[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M733DZ2P47V4E6VT25DC6612":3,"skill-same:01M733DZ2P47V4E6VT25DC6612":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M733DZ2P47V4E6VT25DC6612","log-strategy",null,"Design logging that supports investigations without becoming a privacy liability. Covers what to log and what never to log (PII, secrets), structured logging, retention tiers, centralization choices, alert routing, and the operational-versus-access-versus-audit log split. Invoke when starting a new service, when investigation revealed missing log fields, or when log volume is becoming expensive.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--log-strategy\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: log-strategy\ndescription: Design logging that supports investigations without becoming a privacy liability. Covers what to log and what never to log (PII, secrets), structured logging, retention tiers, centralization choices, alert routing, and the operational-versus-access-versus-audit log split. Invoke when starting a new service, when investigation revealed missing log fields, or when log volume is becoming expensive.\n---\n\n# Log Strategy\n\nMost teams either log too little to investigate anything or too much to find anything (and end up storing PII they didn't mean to). This skill is the middle path: enough to support incident response, not so much that the log becomes a liability of its own.\n\nPairs with [`incident-response`](..\u002Fincident-response\u002FSKILL.md) (where logs get used) and [`gdpr-technical-controls`](..\u002Fgdpr-technical-controls\u002FSKILL.md) (where log privacy lives).\n\n## When to invoke\n\n- Starting a new service or workflow\n- Investigation revealed missing fields (\"we don't know what request triggered this\")\n- Logs are leaking PII or secrets\n- Log volume is becoming expensive \u002F unwieldy\n- Consolidating to a central logging stack (Loki, ELK, OpenObserve, hosted)\n- After an incident where the log was insufficient\n\n## Three classes of log, three retention tiers\n\nTreat your logs as three distinct streams. Conflating them is where the trouble starts.\n\n| Class | Purpose | Typical retention | Storage tier |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| **Operational** | Debugging, performance, errors | 7–30 days | Hot index |\n| **Access** | Who hit what, when (webserver + app request log) | 30–90 days | Hot + warm |\n| **Audit** | Security-relevant events (auth, permission changes, sensitive actions) | 12 months+ | Append-only, immutable where possible |\n\nCosts and tools differ per class. Mixing them gives the audit log's slow-and-expensive retention to the operational stream and is the most common reason logging gets killed by finance.\n\n## Operational logs — what to capture\n\nStructured logging beats freeform every time. Choose JSON (or logfmt) and a single library for the whole app.\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F pino example — Node\nimport pino from 'pino';\n\nconst log = pino({\n  level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL ?? 'info',\n  redact: {\n    paths: ['password', 'token', 'authorization', '*.password', '*.token', 'req.headers.authorization', 'req.headers.cookie'],\n    censor: '[REDACTED]',\n  },\n  serializers: {\n    req: (req) => ({\n      method: req.method,\n      url: req.url,\n      requestId: req.id,\n      \u002F\u002F explicitly NOT: headers (except a few safe ones), body\n    }),\n    err: pino.stdSerializers.err,\n  },\n});\n\nlog.info({ orderId, userId: anonymize(userId) }, 'order created');\nlog.warn({ requestId, latencyMs }, 'slow query');\nlog.error({ requestId, err }, 'unhandled error in handler');\n```\n\nPatterns:\n\n- **One event per line, structured**. Greppable, parseable by any log system.\n- **A `requestId` \u002F `traceId` on every log line** within a request — lets you reconstruct a request's full path. Generate at the edge (Nginx \u002F Cloudflare \u002F app middleware), pass through to downstream services.\n- **Log levels mean something**. `error` = an unhandled exception or a degraded user outcome; `warn` = a recoverable surprise; `info` = state changes worth knowing about; `debug` = noisy diagnostics that ship off by default.\n- **No secrets, no PII** — redact in the serializer, not at the call site (humans forget; serializers don't).\n- **Bounded volume per request** — a handler logging 50 lines per request creates a $\u002Fmonth problem. Tighten before launch.