[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M7393W608KFBG3KCXQJSWKXM":3,"skill-same:01M7393W608KFBG3KCXQJSWKXM":99},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":59,"commitSha":60,"skillDirectory":61,"forksCount":62,"repositoryHtmlUrl":63,"repositoryHomepageUrl":64,"ownerHtmlUrl":65,"ownerBlogUrl":66,"ownerDescription":67,"updatedAt":68,"install":69,"resources":82},"01M7393W608KFBG3KCXQJSWKXM","analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk",null,"Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk\ndescription: 'Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to\n  detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and\n  lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC\n  analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or\n  perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: soc-operations\ntags:\n- soc\n- splunk\n- windows-events\n- sysmon\n- event-logs\n- mitre-attack\n- active-directory\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Restore Access\n- Password Authentication\n- Biometric Authentication\n- Strong Password Policy\n- Restore User Account Access\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- RS.MA-01\n- DE.AE-06\nmitre_attack:\n- T1110\n- T1053.005\n- T1547.001\n- T1021.002\n- T1558.003\n- T1003.006\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\nnote: \"Vendored verbatim from an external Apache-2.0 security-skill library, pinned by commit. Exceeds the internal 300-line skill guideline (agent-code-constraints.md) -- kept as-is because this is vendored reference material (forensics\u002Fthreat-intel procedure), not Yana AI-authored content, and trimming would damage technical accuracy.\"\n---\n# Analyzing Windows Event Logs in Splunk\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- SOC analysts investigate alerts related to Windows authentication, process execution, or AD changes\n- Detection engineers build SPL queries for Windows-based threat detection\n- Incident responders need forensic timelines of Windows endpoint or domain controller activity\n- Periodic threat hunting targets Windows-specific ATT&CK techniques\n\n**Do not use** for Linux\u002FmacOS endpoint analysis or network-only investigations.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Splunk with Windows Event Log data ingested (sourcetype `WinEventLog:Security`, `WinEventLog:System`, `XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\u002FOperational`)\n- Sysmon deployed on endpoints with SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong configuration\n- CIM data model acceleration for Endpoint and Authentication data models\n- Knowledge of Windows Security Event IDs and Sysmon event types\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Authentication Attack Detection\n\n**Brute Force Detection (EventCode 4625 — Failed Logon):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4625\n| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, values(TargetUserName) AS targeted_users\n  by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status\n| where count > 20\n| eval attack_type = case(\n    Logon_Type=3, \"Network Brute Force\",\n    Logon_Type=10, \"RDP Brute Force\",\n    Logon_Type=2, \"Interactive Brute Force\",\n    1=1, \"Other\"\n  )\n| eval status_meaning = case(\n    Status=\"0xc000006d\", \"Bad Username or Password\",\n    Status=\"0xc000006a\", \"Incorrect Password (valid user)\",\n    Status=\"0xc0000234\", \"Account Locked Out\",\n    Status=\"0xc0000072\", \"Account Disabled\",\n    1=1, Status\n  )\n| sort - count\n| table src_ip, attack_type, status_meaning, count, unique_users, targeted_users\n```\n\n**Password Spray Detection:**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3\n| bin _time span=10m\n| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, count AS total_attempts,\n  values(TargetUserName) AS users_targeted by src_ip, _time\n| where unique_users > 10 AND total_attempts \u003C unique_users * 3\n| eval spray_confidence = if(unique_users > 25, \"HIGH\", \"MEDIUM\")\n```\n\n**Successful Logon After Failures (Compromise Indicator):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\"\n(EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) src_ip!