[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M72XYE4N64KAS970R9368S3J":3,"skill-same:01M72XYE4N64KAS970R9368S3J":45},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":23,"commitSha":24,"skillDirectory":25,"forksCount":26,"repositoryHtmlUrl":27,"repositoryHomepageUrl":28,"ownerHtmlUrl":29,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":6,"updatedAt":30,"install":31,"resources":44},"01M72XYE4N64KAS970R9368S3J","signed-audit-trails-recipe",null,"Step-by-step cookbook for setting up cryptographically signed audit trails on Claude Code tool calls. Use when explaining, evaluating, or demonstrating the pattern before committing to the protect-mcp runtime hooks. Covers Cedar policy, Ed25519 receipts, offline verification, tamper detection, CI\u002FCD integration, and SLSA composition.","steph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up","steph-frtech","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F198466323?v=4","01M72XD213FVQA2QXRGTJFKHE1","01M72XD227AANJ993SQTNZB1CK",1,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fmarketplaces\u002Fwshobson\u002Fplugins\u002Fsigned-audit-trails\u002Fskills\u002Fsigned-audit-trails-recipe\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-10 22:39:42",false,"---\nname: signed-audit-trails-recipe\ndescription: Step-by-step cookbook for setting up cryptographically signed audit trails on Claude Code tool calls. Use when explaining, evaluating, or demonstrating the pattern before committing to the protect-mcp runtime hooks. Covers Cedar policy, Ed25519 receipts, offline verification, tamper detection, CI\u002FCD integration, and SLSA composition.\n---\n\n# Signed Audit Trails for Claude Code Tool Calls\n\nCookbook-style walkthrough for cryptographically signed receipts on every\nClaude Code tool call. This is the teaching skill. For the runtime\nimplementation, install the [`protect-mcp`](..\u002F..\u002Fprotect-mcp\u002F) plugin.\n\n## What this gives you\n\nEvery tool call (`Bash`, `Edit`, `Write`, `WebFetch`) is:\n\n1. **Evaluated against a Cedar policy** before execution. If the policy denies\n   the call, the tool does not run.\n2. **Signed as an Ed25519 receipt** after execution. Receipts are\n   JCS-canonical, hash-chained, and verifiable offline by anyone with the\n   public key.\n\nAn auditor, regulator, or counterparty can verify the full chain later with a\nsingle CLI command (`npx @veritasacta\u002Fverify receipts\u002F*.json`). No network\ncall, no vendor lookup, no trust in the operator.\n\n## When to use the pattern\n\n- **Regulated environments** (finance, healthcare, critical infrastructure)\n  where you need tamper-evident evidence of agent behavior\n- **CI\u002FCD pipelines** where you want to prove that a policy gate held for\n  every automated build step\n- **Multi-party collaboration** where a counterparty wants to verify your\n  agent's behavior without trusting your operator\n- **Compliance contexts** (EU AI Act Article 12, SLSA provenance for\n  agent-built software) where standard logging is not sufficient\n\n## Step 1: Install the hook configuration\n\nCreate `.claude\u002Fsettings.json` in your project root:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"hooks\": {\n    \"PreToolUse\": [\n      {\n        \"matcher\": \".*\",\n        \"hook\": {\n          \"type\": \"command\",\n          \"command\": \"npx protect-mcp@latest evaluate --policy .\u002Fprotect.cedar --tool \\\"$TOOL_NAME\\\" --input \\\"$TOOL_INPUT\\\" --fail-on-missing-policy false\"\n        }\n      }\n    ],\n    \"PostToolUse\": [\n      {\n        \"matcher\": \".