[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M73275VMYSZPT7SWDKTZ1N1N":3,"skill-same:01M73275VMYSZPT7SWDKTZ1N1N":113},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":55,"commitSha":56,"skillDirectory":57,"forksCount":58,"repositoryHtmlUrl":59,"repositoryHomepageUrl":60,"ownerHtmlUrl":61,"ownerBlogUrl":62,"ownerDescription":63,"updatedAt":64,"install":65,"resources":78},"01M73275VMYSZPT7SWDKTZ1N1N","detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory",null,"Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: detecting-dcsync-attack-in-active-directory\ndescription: Detect DCSync attacks where adversaries abuse Active Directory replication\n  privileges to extract password hashes by monitoring for non-domain-controller accounts\n  requesting directory replication via DsGetNCChanges.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- active-directory\n- dcsync\n- credential-theft\n- mitre-t1003-006\n- mimikatz\n- kerberos\nversion: '1.0'\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Application Protocol Command Analysis\n- Network Isolation\n- Network Traffic Analysis\n- Client-server Payload Profiling\n- Platform Monitoring\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmitre_attack:\n- T1046\n- T1057\n- T1082\n- T1083\n- T1003\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n\n# Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments\n- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions\n- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump\n- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials\n- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled\n- Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled\n- Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs\n- Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Identify Legitimate Replication Sources**: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.\n2. **Enable Required Auditing**: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.\n3. **Monitor Replication Rights Access**: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).\n4. **Detect Non-DC Replication Requests**: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.\n5. **Correlate with Network Traffic**: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR\u002FRPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.\n6. **Investigate Source Context**: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.\n7. **Check for Credential Abuse**: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials |\n| DsGetNCChanges | RPC function used to request AD replication data |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...) |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...) |\n| MS-DRSR | Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol |\n| KRBTGT Hash | Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory service object access audit event |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |\n| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |\n| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4662\n| where Properties IN (\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\n| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, \".*\\\\$$\")\n| where NOT SubjectUserName IN (\"known_svc_account1\", \"known_svc_account2\")\n| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer\n| where count > 0\n| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n    or Properties has \"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n| where SubjectUserName !endswith \"$\"\n| where SubjectUserName !in (\"AzureADConnect\", \"MSOL_*\")\n| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity\n```yaml\ntitle: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4662\n        Properties|contains:\n            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n    filter_dc:\n        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'\n    condition: selection and not filter_dc\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.006\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz DCSync**: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync \u002Fuser:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.\n2. **Impacket secretsdump**: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain\u002Fuser:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.\n3. **Delegated Replication Rights**: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.\n4. **Azure AD Connect Abuse**: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.\n5. **DSInternals PowerShell**: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nSource Account: [Account requesting replication]\nSource Machine: [Hostname\u002FIP of requestor]\nTarget DC: [Domain controller receiving request]\nReplication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]\nTimestamp: [Event time]\nLegitimate DC: [Yes\u002FNo]\nKnown Service Account: [Yes\u002FNo]\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]\n```\n","# Detecting DCSync Attack in Active Directory\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When hunting for credential theft in Active Directory environments\n- After compromise of accounts with Replicating Directory Changes permissions\n- When investigating suspected use of Mimikatz or Impacket secretsdump\n- During incident response involving lateral movement with domain admin credentials\n- When auditing AD replication permissions as part of security hardening\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Event ID 4662 (Object Access) enabled\n- Advanced Audit Policy: Audit Directory Service Access enabled\n- Domain Controller event forwarding to SIEM\n- Knowledge of legitimate domain controller hostnames and IPs\n- Directory Service Access auditing with SACL on domain object\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Identify Legitimate Replication Sources**: Document all domain controllers in the environment by hostname, IP, and computer account. Only these should perform directory replication.\n2. **Enable Required Auditing**: Configure Advanced Audit Policy to capture Event ID 4662 on domain controllers with specific GUID monitoring for replication rights.\n3. **Monitor Replication Rights Access**: Track access to three critical GUIDs -- DS-Replication-Get-Changes (1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All (1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2), and DS-Replication-Get-Changes-In-Filtered-Set (89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c).\n4. **Detect Non-DC Replication Requests**: Alert when any account NOT associated with a domain controller requests replication rights.\n5. **Correlate with Network Traffic**: DCSync generates replication traffic (MS-DRSR\u002FRPC) from the attacker's machine to the DC. Monitor for DrsGetNCChanges RPC calls from non-DC IP addresses.\n6. **Investigate Source Context**: Examine the process, user account, and machine originating the replication request.\n7. **Check for Credential Abuse**: After DCSync detection, audit for subsequent use of extracted hashes (pass-the-hash, golden ticket creation).\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync |\n| DCSync | Mimicking domain controller replication to extract credentials |\n| DsGetNCChanges | RPC function used to request AD replication data |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes | AD permission required (GUID: 1131f6aa-...) |\n| DS-Replication-Get-Changes-All | Permission including confidential attributes (GUID: 1131f6ad-...) |\n| MS-DRSR | Microsoft Directory Replication Service Remote Protocol |\n| KRBTGT Hash | Key target of DCSync enabling Golden Ticket attacks |\n| Event ID 4662 | Directory service object access audit event |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |\n| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |\n| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4662\n| where Properties IN (\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\n| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, \".*\\\\$$\")\n| where NOT SubjectUserName IN (\"known_svc_account1\", \"known_svc_account2\")\n| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer\n| where count > 0\n| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n    or Properties has \"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n| where SubjectUserName !endswith \"$\"\n| where SubjectUserName !in (\"AzureADConnect\", \"MSOL_*\")\n| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity\n```yaml\ntitle: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4662\n        Properties|contains:\n            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n    filter_dc:\n        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'\n    condition: selection and not filter_dc\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.006\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz DCSync**: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync \u002Fuser:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.\n2. **Impacket secretsdump**: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain\u002Fuser:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.\n3. **Delegated Replication Rights**: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.\n4. **Azure AD Connect Abuse**: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.\n5. **DSInternals PowerShell**: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nSource Account: [Account requesting replication]\nSource Machine: [Hostname\u002FIP of requestor]\nTarget DC: [Domain controller receiving request]\nReplication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]\nTimestamp: [Event time]\nLegitimate DC: [Yes\u002FNo]\nKnown Service Account: [Yes\u002FNo]\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":33,"domain":34,"source":35,"license":15,"version":36,"nist_csf":37,"subdomain":26,"description":7,"mitre_attack":42,"source_commit":48,"d3fend_techniques":49},[26,27,28,29,30,31,32],"threat-hunting","active-directory","dcsync","credential-theft","mitre-t1003-006","mimikatz","kerberos","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0",[38,39,40,41],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[43,44,45,46,47],"T1046","T1057","T1082","T1083","T1003","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d",[50,51,52,53,54],"Application Protocol Command Analysis","Network Isolation","Network Traffic Analysis","Client-server Payload Profiling","Platform 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