=\"127.0.0.1\"\n| sort _time\n| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen,\n  sum(eval(if(EventCode=4625,1,0))) AS failures,\n  sum(eval(if(EventCode=4624,1,0))) AS successes\n  by src_ip, TargetUserName, ComputerName\n| where failures > 10 AND successes > 0\n| eval time_to_success = round((last_seen - first_seen)\u002F60, 1)\n| sort - failures\n```\n\n### Step 2: Privilege Escalation Detection\n\n**New Admin Account Created (T1136.001):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4720\n| join TargetUserName type=left [\n    search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 TargetUserName=\"Administrators\"\n    | rename MemberName AS TargetUserName\n  ]\n| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName\n| eval alert = \"New account created and added to Administrators group\"\n```\n\n**Special Privileges Assigned (EventCode 4672):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4672\nSubjectUserName!=\"SYSTEM\" SubjectUserName!=\"LOCAL SERVICE\" SubjectUserName!=\"NETWORK SERVICE\"\n| stats count, values(PrivilegeList) AS privileges by SubjectUserName, ComputerName\n| where count > 0\n| search privileges IN (\"SeDebugPrivilege\", \"SeTcbPrivilege\", \"SeBackupPrivilege\",\n  \"SeRestorePrivilege\", \"SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege\")\n```\n\n**Token Manipulation Detection (T1134):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage=\"*\\\\lsass.exe\"\nGrantedAccess IN (\"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x40\")\n| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng|CrowdStrike)\")\n| sort - count\n```\n\n### Step 3: Persistence Mechanism Detection\n\n**Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog (sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4698)\n  OR (sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\u002FOperational\" EventCode=1\n      Image=\"*\\\\schtasks.exe\")\n| eval task_info = coalesce(TaskContent, CommandLine)\n| search task_info=\"*powershell*\" OR task_info=\"*cmd*\" OR task_info=\"*http*\" OR task_info=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\"\n| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_info\n```\n\n**Registry Run Key Modification (T1547.001):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=13\nTargetObject IN (\n  \"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run\\\\*\",\n  \"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce\\\\*\",\n  \"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunServices\\\\*\",\n  \"*\\\\Explorer\\\\Shell Folders\\\\*\"\n)\n| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetObject, Details\n| where NOT match(Image, \"(explorer\\.exe|msiexec\\.exe|setup\\.exe)\")\n| sort - count\n```\n\n**WMI Event Subscription (T1546.003):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21\n| stats count by Computer, Operation, Consumer, EventNamespace\n| where count > 0\n```\n\n### Step 4: Lateral Movement Detection\n\n**Remote Service Exploitation (T1021.002 — SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3\n| stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_destinations, values(ComputerName) AS targets\n  by src_ip, TargetUserName\n| where unique_destinations > 3\n| sort - unique_destinations\n| table src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_destinations, targets\n```\n\n**PsExec Detection (T1021.002):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n(Image=\"*\\\\psexec.exe\" OR Image=\"*\\\\psexesvc.exe\"\n OR ParentImage=\"*\\\\psexesvc.exe\"\n OR OriginalFileName=\"psexec.c\")\n| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine\n```\n\n**RDP Lateral Movement (T1021.001):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10\n| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS rdp_targets, values(ComputerName) AS destinations\n  by src_ip, TargetUserName\n| where rdp_targets > 2\n| sort - rdp_targets\n```\n\n### Step 5: Build Forensic Timeline\n\nCreate comprehensive timeline for a compromised host:\n\n```spl\n(index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon) Computer=\"WORKSTATION-042\"\nearliest=\"2024-03-14T00:00:00\" latest=\"2024-03-16T00:00:00\"\n| eval event_description = case(\n    EventCode=4624, \"Logon: \".TargetUserName.\" (Type \".Logon_Type.\")\",\n    EventCode=4625, \"Failed Logon: \".TargetUserName,\n    EventCode=4688 OR (sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:*Sysmon*\" AND EventCode=1),\n      \"Process: \".Image.\" CMD: \".CommandLine,\n    EventCode=4698, \"Scheduled Task: \".TaskName,\n    EventCode=3, \"Network: \".DestinationIp.