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Exceeds the internal 300-line skill guideline (agent-code-constraints.md) -- kept as-is because this is vendored reference material (forensics\u002Fthreat-intel procedure), not Yana AI-authored content, and trimming would damage technical accuracy.\"\n---\n# Configuring Network Segmentation with VLANs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Segmenting an enterprise network into isolated security zones (corporate, servers, DMZ, guest, IoT)\n- Meeting compliance requirements (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, SOC 2) that mandate network isolation for sensitive data\n- Reducing blast radius of security incidents by preventing lateral movement between network segments\n- Isolating high-risk devices (IoT, BYOD, legacy systems) from critical infrastructure\n- Implementing defense-in-depth by combining VLANs with firewall rules and access control lists\n\n**Do not use** VLANs as the sole security control without Layer 3 filtering, for isolating networks that require air-gapping, or without proper switch hardening against VLAN hopping attacks.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Managed switches supporting 802.1Q VLAN trunking (Cisco Catalyst, HP Aruba, Juniper EX, etc.)\n- Layer 3 switch or firewall for inter-VLAN routing and access control\n- Network design document specifying VLAN assignments, IP subnets, and traffic flow requirements\n- Console or SSH access to switches with privileged configuration mode\n- Understanding of 802.1Q trunking, STP, and inter-VLAN routing concepts\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Design the VLAN Architecture\n\n```\n# Define VLANs based on security zones and function\n\nVLAN Plan:\n  VLAN 10  - CORPORATE    (10.10.10.0\u002F24)  - Employee workstations\n  VLAN 20  - SERVERS      (10.10.20.0\u002F24)  - Internal servers\n  VLAN 30  - DMZ          (10.10.30.0\u002F24)  - Internet-facing servers\n  VLAN 40  - GUEST        (10.10.40.0\u002F24)  - Guest WiFi\n  VLAN 50  - IOT          (10.10.50.0\u002F24)  - IoT\u002FOT devices\n  VLAN 60  - VOIP         (10.10.60.0\u002F24)  - VoIP phones\n  VLAN 100 - MANAGEMENT   (10.10.100.0\u002F24) - Switch\u002FAP management\n  VLAN 999 - QUARANTINE   (10.10.99.0\u002F24)  - Isolated\u002Fcompromised hosts\n  VLAN 998 - NATIVE_UNUSED                  - Native VLAN (no traffic)\n\n# Traffic flow matrix:\n# CORPORATE -> SERVERS: Allowed (specific ports)\n# CORPORATE -> DMZ: Allowed (HTTP\u002FHTTPS only)\n# CORPORATE -> GUEST: Denied\n# CORPORATE -> IOT: Denied\n# GUEST -> Any Internal: Denied\n# IOT -> SERVERS: Allowed (specific ports to specific hosts only)\n# DMZ -> SERVERS: Allowed (database ports only)\n# MANAGEMENT -> All: Allowed (from management stations only)\n```\n\n### Step 2: Configure VLANs on Cisco Catalyst Switch\n\n```\n! Enter configuration mode\nenable\nconfigure terminal\n\n! Create VLANs\nvlan 10\n  name CORPORATE\n  exit\nvlan 20\n  name SERVERS\n  exit\nvlan 30\n  name DMZ\n  exit\nvlan 40\n  name GUEST\n  exit\nvlan 50\n  name IOT\n  exit\nvlan 60\n  name VOIP\n  exit\nvlan 100\n  name MANAGEMENT\n  exit\nvlan 998\n  name NATIVE_UNUSED\n  exit\nvlan 999\n  name QUARANTINE\n  exit\n\n! Configure access ports for workstations (VLAN 10)\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-24\n  switchport mode access\n  switchport access vlan 10\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  spanning-tree portfast\n  spanning-tree bpduguard enable\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! Configure access ports for servers (VLAN 20)\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F25-36\n  switchport mode access\n  switchport access vlan 20\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  spanning-tree portfast\n  spanning-tree bpduguard enable\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! Configure trunk ports to other switches\ninterface GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F48\n  switchport mode trunk\n  switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q\n  switchport trunk native vlan 998\n  switchport trunk allowed vlan 10,20,30,40,50,60,100\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! Configure