[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M731SS1H0F043PS3JCZER0WN":3,"skill-same:01M731SS1H0F043PS3JCZER0WN":89},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":49,"commitSha":50,"skillDirectory":51,"forksCount":52,"repositoryHtmlUrl":53,"repositoryHomepageUrl":54,"ownerHtmlUrl":55,"ownerBlogUrl":56,"ownerDescription":57,"updatedAt":58,"install":59,"resources":72},"01M731SS1H0F043PS3JCZER0WN","deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection",null,"Deploys canary files (honeytokens) across file systems to detect ransomware encryption activity in real time. Uses strategically placed decoy documents monitored via file integrity monitoring or OS-level watchdogs to trigger alerts when ransomware modifies or encrypts them. Activates for requests involving ransomware canary deployment, honeyfile setup, deception-based ransomware detection, or file integrity monitoring for encryption.","Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection\ndescription: 'Deploys canary files (honeytokens) across file systems to detect ransomware\n  encryption activity in real time. Uses strategically placed decoy documents monitored\n  via file integrity monitoring or OS-level watchdogs to trigger alerts when ransomware\n  modifies or encrypts them. Activates for requests involving ransomware canary deployment,\n  honeyfile setup, deception-based ransomware detection, or file integrity monitoring\n  for encryption.\n\n  '\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: ransomware-defense\ntags:\n- ransomware\n- detection\n- canary-files\n- honeytokens\n- deception\n- file-integrity\nversion: 1.0.0\nauthor: mahipal\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nnist_csf:\n- PR.DS-11\n- RS.MA-01\n- RC.RP-01\n- PR.IR-01\nmitre_attack:\n- T1486\n- T1083\n- T1490\n- T1485\nsource: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills\nsource_commit: 04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d\n---\n\n# Deploying Decoy Files for Ransomware Detection\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Setting up early-warning detection for ransomware on file servers or endpoints\n- Supplementing EDR\u002FAV with a deception-based detection layer that catches unknown ransomware variants\n- Creating high-fidelity ransomware alerts that have very low false-positive rates (legitimate users have no reason to touch decoy files)\n- Testing ransomware response procedures by validating that canary file modifications trigger the expected alerting pipeline\n- Protecting high-value file shares (finance, HR, legal) with tripwire files that indicate unauthorized encryption activity\n\n**Do not use** decoy files as the sole ransomware defense. They are a detection mechanism, not a prevention mechanism, and should complement backups, EDR, and access controls.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.8+ with `watchdog` library for cross-platform file system monitoring\n- Administrative access to target file shares or endpoints for canary placement\n- File integrity monitoring (FIM) tool or SIEM integration for alert routing\n- Understanding of target directory structure to place canaries in high-value locations\n- Windows: NTFS change journal or ReadDirectoryChangesW API access\n- Linux: inotify support in kernel (standard in modern kernels)\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Design Canary File Strategy\n\nPlan file placement for maximum detection coverage:\n\n```\nCanary File Placement Strategy:\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nNaming Convention:\n  - Use names that sort FIRST and LAST alphabetically in each directory\n  - Ransomware typically enumerates directories A-Z or Z-A\n  - Examples: _AAAA_budget_2024.docx, ~zzzz_report_final.xlsx\n\nPlacement Locations:\n  - Root of every file share (\\\\server\\share\\_AAAA_canary.docx)\n  - Desktop, Documents, Downloads on each endpoint\n  - Department-specific shares (Finance, HR, Legal)\n  - Backup staging directories\n  - Home directories of high-privilege accounts\n\nFile Types:\n  - .docx, .xlsx, .pdf (most targeted by ransomware)\n  - .sql, .bak (database files, high value)\n  - Mix of file types to detect ransomware that targets specific extensions\n```\n\n### Step 2: Generate Realistic Canary Files\n\nCreate decoy files with realistic content and metadata:\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport time\n\ndef create_canary_docx(filepath, content=\"Q4 Financial Summary - Confidential\"):\n    \"\"\"Create a realistic .docx canary file using python-docx.\"\"\"\n    from docx import Document\n    doc = Document()\n    doc.add_heading(\"Financial Report - CONFIDENTIAL\", level=1)\n    doc.add_paragraph(content)\n    doc.add_paragraph(f\"Generated: {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d')}\")\n    doc.save(filepath)\n\ndef create_canary_txt(filepath):\n    \"\"\"Create a simple text canary with known content for hash verification.\"\"\"\n    content = \"CANARY_TOKEN_DO_NOT_MODIFY\\n\"\n    content += f\"Created: {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S')}\\n\"\n    content += \"This file is monitored for unauthorized changes.