\":\".DestinationPort,\n    EventCode=11, \"File Created: \".TargetFilename,\n    EventCode=13, \"Registry: \".TargetObject,\n    1=1, \"Event \".EventCode\n  )\n| sort _time\n| table _time, EventCode, event_description, User, src_ip\n```\n\n### Step 6: Create Lookup Tables for Enrichment\n\nBuild reference lookups for Windows Event ID context:\n\n```spl\n| inputlookup windows_eventcode_lookup.csv\n| table EventCode, Description, ATT_CK_Technique, Severity\n```\n\nIf lookup doesn't exist, create it:\n\n```csv\nEventCode,Description,ATT_CK_Technique,Severity\n4624,Successful Logon,T1078,Informational\n4625,Failed Logon,T1110,Low\n4648,Explicit Credential Logon,T1078,Medium\n4672,Special Privileges Assigned,T1134,Medium\n4688,New Process Created,T1059,Informational\n4698,Scheduled Task Created,T1053.005,Medium\n4720,User Account Created,T1136.001,High\n4732,Member Added to Security Group,T1098,High\n4768,Kerberos TGT Requested,T1558,Informational\n4769,Kerberos Service Ticket,T1558.003,Low\n4771,Kerberos Pre-Auth Failed,T1110,Low\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **EventCode 4624** | Successful logon event — Logon_Type 2 (interactive), 3 (network), 10 (RDP), 7 (unlock) |\n| **EventCode 4625** | Failed logon event — Status code indicates failure reason (bad password, account locked, disabled) |\n| **Sysmon EventCode 1** | Process creation with full command line, parent process, and hash information |\n| **Sysmon EventCode 3** | Network connection initiated by a process — source\u002Fdest IP, port, and process context |\n| **Logon Type 3** | Network logon (SMB, WMI, PowerShell Remoting) — key indicator of lateral movement |\n| **Logon Type 10** | Remote interactive logon via RDP\u002FTerminal Services |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Splunk Enterprise**: SIEM platform with SPL query engine for Windows event log analysis and correlation\n- **Sysmon (System Monitor)**: Microsoft Sysinternals tool providing detailed process, network, and file activity logging\n- **Splunk CIM**: Common Information Model mapping Windows events to normalized fields for cross-source queries\n- **Windows Event Forwarding (WEF)**: Built-in Windows mechanism for centralizing event logs to a collector server\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Kerberoasting (T1558.003)**: Detect EventCode 4769 with encryption type 0x17 (RC4) for non-standard service accounts\n- **DCSync (T1003.006)**: Detect EventCode 4662 with DS-Replication-Get-Changes from non-DC sources\n- **Golden Ticket (T1558.001)**: Detect EventCode 4769 with abnormal ticket properties (long lifetime, non-standard encryption)\n- **Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002)**: Detect EventCode 4624 Logon_Type 3 with NTLM authentication from unexpected sources\n- **DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002)**: Sysmon EventCode 7 showing unsigned DLLs loaded by legitimate processes\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nWINDOWS EVENT LOG ANALYSIS — HOST: WORKSTATION-042\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nPeriod:     2024-03-14 to 2024-03-15\nEvents:     12,847 total (Security: 9,231 | Sysmon: 3,616)\n\nAuthentication Summary:\n  Successful Logons (4624):    487 (Type 3: 312, Type 10: 45, Type 2: 130)\n  Failed Logons (4625):        847 (from 192.168.1.105 — BRUTE FORCE)\n  Explicit Creds (4648):       12\n\nSuspicious Findings:\n  [HIGH]   847 failed logons followed by success at 14:35 from 192.168.1.105\n  [HIGH]   New user \"backdoor_admin\" created (4720) at 14:38\n  [HIGH]   User added to Administrators group (4732) at 14:38\n  [MEDIUM] schtasks.exe creating persistence task at 14:42\n  [MEDIUM] PowerShell encoded command execution at 14:45\n\nATT&CK Mapping:\n  T1110.001 — Password Guessing (847 failed logons)\n  T1136.001 — Local Account Creation (backdoor_admin)\n  T1053.005 — Scheduled Task (persistence)\n  T1059.001 — PowerShell (encoded execution)\n```\n","# Analyzing Windows Event Logs in Splunk\n\n## When to Use\n\nUse this skill when:\n- SOC analysts investigate alerts related to Windows authentication, process execution, or AD changes\n- Detection engineers build SPL queries for Windows-based threat detection\n- Incident responders need forensic timelines of Windows endpoint or domain controller activity\n- Periodic threat hunting targets Windows-specific ATT&CK techniques\n\n**Do not use** for Linux\u002FmacOS endpoint analysis or network-only investigations.