trunk to firewall\u002Frouter\ninterface GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F47\n  switchport mode trunk\n  switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q\n  switchport trunk native vlan 998\n  switchport trunk allowed vlan 10,20,30,40,50,60,100\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! Shutdown unused ports\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F37-46\n  shutdown\n  switchport mode access\n  switchport access vlan 999\n  exit\n```\n\n### Step 3: Harden Switch Against VLAN Hopping\n\n```\n! Disable DTP on all ports (prevents switch spoofing)\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-46\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  exit\n\n! Set native VLAN to unused VLAN on all trunks\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F47-48\n  switchport trunk native vlan 998\n  exit\n\n! Enable DHCP Snooping\nip dhcp snooping\nip dhcp snooping vlan 10,20,30,40,50,60\ninterface GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F47\n  ip dhcp snooping trust\n  exit\n\n! Enable Dynamic ARP Inspection\nip arp inspection vlan 10,20,30,40,50,60\ninterface GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F47\n  ip arp inspection trust\n  exit\n\n! Enable IP Source Guard (prevents IP spoofing)\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-36\n  ip verify source\n  exit\n\n! Enable Port Security\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-24\n  switchport port-security\n  switchport port-security maximum 2\n  switchport port-security violation restrict\n  switchport port-security aging time 60\n  exit\n\n! Set VTP to transparent mode (prevents VTP attacks)\nvtp mode transparent\n\n! Enable BPDU Guard globally\nspanning-tree portfast bpduguard default\n\n! Enable Storm Control\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-36\n  storm-control broadcast level 10\n  storm-control multicast level 10\n  storm-control action shutdown\n  exit\n```\n\n### Step 4: Configure Inter-VLAN Routing with ACLs\n\n```\n! On the Layer 3 switch or firewall, configure SVIs\ninterface Vlan10\n  ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\ninterface Vlan20\n  ip address 10.10.20.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\ninterface Vlan30\n  ip address 10.10.30.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\ninterface Vlan40\n  ip address 10.10.40.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\ninterface Vlan50\n  ip address 10.10.50.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! ACL: Corporate to Servers (allow specific services)\nip access-list extended CORP-TO-SERVERS\n  permit tcp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80\n  permit tcp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443\n  permit tcp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 eq 445\n  permit udp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 eq 53\n  permit icmp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 echo\n  deny ip any any log\n  exit\n\n! ACL: Guest to Internet only (deny all internal)\nip access-list extended GUEST-OUTBOUND\n  deny ip 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255\n  deny ip 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255\n  deny ip 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255\n  permit tcp 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 80\n  permit tcp 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 443\n  permit udp 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 53\n  deny ip any any log\n  exit\n\n! ACL: IoT limited access\nip access-list extended IOT-OUTBOUND\n  permit tcp 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.10.20.10 eq 443\n  permit tcp 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 443\n  permit udp 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.10.20.1 eq 53\n  deny ip 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 log\n  deny ip any any log\n  exit\n\n! Apply ACLs to VLAN interfaces\ninterface Vlan10\n  ip access-group CORP-TO-SERVERS out\n  exit\ninterface Vlan40\n  ip access-group GUEST-OUTBOUND in\n  exit\ninterface Vlan50\n  