\n\n## Access logs — webserver + app\n\nWebserver-level access logs (nginx, Caddy, Cloudflare logs) are usually fine with their defaults plus a few tweaks:\n\n```nginx\n# nginx — log format that includes useful diagnostic + minimal PII\nlog_format main escape=json '{'\n  '\"time\":\"$time_iso8601\",'\n  '\"remote_addr\":\"$remote_addr\",'           # consider hashing — see below\n  '\"request_id\":\"$request_id\",'\n  '\"method\":\"$request_method\",'\n  '\"path\":\"$request_uri\",'\n  '\"status\":$status,'\n  '\"body_bytes_sent\":$body_bytes_sent,'\n  '\"referer\":\"$http_referer\",'\n  '\"user_agent\":\"$http_user_agent\",'\n  '\"request_time\":$request_time,'\n  '\"upstream_response_time\":\"$upstream_response_time\"'\n'}';\naccess_log \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fnginx\u002Faccess.log main;\n```\n\nConsiderations:\n\n- **IPs in DACH\u002FEU** — full IP storage is widely treated as personal data. Options:\n  - Hash with HMAC + rotating key (anonymous but consistent within rotation window)\n  - Truncate to `\u002F24` for IPv4, `\u002F64` for IPv6 (lossy but acceptable for most analytics)\n  - Keep full only for the abuse-investigation tier with shorter retention (e.g. 7 days)\n- **No bodies in access logs**. Bodies leak passwords on login routes, payment data on checkout, PII on profile updates. The webserver default doesn't log bodies; don't be tempted by \"let's just log the request body for debugging\".\n- **Cookies and `Authorization` header** stripped — they include session identifiers and tokens.\n\n## Audit logs — security-relevant events\n\nThese are the events you want to find six months from now during an investigation.\n\nWhat deserves an audit-log entry:\n\n- **Authentication**: successful login, failed login, MFA challenge result, password change, password reset request, password reset use, account locked, email change request, email change confirm, account deletion\n- **Authorization**: role\u002Fpermission granted or revoked, admin actions affecting other users, sensitive data export (SAR), data deletion\n- **Configuration**: feature-flag flips, security-setting changes, API key issued\u002Frevoked, integration enabled\u002Fdisabled\n- **Sensitive data access**: who viewed which PII record, who exported the database, who downloaded an attachment containing PII\n- **Money-touching**: refunds issued, manual ledger adjustments, fee waivers, balance transfers\n\nPer entry, capture:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"ts\": \"2026-05-12T14:23:00Z\",\n  \"actor\": { \"type\": \"user\", \"id\": \"u_abc\", \"via\": \"session\" },\n  \"action\": \"user.password.reset.request\",\n  \"target\": { \"type\": \"user\", \"id\": \"u_abc\" },\n  \"context\": {\n    \"ip_hash\": \"...\",\n    \"user_agent\": \"...\",\n    \"request_id\": \"...\",\n    \"result\": \"ok\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nPatterns:\n\n- **Append-only.** Use a write-only database role, an append-only S3 bucket with object lock, or a managed audit-log service. The app's normal role must not be able to delete or update audit rows.\n- **Tamper-evidence** for high-stakes contexts: hash-chain each entry against the previous one, or write to a service that does (e.g. AWS QLDB, Tigris).\n- **Separate storage** from operational logs — different retention, different access controls.\n- **Indexed by actor, target, and action** for investigation queries.\n- **Visible to the user** for their own audit trail (\"recent activity\" view) — surfaces own compromises faster than you do.\n\n## What NEVER to log\n\nA handful of values that turn the log into a new liability:\n\n- Passwords, password hashes, password reset tokens\n- Session cookies \u002F `Authorization` headers \u002F API keys \u002F JWTs \u002F OAuth tokens\n- Credit card numbers, CVVs, bank account numbers (PCI scope explodes if you do)\n- Private keys, signing keys, encryption keys\n- Full social security \u002F national-ID numbers\n- Full email or phone of users when an identifier alone would do\n- Raw request\u002Fresponse bodies on any auth, payment, or profile endpoint\n\nIf a regex \u002F structured-log redactor catches these, you're protected when a future code change accidentally tries to log one.\n\n## Centralization choices\n\nPick a stack and stick to it. Mixing is operational hell.\n\n**Self-hosted options**:\n\n- **Grafana Loki + Promtail \u002F Vector** — store JSON logs in object storage, query in Grafana. Cheap, simple, fine for small\u002Fmedium scale.\n- **OpenSearch \u002F ELK** — full text + dashboarding. More moving parts.\n- **OpenObserve** — newer, integrates logs+metrics+traces, lower operational footprint than ELK.