\\n\"\n    with open(filepath, \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(content)\n```\n\n### Step 3: Deploy File System Watcher\n\nMonitor canary files for any modification, rename, or deletion:\n\n```python\nfrom watchdog.observers import Observer\nfrom watchdog.events import FileSystemEventHandler\n\nclass CanaryHandler(FileSystemEventHandler):\n    def __init__(self, canary_paths, alert_callback):\n        self.canary_paths = set(canary_paths)\n        self.alert_callback = alert_callback\n\n    def on_modified(self, event):\n        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:\n            self.alert_callback(\"MODIFIED\", event.src_path)\n\n    def on_deleted(self, event):\n        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:\n            self.alert_callback(\"DELETED\", event.src_path)\n\n    def on_moved(self, event):\n        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:\n            self.alert_callback(\"RENAMED\", event.src_path)\n```\n\n### Step 4: Configure Alerting and Response\n\nDefine automated responses when canary files are triggered:\n\n```\nAlert Response Matrix:\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nEvent: Canary MODIFIED\n  → Severity: CRITICAL\n  → Action: Alert SOC, identify modifying process (PID), isolate endpoint\n\nEvent: Canary DELETED\n  → Severity: HIGH\n  → Action: Alert SOC, check for ransomware note in same directory\n\nEvent: Canary RENAMED (new extension added)\n  → Severity: CRITICAL\n  → Action: Alert SOC, check extension against known ransomware extensions\n  → Automated: Kill modifying process, disable network interface\n\nEvent: Multiple canaries triggered within 60 seconds\n  → Severity: EMERGENCY\n  → Action: Network-wide isolation, activate incident response plan\n```\n\n### Step 5: Validate Detection Coverage\n\nTest that canary files detect actual ransomware behavior:\n\n```bash\n# Simulate ransomware encryption (safe test - modifies canary content)\necho \"ENCRYPTED_BY_TEST\" > \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fcanary\u002F_AAAA_budget.docx\n\n# Simulate ransomware rename (adds extension)\nmv \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fcanary\u002Freport.xlsx \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fcanary\u002Freport.xlsx.locked\n\n# Verify alerts were generated in SIEM\u002Falerting system\n```\n\n## Verification\n\n- Confirm all canary files are present and unmodified using stored hash baselines\n- Verify that modifying any canary file generates an alert within the expected timeframe (under 30 seconds)\n- Test that alert routing to SOC\u002FSIEM is functional with a controlled modification\n- Validate that automated response actions (process kill, network isolation) execute correctly\n- Check that canary files survive normal backup and restore operations\n- Ensure legitimate users and processes are excluded from false-positive alerts (backup agents, AV scans)\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **Canary File** | A decoy file placed in a directory that is monitored for any access or modification, serving as a tripwire for unauthorized activity |\n| **Honeytoken** | A broader category of deception artifacts (files, credentials, database records) designed to alert when accessed |\n| **File Integrity Monitoring** | Continuous monitoring of file attributes (hash, size, permissions, timestamps) to detect unauthorized changes |\n| **ReadDirectoryChangesW** | Windows API for monitoring file system changes in a directory; used by the watchdog library on Windows |\n| **inotify** | Linux kernel subsystem for monitoring file system events; provides near-instant notification of file changes |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **watchdog (Python)**: Cross-platform file system event monitoring library supporting Windows, Linux, and macOS\n- **Canarytokens (Thinkst)**: Free hosted service for generating various types of canary tokens including files, URLs, and DNS tokens\n- **OSSEC\u002FWazuh**: Open-source HIDS with built-in file integrity monitoring and alerting capabilities\n- **Elastic Endpoint**: Uses canary files internally for ransomware protection and key capture\n- **Sysmon**: Windows system monitor that logs file creation events (Event ID 11) for canary file monitoring\n","# Deploying Decoy Files for Ransomware Detection\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Setting up early-warning detection for ransomware on file servers or endpoints\n- Supplementing EDR\u002FAV with a deception-based detection layer that catches unknown ransomware variants\n- Creating high-fidelity ransomware alerts that have very low false-positive rates (legitimate users have no reason to touch decoy files)\n- Testing ransomware response procedures by validating that canary file modifications trigger the expected alerting pipeline\n- Protecting high-value file shares (finance, HR, legal) with tripwire files that indicate unauthorized encryption activity\n\n**Do not use** decoy files as the sole ransomware defense. They are a detection mechanism, not a prevention mechanism, and should complement backups, EDR, and access controls.