ip access-group IOT-OUTBOUND in\n  exit\n```\n\n### Step 5: Configure DHCP and DNS per VLAN\n\n```\n! DHCP pools for each VLAN\nip dhcp pool CORPORATE\n  network 10.10.10.0 255.255.255.0\n  default-router 10.10.10.1\n  dns-server 10.10.20.10\n  domain-name corp.example.com\n  lease 1\n  exit\n\nip dhcp pool GUEST\n  network 10.10.40.0 255.255.255.0\n  default-router 10.10.40.1\n  dns-server 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8\n  lease 0 4\n  exit\n\nip dhcp pool IOT\n  network 10.10.50.0 255.255.255.0\n  default-router 10.10.50.1\n  dns-server 10.10.20.10\n  lease 7\n  exit\n\n! Exclude gateway and server IPs from DHCP pools\nip dhcp excluded-address 10.10.10.1 10.10.10.10\nip dhcp excluded-address 10.10.40.1 10.10.40.10\nip dhcp excluded-address 10.10.50.1 10.10.50.10\n```\n\n### Step 6: Verify and Test Segmentation\n\n```bash\n# From a workstation on VLAN 10 (Corporate):\n# Should succeed:\nping 10.10.20.10          # Server access\ncurl https:\u002F\u002F10.10.20.10  # HTTPS to server\n\n# Should fail:\nping 10.10.40.100         # Guest VLAN - should be blocked\nping 10.10.50.100         # IoT VLAN - should be blocked\n\n# From a device on VLAN 40 (Guest):\n# Should succeed:\nping 8.8.8.8              # Internet access\ncurl https:\u002F\u002Fwww.google.com\n\n# Should fail:\nping 10.10.10.1           # Corporate gateway - blocked\nping 10.10.20.10          # Server - blocked\n\n# Verify switch configuration\nshow vlan brief\nshow interfaces trunk\nshow ip arp inspection statistics\nshow ip dhcp snooping binding\nshow port-security\nshow ip access-lists\n\n# Run VLAN hopping tests (from authorized pentest)\n# These should all fail if hardening is correct:\n# 1. DTP negotiation - should fail (nonegotiate)\n# 2. Double tagging - should fail (native VLAN 998)\n# 3. ARP spoofing - should fail (DAI enabled)\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **VLAN (Virtual LAN)** | Logical network partition at Layer 2 that groups switch ports into isolated broadcast domains, regardless of physical location |\n| **802.1Q Trunking** | IEEE standard for VLAN tagging that adds a 4-byte header to Ethernet frames, identifying which VLAN a frame belongs to across trunk links |\n| **Inter-VLAN Routing** | Layer 3 forwarding of traffic between VLANs using a router, Layer 3 switch, or firewall with access control lists |\n| **Native VLAN** | VLAN assigned to untagged frames on trunk ports; should be set to an unused VLAN to prevent VLAN hopping attacks |\n| **DHCP Snooping** | Switch feature that validates DHCP messages and builds a binding table of IP-MAC-port mappings, preventing rogue DHCP servers |\n| **Port Security** | Switch feature that limits the number of MAC addresses per port and takes action (shutdown, restrict) when violated |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Cisco Catalyst\u002FNexus**: Enterprise managed switches with comprehensive VLAN, trunking, and security feature support\n- **HP Aruba CX**: Enterprise switches with REST API management and VLAN segmentation capabilities\n- **pfSense\u002FOPNsense**: Open-source firewalls for inter-VLAN routing with stateful access control\n- **NetBox**: Open-source IPAM and DCIM tool for documenting VLAN assignments, IP addressing, and network topology\n- **Nmap**: Network scanner for verifying segmentation effectiveness by testing reachability across VLAN boundaries\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Implementing PCI-DSS Compliant Network Segmentation for Retail\n\n**Context**: A retail chain must isolate their payment card processing systems from the general corporate network to meet PCI-DSS requirements. The current flat network has point-of-sale terminals, employee workstations, inventory servers, and guest WiFi on a single VLAN. The environment uses Cisco Catalyst 9300 switches.