[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M737SWMR3XABZZKARBQ9228P":3,"skill-same:01M737SWMR3XABZZKARBQ9228P":107},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":54,"commitSha":55,"skillDirectory":56,"forksCount":57,"repositoryHtmlUrl":58,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":59,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":60,"install":61,"resources":74},"01M737SWMR3XABZZKARBQ9228P","oss-forensics",null,"GitHub supply-chain forensics: recovery, IOCs, reporting.","ashneil12\u002Fvanilla-hermes-agent-canary","ashneil12","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F49880658?v=4","01M7378BQ9W161EPENEWBYAQNN","01M7378BRDJG8SFS93FG4V6BWY",1,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fashneil12\u002Fvanilla-hermes-agent-canary\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Foptional-skills\u002Fsecurity\u002Foss-forensics\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: oss-forensics\ndescription: \"GitHub supply-chain forensics: recovery, IOCs, reporting.\"\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: Teknium (teknium1), Hermes Agent\nlicense: MIT\nplatforms: [linux, macos, windows]\ncategory: security\ntriggers:\n  - \"investigate this repository\"\n  - \"investigate [owner\u002Frepo]\"\n  - \"check for supply chain compromise\"\n  - \"recover deleted commits\"\n  - \"forensic analysis of [owner\u002Frepo]\"\n  - \"was this repo compromised\"\n  - \"supply chain attack\"\n  - \"suspicious commit\"\n  - \"force push detected\"\n  - \"IOC extraction\"\ntoolsets:\n  - terminal\n  - web\n  - file\n  - delegation\nmetadata:\n  hermes:\n    tags: [Security, Forensics, GitHub, Supply-Chain]\n    related_skills: []\n---\n\n# OSS Security Forensics Skill\n\nA 7-phase multi-agent investigation framework for researching open-source supply chain attacks.\nAdapted from RAPTOR's forensics system. Covers GitHub Archive, Wayback Machine, GitHub API,\nlocal git analysis, IOC extraction, evidence-backed hypothesis formation and validation,\nand final forensic report generation.\n\n---\n\n## ⚠️ Anti-Hallucination Guardrails\n\nRead these before every investigation step. Violating them invalidates the report.\n\n1. **Evidence-First Rule**: Every claim in any report, hypothesis, or summary MUST cite at least one evidence ID (`EV-XXXX`). Assertions without citations are forbidden.\n2. **STAY IN YOUR LANE**: Each sub-agent (investigator) has a single data source. Do NOT mix sources. The GH Archive investigator does not query the GitHub API, and vice versa. Role boundaries are hard.\n3. **Fact vs. Hypothesis Separation**: Mark all unverified inferences with `[HYPOTHESIS]`. Only statements verified against original sources may be stated as facts.\n4. **No Evidence Fabrication**: The hypothesis validator MUST mechanically check that every cited evidence ID actually exists in the evidence store before accepting a hypothesis.\n5. **Proof-Required Disproval**: A hypothesis cannot be dismissed without a specific, evidence-backed counter-argument. \"No evidence found\" is not sufficient to disprove—it only makes a hypothesis inconclusive.\n6. **SHA\u002FURL Double-Verification**: Any commit SHA, URL, or external identifier cited as evidence must be independently confirmed from at least two sources before being marked as verified.\n7. **Suspicious Code Rule**: Never run code found inside the investigated repository locally. Analyze statically only, or use `execute_code` in a sandboxed environment.\n8. **Secret Redaction**: Any API keys, tokens, or credentials discovered during investigation must be redacted in the final report. Log them internally only.\n\n---\n\n## Example Scenarios\n\n- **Scenario A: Dependency Confusion**: A malicious package `internal-lib-v2` is uploaded to NPM with a higher version than the internal one. The investigator must track when this package was first seen and if any PushEvents in the target repo updated `package.json` to this version.\n- **Scenario B: Maintainer Takeover**: A long-term contributor's account is used to push a backdoored `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fbuild.yml`. The investigator looks for PushEvents from this user after a long period of inactivity or from a new IP\u002Flocation (if detectable via BigQuery).\n- **Scenario C: Force-Push Hide**: A developer accidentally commits a production secret, then force-pushes to \"fix\" it. The investigator uses `git fsck` and GH Archive to recover the original commit SHA and verify what was leaked.\n\n---\n\n> **Path convention**: Throughout this skill, `SKILL_DIR` refers to the root of this skill's\n> installation directory (the folder containing this `SKILL.md`). When the skill is loaded,\n> resolve `SKILL_DIR` to the actual path — e.g. `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Foss-forensics\u002F`\n> or the `optional-skills\u002F` equivalent. All script and template references are relative to it.\n\n## Phase 0: Initialization\n\n1. Create investigation working directory:\n   ```bash\n   mkdir investigation_$(echo \"REPO_NAME\" | tr '\u002F' '_')\n   cd investigation_$(echo \"REPO_NAME\" | tr '\u002F' '_')\n   ```\n2. Initialize the evidence store:\n   ```bash\n   python SKILL_DIR\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py --store evidence.json list\n   ```\n3. Copy the forensic report template:\n   ```bash\n   cp SKILL_DIR\u002Ftemplates\u002Fforensic-report.md .