49,"commitSha":50,"skillDirectory":51,"forksCount":52,"repositoryHtmlUrl":53,"repositoryHomepageUrl":54,"ownerHtmlUrl":55,"ownerBlogUrl":56,"ownerDescription":57,"updatedAt":58,"install":59,"resources":72},"01M73AT8BJVAYA8PC9A8R2P4MH","detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints",null,"Detects fileless malware and in-memory attacks that execute entirely in RAM without writing persistent files to disk, evading traditional antivirus. Use when building detections for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection, WMI persistence, and registry-resident malware. Activates for requests involving fileless malware detection, in-memory attacks, PowerShell exploitation, or living-off-the-land techniques.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\ndescription: 'Detects fileless malware and in-memory attacks that execute entirely\n  in RAM without writing persistent files to disk, evading traditional antivirus.\n  Use when building detections for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection,\n  WMI persistence, and registry-resident malware. Activates for requests involving\n  fileless malware detection, in-memory attacks, PowerShell exploitation, or living-off-the-land\n  techniques.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: endpoint-security\ntags:\n- endpoint\n- fileless-malware\n- memory-attacks\n- PowerShell\n- detection-engineering\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.PS-01\n- PR.PS-02\n- DE.CM-01\n- PR.IR-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1055\n- T1547\n- T1059\n- T1036\n- T1053\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n# Detecting Fileless Attacks on Endpoints\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- Building detection rules for fileless malware that operates entirely in memory\n- Hunting for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection, and WMI abuse\n- Configuring endpoint telemetry (Sysmon, AMSI, PowerShell logging) to capture fileless indicators\n- Investigating incidents where traditional AV found no malicious files\n\n**Do not use** for detecting file-based malware or for malware reverse engineering.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon with process creation and WMI event logging enabled\n- PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging enabled\n- AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) enabled for script content inspection\n- EDR with behavioral detection capabilities (MDE, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne)\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Enable Required Telemetry\n\n```powershell\n# Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging (GPO or registry)\nNew-ItemProperty -Path \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" `\n  -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force\n\n# Enable PowerShell Module Logging\nNew-ItemProperty -Path \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ModuleLogging\" `\n  -Name EnableModuleLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force\n\n# Enable PowerShell Transcription\nNew-ItemProperty -Path \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\Transcription\" `\n  -Name EnableTranscripting -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force\n\n# Sysmon config for fileless detection (key events):\n# Event ID 1: Process creation (captures CommandLine)\n# Event ID 7: Image loaded (DLL loading)\n# Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread (injection)\n# Event ID 10: Process access (LSASS access)\n# Event ID 19\u002F20\u002F21: WMI events\n```\n\n### Step 2: Detect PowerShell-Based Attacks\n\n```\n# Indicators of malicious PowerShell:\n\n# Encoded command execution\nEventID: 1\nCommandLine contains: \"powershell\" AND (\"-enc\" OR \"-e \" OR \"-encodedcommand\" OR \"FromBase64String\")\n\n# Download cradle patterns\nCommandLine contains: \"IEX\" AND (\"Net.WebClient\" OR \"DownloadString\" OR \"Invoke-WebRequest\")\nCommandLine contains: \"Invoke-Expression\" AND \"New-Object\"\n\n# AMSI bypass attempts (Event ID 4104 - Script Block)\nScriptBlock contains: (\"Amsi\"+\"Utils\") OR (\"amsi\"+\"InitFailed\") OR \"SetValue.