\n\n**Hosted options**:\n\n- **Datadog \u002F New Relic \u002F Honeycomb** — turn-key, expensive at volume, easiest pickup\n- **Better Stack \u002F Axiom \u002F Baselime** — affordable mid-tier\n- **Cloudflare Logpush** — if you're already on Cloudflare, ship to R2\u002FS3 cheaply\n\nFor audit logs specifically, consider a separate destination (immutable bucket, or a service like AWS CloudTrail \u002F Google Cloud Audit Logs equivalent).\n\n## Alerts vs logs\n\nLogs are for investigation; alerts are for getting woken up. They should not be the same thing.\n\n- **From operational logs**: 5xx rate per service, error-class spike, slow-query rate, queue depth\n- **From access logs**: spike in 4xx per route (especially 401\u002F403\u002F404), spike in 429, unusual ASNs\n- **From audit logs**: admin actions on other users, sensitive data exports, password-reset bursts on a single account, MFA-disabled events\n\nRoute each alert class to a different channel — paged for ops, weekly digest for audit anomalies, etc. Reduces alert fatigue.\n\n## Cost control\n\nLogs scale linearly with traffic; cost surprises are universal.\n\n- **Cap volume at the source.** A handler emitting 50 log lines per request is the most common cause of bills.\n- **Sample debug-level logs in production.** Keep 1–10% of `debug` and `trace`.\n- **Drop bot traffic at the ingest layer** if it's clean (otherwise it dominates the access log).\n- **Retain warm tier short, archive long.** Most queries hit the last 7 days; cold storage in S3\u002FR2 is pennies vs hot indexing.\n- **Reduce field count.** Every JSON key in every log line costs at index time. Audit which fields are queried, drop the rest.\n\n## Privacy checklist (DACH \u002F EU)\n\n- [ ] No bodies of POST\u002FPUT\u002FPATCH in access logs\n- [ ] IPs hashed\u002Ftruncated, or kept full only on a separate stream with short retention\n- [ ] `Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Set-Cookie` headers stripped\n- [ ] Known-sensitive JSON fields redacted in structured logs by key name\n- [ ] Retention period documented per log stream, matches privacy policy\n- [ ] Sub-processor list updated if logs ship to a hosted service\n- [ ] Audit logs separate from operational, with separate retention and access controls\n- [ ] Log queries by employees are themselves audited (who searched what)\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- Recommend logging request bodies on auth or payment routes\n- Help build a logging stack for systems you do not own\n- Replace a regulated-environment (HIPAA \u002F PCI \u002F SOC 2) audit-log requirement — those have specifics this doesn't cover\n","# Log Strategy\n\nMost teams either log too little to investigate anything or too much to find anything (and end up storing PII they didn't mean to). This skill is the middle path: enough to support incident response, not so much that the log becomes a liability of its own.\n\nPairs with [`incident-response`](..\u002Fincident-response\u002FSKILL.md) (where logs get used) and [`gdpr-technical-controls`](..\u002Fgdpr-technical-controls\u002FSKILL.md) (where log privacy lives).\n\n## When to invoke\n\n- Starting a new service or workflow\n- Investigation revealed missing fields (\"we don't know what request triggered this\")\n- Logs are leaking PII or secrets\n- Log volume is becoming expensive \u002F unwieldy\n- Consolidating to a central logging stack (Loki, ELK, OpenObserve, hosted)\n- After an incident where the log was insufficient\n\n## Three classes of log, three retention tiers\n\nTreat your logs as three distinct streams. Conflating them is where the trouble starts.\n\n| Class | Purpose | Typical retention | Storage tier |\n|---|---|---|---|\n| **Operational** | Debugging, performance, errors | 7–30 days | Hot index |\n| **Access** | Who hit what, when (webserver + app request log) | 30–90 days | Hot + warm |\n| **Audit** | Security-relevant events (auth, permission changes, sensitive actions) | 12 months+ | Append-only, immutable where possible |\n\nCosts and tools differ per class. Mixing them gives the audit log's slow-and-expensive retention to the operational stream and is the most common reason logging gets killed by finance.\n\n## Operational logs — what to capture\n\nStructured logging beats freeform every time. Choose JSON (or logfmt) and a single library for the whole app.\n\n```ts\n\u002F\u002F pino example — Node\nimport pino from 'pino';\n\nconst log = pino({\n  level: process.env.LOG_LEVEL ?? 