\u002Finvestigation-report.md\n   ```\n4. Create an `iocs.md` file to track Indicators of Compromise as they are discovered.\n5. Record the investigation start time, target repository, and stated investigation goal.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1: Prompt Parsing and IOC Extraction\n\n**Goal**: Extract all structured investigative targets from the user's request.\n\n**Actions**:\n- Parse the user prompt and extract:\n  - Target repository (`owner\u002Frepo`)\n  - Target actors (GitHub handles, email addresses)\n  - Time window of interest (commit date ranges, PR timestamps)\n  - Provided Indicators of Compromise: commit SHAs, file paths, package names, IP addresses, domains, API keys\u002Ftokens, malicious URLs\n  - Any linked vendor security reports or blog posts\n\n**Tools**: Reasoning only, or `execute_code` for regex extraction from large text blocks.\n\n**Output**: Populate `iocs.md` with extracted IOCs. Each IOC must have:\n- Type (from: COMMIT_SHA, FILE_PATH, API_KEY, SECRET, IP_ADDRESS, DOMAIN, PACKAGE_NAME, ACTOR_USERNAME, MALICIOUS_URL, OTHER)\n- Value\n- Source (user-provided, inferred)\n\n**Reference**: See [evidence-types.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fevidence-types.md) for IOC taxonomy.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2: Parallel Evidence Collection\n\nSpawn up to 5 specialist investigator sub-agents using `delegate_task` (batch mode, max 3 concurrent). Each investigator has a **single data source** and must not mix sources.\n\n> **Orchestrator note**: Pass the IOC list from Phase 1 and the investigation time window in the `context` field of each delegated task.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 1: Local Git Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You query the LOCAL GIT REPOSITORY ONLY. Do not call any external APIs.\n\n**Actions**:\n```bash\n# Clone repository\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO.git target_repo && cd target_repo\n\n# Full commit log with stats\ngit log --all --full-history --stat --format=\"%H|%ae|%an|%ai|%s\" > ..\u002Fgit_log.txt\n\n# Detect force-push evidence (orphaned\u002Fdangling commits)\ngit fsck --lost-found --unreachable 2>&1 | grep commit > ..\u002Fdangling_commits.txt\n\n# Check reflog for rewritten history\ngit reflog --all > ..\u002Freflog.txt\n\n# List ALL branches including deleted remote refs\ngit branch -a -v > ..\u002Fbranches.txt\n\n# Find suspicious large binary additions\ngit log --all --diff-filter=A --name-only --format=\"%H %ai\" -- \"*.so\" \"*.dll\" \"*.exe\" \"*.bin\" > ..\u002Fbinary_additions.txt\n\n# Check for GPG signature anomalies\ngit log --show-signature --format=\"%H %ai %aN\" > ..\u002Fsignature_check.txt 2>&1\n```\n\n**Evidence to collect** (add via `python SKILL_DIR\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py add`):\n- Each dangling commit SHA → type: `git`\n- Force-push evidence (reflog showing history rewrite) → type: `git`\n- Unsigned commits from verified contributors → type: `git`\n- Suspicious binary file additions → type: `git`\n\n**Reference**: See [recovery-techniques.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Frecovery-techniques.md) for accessing force-pushed commits.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 2: GitHub API Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You query the GITHUB REST API ONLY. Do not run git commands locally.\n\n**Actions**:\n```bash\n# Commits (paginated)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fcommits?per_page=100\" > api_commits.json\n\n# Pull Requests including closed\u002Fdeleted\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fpulls?state=all&per_page=100\" > api_prs.json\n\n# Issues\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fissues?state=all&per_page=100\" > api_issues.json\n\n# Contributors and collaborator changes\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fcontributors\" > api_contributors.json\n\n# Repository events (last 300)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fevents?per_page=100\" > api_events.json\n\n# Check specific suspicious commit SHA details\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fgit\u002Fcommits\u002FSHA\" > commit_detail.json\n\n# Releases\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Freleases?per_page=100\" > api_releases.json\n\n# Check if a specific commit exists (force-pushed commits may 404 on commits\u002F but succeed on git\u002Fcommits\u002F)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fcommits\u002FSHA\" | jq .sha\n```\n\n**Cross-reference targets** (flag discrepancies as evidence):\n- PR exists in archive but missing from API → evidence of deletion\n- Contributor in archive events but not in contributors list → evidence of permission revocation\n- Commit in archive PushEvents but not in API commit list → evidence of force-push\u002Fdeletion\n\n**Reference**: See [evidence-types.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fevidence-types.md) for GH event types.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 3: Wayback Machine Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You query the WAYBACK MACHINE CDX API ONLY. Do not use the GitHub API.\n\n**Goal**: Recover deleted GitHub pages (READMEs, issues, PRs, releases, wiki pages).