[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M733BJGDKEDQC8KHJSCH55GH":3,"skill-same:01M733BJGDKEDQC8KHJSCH55GH":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":24,"commitSha":25,"skillDirectory":26,"forksCount":27,"repositoryHtmlUrl":28,"repositoryHomepageUrl":29,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M733BJGDKEDQC8KHJSCH55GH","cloudflare-hardening",null,"Harden a site behind Cloudflare end-to-end, from account to zone to origin. Covers DNS hygiene, origin-IP protection via Authenticated Origin Pulls and IP allowlisting, WAF managed rules, Bot Fight Mode, rate limiting, Transform Rules for security headers, Zero Trust Access for admin paths, and R2 \u002F Pages security. Invoke when onboarding a domain, when the origin IP may be exposed, or after an attack.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--cloudflare-hardening\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: cloudflare-hardening\ndescription: Harden a site behind Cloudflare end-to-end, from account to zone to origin. Covers DNS hygiene, origin-IP protection via Authenticated Origin Pulls and IP allowlisting, WAF managed rules, Bot Fight Mode, rate limiting, Transform Rules for security headers, Zero Trust Access for admin paths, and R2 \u002F Pages security. Invoke when onboarding a domain, when the origin IP may be exposed, or after an attack.\n---\n\n# Cloudflare Hardening\n\nCloudflare gives you a powerful edge layer for free, but its defaults are conservative — most of the protection is opt-in. This skill walks the security-relevant settings and the ones that catch people out.\n\nApplies to Cloudflare's main product (DNS + Proxy + WAF + Workers\u002FPages\u002FR2). Not Magic Transit \u002F Spectrum specifics.\n\n## When to invoke\n\n- Domain just onboarded to Cloudflare\n- Site behind CF was scraped, brute-forced, or DDoSed\n- Origin IP may be exposed (showed up in `dnshistory`, accidentally A-recorded)\n- Periodic review of an existing public site\n- Setting up Cloudflare Pages or R2 with a custom domain\n\n## Step 1 — Lock the account itself\n\nBefore site settings, harden the account.\n\n- **2FA on the account** with WebAuthn \u002F hardware key, not SMS\n- **API tokens, not Global API Key** — Global API Key has account-wide power and cannot be scoped\n- **Audit Logs** — `Account → Audit Log` shows who did what; review monthly\n- **Members** — separate humans from automation; each automation gets its own scoped token\n\nAPI tokens: scope to **specific zones + specific permissions**. A common mistake is creating a \"DNS edit\" token at account level when only one zone needs it.\n\n## Step 2 — DNS and proxy posture\n\n```\nZone → DNS → Records\n```\n\n- **All public hostnames proxied (orange cloud)** unless you have a specific reason for grey-cloud (e.g. mail records — MX must be grey)\n- **Origin IP must not be in any public DNS record** — common leaks:\n  - Direct A record for `direct.example.com` or `origin.example.com` left over\n  - MX pointing to a host on the same IP as the web origin (move mail to a separate IP\u002Fhost)\n  - SPF\u002FTXT records containing IP literals that match the origin\n- **DNSSEC** — enable in `DNS → Settings`. Requires DS record at the registrar.\n- **CAA records** — restrict who can issue certs for your domain. Cloudflare adds these automatically if you turn it on.\n\nIf your origin IP is known-leaked, **rotate it** — provider panel usually lets you re-assign. Pair with origin allowlist (next step).\n\n## Step 3 — Origin allowlist (defense-in-depth)\n\nCloudflare proxy is useless if attackers can hit the origin IP directly. Two complementary controls:\n\n**1. Authenticated Origin Pulls** — origin only accepts TLS connections that present Cloudflare's client cert.\n\n```\nZone → SSL\u002FTLS → Origin Server → Authenticated Origin Pulls\n```\n\nThen on your origin nginx:\n\n```nginx\nssl_client_certificate \u002Fetc\u002Fssl\u002Fcloudflare\u002Fauthenticated_origin_pull_ca.pem;\nssl_verify_client on;\n```\n\n**2. Firewall the origin to Cloudflare's IPs only** — at the VPS, restrict 80\u002F443 to CF's published ranges:\n\n```bash\n# Fetch and ufw-allow only Cloudflare IPs (refresh on a cron)\nsudo ufw delete allow 80\u002Ftcp\nsudo ufw delete allow 443\u002Ftcp\nfor ip in $(curl -s https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cloudflare.com\u002Fips-v4); do\n  sudo ufw allow from \"$ip\" to any port 80,443 proto tcp comment 'cloudflare'\ndone\nfor ip in $(curl -s https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cloudflare.com\u002Fips-v6); do\n  sudo ufw allow from \"$ip\" to any port 80,443 proto tcp comment 'cloudflare-v6'\ndone\nsudo ufw reload\n```\n\nEither alone is acceptable; both is best. Without one of them, the proxy provides little hardening because attackers will bypass it.