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.8+ with `watchdog` library for cross-platform file system monitoring\n- Administrative access to target file shares or endpoints for canary placement\n- File integrity monitoring (FIM) tool or SIEM integration for alert routing\n- Understanding of target directory structure to place canaries in high-value locations\n- Windows: NTFS change journal or ReadDirectoryChangesW API access\n- Linux: inotify support in kernel (standard in modern kernels)\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Design Canary File Strategy\n\nPlan file placement for maximum detection coverage:\n\n```\nCanary File Placement Strategy:\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nNaming Convention:\n  - Use names that sort FIRST and LAST alphabetically in each directory\n  - Ransomware typically enumerates directories A-Z or Z-A\n  - Examples: _AAAA_budget_2024.docx, ~zzzz_report_final.xlsx\n\nPlacement Locations:\n  - Root of every file share (\\\\server\\share\\_AAAA_canary.docx)\n  - Desktop, Documents, Downloads on each endpoint\n  - Department-specific shares (Finance, HR, Legal)\n  - Backup staging directories\n  - Home directories of high-privilege accounts\n\nFile Types:\n  - .docx, .xlsx, .pdf (most targeted by ransomware)\n  - .sql, .bak (database files, high value)\n  - Mix of file types to detect ransomware that targets specific extensions\n```\n\n### Step 2: Generate Realistic Canary Files\n\nCreate decoy files with realistic content and metadata:\n\n```python\nimport os\nimport time\n\ndef create_canary_docx(filepath, content=\"Q4 Financial Summary - Confidential\"):\n    \"\"\"Create a realistic .docx canary file using python-docx.\"\"\"\n    from docx import Document\n    doc = Document()\n    doc.add_heading(\"Financial Report - CONFIDENTIAL\", level=1)\n    doc.add_paragraph(content)\n    doc.add_paragraph(f\"Generated: {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%d')}\")\n    doc.save(filepath)\n\ndef create_canary_txt(filepath):\n    \"\"\"Create a simple text canary with known content for hash verification.\"\"\"\n    content = \"CANARY_TOKEN_DO_NOT_MODIFY\\n\"\n    content += f\"Created: {time.strftime('%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S')}\\n\"\n    content += \"This file is monitored for unauthorized changes.\\n\"\n    with open(filepath, \"w\") as f:\n        f.write(content)\n```\n\n### Step 3: Deploy File System Watcher\n\nMonitor canary files for any modification, rename, or deletion:\n\n```python\nfrom watchdog.observers import Observer\nfrom watchdog.events import FileSystemEventHandler\n\nclass CanaryHandler(FileSystemEventHandler):\n    def __init__(self, canary_paths, alert_callback):\n        self.canary_paths = set(canary_paths)\n        self.alert_callback = alert_callback\n\n    def on_modified(self, event):\n        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:\n            self.alert_callback(\"MODIFIED\", event.src_path)\n\n    def on_deleted(self, event):\n        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:\n            self.alert_callback(\"DELETED\", event.src_path)\n\n    def on_moved(self, event):\n        if event.src_path in self.canary_paths:\n            self.alert_callback(\"RENAMED\", event.src_path)\n```\n\n### Step 4: Configure Alerting and Response\n\nDefine automated responses when canary files are triggered:\n\n```\nAlert Response Matrix:\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nEvent: Canary MODIFIED\n  → Severity: CRITICAL\n  → Action: Alert SOC, identify modifying process (PID), isolate endpoint\n\nEvent: Canary DELETED\n  → Severity: HIGH\n  → Action: Alert SOC, check for ransomware note in same directory\n\nEvent: Canary RENAMED (new extension added)\n  → Severity: CRITICAL\n  → Action: Alert SOC, check extension against known ransomware extensions\n  → Automated: Kill modifying process, disable network interface\n\nEvent: Multiple canaries triggered within 60 seconds\n  → Severity: EMERGENCY\n  → Action: Network-wide isolation, activate incident response plan\n```\n\n### Step 5: Validate Detection Coverage\n\nTest that canary files detect actual ransomware behavior:\n\n```bash\n# Simulate ransomware encryption (safe test - modifies canary content)\necho \"ENCRYPTED_BY_TEST\" > \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fcanary\u002F_AAAA_budget.docx\n\n# Simulate ransomware rename (adds extension)\nmv \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fcanary\u002Freport.xlsx \u002Fpath\u002Fto\u002Fcanary\u002Freport.xlsx.locked\n\n# Verify alerts were generated in SIEM\u002Falerting system\n```\n\n## Verification\n\n- Confirm all canary files are present and unmodified using stored hash baselines\n- Verify that modifying any canary file generates an alert within the expected timeframe (under 30 seconds)\n- Test that alert routing to SOC\u002FSIEM is functional with a controlled modification\n- Validate that automated response actions (process kill, network isolation) execute correctly\n- Check that canary files survive normal backup and restore operations\n- Ensure