[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M731K9F0WPKDY2PSD1CMMHSG":3,"skill-same:01M731K9F0WPKDY2PSD1CMMHSG":47},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":23,"commitSha":24,"skillDirectory":25,"forksCount":26,"repositoryHtmlUrl":27,"repositoryHomepageUrl":28,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":30,"ownerDescription":31,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M731K9F0WPKDY2PSD1CMMHSG","container-interactivity",null,"Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","Horonomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F355299122?v=4","01M76B3QPXE88ET2SQPDPVATZT"," Horonomos-laps","01M72ZQRJPCYPSSWT4D00VJR2A",13,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcontainer-interactivity\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",false,"---\nname: container-interactivity\ndescription: Real-time data streaming to\u002Ffrom isolated containers for AI agent sandboxing. Docker ephemeral exec patterns, stdin\u002Fstdout pipe attachment, nsjail namespace jail setup, streaming output with live tail, container health monitoring, and clean teardown. Sources: moby\u002Fmoby, google\u002Fnsjail, containers\u002Fpodman, kata-containers\u002Fkata-containers, firecracker-microvm\u002Ffirecracker.\norigin: yana-ai — synthesized from moby\u002Fmoby, google\u002Fnsjail, containers\u002Fpodman, kata-containers\u002Fkata-containers, firecracker-microvm\u002Ffirecracker\nlicense: Apache-2.0\nversion: 1.0.0\ncompatibility: yana-ai >= 1.3.47\n---\n\n# \u002Fcontainer-interactivity\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Agent tool call must run in complete filesystem\u002Fnetwork isolation\n- Streaming large output from a sandboxed process (no buffering in memory)\n- Attaching to a running container stdin to feed input interactively\n- Post-exec cleanup: confirm container is fully destroyed, no state leaks\n\n## Do NOT use for\n\n- Purely in-process operations (no exec boundary — no container needed)\n- Dev-only scripts where ulimit fallback is acceptable\n\n---\n\n## Decision: Docker vs nsjail vs ulimit\n\n```\nHost has Docker daemon + image already built?\n  YES → Docker (strongest isolation, read-only FS, --network=none)\n  NO  →\n    Linux host with root\u002FCAP_SYS_ADMIN?\n      YES → nsjail (Linux namespaces, ~1ms overhead, no daemon)\n      NO  → ulimit fallback (resource limits only, no FS isolation)\n\nHardware-level isolation required (multi-tenant cloud)?\n  YES → Firecracker micro-VM via sandbox-exec.sh\n```\n\n---\n\n## Docker: Ephemeral Isolated Execution\n\n```bash\n# One-shot: run command and auto-remove container (no state persists)\ndocker run --rm \\\n  --name    \"yamtam-$(uuidgen | head -c 8)\" \\\n  --network none \\                          # no NIC — zero network\n  --read-only \\                             # root FS immutable\n  --tmpfs   \u002Fworkspace:rw,size=64m,noexec \\ # memory-only workspace\n  --tmpfs   \u002Ftmp:rw,size=32m,noexec \\\n  --memory  128m \\\n  --memory-swap 128m \\                      # disable swap\n  --cpus    0.5 \\\n  --pids-limit 64 \\\n  --cap-drop ALL \\\n  --security-opt no-new-privileges \\\n  --user    nobody \\\n  yamtam-sandbox:latest \\\n  bash -c \"$TOOL_COMMAND\"\n```\n\n```typescript\nimport { execa } from 'execa'\n\n\u002F\u002F Stream container stdout\u002Fstderr in real-time — no buffering\nasync function runInContainer(command: string, args: string[]): Promise\u003Cstring> {\n  const containerName = `yamtam-${Date.now()}`\n  const output: string[] = []\n\n  const proc = execa('docker', [\n    'run', '--rm',\n    '--name',     containerName,\n    '--network',  'none',\n    '--read-only',\n    '--tmpfs',    '\u002Fworkspace:rw,size=64m,noexec',\n    '--memory',   '128m',\n    '--cpus',     '0.5',\n    '--pids-limit', '64',\n    '--cap-drop', 'ALL',\n    '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges',\n    '--user',     'nobody',\n    'yamtam-sandbox:latest',\n    command, ...args,\n  ])\n\n  \u002F\u002F Stream each line as it arrives — don't wait for process to finish\n  proc.stdout?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n    const line = chunk.toString()\n    output.push(line)\n    process.stdout.write(`[sandbox] ${line}`)  \u002F\u002F live tail\n  })\n\n  proc.stderr?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n    process.stderr.write(`[sandbox:err] ${chunk}`)\n  })\n\n  const { exitCode } = await proc\n\n  if (exitCode === 124) throw new Error('sandbox timeout exceeded')\n  if (exitCode !