\n\n## Step 4 — TLS\n\n```\nZone → SSL\u002FTLS\n```\n\n- **Encryption mode**: **Full (strict)** — anything less either allows MITM (Full, not strict) or runs plaintext between CF and origin (Flexible). Flexible is a footgun; do not use.\n- **Minimum TLS Version**: 1.2 minimum, 1.3 if your audience tolerates it\n- **Always Use HTTPS**: on\n- **Automatic HTTPS Rewrites**: on\n- **HSTS** — apply via `Edge Certificates → HSTS`. `max-age=31536000`, `includeSubDomains`, preload only if you understand the lock-in.\n\n## Step 5 — WAF and Bot management\n\n```\nZone → Security → WAF\n```\n\n- **Managed Rules → Cloudflare Managed Ruleset**: on, default action `Managed Challenge`\n- **OWASP Core Ruleset**: on, but watch for false positives — start in Log mode, then escalate\n- **Custom Rules** for your stack:\n\n```\n# Block direct access to wp-admin from outside your country (adjust)\n(http.request.uri.path contains \"\u002Fwp-admin\" or http.request.uri.path contains \"\u002Fwp-login.php\")\n  and ip.geoip.country ne \"AT\"\n→ Action: Managed Challenge\n\n# Block known abusive paths\nhttp.request.uri.path in {\"\u002F.git\u002Fconfig\" \"\u002F.env\" \"\u002Fwp-config.php.bak\" \"\u002Fserver-status\"}\n→ Action: Block\n\n# Tighten login endpoints\nhttp.request.uri.path eq \"\u002Fwp-login.php\" and http.request.method eq \"POST\"\n→ Action: Managed Challenge\n\n# Hide xmlrpc unless you actually use it\nhttp.request.uri.path eq \"\u002Fxmlrpc.php\"\n→ Action: Block\n```\n\n- **Bot Fight Mode** (free tier): on. Catches dumb scrapers. False positives are rare.\n- **Super Bot Fight Mode** (paid): better, distinguishes verified bots from definitely-automated traffic.\n- **Rate Limiting Rules** — free tier gives one rule; use it well:\n\n```\nhttp.request.uri.path eq \"\u002Fwp-login.php\" → 5 requests \u002F 1 minute per IP → Block 10m\n```\n\n## Step 6 — Security headers via Transform Rules\n\nYou can inject headers without touching the origin. `Rules → Transform Rules → Modify Response Header`:\n\n```\nSet: Strict-Transport-Security  =  max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\nSet: X-Content-Type-Options     =  nosniff\nSet: Referrer-Policy            =  strict-origin-when-cross-origin\nSet: Permissions-Policy         =  camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), interest-cohort=()\nSet: Content-Security-Policy    =  \u003Csee below — app-specific>\n```\n\nCSP is too app-specific to template here. Start in **`Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`** with a permissive baseline, watch the reports for a week, tighten, then promote to enforcing.\n\n## Step 7 — Zero Trust Access for admin paths\n\n`\u002Fwp-admin`, `\u002Fadmin`, `\u002Fstaging`, `\u002Fapi\u002Finternal\u002F*` should not be reachable from the open internet for most projects. Cloudflare Zero Trust (free for ≤ 50 users) gives you SSO-gated access:\n\n```\nCloudflare Zero Trust → Access → Applications → Add → Self-hosted\n```\n\n- Application domain: `*.example.com\u002Fwp-admin*`\n- Identity provider: Google\u002FGitHub\u002Femail-OTP\n- Policy: `Allow → emails in @yourcompany.com` or specific list\n\nNow `\u002Fwp-admin` requires SSO before traffic reaches the origin at all. Brute-force on the WP login endpoint stops being your problem.\n\n## Step 8 — Cache and Page Rules\n\n(New zones: Page Rules are being phased out in favor of `Cache Rules`, `Configuration Rules`, `Origin Rules`, and `Single Redirects`.)