'info',\n  redact: {\n    paths: ['password', 'token', 'authorization', '*.password', '*.token', 'req.headers.authorization', 'req.headers.cookie'],\n    censor: '[REDACTED]',\n  },\n  serializers: {\n    req: (req) => ({\n      method: req.method,\n      url: req.url,\n      requestId: req.id,\n      \u002F\u002F explicitly NOT: headers (except a few safe ones), body\n    }),\n    err: pino.stdSerializers.err,\n  },\n});\n\nlog.info({ orderId, userId: anonymize(userId) }, 'order created');\nlog.warn({ requestId, latencyMs }, 'slow query');\nlog.error({ requestId, err }, 'unhandled error in handler');\n```\n\nPatterns:\n\n- **One event per line, structured**. Greppable, parseable by any log system.\n- **A `requestId` \u002F `traceId` on every log line** within a request — lets you reconstruct a request's full path. Generate at the edge (Nginx \u002F Cloudflare \u002F app middleware), pass through to downstream services.\n- **Log levels mean something**. `error` = an unhandled exception or a degraded user outcome; `warn` = a recoverable surprise; `info` = state changes worth knowing about; `debug` = noisy diagnostics that ship off by default.\n- **No secrets, no PII** — redact in the serializer, not at the call site (humans forget; serializers don't).\n- **Bounded volume per request** — a handler logging 50 lines per request creates a $\u002Fmonth problem. Tighten before launch.\n\n## Access logs — webserver + app\n\nWebserver-level access logs (nginx, Caddy, Cloudflare logs) are usually fine with their defaults plus a few tweaks:\n\n```nginx\n# nginx — log format that includes useful diagnostic + minimal PII\nlog_format main escape=json '{'\n  '\"time\":\"$time_iso8601\",'\n  '\"remote_addr\":\"$remote_addr\",'           # consider hashing — see below\n  '\"request_id\":\"$request_id\",'\n  '\"method\":\"$request_method\",'\n  '\"path\":\"$request_uri\",'\n  '\"status\":$status,'\n  '\"body_bytes_sent\":$body_bytes_sent,'\n  '\"referer\":\"$http_referer\",'\n  '\"user_agent\":\"$http_user_agent\",'\n  '\"request_time\":$request_time,'\n  '\"upstream_response_time\":\"$upstream_response_time\"'\n'}';\naccess_log \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fnginx\u002Faccess.log main;\n```\n\nConsiderations:\n\n- **IPs in DACH\u002FEU** — full IP storage is widely treated as personal data. Options:\n  - Hash with HMAC + rotating key (anonymous but consistent within rotation window)\n  - Truncate to `\u002F24` for IPv4, `\u002F64` for IPv6 (lossy but acceptable for most analytics)\n  - Keep full only for the abuse-investigation tier with shorter retention (e.g. 7 days)\n- **No bodies in access logs**. Bodies leak passwords on login routes, payment data on checkout, PII on profile updates. The webserver default doesn't log bodies; don't be tempted by \"let's just log the request body for debugging\".\n- **Cookies and `Authorization` header** stripped — they include session identifiers and tokens.\n\n## Audit logs — security-relevant events\n\nThese are the events you want to find six months from now during an investigation.\n\nWhat deserves an audit-log entry:\n\n- **Authentication**: successful login, failed login, MFA challenge result, password change, password reset request, password reset use, account locked, email change request, email change confirm, account deletion\n- **Authorization**: role\u002Fpermission granted or revoked, admin actions affecting other users, sensitive data export (SAR), data deletion\n- **Configuration**: feature-flag flips, security-setting changes, API key issued\u002Frevoked, integration enabled\u002Fdisabled\n- **Sensitive data access**: who viewed which PII record, who exported the database, who downloaded an attachment containing PII\n- **Money-touching**: refunds issued, manual ledger adjustments, fee waivers, balance transfers\n\nPer entry, capture:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"ts\": \"2026-05-12T14:23:00Z\",\n  \"actor\": { \"type\": \"user\", \"id\": \"u_abc\", \"via\": \"session\" },\n  \"action\": \"user.password.reset.request\",\n  \"target\": { \"type\": \"user\", \"id\": \"u_abc\" },\n  \"context\": {\n    \"ip_hash\": \"...\",\n    \"user_agent\": \"...\",\n    \"request_id\": \"...\",\n    \"result\": \"ok\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nPatterns:\n\n- **Append-only.** Use a write-only database role, an append-only S3 bucket with object lock, or a managed audit-log service. The app's normal role must not be able to delete or update audit rows.\n- **Tamper-evidence** for high-stakes contexts: hash-chain each entry against the previous one, or write to a service that does (e.g. AWS QLDB, Tigris).\n- **Separate storage** from operational logs — different retention, different access controls.\n- **Indexed by actor, target, and action** for investigation queries.