[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M732MHBWK8HAKQVGKR80RV3X":3,"skill-same:01M732MHBWK8HAKQVGKR80RV3X":51},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":30,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":32,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":34,"ownerDescription":35,"updatedAt":36,"install":37,"resources":50},"01M732MHBWK8HAKQVGKR80RV3X","ebpf-syscall-monitoring",null,"Monitor and intercept Linux kernel syscalls from agent processes using eBPF (Extended Berkeley Packet Filter). Real-time syscall filtering, PID-based policy enforcement, cgroups v2 throttling, and seccomp profile generation.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Febpf-syscall-monitoring\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: ebpf-syscall-monitoring\ndescription: Monitor and intercept Linux kernel syscalls from agent processes using eBPF (Extended Berkeley Packet Filter). Real-time syscall filtering, PID-based policy enforcement, cgroups v2 throttling, and seccomp profile generation.\norigin: Linux kernel eBPF docs, Cilium (Apache-2.0), Falco (Apache-2.0)\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nversion: 1.0.0\ncompatibility: claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-opus-4-7\n---\n\n# eBPF Syscall Monitoring\n\nInstrument the Linux kernel to intercept agent process syscalls in real time — without modifying agent code.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Detecting when a containerized agent calls forbidden syscalls (open, write to protected paths)\n- Building a dynamic seccomp profile from observed agent behavior\n- Monitoring byte-level network activity between agent containers\n- Enforcing cgroups v2 CPU\u002FRAM hard limits on per-agent processes\n\n## Do NOT use for\n\n- macOS or Windows environments (eBPF is Linux-only)\n- Application-level API monitoring (use OpenTelemetry spans instead)\n- Replacing sandboxing — eBPF observes, seccomp enforces\n\n## Core Tools\n\n```bash\n# Install BCC (BPF Compiler Collection)\napt-get install bpfcc-tools linux-headers-$(uname -r)\n\n# Trace all file opens by a specific PID\nopensnoop-bpfcc -p \u003Cagent-pid>\n\n# Watch syscalls in real-time\nsyscount-bpfcc -p \u003Cagent-pid> --syscall write\n\n# Monitor network bytes per container\nnethogs  # or use cilium\u002Ftetragon for pod-level\n```\n\n## Seccomp Profile Generation\n\n```bash\n# Record allowed syscalls during a safe training run\noci-seccomp-bpf-hook --record --output agent-profile.json \\\n  -- node core\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent-runner.js\n\n# Apply generated profile to restrict future runs\ndocker run --security-opt seccomp=agent-profile.json ...\n```\n\n## Dynamic Seccomp Morphing\n\n```js\n\u002F\u002F Adjust allowed syscalls based on current task phase\nconst PHASE_PROFILES = {\n  read_only:  ['read', 'close', 'stat', 'getdents64', 'mmap'],\n  write_logs: ['read', 'close', 'stat', 'write', 'fsync', 'mmap'],\n  network:    ['read', 'write', 'close', 'connect', 'send', 'recv'],\n};\n\nfunction applySeccompProfile(pid, phase) {\n  const allowed = PHASE_PROFILES[phase];\n  \u002F\u002F write seccomp BPF filter to \u002Fproc\u002F\u003Cpid>\u002Ffd via prctl() wrapper\n  execSync(`seccomp-apply --pid ${pid} --allow ${allowed.join(',')}`);\n}\n```\n\n## cgroups v2 Hard Limits\n\n```bash\n# Create per-agent cgroup\nmkdir \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-42\n\n# Memory hard limit: 512MB\necho \"536870912\" > \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-42\u002Fmemory.max\n\n# CPU: max 50% of one core\necho \"50000 100000\" > \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-42\u002Fcpu.max\n\n# Assign agent PID to cgroup\necho \u003Cagent-pid> > \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-42\u002Fcgroup.procs\n```\n\n## OOM Score Tuning (Lớp 16)\n\n```bash\n# Agent gets killed first when system is under memory pressure\necho 900 > \u002Fproc\u002F\u003Cagent-pid>\u002Foom_score_adj  # range: -1000 to 1000\n```\n\n## Anti-Fake-Pass Checklist\n\n- [ ] eBPF program loaded successfully (`bpftool prog list` shows it)\n- [ ] Seccomp profile tested in dry-run mode before enforcing\n- [ ] cgroup memory.max verified with `cat \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-\u003Cid>\u002Fmemory.current`\n- [ ] OOM score confirmed with `cat \u002Fproc\u002F\u003Cpid>\u002Foom_score_adj`\n- [ ] Syscall violations logged to Merkle audit chain (not just stderr)\n","# eBPF Syscall Monitoring\n\nInstrument the Linux kernel to intercept agent process syscalls in real time — without modifying agent code.