\n\n**Actions**:\n```bash\n# Search for archived snapshots of the repo main page\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO&output=json&limit=100&from=YYYYMMDD&to=YYYYMMDD\" > wayback_main.json\n\n# Search for a specific deleted issue\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fissues\u002FNUM&output=json&limit=50\" > wayback_issue_NUM.json\n\n# Search for a specific deleted PR\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fpull\u002FNUM&output=json&limit=50\" > wayback_pr_NUM.json\n\n# Fetch the best snapshot of a page\n# Use the Wayback Machine URL: https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fweb\u002FTIMESTAMP\u002FORIGINAL_URL\n# Example: https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fweb\u002F20240101000000*\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\n\n# Advanced: Search for deleted releases\u002Ftags\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F*&output=json\" > wayback_tags.json\n\n# Advanced: Search for historical wiki changes\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fwiki\u002F*&output=json\" > wayback_wiki.json\n```\n\n**Evidence to collect**:\n- Archived snapshots of deleted issues\u002FPRs with their content\n- Historical README versions showing changes\n- Evidence of content present in archive but missing from current GitHub state\n\n**Reference**: See [github-archive-guide.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fgithub-archive-guide.md) for CDX API parameters.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 4: GH Archive \u002F BigQuery Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You query GITHUB ARCHIVE via BIGQUERY ONLY. This is a tamper-proof record of all public GitHub events.\n\n> **Prerequisites**: Requires Google Cloud credentials with BigQuery access (`gcloud auth application-default login`). If unavailable, skip this investigator and note it in the report.\n\n**Cost Optimization Rules** (MANDATORY):\n1. ALWAYS run a `--dry_run` before every query to estimate cost.\n2. Use `_TABLE_SUFFIX` to filter by date range and minimize scanned data.\n3. Only SELECT the columns you need.\n4. Add a LIMIT unless aggregating.\n\n```bash\n# Template: safe BigQuery query for PushEvents to OWNER\u002FREPO\nbq query --use_legacy_sql=false --dry_run \"\nSELECT created_at, actor.login, payload.commits, payload.before, payload.head,\n       payload.size, payload.distinct_size\nFROM \\`githubarchive.month.*\\`\nWHERE _TABLE_SUFFIX BETWEEN 'YYYYMM' AND 'YYYYMM'\n  AND type = 'PushEvent'\n  AND repo.name = 'OWNER\u002FREPO'\nLIMIT 1000\n\"\n# If cost is acceptable, re-run without --dry_run\n\n# Detect force-pushes: zero-distinct_size PushEvents mean commits were force-erased\n# payload.distinct_size = 0 AND payload.size > 0 → force push indicator\n\n# Check for deleted branch events\nbq query --use_legacy_sql=false \"\nSELECT created_at, actor.login, payload.ref, payload.ref_type\nFROM \\`githubarchive.month.*\\`\nWHERE _TABLE_SUFFIX BETWEEN 'YYYYMM' AND 'YYYYMM'\n  AND type = 'DeleteEvent'\n  AND repo.name = 'OWNER\u002FREPO'\nLIMIT 200\n\"\n```\n\n**Evidence to collect**:\n- Force-push events (payload.size > 0, payload.distinct_size = 0)\n- DeleteEvents for branches\u002Ftags\n- WorkflowRunEvents for suspicious CI\u002FCD automation\n- PushEvents that precede a \"gap\" in the git log (evidence of rewrite)\n\n**Reference**: See [github-archive-guide.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fgithub-archive-guide.md) for all 12 event types and query patterns.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 5: IOC Enrichment Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You enrich EXISTING IOCs from Phase 1 using passive public sources ONLY. Do not execute any code from the target repository.\n\n**Actions**:\n- For each commit SHA: attempt recovery via direct GitHub URL (`github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fcommit\u002FSHA.patch`)\n- For each domain\u002FIP: check passive DNS, WHOIS records (via `web_extract` on public WHOIS services)\n- For each package name: check npm\u002FPyPI for matching malicious package reports\n- For each actor username: check GitHub profile, contribution history, account age\n- Recover force-pushed commits using 3 methods (see [recovery-techniques.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Frecovery-techniques.md))\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3: Evidence Consolidation\n\nAfter all investigators complete:\n\n1. Run `python SKILL_DIR\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py --store evidence.json list` to see all collected evidence.\n2. For each piece of evidence, verify the `content_sha256` hash matches the original source.\n3. Group evidence by:\n   - **Timeline**: Sort all timestamped evidence chronologically\n   - **Actor**: Group by GitHub handle or email\n   - **IOC**: Link evidence to the IOC it relates to\n4. Identify **discrepancies**: items present in one source but absent in another (key deletion indicators).\n5. Flag evidence as `[VERIFIED]` (confirmed from 2+ independent sources) or `[UNVERIFIED]` (single source only).\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4: Hypothesis Formation\n\nA hypothesis must:\n- State a specific claim (e.g., \"Actor X force-pushed to BRANCH on DATE to erase commit SHA\")\n- Cite at least 2 evidence IDs that support it (`EV-XXXX`, `EV-YYYY`)\n- Identify what evidence would disprove it\n- Be labeled `[HYPOTHESIS]` until validated\n\n**Common hypothesis templates** (see [investigation-templates.