\n\n- **Cache static assets aggressively**, but never cache responses with `Set-Cookie` or auth headers\n- **Bypass cache for** `\u002Fwp-admin\u002F*`, `\u002Fwp-login.php`, `\u002Fcart\u002F*`, `\u002Fcheckout\u002F*`, `\u002Fapi\u002F*` — auth and per-user content\n- **Always Use HTTPS** as a Configuration Rule, not a workaround\n- **Single Redirect** is the modern replacement for the \"forward url\" Page Rule\n\n## Step 9 — Cloudflare Pages security\n\nIf you use Pages:\n\n- **Branch deploy previews** are public by default — gate them with Access if they contain anything non-public\n- **Environment variables** marked as Secret are not exposed to client bundles, but `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` and similar prefixes still go to the browser. Audit which env vars exist and where they end up.\n- **`_headers` file** in the output directory applies headers per path — convenient for static-site CSP\n- **Custom domain CNAME** must be a CF-orange-clouded record on a CF-managed zone\n\n## Step 10 — R2 buckets\n\n- **Public buckets** — only for content actually meant to be public. Check `Bucket → Settings → Public access`.\n- **Custom domain on R2** — use it for public assets; never bind sensitive buckets to public custom domains\n- **CORS** — restrict origins, do not use `*` unless you understand it\n- **Object listing** — disable public listing; serve specific objects, not directory enumeration\n\n## Step 11 — Audit and monitoring\n\n```\nZone → Security → Events\nZone → Analytics → Security\n```\n\n- Review weekly for the first month, then monthly\n- Look for: unusual ASNs, sustained 4xx\u002F5xx from one source, spikes in Managed Challenge issuances\n- For paid tiers: alerts on rule actions, expensive queries to Workers\n\n## Step 12 — Periodic re-audit\n\nOnce a quarter, walk through:\n\n- [ ] All DNS records still in use; remove orphans\n- [ ] No DNS record exposes origin IP\n- [ ] Authenticated Origin Pulls + origin firewall still in place\n- [ ] WAF rules still match current app paths\n- [ ] CSP still matches frontend (after deploys it can drift)\n- [ ] No new public R2 buckets without intent\n- [ ] No new long-lived API tokens with broad scope; rotate ones older than 90 days\n- [ ] Zero Trust app list matches current team\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- Recommend Flexible SSL or any setting that allows plaintext between CF and origin\n- Help bypass Cloudflare protection on a site you do not own\n- Endorse leaving origin IP discoverable when the site is intentionally proxied\n","# Cloudflare Hardening\n\nCloudflare gives you a powerful edge layer for free, but its defaults are conservative — most of the protection is opt-in. This skill walks the security-relevant settings and the ones that catch people out.\n\nApplies to Cloudflare's main product (DNS + Proxy + WAF + Workers\u002FPages\u002FR2). Not Magic Transit \u002F Spectrum specifics.\n\n## When to invoke\n\n- Domain just onboarded to Cloudflare\n- Site behind CF was scraped, brute-forced, or DDoSed\n- Origin IP may be exposed (showed up in `dnshistory`, accidentally A-recorded)\n- Periodic review of an existing public site\n- Setting up Cloudflare Pages or R2 with a custom domain\n\n## Step 1 — Lock the account itself\n\nBefore site settings, harden the account.\n\n- **2FA on the account** with WebAuthn \u002F hardware key, not SMS\n- **API tokens, not Global API Key** — Global API Key has account-wide power and cannot be scoped\n- **Audit Logs** — `Account → Audit Log` shows who did what; review monthly\n- **Members** — separate humans from automation; each automation gets its own scoped token\n\nAPI tokens: scope to **specific zones + specific permissions**. A common mistake is creating a \"DNS edit\" token at account level when only one zone needs it.\n\n## Step 2 — DNS and proxy posture\n\n```\nZone → DNS → Records\n```\n\n- **All public hostnames proxied (orange cloud)** unless you have a specific reason for grey-cloud (e.g. mail records — MX must be grey)\n- **Origin IP must not be in any public DNS record** — common leaks:\n  - Direct A record for `direct.example.com` or `origin.example.com` left over\n  - MX pointing to a host on the same IP as the web origin (move mail to a separate IP\u002Fhost)\n  - SPF\u002FTXT records containing IP literals that match the origin\n- **DNSSEC** — enable in `DNS → Settings`. Requires DS record at the registrar.\n- **CAA records** — restrict who can issue certs for your domain. Cloudflare adds these automatically if you turn it on.\n\nIf your origin IP is known-leaked, **rotate it** — provider panel usually lets you re-assign. Pair with origin allowlist (next step).