== 0)  throw Object.assign(new Error('sandbox command failed'), { exitCode })\n\n  return output.join('')\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Rule: always --rm (container removed on exit — no state leak)\n\u002F\u002F Rule: --network none is mandatory — not optional even in dev\n\u002F\u002F Rule: stream stdout in real-time for large output (don't buffer 1GB in memory)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Attach stdin to Running Container\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F Feed input into a long-running sandboxed process (e.g., interactive REPL)\nimport { spawn } from 'child_process'\n\nfunction attachContainerStdin(containerId: string, input: string): Promise\u003Cstring> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const proc = spawn('docker', ['exec', '-i', containerId, 'sh'], {\n      stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],\n    })\n\n    const output: string[] = []\n    proc.stdout.on('data', (d: Buffer) => output.push(d.toString()))\n    proc.stderr.on('data', (d: Buffer) => output.push(d.toString()))\n\n    proc.stdin.write(input + '\\n')\n    proc.stdin.end()  \u002F\u002F close stdin → process sees EOF\n\n    proc.on('close', (code) => {\n      if (code === 0) resolve(output.join(''))\n      else reject(new Error(`container exec failed with code ${code}`))\n    })\n  })\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Rule: always close stdin after writing (proc.stdin.end()) — or process hangs\n\u002F\u002F Rule: use -i not -it for non-TTY piping (tty allocation fails in CI\u002Fagent context)\n```\n\n---\n\n## nsjail: Namespace Jail (no Docker daemon)\n\n```bash\n# nsjail one-shot execution in isolated Linux namespaces\n# Requires: nsjail binary + CAP_SYS_ADMIN (or user namespaces enabled)\nnsjail \\\n  --mode o \\                       # one-shot: execute once and exit\n  --time_limit 30 \\                # wall-clock timeout (seconds)\n  --rlimit_as 131072 \\             # virtual address space: 128MB (KB)\n  --rlimit_cpu 30 \\                # CPU time limit\n  --rlimit_fsize 65536 \\           # max file size (KB)\n  --rlimit_nofile 32 \\\n  --disable_proc \\                 # no \u002Fproc (blocks \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmem)\n  --iface_no_lo \\                  # no loopback interface\n  --user nobody \\\n  --group nobody \\\n  --chroot \u002F \\\n  --bindmount_ro \u002Fusr \\\n  --bindmount_ro \u002Fbin \\\n  --bindmount_ro \u002Flib \\\n  --tmpfsmount \u002Ftmp \\\n  --cwd \u002Ftmp \\\n  -- bash -c \"$TOOL_COMMAND\"\n\n# Rule: --disable_proc prevents reading \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmem (process injection attack)\n# Rule: --iface_no_lo = no loopback = no localhost network\n# Rule: --tmpfsmount \u002Ftmp = writable tmp is memory-only (wiped on exit)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Container Health & Teardown\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F Ensure container is completely gone after execution\nasync function ensureContainerGone(name: string): Promise\u003Cvoid> {\n  try {\n    \u002F\u002F Force kill if somehow still running\n    await execa('docker', ['kill', name]).catch(() => {})\n    await execa('docker', ['rm', '-f', name]).catch(() => {})\n\n    \u002F\u002F Verify gone\n    const { stdout } = await execa('docker', ['ps', '-a', '--filter', `name=${name}`, '--format', '{{.ID}}'])\n    if (stdout.trim()) {\n      throw new Error(`container ${name} still exists after teardown`)\n    }\n  } catch (e) {\n    \u002F\u002F Log but don't throw — best-effort cleanup\n    console.error(`[sandbox] teardown warning: ${(e as Error).message}`)\n  }\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Audit: verify no dangling volumes from sandbox containers\nasync function auditDanglingVolumes(): Promise\u003Cstring[]> {\n  const { stdout } = await execa('docker', ['volume', 'ls', '--filter', 'dangling=true', '--format', '{{.Name}}'])\n  return stdout.trim().split('\\n').filter(Boolean)\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Rule: always call ensureContainerGone() in finally block (teardown on error too)\n\u002F\u002F Rule: dangling volumes from sandbox containers = data leak audit finding\n```\n\n---\n\n## Output Size Cap in Streaming Context\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F Cap container output to 16KB (matches middleware size-cap) even when streaming\nclass SandboxOutputStream extends Transform {\n  #bytes = 0\n  readonly #cap = 16 * 1024\n\n  _transform(chunk: Buffer, _enc: string, cb: (err: Error | null, data?: Buffer) => void) {\n    this.