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Splunk with Windows Event Log data ingested (sourcetype `WinEventLog:Security`, `WinEventLog:System`, `XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\u002FOperational`)\n- Sysmon deployed on endpoints with SwiftOnSecurity or Olaf Hartong configuration\n- CIM data model acceleration for Endpoint and Authentication data models\n- Knowledge of Windows Security Event IDs and Sysmon event types\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Authentication Attack Detection\n\n**Brute Force Detection (EventCode 4625 — Failed Logon):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4625\n| stats count, dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, values(TargetUserName) AS targeted_users\n  by src_ip, Logon_Type, Status\n| where count > 20\n| eval attack_type = case(\n    Logon_Type=3, \"Network Brute Force\",\n    Logon_Type=10, \"RDP Brute Force\",\n    Logon_Type=2, \"Interactive Brute Force\",\n    1=1, \"Other\"\n  )\n| eval status_meaning = case(\n    Status=\"0xc000006d\", \"Bad Username or Password\",\n    Status=\"0xc000006a\", \"Incorrect Password (valid user)\",\n    Status=\"0xc0000234\", \"Account Locked Out\",\n    Status=\"0xc0000072\", \"Account Disabled\",\n    1=1, Status\n  )\n| sort - count\n| table src_ip, attack_type, status_meaning, count, unique_users, targeted_users\n```\n\n**Password Spray Detection:**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4625 Logon_Type=3\n| bin _time span=10m\n| stats dc(TargetUserName) AS unique_users, count AS total_attempts,\n  values(TargetUserName) AS users_targeted by src_ip, _time\n| where unique_users > 10 AND total_attempts \u003C unique_users * 3\n| eval spray_confidence = if(unique_users > 25, \"HIGH\", \"MEDIUM\")\n```\n\n**Successful Logon After Failures (Compromise Indicator):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\"\n(EventCode=4625 OR EventCode=4624) src_ip!=\"127.0.0.1\"\n| sort _time\n| stats earliest(_time) AS first_seen, latest(_time) AS last_seen,\n  sum(eval(if(EventCode=4625,1,0))) AS failures,\n  sum(eval(if(EventCode=4624,1,0))) AS successes\n  by src_ip, TargetUserName, ComputerName\n| where failures > 10 AND successes > 0\n| eval time_to_success = round((last_seen - first_seen)\u002F60, 1)\n| sort - failures\n```\n\n### Step 2: Privilege Escalation Detection\n\n**New Admin Account Created (T1136.001):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4720\n| join TargetUserName type=left [\n    search index=wineventlog EventCode=4732 TargetUserName=\"Administrators\"\n    | rename MemberName AS TargetUserName\n  ]\n| table _time, SubjectUserName, TargetUserName, ComputerName\n| eval alert = \"New account created and added to Administrators group\"\n```\n\n**Special Privileges Assigned (EventCode 4672):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4672\nSubjectUserName!=\"SYSTEM\" SubjectUserName!=\"LOCAL SERVICE\" SubjectUserName!=\"NETWORK SERVICE\"\n| stats count, values(PrivilegeList) AS privileges by SubjectUserName, ComputerName\n| where count > 0\n| search privileges IN (\"SeDebugPrivilege\", \"SeTcbPrivilege\", \"SeBackupPrivilege\",\n  \"SeRestorePrivilege\", \"SeAssignPrimaryTokenPrivilege\")\n```\n\n**Token Manipulation Detection (T1134):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10 TargetImage=\"*\\\\lsass.exe\"\nGrantedAccess IN (\"0x1010\", \"0x1038\", \"0x1fffff\", \"0x40\")\n| stats count by SourceImage, SourceUser, Computer, GrantedAccess\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(svchost|csrss|wininit|MsMpEng|CrowdStrike)\")\n| sort - count\n```\n\n### Step 3: Persistence Mechanism Detection\n\n**Scheduled Task Creation (T1053.005):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog (sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4698)\n  OR (sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon\u002FOperational\" EventCode=1\n      Image=\"*\\\\schtasks.exe\")\n| eval task_info = coalesce(TaskContent, CommandLine)\n| search task_info=\"*powershell*\" OR task_info=\"*cmd*\" OR task_info=\"*http*\" OR task_info=\"*\\\\Temp\\\\*\"\n| table _time, Computer, SubjectUserName, TaskName, task_info\n```\n\n**Registry Run Key Modification (T1547.001):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=13\nTargetObject IN (\n  \"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\Run\\\\*\",\n  \"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunOnce\\\\*\",\n  \"*\\\\CurrentVersion\\\\RunServices\\\\*\",\n  \"*\\\\Explorer\\\\Shell Folders\\\\*\"\n)\n| stats count by Computer, Image, TargetObject, Details\n| where NOT match(Image, \"(explorer\\.exe|msiexec\\.exe|setup\\.exe)\")\n| sort - count\n```\n\n**WMI Event Subscription (T1546.003):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=20 OR EventCode=21\n| stats count by Computer, Operation, Consumer, EventNamespace\n| where count > 0\n```\n\n### Step 4: Lateral Movement Detection\n\n**Remote Service Exploitation (T1021.002 — SMB\u002FWindows Admin Shares):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=3\n| stats dc(ComputerName) AS unique_destinations, values(ComputerName) AS targets\n  by src_ip, TargetUserName\n| where