*amsi\"\n\n# Splunk query for suspicious PowerShell:\nindex=windows source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\u002FOperational\" EventCode=4104\n| where match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|net\\.webclient|frombase64|bypass|amsi.utils)\")\n| table _time host ScriptBlockText\n```\n\n### Step 3: Detect Process Injection Techniques\n\n```\n# Reflective DLL injection - loads DLL from memory without touching disk\n# Detection: Sysmon Event 7 (ImageLoaded) where image path is unusual\nEventID: 7\nImageLoaded NOT starts with: \"C:\\Windows\\\" AND NOT starts with: \"C:\\Program Files\"\n\n# Process hollowing - creates process in suspended state, replaces memory\n# Detection: Process creation followed by immediate memory write\nEventID: 1 + 10 correlation\n# Process created then accessed with PROCESS_VM_WRITE\n\n# APC injection - queues code to thread's async procedure call queue\n# Detection: Sysmon CreateRemoteThread from non-system process\nEventID: 8\nSourceImage NOT IN (known_legitimate_sources)\n\n# MDE KQL:\nDeviceEvents\n| where ActionType in (\"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\", \"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\")\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in (\"MsMpEng.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName\n```\n\n### Step 4: Detect WMI-Based Persistence\n\n```\n# Sysmon Event IDs 19\u002F20\u002F21 for WMI events\nEventID: 19  # WmiEventFilter activity detected\nEventID: 20  # WmiEventConsumer activity detected\nEventID: 21  # WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected\n\n# Any WMI event subscription creation is suspicious unless expected\n# Common malicious WMI persistence:\nConsumer contains: \"CommandLineEventConsumer\" OR \"ActiveScriptEventConsumer\"\n\n# Query for WMI subscriptions via osquery or PowerShell:\nGet-WMIObject -Namespace root\\Subscription -Class __EventFilter\nGet-WMIObject -Namespace root\\Subscription -Class __EventConsumer\nGet-WMIObject -Namespace root\\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding\n```\n\n### Step 5: Detect Registry-Based Execution\n\n```\n# Malware stored in registry values and executed via PowerShell\n# Sysmon Event 13 - Registry value set with encoded content\nEventID: 13\nTargetObject contains: \"CurrentVersion\\Run\"\nDetails: unusually long value or Base64-encoded content\n\n# Detection query:\nindex=sysmon EventCode=13\n| where match(Details, \"[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F=]{100,}\")\n| table _time host TargetObject Details Image\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Fileless Malware** | Malware that operates entirely in memory without writing executable files to disk |\n| **AMSI** | Antimalware Scan Interface; Windows API allowing security products to inspect script content before execution |\n| **Reflective DLL Injection** | Loading a DLL from memory rather than disk, avoiding file-based detection |\n| **Process Hollowing** | Creating a legitimate process in suspended state and replacing its memory with malicious code |\n| **Script Block Logging** | PowerShell logging feature that captures deobfuscated script content (Event ID 4104) |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Sysmon**: Kernel-level process, DLL, and WMI monitoring\n- **AMSI**: Windows script content inspection API\n- **PowerShell Logging**: Script Block, Module, and Transcription logging\n- **Microsoft Defender for Endpoint**: Behavioral detection for fileless techniques\n- **Volatility 3**: Memory forensics for post-incident fileless malware analysis\n\n## Common Pitfalls\n\n- **Relying on file-based AV**: Traditional AV that scans files on disk will miss fileless attacks entirely. Behavioral detection and AMSI are required.\n- **Disabled PowerShell logging**: Without Script Block Logging, deobfuscated PowerShell commands are invisible to defenders.\n- **AMSI bypass not detected**: Sophisticated attackers bypass AMSI before executing payloads. Detect AMSI bypass attempts as a high-priority alert.\n- **Not monitoring WMI events**: WMI persistence is a favored technique of APT groups. Sysmon events 19-21 must be enabled.\n","# Detecting Fileless Attacks on Endpoints\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- Building detection rules for fileless malware that operates entirely in memory\n- Hunting for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection, and WMI abuse\n- Configuring endpoint telemetry (Sysmon, AMSI, PowerShell logging) to capture fileless indicators\n- Investigating incidents where traditional AV found no malicious files\n\n**Do not use** for detecting file-based malware or for malware reverse engineering.