\n\n## Step 3 — Origin allowlist (defense-in-depth)\n\nCloudflare proxy is useless if attackers can hit the origin IP directly. Two complementary controls:\n\n**1. Authenticated Origin Pulls** — origin only accepts TLS connections that present Cloudflare's client cert.\n\n```\nZone → SSL\u002FTLS → Origin Server → Authenticated Origin Pulls\n```\n\nThen on your origin nginx:\n\n```nginx\nssl_client_certificate \u002Fetc\u002Fssl\u002Fcloudflare\u002Fauthenticated_origin_pull_ca.pem;\nssl_verify_client on;\n```\n\n**2. Firewall the origin to Cloudflare's IPs only** — at the VPS, restrict 80\u002F443 to CF's published ranges:\n\n```bash\n# Fetch and ufw-allow only Cloudflare IPs (refresh on a cron)\nsudo ufw delete allow 80\u002Ftcp\nsudo ufw delete allow 443\u002Ftcp\nfor ip in $(curl -s https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cloudflare.com\u002Fips-v4); do\n  sudo ufw allow from \"$ip\" to any port 80,443 proto tcp comment 'cloudflare'\ndone\nfor ip in $(curl -s https:\u002F\u002Fwww.cloudflare.com\u002Fips-v6); do\n  sudo ufw allow from \"$ip\" to any port 80,443 proto tcp comment 'cloudflare-v6'\ndone\nsudo ufw reload\n```\n\nEither alone is acceptable; both is best. Without one of them, the proxy provides little hardening because attackers will bypass it.\n\n## Step 4 — TLS\n\n```\nZone → SSL\u002FTLS\n```\n\n- **Encryption mode**: **Full (strict)** — anything less either allows MITM (Full, not strict) or runs plaintext between CF and origin (Flexible). Flexible is a footgun; do not use.\n- **Minimum TLS Version**: 1.2 minimum, 1.3 if your audience tolerates it\n- **Always Use HTTPS**: on\n- **Automatic HTTPS Rewrites**: on\n- **HSTS** — apply via `Edge Certificates → HSTS`. `max-age=31536000`, `includeSubDomains`, preload only if you understand the lock-in.\n\n## Step 5 — WAF and Bot management\n\n```\nZone → Security → WAF\n```\n\n- **Managed Rules → Cloudflare Managed Ruleset**: on, default action `Managed Challenge`\n- **OWASP Core Ruleset**: on, but watch for false positives — start in Log mode, then escalate\n- **Custom Rules** for your stack:\n\n```\n# Block direct access to wp-admin from outside your country (adjust)\n(http.request.uri.path contains \"\u002Fwp-admin\" or http.request.uri.path contains \"\u002Fwp-login.php\")\n  and ip.geoip.country ne \"AT\"\n→ Action: Managed Challenge\n\n# Block known abusive paths\nhttp.request.uri.path in {\"\u002F.git\u002Fconfig\" \"\u002F.env\" \"\u002Fwp-config.php.bak\" \"\u002Fserver-status\"}\n→ Action: Block\n\n# Tighten login endpoints\nhttp.request.uri.path eq \"\u002Fwp-login.php\" and http.request.method eq \"POST\"\n→ Action: Managed Challenge\n\n# Hide xmlrpc unless you actually use it\nhttp.request.uri.path eq \"\u002Fxmlrpc.php\"\n→ Action: Block\n```\n\n- **Bot Fight Mode** (free tier): on. Catches dumb scrapers. False positives are rare.\n- **Super Bot Fight Mode** (paid): better, distinguishes verified bots from definitely-automated traffic.\n- **Rate Limiting Rules** — free tier gives one rule; use it well:\n\n```\nhttp.request.uri.path eq \"\u002Fwp-login.php\" → 5 requests \u002F 1 minute per IP → Block 10m\n```\n\n## Step 6 — Security headers via Transform Rules\n\nYou can inject headers without touching the origin. `Rules → Transform Rules → Modify Response Header`:\n\n```\nSet: Strict-Transport-Security  =  max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains\nSet: X-Content-Type-Options     =  nosniff\nSet: Referrer-Policy            =  strict-origin-when-cross-origin\nSet: Permissions-Policy         =  camera=(), microphone=(), geolocation=(), interest-cohort=()\nSet: Content-Security-Policy    =  \u003Csee below — app-specific>\n```\n\nCSP is too app-specific to template here. Start in **`Content-Security-Policy-Report-Only`** with a permissive baseline, watch the reports for a week, tighten, then promote to enforcing.\n\n## Step 7 — Zero Trust Access for admin paths\n\n`\u002Fwp-admin`, `\u002Fadmin`, `\u002Fstaging`, `\u002Fapi\u002Finternal\u002F*` should not be reachable from the open internet for most projects. Cloudflare Zero Trust (free for ≤ 50 users) gives you SSO-gated access:\n\n```\nCloudflare Zero Trust → Access → Applications → Add → Self-hosted\n```\n\n- Application domain: `*.example.com\u002Fwp-admin*`\n- Identity provider: Google\u002FGitHub\u002Femail-OTP\n- Policy: `Allow → emails in @yourcompany.com` or specific list\n\nNow `\u002Fwp-admin` requires SSO before traffic reaches the origin at all. Brute-force on the WP login endpoint stops being your problem.