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Finvestigation-templates.md)):\n- Maintainer Compromise: legitimate account used post-takeover to inject malicious code\n- Dependency Confusion: package name squatting to intercept installs\n- CI\u002FCD Injection: malicious workflow changes to run code during builds\n- Typosquatting: near-identical package name targeting misspellers\n- Credential Leak: token\u002Fkey accidentally committed then force-pushed to erase\n\nFor each hypothesis, spawn a `delegate_task` sub-agent to attempt to find disconfirming evidence before confirming.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5: Hypothesis Validation\n\nThe validator sub-agent MUST mechanically check:\n\n1. For each hypothesis, extract all cited evidence IDs.\n2. Verify each ID exists in `evidence.json` (hard failure if any ID is missing → hypothesis rejected as potentially fabricated).\n3. Verify each `[VERIFIED]` piece of evidence was confirmed from 2+ sources.\n4. Check logical consistency: does the timeline depicted by the evidence support the hypothesis?\n5. Check for alternative explanations: could the same evidence pattern arise from a benign cause?\n\n**Output**:\n- `VALIDATED`: All evidence cited, verified, logically consistent, no plausible alternative explanation.\n- `INCONCLUSIVE`: Evidence supports hypothesis but alternative explanations exist or evidence is insufficient.\n- `REJECTED`: Missing evidence IDs, unverified evidence cited as fact, logical inconsistency detected.\n\nRejected hypotheses feed back into Phase 4 for refinement (max 3 iterations).\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6: Final Report Generation\n\nPopulate `investigation-report.md` using the template in [forensic-report.md](.\u002Ftemplates\u002Fforensic-report.md).\n\n**Mandatory sections**:\n- Executive Summary: one-paragraph verdict (Compromised \u002F Clean \u002F Inconclusive) with confidence level\n- Timeline: chronological reconstruction of all significant events with evidence citations\n- Validated Hypotheses: each with status and supporting evidence IDs\n- Evidence Registry: table of all `EV-XXXX` entries with source, type, and verification status\n- IOC List: all extracted and enriched Indicators of Compromise\n- Chain of Custody: how evidence was collected, from what sources, at what timestamps\n- Recommendations: immediate mitigations if compromise detected; monitoring recommendations\n\n**Report rules**:\n- Every factual claim must have at least one `[EV-XXXX]` citation\n- Executive Summary must state confidence level (High \u002F Medium \u002F Low)\n- All secrets\u002Fcredentials must be redacted to `[REDACTED]`\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7: Completion\n\n1. Run final evidence count: `python SKILL_DIR\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py --store evidence.json list`\n2. Archive the full investigation directory.\n3. If compromise is confirmed:\n   - List immediate mitigations (rotate credentials, pin dependency hashes, notify affected users)\n   - Identify affected versions\u002Fpackages\n   - Note disclosure obligations (if a public package: coordinate with the package registry)\n4. Present the final `investigation-report.md` to the user.\n\n---\n\n## Ethical Use Guidelines\n\nThis skill is designed for **defensive security investigation** — protecting open-source software from supply chain attacks. It must not be used for:\n\n- **Harassment or stalking** of contributors or maintainers\n- **Doxing** — correlating GitHub activity to real identities for malicious purposes\n- **Competitive intelligence** — investigating proprietary or internal repositories without authorization\n- **False accusations** — publishing investigation results without validated evidence (see anti-hallucination guardrails)\n\nInvestigations should be conducted with the principle of **minimal intrusion**: collect only the evidence necessary to validate or refute the hypothesis. When publishing results, follow responsible disclosure practices and coordinate with affected maintainers before public disclosure.\n\nIf the investigation reveals a genuine compromise, follow the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process:\n1. Notify the repository maintainers privately first\n2. Allow reasonable time for remediation (typically 90 days)\n3. Coordinate with package registries (npm, PyPI, etc.) if published packages are affected\n4. File a CVE if appropriate\n\n---\n\n## API Rate Limiting\n\nGitHub REST API enforces rate limits that will interrupt large investigations if not managed.\n\n**Authenticated requests**: 5,000\u002Fhour (requires `GITHUB_TOKEN` env var or `gh` CLI auth)\n**Unauthenticated requests**: 60\u002Fhour (unusable for investigations)\n\n**Best practices**:\n- Always authenticate: `export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_...` or use `gh` CLI (auto-authenticates)\n- Use conditional requests (`If-None-Match` \u002F `If-Modified-Since` headers) to avoid consuming quota on unchanged data\n- For paginated endpoints, fetch all pages in sequence — don't parallelize against the same endpoint\n- Check `X-RateLimit-Remaining` header; if below 100, pause for `X-RateLimit-Reset` timestamp\n- BigQuery has its own quotas (10 TiB\u002Fday free tier) — always dry-run first\n- Wayback Machine CDX API: no formal rate limit, but be courteous (1-2 req\u002Fsec max)\n\nIf rate-limited mid-investigation, record the partial results in the evidence store and note the limitation in the report.\n\n---\n\n## Reference Materials\n\n- [github-archive-guide.