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Design VLAN architecture: POS terminals on VLAN 50 (CDE), corporate on VLAN 10, servers on VLAN 20, guest on VLAN 40\n2. Create VLANs on all access-layer switches and configure access ports by function\n3. Configure trunk links between switches with explicit VLAN allowed lists (no \"all\" trunks)\n4. Set native VLAN to 998 (unused) on all trunks and disable DTP on every port\n5. Configure ACLs on the Layer 3 switch: CDE VLAN can only reach the payment processor's IP on port 443; no other inter-VLAN traffic to\u002Ffrom CDE\n6. Enable DHCP snooping, DAI, and port security on all access ports\n7. Verify segmentation with penetration testing from each VLAN, confirming CDE is fully isolated\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Leaving DTP enabled on access ports, allowing VLAN hopping to reach the CDE\n- Using VLAN 1 as the native VLAN, enabling double-tagging attacks\n- Not restricting trunk allowed VLANs, carrying all VLANs including CDE to non-essential switches\n- Creating ACLs that allow \"any\" source to reach CDE servers instead of specific POS terminal IPs\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## Network Segmentation Implementation Report\n\n**Network**: Retail Store #42\n**Switch Platform**: Cisco Catalyst 9300\n**VLANs Configured**: 8\n\n### VLAN Summary\n\n| VLAN ID | Name | Subnet | Ports | Purpose |\n|---------|------|--------|-------|---------|\n| 10 | CORPORATE | 10.10.10.0\u002F24 | Gi1\u002F0\u002F1-24 | Employee workstations |\n| 20 | SERVERS | 10.10.20.0\u002F24 | Gi1\u002F0\u002F25-36 | Internal servers |\n| 30 | DMZ | 10.10.30.0\u002F24 | Gi2\u002F0\u002F1-4 | Internet-facing |\n| 40 | GUEST | 10.10.40.0\u002F24 | WiFi AP trunk | Guest WiFi |\n| 50 | CDE | 10.10.50.0\u002F24 | Gi2\u002F0\u002F5-12 | POS terminals |\n| 100 | MGMT | 10.10.100.0\u002F24 | Gi1\u002F0\u002F48 | Switch management |\n| 998 | NATIVE | N\u002FA | Trunks only | Unused native |\n| 999 | QUARANTINE | 10.10.99.0\u002F24 | Unused ports | Isolation |\n\n### Security Hardening Status\n\n| Control | Status |\n|---------|--------|\n| DTP Disabled (nonegotiate) | All ports |\n| Native VLAN (998) | All trunks |\n| DHCP Snooping | VLANs 10,20,40,50 |\n| Dynamic ARP Inspection | VLANs 10,20,40,50 |\n| Port Security | Access ports |\n| BPDU Guard | Access ports |\n| Unused Ports Shutdown | 10 ports in VLAN 999 |\n| VTP Transparent Mode | Enabled |\n```\n","# Configuring Network Segmentation with VLANs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- Segmenting an enterprise network into isolated security zones (corporate, servers, DMZ, guest, IoT)\n- Meeting compliance requirements (PCI-DSS, HIPAA, SOC 2) that mandate network isolation for sensitive data\n- Reducing blast radius of security incidents by preventing lateral movement between network segments\n- Isolating high-risk devices (IoT, BYOD, legacy systems) from critical infrastructure\n- Implementing defense-in-depth by combining VLANs with firewall rules and access control lists\n\n**Do not use** VLANs as the sole security control without Layer 3 filtering, for isolating networks that require air-gapping, or without proper switch hardening against VLAN hopping attacks.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Managed switches supporting 802.1Q VLAN trunking (Cisco Catalyst, HP Aruba, Juniper EX, etc.)\n- Layer 3 switch or firewall for inter-VLAN routing and access control\n- Network design document specifying VLAN assignments, IP subnets, and traffic flow requirements\n- Console or SSH access to switches with privileged configuration mode\n- Understanding of 802.1Q trunking, STP, and inter-VLAN routing concepts\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Design the VLAN Architecture\n\n```\n# Define VLANs based on security zones and function\n\nVLAN Plan:\n  VLAN 10  - CORPORATE    (10.10.10.0\u002F24)  - Employee workstations\n  VLAN 20  - SERVERS      (10.10.20.0\u002F24)  - Internal servers\n  VLAN 30  - DMZ          (10.10.30.0\u002F24)  - Internet-facing servers\n  VLAN 40  - GUEST        (10.10.40.0\u002F24)  - Guest WiFi\n  VLAN 50  - IOT          (10.10.50.0\u002F24)  - IoT\u002FOT devices\n  VLAN 60  - VOIP         (10.10.60.0\u002F24)  - VoIP phones\n  VLAN 100 - MANAGEMENT   (10.10.100.0\u002F24) - Switch\u002FAP management\n  VLAN 999 - QUARANTINE   (10.10.99.0\u002F24)  - Isolated\u002Fcompromised hosts\n  VLAN 998 - NATIVE_UNUSED                  - Native VLAN (no traffic)\n\n# Traffic flow matrix:\n# CORPORATE -> SERVERS: Allowed (specific ports)\n# CORPORATE -> DMZ: Allowed (HTTP\u002FHTTPS only)\n# CORPORATE -> GUEST: Denied\n# CORPORATE -> IOT: Denied\n# GUEST -> Any Internal: Denied\n# IOT -> SERVERS: Allowed (specific ports to specific hosts only)\n# DMZ -> SERVERS: Allowed (database ports only)\n# MANAGEMENT -> All: Allowed (from management stations only)\n```\n\n### Step 2: Configure VLANs on Cisco Catalyst Switch\n\n```\n! Enter configuration mode\nenable\nconfigure terminal\n\n! Create VLANs\nvlan 10\n  name CORPORATE\n  exit\nvlan 20\n  name SERVERS\n  exit\nvlan 30\n  name DMZ\n  exit\nvlan 40\n  name GUEST\n  exit\nvlan 50\n  name IOT\n  exit\nvlan 60\n  name VOIP\n  exit\nvlan 100\n  name MANAGEMENT\n  exit\nvlan 998\n  name NATIVE_UNUSED\n  exit\nvlan 999\n  name QUARANTINE\n  exit\n\n! Configure access ports for workstations (VLAN 10)\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-24\n  switchport mode access\n  switchport access vlan 10\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  spanning-tree portfast\n  spanning-tree bpduguard enable\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! Configure access ports for servers (VLAN 20)\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F25-36\n  switchport mode access\n  switchport access vlan 20\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  spanning-tree portfast\n  spanning-tree bpduguard enable\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! Configure trunk ports to other switches\ninterface GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F48\n  switchport mode trunk\n  switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q\n  switchport trunk native vlan 998\n  switchport trunk allowed vlan 10,20,30,40,50,60,100\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! Configure trunk to firewall\u002Frouter\ninterface GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F47\n  switchport mode trunk\n  switchport trunk encapsulation dot1q\n  switchport trunk native vlan 998\n  switchport trunk allowed vlan 10,20,30,40,50,60,100\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! Shutdown unused ports\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F37-46\n  shutdown\n  switchport mode access\n  switchport access vlan 999\n  exit\n```\n\n### Step 3: Harden Switch Against VLAN Hopping\n\n```\n! Disable DTP on all ports (prevents switch spoofing)\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-46\n  switchport nonegotiate\n  exit\n\n! Set native VLAN to unused VLAN on all trunks\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F47-48\n  switchport trunk native vlan 998\n  exit\n\n! Enable DHCP Snooping\nip dhcp snooping\nip dhcp snooping vlan 10,20,30,40,50,60\ninterface GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F47\n  ip dhcp snooping trust\n  exit\n\n! Enable Dynamic ARP Inspection\nip arp inspection vlan 10,20,30,40,50,60\ninterface GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F47\n  ip arp inspection trust\n  exit\n\n! Enable IP Source Guard (prevents IP spoofing)\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-36\n  ip verify source\n  exit\n\n! Enable Port Security\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-24\n  switchport port-security\n  switchport port-security maximum 2\n  switchport port-security violation restrict\n  switchport port-security aging time 60\n  exit\n\n! Set VTP to transparent mode (prevents VTP attacks)\nvtp mode transparent\n\n! Enable BPDU Guard globally\nspanning-tree portfast bpduguard default\n\n! Enable Storm Control\ninterface range GigabitEthernet1\u002F0\u002F1-36\n  storm-control broadcast level 10\n  storm-control multicast level 10\n  storm-control action shutdown\n  exit\n```\n\n### Step 4: Configure Inter-VLAN Routing with ACLs\n\n```\n! On the Layer 3 switch or firewall, configure SVIs\ninterface Vlan10\n  ip address 10.10.10.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\ninterface Vlan20\n  ip address 10.10.20.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\ninterface Vlan30\n  ip address 10.10.30.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\ninterface Vlan40\n  ip address 10.10.40.