\n\n## Step 8 — Cache and Page Rules\n\n(New zones: Page Rules are being phased out in favor of `Cache Rules`, `Configuration Rules`, `Origin Rules`, and `Single Redirects`.)\n\n- **Cache static assets aggressively**, but never cache responses with `Set-Cookie` or auth headers\n- **Bypass cache for** `\u002Fwp-admin\u002F*`, `\u002Fwp-login.php`, `\u002Fcart\u002F*`, `\u002Fcheckout\u002F*`, `\u002Fapi\u002F*` — auth and per-user content\n- **Always Use HTTPS** as a Configuration Rule, not a workaround\n- **Single Redirect** is the modern replacement for the \"forward url\" Page Rule\n\n## Step 9 — Cloudflare Pages security\n\nIf you use Pages:\n\n- **Branch deploy previews** are public by default — gate them with Access if they contain anything non-public\n- **Environment variables** marked as Secret are not exposed to client bundles, but `NEXT_PUBLIC_*` and similar prefixes still go to the browser. Audit which env vars exist and where they end up.\n- **`_headers` file** in the output directory applies headers per path — convenient for static-site CSP\n- **Custom domain CNAME** must be a CF-orange-clouded record on a CF-managed zone\n\n## Step 10 — R2 buckets\n\n- **Public buckets** — only for content actually meant to be public. Check `Bucket → Settings → Public access`.\n- **Custom domain on R2** — use it for public assets; never bind sensitive buckets to public custom domains\n- **CORS** — restrict origins, do not use `*` unless you understand it\n- **Object listing** — disable public listing; serve specific objects, not directory enumeration\n\n## Step 11 — Audit and monitoring\n\n```\nZone → Security → Events\nZone → Analytics → Security\n```\n\n- Review weekly for the first month, then monthly\n- Look for: unusual ASNs, sustained 4xx\u002F5xx from one source, spikes in Managed Challenge issuances\n- For paid tiers: alerts on rule actions, expensive queries to Workers\n\n## Step 12 — Periodic re-audit\n\nOnce a quarter, walk through:\n\n- [ ] All DNS records still in use; remove orphans\n- [ ] No DNS record exposes origin IP\n- [ ] Authenticated Origin Pulls + origin firewall still in place\n- [ ] WAF rules still match current app paths\n- [ ] CSP still matches frontend (after deploys it can drift)\n- [ ] No new public R2 buckets without intent\n- [ ] No new long-lived API tokens with broad scope; rotate ones older than 90 days\n- [ ] Zero Trust app list matches current team\n\n## What this skill will not do\n\n- Recommend Flexible SSL or any setting that allows plaintext between CF and origin\n- Help bypass Cloudflare protection on a site you do not own\n- Endorse leaving origin IP discoverable when the site is intentionally proxied\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa",".claude\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--cloudflare-hardening",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill cloudflare-hardening",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill cloudflare-hardening",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill cloudflare-hardening","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fgw360--cloudflare-hardening\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,64,72,80,88],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":53,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":54,"categories":55,"keywords":56,"publishedAt":19},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":19},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":65,"name":66,"nameZh":6,"description":67,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":68,"sourceHtmlUrl":69,"categories":70,"keywords":71,"publishedAt":19},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":73,"name":74,"nameZh":6,"description":75,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":76,"sourceHtmlUrl":77,"categories":78,"keywords":79,"publishedAt":19},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":84,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":19},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":89,"name":90,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":19},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]