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fgithub-archive-guide.md) — BigQuery queries, CDX API, 12 event types\n- [evidence-types.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fevidence-types.md) — IOC taxonomy, evidence source types, observation types\n- [recovery-techniques.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Frecovery-techniques.md) — Recovering deleted commits, PRs, issues\n- [investigation-templates.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Finvestigation-templates.md) — Pre-built hypothesis templates per attack type\n- [evidence-store.py](.\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py) — CLI tool for managing the evidence JSON store\n- [forensic-report.md](.\u002Ftemplates\u002Fforensic-report.md) — Structured report template\n","# OSS Security Forensics Skill\n\nA 7-phase multi-agent investigation framework for researching open-source supply chain attacks.\nAdapted from RAPTOR's forensics system. Covers GitHub Archive, Wayback Machine, GitHub API,\nlocal git analysis, IOC extraction, evidence-backed hypothesis formation and validation,\nand final forensic report generation.\n\n---\n\n## ⚠️ Anti-Hallucination Guardrails\n\nRead these before every investigation step. Violating them invalidates the report.\n\n1. **Evidence-First Rule**: Every claim in any report, hypothesis, or summary MUST cite at least one evidence ID (`EV-XXXX`). Assertions without citations are forbidden.\n2. **STAY IN YOUR LANE**: Each sub-agent (investigator) has a single data source. Do NOT mix sources. The GH Archive investigator does not query the GitHub API, and vice versa. Role boundaries are hard.\n3. **Fact vs. Hypothesis Separation**: Mark all unverified inferences with `[HYPOTHESIS]`. Only statements verified against original sources may be stated as facts.\n4. **No Evidence Fabrication**: The hypothesis validator MUST mechanically check that every cited evidence ID actually exists in the evidence store before accepting a hypothesis.\n5. **Proof-Required Disproval**: A hypothesis cannot be dismissed without a specific, evidence-backed counter-argument. \"No evidence found\" is not sufficient to disprove—it only makes a hypothesis inconclusive.\n6. **SHA\u002FURL Double-Verification**: Any commit SHA, URL, or external identifier cited as evidence must be independently confirmed from at least two sources before being marked as verified.\n7. **Suspicious Code Rule**: Never run code found inside the investigated repository locally. Analyze statically only, or use `execute_code` in a sandboxed environment.\n8. **Secret Redaction**: Any API keys, tokens, or credentials discovered during investigation must be redacted in the final report. Log them internally only.\n\n---\n\n## Example Scenarios\n\n- **Scenario A: Dependency Confusion**: A malicious package `internal-lib-v2` is uploaded to NPM with a higher version than the internal one. The investigator must track when this package was first seen and if any PushEvents in the target repo updated `package.json` to this version.\n- **Scenario B: Maintainer Takeover**: A long-term contributor's account is used to push a backdoored `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fbuild.yml`. The investigator looks for PushEvents from this user after a long period of inactivity or from a new IP\u002Flocation (if detectable via BigQuery).\n- **Scenario C: Force-Push Hide**: A developer accidentally commits a production secret, then force-pushes to \"fix\" it. The investigator uses `git fsck` and GH Archive to recover the original commit SHA and verify what was leaked.\n\n---\n\n> **Path convention**: Throughout this skill, `SKILL_DIR` refers to the root of this skill's\n> installation directory (the folder containing this `SKILL.md`). When the skill is loaded,\n> resolve `SKILL_DIR` to the actual path — e.g. `~\u002F.hermes\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Foss-forensics\u002F`\n> or the `optional-skills\u002F` equivalent. All script and template references are relative to it.\n\n## Phase 0: Initialization\n\n1. Create investigation working directory:\n   ```bash\n   mkdir investigation_$(echo \"REPO_NAME\" | tr '\u002F' '_')\n   cd investigation_$(echo \"REPO_NAME\" | tr '\u002F' '_')\n   ```\n2. Initialize the evidence store:\n   ```bash\n   python SKILL_DIR\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py --store evidence.json list\n   ```\n3. Copy the forensic report template:\n   ```bash\n   cp SKILL_DIR\u002Ftemplates\u002Fforensic-report.md .\u002Finvestigation-report.md\n   ```\n4. Create an `iocs.md` file to track Indicators of Compromise as they are discovered.\n5. Record the investigation start time, target repository, and stated investigation goal.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 1: Prompt Parsing and IOC Extraction\n\n**Goal**: Extract all structured investigative targets from the user's request.\n\n**Actions**:\n- Parse the user prompt and extract:\n  - Target repository (`owner\u002Frepo`)\n  - Target actors (GitHub handles, email addresses)\n  - Time window of interest (commit date ranges, PR timestamps)\n  - Provided Indicators of Compromise: commit SHAs, file paths, package names, IP addresses, domains, API keys\u002Ftokens, malicious URLs\n  - Any linked vendor security reports or blog posts\n\n**Tools**: Reasoning only, or `execute_code` for regex extraction from large text blocks.