\n- **Visible to the user** for their own audit trail (\"recent activity\" view) — surfaces own compromises faster than you do.\n\n## What NEVER to log\n\nA handful of values that turn the log into a new liability:\n\n- Passwords, password hashes, password reset tokens\n- Session cookies \u002F `Authorization` headers \u002F API keys \u002F JWTs \u002F OAuth tokens\n- Credit card numbers, CVVs, bank account numbers (PCI scope explodes if you do)\n- Private keys, signing keys, encryption keys\n- Full social security \u002F national-ID numbers\n- Full email or phone of users when an identifier alone would do\n- Raw request\u002Fresponse bodies on any auth, payment, or profile endpoint\n\nIf a regex \u002F structured-log redactor catches these, you're protected when a future code change accidentally tries to log one.\n\n## Centralization choices\n\nPick a stack and stick to it. Mixing is operational hell.\n\n**Self-hosted options**:\n\n- **Grafana Loki + Promtail \u002F Vector** — store JSON logs in object storage, query in Grafana. Cheap, simple, fine for small\u002Fmedium scale.\n- **OpenSearch \u002F ELK** — full text + dashboarding. More moving parts.\n- **OpenObserve** — newer, integrates logs+metrics+traces, lower operational footprint than ELK.\n\n**Hosted options**:\n\n- **Datadog \u002F New Relic \u002F Honeycomb** — turn-key, expensive at volume, easiest pickup\n- **Better Stack \u002F Axiom \u002F Baselime** — affordable mid-tier\n- **Cloudflare Logpush** — if you're already on Cloudflare, ship to R2\u002FS3 cheaply\n\nFor audit logs specifically, consider a separate destination (immutable bucket, or a service like AWS CloudTrail \u002F Google Cloud Audit Logs equivalent).\n\n## Alerts vs logs\n\nLogs are for investigation; alerts are for getting woken up. They should not be the same thing.\n\n- **From operational logs**: 5xx rate per service, error-class spike, slow-query rate, queue depth\n- **From access logs**: spike in 4xx per route (especially 401\u002F403\u002F404), spike in 429, unusual ASNs\n- **From audit logs**: admin actions on other users, sensitive data exports, password-reset bursts on a single account, MFA-disabled events\n\nRoute each alert class to a different channel — paged for ops, weekly digest for audit anomalies, etc. Reduces alert fatigue.\n\n## Cost control\n\nLogs scale linearly with traffic; cost surprises are universal.\n\n- **Cap volume at the source.** A handler emitting 50 log lines per request is the most common cause of bills.\n- **Sample debug-level logs in production.** Keep 1–10% of `debug` and `trace`.\n- **Drop bot traffic at the ingest layer** if it's clean (otherwise it dominates the access log).\n- **Retain warm tier short, archive long.** Most queries hit the last 7 days; cold storage in S3\u002FR2 is pennies vs hot indexing.\n- **Reduce field count.** Every JSON key in every log line costs at index time. Audit which fields are queried, drop the rest.\n\n## Privacy checklist (DACH \u002F EU)\n\n- [ ] No bodies of POST\u002FPUT\u002FPATCH in access logs\n- [ ] IPs hashed\u002Ftruncated, or kept full only on a separate stream with short retention\n- [ ] `Authorization`, `Cookie`, `Set-Cookie` headers stripped\n- [ ] Known-sensitive JSON fields redacted in structured logs by key name\n- [ ] Retention period documented per log stream, matches privacy policy\n- [ ] Sub-processor list updated if logs ship to a hosted service\n- [ ] Audit logs separate from operational, with separate retention and access controls\n- [ ] Log queries by employees are themselves audited (who searched what)\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- Recommend logging request bodies on auth or payment routes\n- Help build a logging stack for systems you do not own\n- Replace a regulated-environment (HIPAA \u002F PCI \u002F SOC 2) audit-log requirement — those have specifics this doesn't cover\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa",".claude\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--log-strategy",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill log-strategy",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill log-strategy",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill log-strategy","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--log-strategy\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,64,72,80,88],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":53,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":68,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":76,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":19},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]