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\ninterface Vlan50\n  ip address 10.10.50.1 255.255.255.0\n  no shutdown\n  exit\n\n! ACL: Corporate to Servers (allow specific services)\nip access-list extended CORP-TO-SERVERS\n  permit tcp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 eq 80\n  permit tcp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 eq 443\n  permit tcp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 eq 445\n  permit udp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 eq 53\n  permit icmp 10.10.10.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.20.0 0.0.0.255 echo\n  deny ip any any log\n  exit\n\n! ACL: Guest to Internet only (deny all internal)\nip access-list extended GUEST-OUTBOUND\n  deny ip 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255\n  deny ip 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 172.16.0.0 0.15.255.255\n  deny ip 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 192.168.0.0 0.0.255.255\n  permit tcp 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 80\n  permit tcp 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 443\n  permit udp 10.10.40.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 53\n  deny ip any any log\n  exit\n\n! ACL: IoT limited access\nip access-list extended IOT-OUTBOUND\n  permit tcp 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.10.20.10 eq 443\n  permit tcp 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 any eq 443\n  permit udp 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 host 10.10.20.1 eq 53\n  deny ip 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 10.10.50.0 0.0.0.255 log\n  deny ip any any log\n  exit\n\n! Apply ACLs to VLAN interfaces\ninterface Vlan10\n  ip access-group CORP-TO-SERVERS out\n  exit\ninterface Vlan40\n  ip access-group GUEST-OUTBOUND in\n  exit\ninterface Vlan50\n  ip access-group IOT-OUTBOUND in\n  exit\n```\n\n### Step 5: Configure DHCP and DNS per VLAN\n\n```\n! DHCP pools for each VLAN\nip dhcp pool CORPORATE\n  network 10.10.10.0 255.255.255.0\n  default-router 10.10.10.1\n  dns-server 10.10.20.10\n  domain-name corp.example.com\n  lease 1\n  exit\n\nip dhcp pool GUEST\n  network 10.10.40.0 255.255.255.0\n  default-router 10.10.40.1\n  dns-server 1.1.1.1 8.8.8.8\n  lease 0 4\n  exit\n\nip dhcp pool IOT\n  network 10.10.50.0 255.255.255.0\n  default-router 10.10.50.1\n  dns-server 10.10.20.10\n  lease 7\n  exit\n\n! Exclude gateway and server IPs from DHCP pools\nip dhcp excluded-address 10.10.10.1 10.10.10.10\nip dhcp excluded-address 10.10.40.1 10.10.40.10\nip dhcp excluded-address 10.10.50.1 10.10.50.10\n```\n\n### Step 6: Verify and Test Segmentation\n\n```bash\n# From a workstation on VLAN 10 (Corporate):\n# Should succeed:\nping 10.10.20.10          # Server access\ncurl https:\u002F\u002F10.10.20.10  # HTTPS to server\n\n# Should fail:\nping 10.10.40.100         # Guest VLAN - should be blocked\nping 10.10.50.100         # IoT VLAN - should be blocked\n\n# From a device on VLAN 40 (Guest):\n# Should succeed:\nping 8.8.8.8              # Internet access\ncurl https:\u002F\u002Fwww.google.com\n\n# Should fail:\nping 10.10.10.1           # Corporate gateway - blocked\nping 10.10.20.10          # Server - blocked\n\n# Verify switch configuration\nshow vlan brief\nshow interfaces trunk\nshow ip arp inspection statistics\nshow ip dhcp snooping binding\nshow port-security\nshow ip access-lists\n\n# Run VLAN hopping tests (from authorized pentest)\n# These should all fail if hardening is correct:\n# 1. DTP negotiation - should fail (nonegotiate)\n# 2. Double tagging - should fail (native VLAN 998)\n# 3. ARP spoofing - should fail (DAI enabled)\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| **VLAN (Virtual LAN)** | Logical network partition at Layer 2 that groups switch ports into isolated broadcast domains, regardless of physical location |\n| **802.1Q Trunking** | IEEE standard for VLAN tagging that adds a 4-byte header to Ethernet frames, identifying which VLAN a frame belongs to across trunk links |\n| **Inter-VLAN Routing** | Layer 3 forwarding of traffic between VLANs using a router, Layer 3 switch, or firewall with access control lists |\n| **Native VLAN** | VLAN assigned to untagged