\n\n**Output**: Populate `iocs.md` with extracted IOCs. Each IOC must have:\n- Type (from: COMMIT_SHA, FILE_PATH, API_KEY, SECRET, IP_ADDRESS, DOMAIN, PACKAGE_NAME, ACTOR_USERNAME, MALICIOUS_URL, OTHER)\n- Value\n- Source (user-provided, inferred)\n\n**Reference**: See [evidence-types.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fevidence-types.md) for IOC taxonomy.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 2: Parallel Evidence Collection\n\nSpawn up to 5 specialist investigator sub-agents using `delegate_task` (batch mode, max 3 concurrent). Each investigator has a **single data source** and must not mix sources.\n\n> **Orchestrator note**: Pass the IOC list from Phase 1 and the investigation time window in the `context` field of each delegated task.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 1: Local Git Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You query the LOCAL GIT REPOSITORY ONLY. Do not call any external APIs.\n\n**Actions**:\n```bash\n# Clone repository\ngit clone https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO.git target_repo && cd target_repo\n\n# Full commit log with stats\ngit log --all --full-history --stat --format=\"%H|%ae|%an|%ai|%s\" > ..\u002Fgit_log.txt\n\n# Detect force-push evidence (orphaned\u002Fdangling commits)\ngit fsck --lost-found --unreachable 2>&1 | grep commit > ..\u002Fdangling_commits.txt\n\n# Check reflog for rewritten history\ngit reflog --all > ..\u002Freflog.txt\n\n# List ALL branches including deleted remote refs\ngit branch -a -v > ..\u002Fbranches.txt\n\n# Find suspicious large binary additions\ngit log --all --diff-filter=A --name-only --format=\"%H %ai\" -- \"*.so\" \"*.dll\" \"*.exe\" \"*.bin\" > ..\u002Fbinary_additions.txt\n\n# Check for GPG signature anomalies\ngit log --show-signature --format=\"%H %ai %aN\" > ..\u002Fsignature_check.txt 2>&1\n```\n\n**Evidence to collect** (add via `python SKILL_DIR\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py add`):\n- Each dangling commit SHA → type: `git`\n- Force-push evidence (reflog showing history rewrite) → type: `git`\n- Unsigned commits from verified contributors → type: `git`\n- Suspicious binary file additions → type: `git`\n\n**Reference**: See [recovery-techniques.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Frecovery-techniques.md) for accessing force-pushed commits.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 2: GitHub API Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You query the GITHUB REST API ONLY. Do not run git commands locally.\n\n**Actions**:\n```bash\n# Commits (paginated)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fcommits?per_page=100\" > api_commits.json\n\n# Pull Requests including closed\u002Fdeleted\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fpulls?state=all&per_page=100\" > api_prs.json\n\n# Issues\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fissues?state=all&per_page=100\" > api_issues.json\n\n# Contributors and collaborator changes\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fcontributors\" > api_contributors.json\n\n# Repository events (last 300)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fevents?per_page=100\" > api_events.json\n\n# Check specific suspicious commit SHA details\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fgit\u002Fcommits\u002FSHA\" > commit_detail.json\n\n# Releases\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Freleases?per_page=100\" > api_releases.json\n\n# Check if a specific commit exists (force-pushed commits may 404 on commits\u002F but succeed on git\u002Fcommits\u002F)\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fapi.github.com\u002Frepos\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fcommits\u002FSHA\" | jq .sha\n```\n\n**Cross-reference targets** (flag discrepancies as evidence):\n- PR exists in archive but missing from API → evidence of deletion\n- Contributor in archive events but not in contributors list → evidence of permission revocation\n- Commit in archive PushEvents but not in API commit list → evidence of force-push\u002Fdeletion\n\n**Reference**: See [evidence-types.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fevidence-types.md) for GH event types.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 3: Wayback Machine Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You query the WAYBACK MACHINE CDX API ONLY. Do not use the GitHub API.\n\n**Goal**: Recover deleted GitHub pages (READMEs, issues, PRs, releases, wiki pages).\n\n**Actions**:\n```bash\n# Search for archived snapshots of the repo main page\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO&output=json&limit=100&from=YYYYMMDD&to=YYYYMMDD\" > wayback_main.json\n\n# Search for a specific deleted issue\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fissues\u002FNUM&output=json&limit=50\" > wayback_issue_NUM.json\n\n# Search for a specific deleted PR\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fpull\u002FNUM&output=json&limit=50\" > wayback_pr_NUM.json\n\n# Fetch the best snapshot of a page\n# Use the Wayback Machine URL: https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fweb\u002FTIMESTAMP\u002FORIGINAL_URL\n# Example: https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fweb\u002F20240101000000*\u002Fgithub.