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Detecting when a containerized agent calls forbidden syscalls (open, write to protected paths)\n- Building a dynamic seccomp profile from observed agent behavior\n- Monitoring byte-level network activity between agent containers\n- Enforcing cgroups v2 CPU\u002FRAM hard limits on per-agent processes\n\n## Do NOT use for\n\n- macOS or Windows environments (eBPF is Linux-only)\n- Application-level API monitoring (use OpenTelemetry spans instead)\n- Replacing sandboxing — eBPF observes, seccomp enforces\n\n## Core Tools\n\n```bash\n# Install BCC (BPF Compiler Collection)\napt-get install bpfcc-tools linux-headers-$(uname -r)\n\n# Trace all file opens by a specific PID\nopensnoop-bpfcc -p \u003Cagent-pid>\n\n# Watch syscalls in real-time\nsyscount-bpfcc -p \u003Cagent-pid> --syscall write\n\n# Monitor network bytes per container\nnethogs  # or use cilium\u002Ftetragon for pod-level\n```\n\n## Seccomp Profile Generation\n\n```bash\n# Record allowed syscalls during a safe training run\noci-seccomp-bpf-hook --record --output agent-profile.json \\\n  -- node core\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent-runner.js\n\n# Apply generated profile to restrict future runs\ndocker run --security-opt seccomp=agent-profile.json ...\n```\n\n## Dynamic Seccomp Morphing\n\n```js\n\u002F\u002F Adjust allowed syscalls based on current task phase\nconst PHASE_PROFILES = {\n  read_only:  ['read', 'close', 'stat', 'getdents64', 'mmap'],\n  write_logs: ['read', 'close', 'stat', 'write', 'fsync', 'mmap'],\n  network:    ['read', 'write', 'close', 'connect', 'send', 'recv'],\n};\n\nfunction applySeccompProfile(pid, phase) {\n  const allowed = PHASE_PROFILES[phase];\n  \u002F\u002F write seccomp BPF filter to \u002Fproc\u002F\u003Cpid>\u002Ffd via prctl() wrapper\n  execSync(`seccomp-apply --pid ${pid} --allow ${allowed.join(',')}`);\n}\n```\n\n## cgroups v2 Hard Limits\n\n```bash\n# Create per-agent cgroup\nmkdir \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-42\n\n# Memory hard limit: 512MB\necho \"536870912\" > \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-42\u002Fmemory.max\n\n# CPU: max 50% of one core\necho \"50000 100000\" > \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-42\u002Fcpu.max\n\n# Assign agent PID to cgroup\necho \u003Cagent-pid> > \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-42\u002Fcgroup.procs\n```\n\n## OOM Score Tuning (Lớp 16)\n\n```bash\n# Agent gets killed first when system is under memory pressure\necho 900 > \u002Fproc\u002F\u003Cagent-pid>\u002Foom_score_adj  # range: -1000 to 1000\n```\n\n## Anti-Fake-Pass Checklist\n\n- [ ] eBPF program loaded successfully (`bpftool prog list` shows it)\n- [ ] Seccomp profile tested in dry-run mode before enforcing\n- [ ] cgroup memory.max verified with `cat \u002Fsys\u002Ffs\u002Fcgroup\u002Fyamtam\u002Fagent-\u003Cid>\u002Fmemory.current`\n- [ ] OOM score confirmed with `cat \u002Fproc\u002F\u003Cpid>\u002Foom_score_adj`\n- [ ] Syscall violations logged to Merkle audit chain (not just stderr)\n",{"name":5,"origin":24,"license":15,"version":25,"description":7,"compatibility":26},"Linux kernel eBPF docs, Cilium (Apache-2.0), Falco (Apache-2.0)","1.0.0","claude-sonnet-4-6, claude-opus-4-7","main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa",".claude\u002Fskills\u002Febpf-syscall-monitoring",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":38,"prompt":48,"zipAvailable":49},[39,42,45],{"tool":40,"command":41},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill ebpf-syscall-monitoring",{"tool":43,"command":44},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill ebpf-syscall-monitoring",{"tool":46,"command":47},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill ebpf-syscall-monitoring","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Febpf-syscall-monitoring\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[52,60,67,75,83,91],{"skillNo":53,"name":54,"nameZh":6,"description":55,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":56,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":19},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":19},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":71,"sourceHtmlUrl":72,"categories":73,"keywords":74,"publishedAt":19},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":76,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":79,"sourceHtmlUrl":80,"categories":81,"keywords":82,"publishedAt":19},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":87,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":19},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":92,"name":93,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":94,"categories":95,"keywords":96,"publishedAt":19},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]