#bytes += chunk.length\n    if (this.#bytes > this.#cap) {\n      this.push(Buffer.from('\\n[SANDBOX OUTPUT TRUNCATED — 16KB cap]\\n'))\n      this.end()\n      cb(null)\n      return\n    }\n    cb(null, chunk)\n  }\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Pipe container stdout through cap transform\nproc.stdout?.pipe(new SandboxOutputStream()).pipe(process.stdout)\n\n\u002F\u002F Rule: cap must be applied BEFORE output reaches agent — never after\n\u002F\u002F Rule: write truncation marker so agent knows output is incomplete\n```\n\n---\n\n## Anti-Fake-Pass Checklist\n\n```\n❌ Container runs as root (--user missing or --user root)\n❌ --network flag omitted (agent can make outbound calls)\n❌ --rm missing (containers accumulate, disk fills, state leaks)\n❌ stdin left open after write (process hangs waiting for EOF)\n❌ -it flag used in non-TTY context (CI\u002Fagent pipelines fail with \"not a TTY\")\n❌ Output buffered in memory before returning (OOM on large tool results)\n❌ nsjail used without --disable_proc (process memory injection possible)\n❌ Container teardown only in happy path (must be in finally block)\n❌ Dangling volumes not audited (sensitive data persists on host)\n```\n","# \u002Fcontainer-interactivity\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Agent tool call must run in complete filesystem\u002Fnetwork isolation\n- Streaming large output from a sandboxed process (no buffering in memory)\n- Attaching to a running container stdin to feed input interactively\n- Post-exec cleanup: confirm container is fully destroyed, no state leaks\n\n## Do NOT use for\n\n- Purely in-process operations (no exec boundary — no container needed)\n- Dev-only scripts where ulimit fallback is acceptable\n\n---\n\n## Decision: Docker vs nsjail vs ulimit\n\n```\nHost has Docker daemon + image already built?\n  YES → Docker (strongest isolation, read-only FS, --network=none)\n  NO  →\n    Linux host with root\u002FCAP_SYS_ADMIN?\n      YES → nsjail (Linux namespaces, ~1ms overhead, no daemon)\n      NO  → ulimit fallback (resource limits only, no FS isolation)\n\nHardware-level isolation required (multi-tenant cloud)?\n  YES → Firecracker micro-VM via sandbox-exec.sh\n```\n\n---\n\n## Docker: Ephemeral Isolated Execution\n\n```bash\n# One-shot: run command and auto-remove container (no state persists)\ndocker run --rm \\\n  --name    \"yamtam-$(uuidgen | head -c 8)\" \\\n  --network none \\                          # no NIC — zero network\n  --read-only \\                             # root FS immutable\n  --tmpfs   \u002Fworkspace:rw,size=64m,noexec \\ # memory-only workspace\n  --tmpfs   \u002Ftmp:rw,size=32m,noexec \\\n  --memory  128m \\\n  --memory-swap 128m \\                      # disable swap\n  --cpus    0.5 \\\n  --pids-limit 64 \\\n  --cap-drop ALL \\\n  --security-opt no-new-privileges \\\n  --user    nobody \\\n  yamtam-sandbox:latest \\\n  bash -c \"$TOOL_COMMAND\"\n```\n\n```typescript\nimport { execa } from 'execa'\n\n\u002F\u002F Stream container stdout\u002Fstderr in real-time — no buffering\nasync function runInContainer(command: string, args: string[]): Promise\u003Cstring> {\n  const containerName = `yamtam-${Date.now()}`\n  const output: string[] = []\n\n  const proc = execa('docker', [\n    'run', '--rm',\n    '--name',     containerName,\n    '--network',  'none',\n    '--read-only',\n    '--tmpfs',    '\u002Fworkspace:rw,size=64m,noexec',\n    '--memory',   '128m',\n    '--cpus',     '0.5',\n    '--pids-limit', '64',\n    '--cap-drop', 'ALL',\n    '--security-opt', 'no-new-privileges',\n    '--user',     'nobody',\n    'yamtam-sandbox:latest',\n    command, ...args,\n  ])\n\n  \u002F\u002F Stream each line as it arrives — don't wait for process to finish\n  proc.stdout?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n    const line = chunk.toString()\n    output.push(line)\n    process.stdout.write(`[sandbox] ${line}`)  \u002F\u002F live tail\n  })\n\n  proc.stderr?.on('data', (chunk: Buffer) => {\n    process.stderr.write(`[sandbox:err] ${chunk}`)\n  })\n\n  const { exitCode } = await proc\n\n  if (exitCode === 124) throw new Error('sandbox timeout exceeded')\n  if (exitCode !