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\n\n# Advanced: Search for deleted releases\u002Ftags\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Freleases\u002Ftag\u002F*&output=json\" > wayback_tags.json\n\n# Advanced: Search for historical wiki changes\ncurl -s \"https:\u002F\u002Fweb.archive.org\u002Fcdx\u002Fsearch\u002Fcdx?url=github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fwiki\u002F*&output=json\" > wayback_wiki.json\n```\n\n**Evidence to collect**:\n- Archived snapshots of deleted issues\u002FPRs with their content\n- Historical README versions showing changes\n- Evidence of content present in archive but missing from current GitHub state\n\n**Reference**: See [github-archive-guide.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fgithub-archive-guide.md) for CDX API parameters.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 4: GH Archive \u002F BigQuery Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You query GITHUB ARCHIVE via BIGQUERY ONLY. This is a tamper-proof record of all public GitHub events.\n\n> **Prerequisites**: Requires Google Cloud credentials with BigQuery access (`gcloud auth application-default login`). If unavailable, skip this investigator and note it in the report.\n\n**Cost Optimization Rules** (MANDATORY):\n1. ALWAYS run a `--dry_run` before every query to estimate cost.\n2. Use `_TABLE_SUFFIX` to filter by date range and minimize scanned data.\n3. Only SELECT the columns you need.\n4. Add a LIMIT unless aggregating.\n\n```bash\n# Template: safe BigQuery query for PushEvents to OWNER\u002FREPO\nbq query --use_legacy_sql=false --dry_run \"\nSELECT created_at, actor.login, payload.commits, payload.before, payload.head,\n       payload.size, payload.distinct_size\nFROM \\`githubarchive.month.*\\`\nWHERE _TABLE_SUFFIX BETWEEN 'YYYYMM' AND 'YYYYMM'\n  AND type = 'PushEvent'\n  AND repo.name = 'OWNER\u002FREPO'\nLIMIT 1000\n\"\n# If cost is acceptable, re-run without --dry_run\n\n# Detect force-pushes: zero-distinct_size PushEvents mean commits were force-erased\n# payload.distinct_size = 0 AND payload.size > 0 → force push indicator\n\n# Check for deleted branch events\nbq query --use_legacy_sql=false \"\nSELECT created_at, actor.login, payload.ref, payload.ref_type\nFROM \\`githubarchive.month.*\\`\nWHERE _TABLE_SUFFIX BETWEEN 'YYYYMM' AND 'YYYYMM'\n  AND type = 'DeleteEvent'\n  AND repo.name = 'OWNER\u002FREPO'\nLIMIT 200\n\"\n```\n\n**Evidence to collect**:\n- Force-push events (payload.size > 0, payload.distinct_size = 0)\n- DeleteEvents for branches\u002Ftags\n- WorkflowRunEvents for suspicious CI\u002FCD automation\n- PushEvents that precede a \"gap\" in the git log (evidence of rewrite)\n\n**Reference**: See [github-archive-guide.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fgithub-archive-guide.md) for all 12 event types and query patterns.\n\n---\n\n### Investigator 5: IOC Enrichment Investigator\n\n**ROLE BOUNDARY**: You enrich EXISTING IOCs from Phase 1 using passive public sources ONLY. Do not execute any code from the target repository.\n\n**Actions**:\n- For each commit SHA: attempt recovery via direct GitHub URL (`github.com\u002FOWNER\u002FREPO\u002Fcommit\u002FSHA.patch`)\n- For each domain\u002FIP: check passive DNS, WHOIS records (via `web_extract` on public WHOIS services)\n- For each package name: check npm\u002FPyPI for matching malicious package reports\n- For each actor username: check GitHub profile, contribution history, account age\n- Recover force-pushed commits using 3 methods (see [recovery-techniques.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Frecovery-techniques.md))\n\n---\n\n## Phase 3: Evidence Consolidation\n\nAfter all investigators complete:\n\n1. Run `python SKILL_DIR\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py --store evidence.json list` to see all collected evidence.\n2. For each piece of evidence, verify the `content_sha256` hash matches the original source.\n3. Group evidence by:\n   - **Timeline**: Sort all timestamped evidence chronologically\n   - **Actor**: Group by GitHub handle or email\n   - **IOC**: Link evidence to the IOC it relates to\n4. Identify **discrepancies**: items present in one source but absent in another (key deletion indicators).\n5. Flag evidence as `[VERIFIED]` (confirmed from 2+ independent sources) or `[UNVERIFIED]` (single source only).\n\n---\n\n## Phase 4: Hypothesis Formation\n\nA hypothesis must:\n- State a specific claim (e.g., \"Actor X force-pushed to BRANCH on DATE to erase commit SHA\")\n- Cite at least 2 evidence IDs that support it (`EV-XXXX`, `EV-YYYY`)\n- Identify what evidence would disprove it\n- Be labeled `[HYPOTHESIS]` until validated\n\n**Common hypothesis templates** (see [investigation-templates.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Finvestigation-templates.md)):\n- Maintainer Compromise: legitimate account used post-takeover to inject malicious code\n- Dependency Confusion: package name squatting to intercept installs\n- CI\u002FCD Injection: malicious workflow changes to run code during builds\n- Typosquatting: near-identical package name targeting misspellers\n- Credential Leak: token\u002Fkey accidentally committed then force-pushed to erase\n\nFor each hypothesis, spawn a `delegate_task` sub-agent to attempt to find disconfirming evidence before confirming.\n\n---\n\n## Phase 5: Hypothesis Validation\n\nThe validator sub-agent MUST mechanically check:\n\n1. For each hypothesis, extract all cited evidence IDs.\n2. Verify each ID exists in `evidence.json` (hard failure if any ID is missing → hypothesis rejected as potentially fabricated).\n3. Verify each `[VERIFIED]` piece of evidence was confirmed from 2+ sources.