unique_destinations > 3\n| sort - unique_destinations\n| table src_ip, TargetUserName, unique_destinations, targets\n```\n\n**PsExec Detection (T1021.002):**\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n(Image=\"*\\\\psexec.exe\" OR Image=\"*\\\\psexesvc.exe\"\n OR ParentImage=\"*\\\\psexesvc.exe\"\n OR OriginalFileName=\"psexec.c\")\n| table _time, Computer, User, ParentImage, Image, CommandLine\n```\n\n**RDP Lateral Movement (T1021.001):**\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog sourcetype=\"WinEventLog:Security\" EventCode=4624 Logon_Type=10\n| stats count, dc(ComputerName) AS rdp_targets, values(ComputerName) AS destinations\n  by src_ip, TargetUserName\n| where rdp_targets > 2\n| sort - rdp_targets\n```\n\n### Step 5: Build Forensic Timeline\n\nCreate comprehensive timeline for a compromised host:\n\n```spl\n(index=wineventlog OR index=sysmon) Computer=\"WORKSTATION-042\"\nearliest=\"2024-03-14T00:00:00\" latest=\"2024-03-16T00:00:00\"\n| eval event_description = case(\n    EventCode=4624, \"Logon: \".TargetUserName.\" (Type \".Logon_Type.\")\",\n    EventCode=4625, \"Failed Logon: \".TargetUserName,\n    EventCode=4688 OR (sourcetype=\"XmlWinEventLog:*Sysmon*\" AND EventCode=1),\n      \"Process: \".Image.\" CMD: \".CommandLine,\n    EventCode=4698, \"Scheduled Task: \".TaskName,\n    EventCode=3, \"Network: \".DestinationIp.\":\".DestinationPort,\n    EventCode=11, \"File Created: \".TargetFilename,\n    EventCode=13, \"Registry: \".TargetObject,\n    1=1, \"Event \".EventCode\n  )\n| sort _time\n| table _time, EventCode, event_description, User, src_ip\n```\n\n### Step 6: Create Lookup Tables for Enrichment\n\nBuild reference lookups for Windows Event ID context:\n\n```spl\n| inputlookup windows_eventcode_lookup.csv\n| table EventCode, Description, ATT_CK_Technique, Severity\n```\n\nIf lookup doesn't exist, create it:\n\n```csv\nEventCode,Description,ATT_CK_Technique,Severity\n4624,Successful Logon,T1078,Informational\n4625,Failed Logon,T1110,Low\n4648,Explicit Credential Logon,T1078,Medium\n4672,Special Privileges Assigned,T1134,Medium\n4688,New Process Created,T1059,Informational\n4698,Scheduled Task Created,T1053.005,Medium\n4720,User Account Created,T1136.001,High\n4732,Member Added to Security Group,T1098,High\n4768,Kerberos TGT Requested,T1558,Informational\n4769,Kerberos Service Ticket,T1558.003,Low\n4771,Kerberos Pre-Auth Failed,T1110,Low\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|-----------|\n| **EventCode 4624** | Successful logon event — Logon_Type 2 (interactive), 3 (network), 10 (RDP), 7 (unlock) |\n| **EventCode 4625** | Failed logon event — Status code indicates failure reason (bad password, account locked, disabled) |\n| **Sysmon EventCode 1** | Process creation with full command line, parent process, and hash information |\n| **Sysmon EventCode 3** | Network connection initiated by a process — source\u002Fdest IP, port, and process context |\n| **Logon Type 3** | Network logon (SMB, WMI, PowerShell Remoting) — key indicator of lateral movement |\n| **Logon Type 10** | Remote interactive logon via RDP\u002FTerminal Services |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Splunk Enterprise**: SIEM platform with SPL query engine for Windows event log analysis and correlation\n- **Sysmon (System Monitor)**: Microsoft Sysinternals tool providing detailed process, network, and file activity logging\n- **Splunk CIM**: Common Information Model mapping Windows events to normalized fields for cross-source queries\n- **Windows Event Forwarding (WEF)**: Built-in Windows mechanism for centralizing event logs to a collector server\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Kerberoasting (T1558.003)**: Detect EventCode 4769 with encryption type 0x17 (RC4) for non-standard service accounts\n- **DCSync (T1003.006)**: Detect EventCode 4662 with DS-Replication-Get-Changes from non-DC sources\n- **Golden Ticket (T1558.001)**: Detect EventCode 4769 with abnormal ticket properties (long lifetime, non-standard encryption)\n- **Pass-the-Hash (T1550.002)**: Detect EventCode 4624 Logon_Type 3 with NTLM authentication from unexpected sources\n- **DLL Side-Loading (T1574.002)**: Sysmon EventCode 7 showing unsigned DLLs loaded by legitimate processes\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nWINDOWS EVENT LOG ANALYSIS — HOST: WORKSTATION-042\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nPeriod:     2024-03-14 to 2024-03-15\nEvents:     12,847 total (Security: 9,231 | Sysmon: 3,616)\n\nAuthentication Summary:\n  Successful Logons (4624):    487 (Type 3: 312, Type 10: 45, Type 2: 130)\n  