== 0)  throw Object.assign(new Error('sandbox command failed'), { exitCode })\n\n  return output.join('')\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Rule: always --rm (container removed on exit — no state leak)\n\u002F\u002F Rule: --network none is mandatory — not optional even in dev\n\u002F\u002F Rule: stream stdout in real-time for large output (don't buffer 1GB in memory)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Attach stdin to Running Container\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F Feed input into a long-running sandboxed process (e.g., interactive REPL)\nimport { spawn } from 'child_process'\n\nfunction attachContainerStdin(containerId: string, input: string): Promise\u003Cstring> {\n  return new Promise((resolve, reject) => {\n    const proc = spawn('docker', ['exec', '-i', containerId, 'sh'], {\n      stdio: ['pipe', 'pipe', 'pipe'],\n    })\n\n    const output: string[] = []\n    proc.stdout.on('data', (d: Buffer) => output.push(d.toString()))\n    proc.stderr.on('data', (d: Buffer) => output.push(d.toString()))\n\n    proc.stdin.write(input + '\\n')\n    proc.stdin.end()  \u002F\u002F close stdin → process sees EOF\n\n    proc.on('close', (code) => {\n      if (code === 0) resolve(output.join(''))\n      else reject(new Error(`container exec failed with code ${code}`))\n    })\n  })\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Rule: always close stdin after writing (proc.stdin.end()) — or process hangs\n\u002F\u002F Rule: use -i not -it for non-TTY piping (tty allocation fails in CI\u002Fagent context)\n```\n\n---\n\n## nsjail: Namespace Jail (no Docker daemon)\n\n```bash\n# nsjail one-shot execution in isolated Linux namespaces\n# Requires: nsjail binary + CAP_SYS_ADMIN (or user namespaces enabled)\nnsjail \\\n  --mode o \\                       # one-shot: execute once and exit\n  --time_limit 30 \\                # wall-clock timeout (seconds)\n  --rlimit_as 131072 \\             # virtual address space: 128MB (KB)\n  --rlimit_cpu 30 \\                # CPU time limit\n  --rlimit_fsize 65536 \\           # max file size (KB)\n  --rlimit_nofile 32 \\\n  --disable_proc \\                 # no \u002Fproc (blocks \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmem)\n  --iface_no_lo \\                  # no loopback interface\n  --user nobody \\\n  --group nobody \\\n  --chroot \u002F \\\n  --bindmount_ro \u002Fusr \\\n  --bindmount_ro \u002Fbin \\\n  --bindmount_ro \u002Flib \\\n  --tmpfsmount \u002Ftmp \\\n  --cwd \u002Ftmp \\\n  -- bash -c \"$TOOL_COMMAND\"\n\n# Rule: --disable_proc prevents reading \u002Fproc\u002Fself\u002Fmem (process injection attack)\n# Rule: --iface_no_lo = no loopback = no localhost network\n# Rule: --tmpfsmount \u002Ftmp = writable tmp is memory-only (wiped on exit)\n```\n\n---\n\n## Container Health & Teardown\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F Ensure container is completely gone after execution\nasync function ensureContainerGone(name: string): Promise\u003Cvoid> {\n  try {\n    \u002F\u002F Force kill if somehow still running\n    await execa('docker', ['kill', name]).catch(() => {})\n    await execa('docker', ['rm', '-f', name]).catch(() => {})\n\n    \u002F\u002F Verify gone\n    const { stdout } = await execa('docker', ['ps', '-a', '--filter', `name=${name}`, '--format', '{{.ID}}'])\n    if (stdout.trim()) {\n      throw new Error(`container ${name} still exists after teardown`)\n    }\n  } catch (e) {\n    \u002F\u002F Log but don't throw — best-effort cleanup\n    console.error(`[sandbox] teardown warning: ${(e as Error).message}`)\n  }\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Audit: verify no dangling volumes from sandbox containers\nasync function auditDanglingVolumes(): Promise\u003Cstring[]> {\n  const { stdout } = await execa('docker', ['volume', 'ls', '--filter', 'dangling=true', '--format', '{{.Name}}'])\n  return stdout.trim().split('\\n').filter(Boolean)\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Rule: always call ensureContainerGone() in finally block (teardown on error too)\n\u002F\u002F Rule: dangling volumes from sandbox containers = data leak audit finding\n```\n\n---\n\n## Output Size Cap in Streaming Context\n\n```typescript\n\u002F\u002F Cap container output to 16KB (matches middleware size-cap) even when streaming\nclass SandboxOutputStream extends Transform {\n  #bytes = 0\n  readonly #cap = 16 * 1024\n\n  _transform(chunk: Buffer, _enc: string, cb: (err: Error | null, data?: Buffer) => void) {\n    this.#bytes += chunk.length\n    if (this.#bytes > this.