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Sysmon with process creation and WMI event logging enabled\n- PowerShell Script Block Logging and Module Logging enabled\n- AMSI (Antimalware Scan Interface) enabled for script content inspection\n- EDR with behavioral detection capabilities (MDE, CrowdStrike, SentinelOne)\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Enable Required Telemetry\n\n```powershell\n# Enable PowerShell Script Block Logging (GPO or registry)\nNew-ItemProperty -Path \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ScriptBlockLogging\" `\n  -Name EnableScriptBlockLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force\n\n# Enable PowerShell Module Logging\nNew-ItemProperty -Path \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\ModuleLogging\" `\n  -Name EnableModuleLogging -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force\n\n# Enable PowerShell Transcription\nNew-ItemProperty -Path \"HKLM:\\SOFTWARE\\Policies\\Microsoft\\Windows\\PowerShell\\Transcription\" `\n  -Name EnableTranscripting -Value 1 -PropertyType DWORD -Force\n\n# Sysmon config for fileless detection (key events):\n# Event ID 1: Process creation (captures CommandLine)\n# Event ID 7: Image loaded (DLL loading)\n# Event ID 8: CreateRemoteThread (injection)\n# Event ID 10: Process access (LSASS access)\n# Event ID 19\u002F20\u002F21: WMI events\n```\n\n### Step 2: Detect PowerShell-Based Attacks\n\n```\n# Indicators of malicious PowerShell:\n\n# Encoded command execution\nEventID: 1\nCommandLine contains: \"powershell\" AND (\"-enc\" OR \"-e \" OR \"-encodedcommand\" OR \"FromBase64String\")\n\n# Download cradle patterns\nCommandLine contains: \"IEX\" AND (\"Net.WebClient\" OR \"DownloadString\" OR \"Invoke-WebRequest\")\nCommandLine contains: \"Invoke-Expression\" AND \"New-Object\"\n\n# AMSI bypass attempts (Event ID 4104 - Script Block)\nScriptBlock contains: (\"Amsi\"+\"Utils\") OR (\"amsi\"+\"InitFailed\") OR \"SetValue.*amsi\"\n\n# Splunk query for suspicious PowerShell:\nindex=windows source=\"WinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-PowerShell\u002FOperational\" EventCode=4104\n| where match(ScriptBlockText, \"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|downloadstring|net\\.webclient|frombase64|bypass|amsi.utils)\")\n| table _time host ScriptBlockText\n```\n\n### Step 3: Detect Process Injection Techniques\n\n```\n# Reflective DLL injection - loads DLL from memory without touching disk\n# Detection: Sysmon Event 7 (ImageLoaded) where image path is unusual\nEventID: 7\nImageLoaded NOT starts with: \"C:\\Windows\\\" AND NOT starts with: \"C:\\Program Files\"\n\n# Process hollowing - creates process in suspended state, replaces memory\n# Detection: Process creation followed by immediate memory write\nEventID: 1 + 10 correlation\n# Process created then accessed with PROCESS_VM_WRITE\n\n# APC injection - queues code to thread's async procedure call queue\n# Detection: Sysmon CreateRemoteThread from non-system process\nEventID: 8\nSourceImage NOT IN (known_legitimate_sources)\n\n# MDE KQL:\nDeviceEvents\n| where ActionType in (\"CreateRemoteThreadApiCall\", \"NtAllocateVirtualMemoryApiCall\")\n| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in (\"MsMpEng.exe\", \"svchost.exe\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName\n```\n\n### Step 4: Detect WMI-Based Persistence\n\n```\n# Sysmon Event IDs 19\u002F20\u002F21 for WMI events\nEventID: 19  # WmiEventFilter activity detected\nEventID: 20  # WmiEventConsumer activity detected\nEventID: 21  # WmiEventConsumerToFilter activity detected\n\n# Any WMI event subscription creation is suspicious unless expected\n# Common malicious WMI persistence:\nConsumer contains: \"CommandLineEventConsumer\" OR \"ActiveScriptEventConsumer\"\n\n# Query for WMI subscriptions via osquery or PowerShell:\nGet-WMIObject -Namespace root\\Subscription -Class __EventFilter\nGet-WMIObject -Namespace root\\Subscription -Class __EventConsumer\nGet-WMIObject -Namespace root\\Subscription -Class __FilterToConsumerBinding\n```\n\n### Step 5: Detect Registry-Based Execution\n\n```\n# Malware stored in registry values and executed via PowerShell\n# Sysmon Event 13 - Registry value set with encoded content\nEventID: 13\nTargetObject contains: \"CurrentVersion\\Run\"\nDetails: unusually long value or Base64-encoded content\n\n# Detection query:\nindex=sysmon EventCode=13\n| where match(Details, \"[A-Za-z0-9+\u002F=]{100,}\")\n| table _time host TargetObject Details Image\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **Fileless Malware** | Malware that operates entirely in memory without writing executable files to disk |\n| **AMSI** | Antimalware Scan Interface; Windows API allowing security products to inspect script content before execution |\n| **Reflective DLL Injection** | Loading a DLL from memory rather than disk, avoiding file-based detection |\n| **Process Hollowing** | Creating a legitimate process in suspended state and replacing its memory with malicious code |\n| **Script Block Logging** | PowerShell logging feature that captures deobfuscated script content (Event ID 4104) |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Sysmon**: Kernel-level process, DLL, and WMI monitoring\n- **AMSI**: Windows script content inspection API\n- **PowerShell Logging**: Script Block, Module, and Transcription logging\n- **Microsoft Defender for Endpoint**: Behavioral detection for fileless techniques\n- **Volatility 3**: Memory forensics for post-incident fileless malware analysis\n\n## Common Pitfalls\n\n- **Relying on file-based AV**: Traditional AV that scans files on disk will miss fileless attacks entirely. Behavioral detection and AMSI are required.