Failed Logons (4625):        847 (from 192.168.1.105 — BRUTE FORCE)\n  Explicit Creds (4648):       12\n\nSuspicious Findings:\n  [HIGH]   847 failed logons followed by success at 14:35 from 192.168.1.105\n  [HIGH]   New user \"backdoor_admin\" created (4720) at 14:38\n  [HIGH]   User added to Administrators group (4732) at 14:38\n  [MEDIUM] schtasks.exe creating persistence task at 14:42\n  [MEDIUM] PowerShell encoded command execution at 14:45\n\nATT&CK Mapping:\n  T1110.001 — Password Guessing (847 failed logons)\n  T1136.001 — Local Account Creation (backdoor_admin)\n  T1053.005 — Scheduled Task (persistence)\n  T1059.001 — PowerShell (encoded execution)\n```\n",{"name":5,"note":25,"tags":26,"author":34,"domain":35,"source":36,"license":15,"version":37,"nist_csf":38,"subdomain":43,"description":44,"mitre_attack":45,"source_commit":52,"d3fend_techniques":53},"Vendored verbatim from an external Apache-2.0 security-skill library, pinned by commit. Exceeds the internal 300-line skill guideline (agent-code-constraints.md) -- kept as-is because this is vendored reference material (forensics\u002Fthreat-intel procedure), not Yana AI-authored content, and trimming would damage technical accuracy.",[27,28,29,30,31,32,33],"soc","splunk","windows-events","sysmon","event-logs","mitre-attack","active-directory","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0",[39,40,41,42],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","RS.MA-01","DE.AE-06","soc-operations","Analyzes Windows Security, System, and Sysmon event logs in Splunk to detect authentication attacks, privilege escalation, persistence mechanisms, and lateral movement using SPL queries mapped to MITRE ATT&CK techniques. Use when SOC analysts need to investigate Windows-based threats, build detection queries, or perform forensic timeline analysis of Windows endpoints and domain controllers.\n",[46,47,48,49,50,51],"T1110","T1053.005","T1547.001","T1021.002","T1558.003","T1003.006","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d",[54,55,56,57,58],"Restore Access","Password Authentication","Biometric Authentication","Strong Password Policy","Restore User Account Access","main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa","core\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":70,"prompt":80,"zipAvailable":81},[71,74,77],{"tool":72,"command":73},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk",{"tool":75,"command":76},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk",{"tool":78,"command":79},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill analyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk\u002FSKILL.md",true,[83,87,93],{"path":84,"resourceType":84,"resourceTypeDesc":85,"sizeBytes":86,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":88,"resourceType":89,"resourceTypeDesc":90,"sizeBytes":91,"sourceHtmlUrl":92},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",2035,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":94,"resourceType":95,"resourceTypeDesc":96,"sizeBytes":97,"sourceHtmlUrl":98},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",7017,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fanalyzing-windows-event-logs-in-splunk\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[100,108,115,123,131,139],{"skillNo":101,"name":102,"nameZh":6,"description":103,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":104,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":105,"categories":106,"keywords":107,"publishedAt":20},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":109,"name":110,"nameZh":6,"description":111,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":112,"categories":113,"keywords":114,"publishedAt":20},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":116,"name":117,"nameZh":6,"description":118,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":119,"sourceHtmlUrl":120,"categories":121,"keywords":122,"publishedAt":20},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":124,"name":125,"nameZh":6,"description":126,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":127,"sourceHtmlUrl":128,"categories":129,"keywords":130,"publishedAt":20},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":132,"name":133,"nameZh":6,"description":134,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":135,"sourceHtmlUrl":136,"categories":137,"keywords":138,"publishedAt":20},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":140,"name":141,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":142,"categories":143,"keywords":144,"publishedAt":20},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]