\n4. Check logical consistency: does the timeline depicted by the evidence support the hypothesis?\n5. Check for alternative explanations: could the same evidence pattern arise from a benign cause?\n\n**Output**:\n- `VALIDATED`: All evidence cited, verified, logically consistent, no plausible alternative explanation.\n- `INCONCLUSIVE`: Evidence supports hypothesis but alternative explanations exist or evidence is insufficient.\n- `REJECTED`: Missing evidence IDs, unverified evidence cited as fact, logical inconsistency detected.\n\nRejected hypotheses feed back into Phase 4 for refinement (max 3 iterations).\n\n---\n\n## Phase 6: Final Report Generation\n\nPopulate `investigation-report.md` using the template in [forensic-report.md](.\u002Ftemplates\u002Fforensic-report.md).\n\n**Mandatory sections**:\n- Executive Summary: one-paragraph verdict (Compromised \u002F Clean \u002F Inconclusive) with confidence level\n- Timeline: chronological reconstruction of all significant events with evidence citations\n- Validated Hypotheses: each with status and supporting evidence IDs\n- Evidence Registry: table of all `EV-XXXX` entries with source, type, and verification status\n- IOC List: all extracted and enriched Indicators of Compromise\n- Chain of Custody: how evidence was collected, from what sources, at what timestamps\n- Recommendations: immediate mitigations if compromise detected; monitoring recommendations\n\n**Report rules**:\n- Every factual claim must have at least one `[EV-XXXX]` citation\n- Executive Summary must state confidence level (High \u002F Medium \u002F Low)\n- All secrets\u002Fcredentials must be redacted to `[REDACTED]`\n\n---\n\n## Phase 7: Completion\n\n1. Run final evidence count: `python SKILL_DIR\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py --store evidence.json list`\n2. Archive the full investigation directory.\n3. If compromise is confirmed:\n   - List immediate mitigations (rotate credentials, pin dependency hashes, notify affected users)\n   - Identify affected versions\u002Fpackages\n   - Note disclosure obligations (if a public package: coordinate with the package registry)\n4. Present the final `investigation-report.md` to the user.\n\n---\n\n## Ethical Use Guidelines\n\nThis skill is designed for **defensive security investigation** — protecting open-source software from supply chain attacks. It must not be used for:\n\n- **Harassment or stalking** of contributors or maintainers\n- **Doxing** — correlating GitHub activity to real identities for malicious purposes\n- **Competitive intelligence** — investigating proprietary or internal repositories without authorization\n- **False accusations** — publishing investigation results without validated evidence (see anti-hallucination guardrails)\n\nInvestigations should be conducted with the principle of **minimal intrusion**: collect only the evidence necessary to validate or refute the hypothesis. When publishing results, follow responsible disclosure practices and coordinate with affected maintainers before public disclosure.\n\nIf the investigation reveals a genuine compromise, follow the coordinated vulnerability disclosure process:\n1. Notify the repository maintainers privately first\n2. Allow reasonable time for remediation (typically 90 days)\n3. Coordinate with package registries (npm, PyPI, etc.) if published packages are affected\n4. File a CVE if appropriate\n\n---\n\n## API Rate Limiting\n\nGitHub REST API enforces rate limits that will interrupt large investigations if not managed.\n\n**Authenticated requests**: 5,000\u002Fhour (requires `GITHUB_TOKEN` env var or `gh` CLI auth)\n**Unauthenticated requests**: 60\u002Fhour (unusable for investigations)\n\n**Best practices**:\n- Always authenticate: `export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_...` or use `gh` CLI (auto-authenticates)\n- Use conditional requests (`If-None-Match` \u002F `If-Modified-Since` headers) to avoid consuming quota on unchanged data\n- For paginated endpoints, fetch all pages in sequence — don't parallelize against the same endpoint\n- Check `X-RateLimit-Remaining` header; if below 100, pause for `X-RateLimit-Reset` timestamp\n- BigQuery has its own quotas (10 TiB\u002Fday free tier) — always dry-run first\n- Wayback Machine CDX API: no formal rate limit, but be courteous (1-2 req\u002Fsec max)\n\nIf rate-limited mid-investigation, record the partial results in the evidence store and note the limitation in the report.\n\n---\n\n## Reference Materials\n\n- [github-archive-guide.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fgithub-archive-guide.md) — BigQuery queries, CDX API, 12 event types\n- [evidence-types.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Fevidence-types.md) — IOC taxonomy, evidence source types, observation types\n- [recovery-techniques.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Frecovery-techniques.md) — Recovering deleted commits, PRs, issues\n- [investigation-templates.md](.\u002Freferences\u002Finvestigation-templates.md) — Pre-built hypothesis templates per attack type\n- [evidence-store.py](.\u002Fscripts\u002Fevidence-store.py) — CLI tool for managing the evidence JSON store\n- [forensic-report.md](.\u002Ftemplates\u002Fforensic-report.md) — Structured report template\n",{"name":5,"author":23,"license":14,"version":24,"category":25,"metadata":26,"toolsets":34,"triggers":39,"platforms":50,"description":7},"Teknium (teknium1), Hermes 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