\n- **Disabled PowerShell logging**: Without Script Block Logging, deobfuscated PowerShell commands are invisible to defenders.\n- **AMSI bypass not detected**: Sophisticated attackers bypass AMSI before executing payloads. Detect AMSI bypass attempts as a high-priority alert.\n- **Not monitoring WMI events**: WMI persistence is a favored technique of APT groups. Sysmon events 19-21 must be enabled.\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":31,"domain":32,"source":33,"license":15,"version":34,"nist_csf":35,"subdomain":40,"description":41,"mitre_attack":42,"source_commit":48},[26,27,28,29,30],"endpoint","fileless-malware","memory-attacks","PowerShell","detection-engineering","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0.0",[36,37,38,39],"PR.PS-01","PR.PS-02","DE.CM-01","PR.IR-01","endpoint-security","Detects fileless malware and in-memory attacks that execute entirely in RAM without writing persistent files to disk, evading traditional antivirus. Use when building detections for PowerShell-based attacks, reflective DLL injection, WMI persistence, and registry-resident malware. Activates for requests involving fileless malware detection, in-memory attacks, PowerShell exploitation, or living-off-the-land techniques.\n",[43,44,45,46,47],"T1055","T1547","T1059","T1036","T1053","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d","main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":60,"prompt":70,"zipAvailable":71},[61,64,67],{"tool":62,"command":63},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints",{"tool":65,"command":66},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints",{"tool":68,"command":69},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill detecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002FSKILL.md",true,[73,79,83,89,93,97,103],{"path":74,"resourceType":75,"resourceTypeDesc":76,"sizeBytes":77,"sourceHtmlUrl":78},"assets\u002Ftemplate.md","ASSET","资产文件",484,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002Fassets\u002Ftemplate.md",{"path":80,"resourceType":80,"resourceTypeDesc":81,"sizeBytes":82,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":84,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":87,"sourceHtmlUrl":88},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",1905,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":90,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":91,"sourceHtmlUrl":92},"references\u002Fstandards.md",475,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002Freferences\u002Fstandards.md",{"path":94,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":95,"sourceHtmlUrl":96},"references\u002Fworkflows.md",354,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002Freferences\u002Fworkflows.md",{"path":98,"resourceType":99,"resourceTypeDesc":100,"sizeBytes":101,"sourceHtmlUrl":102},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",6474,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":104,"resourceType":99,"resourceTypeDesc":100,"sizeBytes":105,"sourceHtmlUrl":106},"scripts\u002Fprocess.py",2288,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-fileless-attacks-on-endpoints\u002Fscripts\u002Fprocess.py",[108,116,123,131,139,147],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":112,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":113,"categories":114,"keywords":115,"publishedAt":20},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":117,"name":118,"nameZh":6,"description":119,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":120,"categories":121,"keywords":122,"publishedAt":20},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":124,"name":125,"nameZh":6,"description":126,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":127,"sourceHtmlUrl":128,"categories":129,"keywords":130,"publishedAt":20},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":132,"name":133,"nameZh":6,"description":134,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":135,"sourceHtmlUrl":136,"categories":137,"keywords":138,"publishedAt":20},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":140,"name":141,"nameZh":6,"description":142,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":143,"sourceHtmlUrl":144,"categories":145,"keywords":146,"publishedAt":20},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":148,"name":149,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":150,"categories":151,"keywords":152,"publishedAt":20},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]