frames on trunk ports; should be set to an unused VLAN to prevent VLAN hopping attacks |\n| **DHCP Snooping** | Switch feature that validates DHCP messages and builds a binding table of IP-MAC-port mappings, preventing rogue DHCP servers |\n| **Port Security** | Switch feature that limits the number of MAC addresses per port and takes action (shutdown, restrict) when violated |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Cisco Catalyst\u002FNexus**: Enterprise managed switches with comprehensive VLAN, trunking, and security feature support\n- **HP Aruba CX**: Enterprise switches with REST API management and VLAN segmentation capabilities\n- **pfSense\u002FOPNsense**: Open-source firewalls for inter-VLAN routing with stateful access control\n- **NetBox**: Open-source IPAM and DCIM tool for documenting VLAN assignments, IP addressing, and network topology\n- **Nmap**: Network scanner for verifying segmentation effectiveness by testing reachability across VLAN boundaries\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Implementing PCI-DSS Compliant Network Segmentation for Retail\n\n**Context**: A retail chain must isolate their payment card processing systems from the general corporate network to meet PCI-DSS requirements. The current flat network has point-of-sale terminals, employee workstations, inventory servers, and guest WiFi on a single VLAN. The environment uses Cisco Catalyst 9300 switches.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Design VLAN architecture: POS terminals on VLAN 50 (CDE), corporate on VLAN 10, servers on VLAN 20, guest on VLAN 40\n2. Create VLANs on all access-layer switches and configure access ports by function\n3. Configure trunk links between switches with explicit VLAN allowed lists (no \"all\" trunks)\n4. Set native VLAN to 998 (unused) on all trunks and disable DTP on every port\n5. Configure ACLs on the Layer 3 switch: CDE VLAN can only reach the payment processor's IP on port 443; no other inter-VLAN traffic to\u002Ffrom CDE\n6. Enable DHCP snooping, DAI, and port security on all access ports\n7. Verify segmentation with penetration testing from each VLAN, confirming CDE is fully isolated\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Leaving DTP enabled on access ports, allowing VLAN hopping to reach the CDE\n- Using VLAN 1 as the native VLAN, enabling double-tagging attacks\n- Not restricting trunk allowed VLANs, carrying all VLANs including CDE to non-essential switches\n- Creating ACLs that allow \"any\" source to reach CDE servers instead of specific POS terminal IPs\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## Network Segmentation Implementation Report\n\n**Network**: Retail Store #42\n**Switch Platform**: Cisco Catalyst 9300\n**VLANs Configured**: 8\n\n### VLAN Summary\n\n| VLAN ID | Name | Subnet | Ports | Purpose |\n|---------|------|--------|-------|---------|\n| 10 | CORPORATE | 10.10.10.0\u002F24 | Gi1\u002F0\u002F1-24 | Employee workstations |\n| 20 | SERVERS | 10.10.20.0\u002F24 | Gi1\u002F0\u002F25-36 | Internal servers |\n| 30 | DMZ | 10.10.30.0\u002F24 | Gi2\u002F0\u002F1-4 | Internet-facing |\n| 40 | GUEST | 10.10.40.0\u002F24 | WiFi AP trunk | Guest WiFi |\n| 50 | CDE | 10.10.50.0\u002F24 | Gi2\u002F0\u002F5-12 | POS terminals |\n| 100 | MGMT | 10.10.100.0\u002F24 | Gi1\u002F0\u002F48 | Switch management |\n| 998 | NATIVE | N\u002FA | Trunks only | Unused native |\n| 999 | QUARANTINE | 10.10.99.0\u002F24 | Unused ports | Isolation |\n\n### Security Hardening Status\n\n| Control | Status |\n|---------|--------|\n| DTP Disabled (nonegotiate) | All ports |\n| Native VLAN (998) | All trunks |\n| DHCP Snooping | VLANs 10,20,40,50 |\n| Dynamic ARP Inspection | VLANs 10,20,40,50 |\n| Port Security | Access ports |\n| BPDU Guard | Access ports |\n| Unused Ports Shutdown | 10 ports in VLAN 999 |\n| VTP Transparent Mode | Enabled |\n```\n",{"name":5,"note":25,"tags":26,"author":32,"domain":33,"source":34,"license":15,"version":35,"nist_csf":36,"subdomain":27,"description":41,"mitre_attack":42,"source_commit":48},"Vendored verbatim from an external Apache-2.0 security-skill library, pinned by commit. 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