#cap) {\n      this.push(Buffer.from('\\n[SANDBOX OUTPUT TRUNCATED — 16KB cap]\\n'))\n      this.end()\n      cb(null)\n      return\n    }\n    cb(null, chunk)\n  }\n}\n\n\u002F\u002F Pipe container stdout through cap transform\nproc.stdout?.pipe(new SandboxOutputStream()).pipe(process.stdout)\n\n\u002F\u002F Rule: cap must be applied BEFORE output reaches agent — never after\n\u002F\u002F Rule: write truncation marker so agent knows output is incomplete\n```\n\n---\n\n## Anti-Fake-Pass Checklist\n\n```\n❌ Container runs as root (--user missing or --user root)\n❌ --network flag omitted (agent can make outbound calls)\n❌ --rm missing (containers accumulate, disk fills, state leaks)\n❌ stdin left open after write (process hangs waiting for EOF)\n❌ -it flag used in non-TTY context (CI\u002Fagent pipelines fail with \"not a TTY\")\n❌ Output buffered in memory before returning (OOM on large tool results)\n❌ nsjail used without --disable_proc (process memory injection possible)\n❌ Container teardown only in happy path (must be in finally block)\n❌ Dangling volumes not audited (sensitive data persists on host)\n```\n",{},"main","481dcd7dd2e288b9d627a2bd017db70e64e6c6fa",".claude\u002Fskills\u002Fcontainer-interactivity",2,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link\u002F","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps","https:\u002F\u002Fyana.vutam.link","An open-source governed runtime & execution environment for multi-agent AI systems.","2026-11-14 13:24:09",{"source":7,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill container-interactivity",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add Horonomos-laps\u002FYana-AI --skill 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`SENTRY_AUTH_TOKEN`.","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fopenai--sentry--sentry\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":18},"01M73DCAP83T17HY7SMGK7MGFE","ito-basket-compare","Compare Itô prediction-market baskets against a user's knowledge base, portfolio notes, financial context, watchlist, or research thesis. Use for read-only basket comparison and gap analysis without investment advice or live trading.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fito-basket-compare\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":64,"name":65,"nameZh":6,"description":66,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":67,"sourceHtmlUrl":68,"categories":69,"keywords":70,"publishedAt":18},"01M734CYEMZFDR3KH6SW0JP8TD","implementing-network-traffic-baselining","Build network traffic baselines from NetFlow\u002FIPFIX data using Python pandas for statistical analysis, z-score anomaly detection, and hourly\u002Fdaily traffic pattern profiling","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-network-traffic-baselining\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":75,"sourceHtmlUrl":76,"categories":77,"keywords":78,"publishedAt":18},"01M73ASZ6NJRJM44Z2P84NGQ3Q","detecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs","Detects defense evasion techniques used by adversaries in endpoint logs including log tampering, timestomping, process injection, and security tool disabling. Use when investigating suspicious endpoint behavior, building detection rules for evasion tactics, or conducting threat hunting for stealthy adversary activity. Activates for requests involving evasion detection, defense evasion analysis, log tampering detection, or MITRE ATT&CK TA0005.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fcore\u002Fskills\u002Fdetecting-evasion-techniques-in-endpoint-logs\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":80,"name":81,"nameZh":6,"description":82,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":83,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":18},"01M734AFNXD06Z78QRK0VKGT7Q","implementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore","Implementing microsegmentation using Akamai Guardicore Segmentation to map application dependencies, create granular network policies, visualize east-west traffic flows, and enforce least-privilege communication between workloads across data centers and cloud.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fyanacuti1121\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fimplementing-microsegmentation-with-guardicore\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":7,"ownerLogin":8,"ownerAvatarUrl":9,"ownerAccountNo":10,"ownerDisplayName":11,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":18},"01M736TK27QMCXK0DVCH25SJN5","ramdisk-tmpfs-patterns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FHoronomos-laps\u002FYana-AI\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Framdisk-tmpfs-patterns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]