legitimate users and processes are excluded from false-positive alerts (backup agents, AV scans)\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **Canary File** | A decoy file placed in a directory that is monitored for any access or modification, serving as a tripwire for unauthorized activity |\n| **Honeytoken** | A broader category of deception artifacts (files, credentials, database records) designed to alert when accessed |\n| **File Integrity Monitoring** | Continuous monitoring of file attributes (hash, size, permissions, timestamps) to detect unauthorized changes |\n| **ReadDirectoryChangesW** | Windows API for monitoring file system changes in a directory; used by the watchdog library on Windows |\n| **inotify** | Linux kernel subsystem for monitoring file system events; provides near-instant notification of file changes |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **watchdog (Python)**: Cross-platform file system event monitoring library supporting Windows, Linux, and macOS\n- **Canarytokens (Thinkst)**: Free hosted service for generating various types of canary tokens including files, URLs, and DNS tokens\n- **OSSEC\u002FWazuh**: Open-source HIDS with built-in file integrity monitoring and alerting capabilities\n- **Elastic Endpoint**: Uses canary files internally for ransomware protection and key capture\n- **Sysmon**: Windows system monitor that logs file creation events (Event ID 11) for canary file monitoring\n",{"name":5,"tags":25,"author":32,"domain":33,"source":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":41,"description":42,"mitre_attack":43,"source_commit":48},[26,27,28,29,30,31],"ransomware","detection","canary-files","honeytokens","deception","file-integrity","mahipal","cybersecurity","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmukul975\u002FAnthropic-Cybersecurity-Skills","1.0.0",[37,38,39,40],"PR.DS-11","RS.MA-01","RC.RP-01","PR.IR-01","ransomware-defense","Deploys canary files (honeytokens) across file systems to detect ransomware encryption activity in real time. Uses strategically placed decoy documents monitored via file integrity monitoring or OS-level watchdogs to trigger alerts when ransomware modifies or encrypts them. Activates for requests involving ransomware canary deployment, honeyfile setup, deception-based ransomware detection, or file integrity monitoring for encryption.\n",[44,45,46,47],"T1486","T1083","T1490","T1485","04450304b12645cb2b974ab96d28c0664758a88d","main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa",".claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":60,"prompt":70,"zipAvailable":71},[61,64,67],{"tool":62,"command":63},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection",{"tool":65,"command":66},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection",{"tool":68,"command":69},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill deploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection\u002FSKILL.md",true,[73,77,83],{"path":74,"resourceType":74,"resourceTypeDesc":75,"sizeBytes":76,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE","许可证",11255,{"path":78,"resourceType":79,"resourceTypeDesc":80,"sizeBytes":81,"sourceHtmlUrl":82},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md","REFERENCE","参考文档",3201,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":84,"resourceType":85,"resourceTypeDesc":86,"sizeBytes":87,"sourceHtmlUrl":88},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",9424,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fdeploying-decoy-files-for-ransomware-detection\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",[90,98,105,113,121,129],{"skillNo":91,"name":92,"nameZh":6,"description":93,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":94,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":95,"categories":96,"keywords":97,"publishedAt":20},"01M735GKET5YVYKAY62W2P5YXB","openai--sentry--sentry","Use when the user asks to inspect Sentry issues or events, summarize recent production errors, or pull basic Sentry health data via the Sentry API; perform read-only queries with the bundled script and require `SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":99,"name":100,"nameZh":6,"description":101,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":102,"categories":103,"keywords":104,"publishedAt":20},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":109,"sourceHtmlUrl":110,"categories":111,"keywords":112,"publishedAt":20},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":114,"name":115,"nameZh":6,"description":116,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":117,"sourceHtmlUrl":118,"categories":119,"keywords":120,"publishedAt":20},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":122,"name":123,"nameZh":6,"description":124,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":125,"sourceHtmlUrl":126,"categories":127,"keywords":128,"publishedAt":20},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":130,"name":131,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":132,"categories":133,"keywords":134,"publishedAt":20},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]