*\",\n        \"hook\": {\n          \"type\": \"command\",\n          \"command\": \"npx protect-mcp@latest sign --tool \\\"$TOOL_NAME\\\" --input \\\"$TOOL_INPUT\\\" --output \\\"$TOOL_OUTPUT\\\" --receipts .\u002Freceipts\u002F --key .\u002Fprotect-mcp.key\"\n        }\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe first run of `protect-mcp sign` generates `.\u002Fprotect-mcp.key` (Ed25519\nprivate key) if one does not exist. Commit the **public** key fingerprint\n(visible in any receipt's `public_key` field); do not commit the private\nkey.\n\nAdd the private key and receipt directory to `.gitignore`:\n\n```bash\necho \".\u002Fprotect-mcp.key\" >> .gitignore\necho \".\u002Freceipts\u002F\" >> .gitignore\n```\n\n## Step 2: Write a Cedar policy\n\nCreate `.\u002Fprotect.cedar`:\n\n```cedar\n\u002F\u002F Allow all read-oriented tools by default.\npermit (\n    principal,\n    action in [Action::\"Read\", Action::\"Glob\", Action::\"Grep\", Action::\"WebSearch\"],\n    resource\n);\n\n\u002F\u002F Allow Bash commands from a safe list only.\npermit (\n    principal,\n    action == Action::\"Bash\",\n    resource\n) when {\n    context.command_pattern in [\n        \"git\", \"npm\", \"pnpm\", \"yarn\", \"ls\", \"cat\", \"pwd\",\n        \"echo\", \"test\", \"node\", \"python\", \"make\"\n    ]\n};\n\n\u002F\u002F Explicit deny on destructive commands. Cedar deny is authoritative.\nforbid (\n    principal,\n    action == Action::\"Bash\",\n    resource\n) when {\n    context.command_pattern in [\"rm -rf\", \"dd\", \"mkfs\", \"shred\"]\n};\n\n\u002F\u002F Restrict writes to the project directory.\npermit (\n    principal,\n    action in [Action::\"Write\", Action::\"Edit\"],\n    resource\n) when {\n    context.path_starts_with == \".\u002F\"\n};\n```\n\nFour rules:\n\n- Read-oriented tools always allowed\n- `Bash` allowed for safe command patterns (`git`, `npm`, etc.)\n- `Bash rm -rf` and similar destructive commands explicitly denied\n- Writes allowed only within the project (`.\u002F` prefix)\n\nCedar `forbid` rules take precedence over `permit` rules, so destructive\ncommands cannot be bypassed by a later permissive rule.\n\n## Step 3: Use Claude Code normally\n\nStart Claude Code. Every tool call goes through both hooks:\n\n```\nYou: Please read the README and summarize it.\n\nClaude: I will read README.md.\n  [PreToolUse: Read .\u002FREADME.md -> allow]\n  [Tool: Read executes]\n  [PostToolUse: receipt rcpt-a8f3c9d2 signed to .\u002Freceipts\u002F]\n\n... summary of README ...\n```\n\nA session of 20 tool calls produces 20 receipts, each hash-chained to its\npredecessor.\n\n## Step 4: Inspect a receipt\n\n```bash\ncat .\u002Freceipts\u002F$(ls -t .\u002Freceipts\u002F | head -1)\n```\n\n```json\n{\n  \"receipt_id\": \"rcpt-a8f3c9d2\",\n  \"receipt_version\": \"1.0\",\n  \"issuer_id\": \"claude-code-protect-mcp\",\n  \"event_time\": \"2026-04-17T12:34:56.123Z\",\n  \"tool_name\": \"Read\",\n  \"input_hash\": \"sha256:a3f8c9d2e1b7465f...\",\n  \"decision\": \"allow\",\n  \"policy_id\": \"protect.cedar\",\n  \"policy_digest\": \"sha256:b7e2f4a6c8d0e1f3...\",\n  \"parent_receipt_id\": \"rcpt-3d1ab7c2\",\n  \"public_key\": \"4437ca56815c0516...\",\n  \"signature\": \"4cde814b7889e987...\"\n}\n```\n\nEvery field except `signature` and `public_key` is covered by the Ed25519\nsignature. Modifying any field after signing invalidates the signature.\n\n## Step 5: Verify the receipt chain\n\n```bash\nnpx @veritasacta\u002Fverify .\u002Freceipts\u002F*.json\n```\n\nExit codes:\n\n| Code | Meaning |\n|------|---------|\n| `0`  | All receipts verified; chain intact |\n| `1`  | A receipt failed signature verification (tampered, or wrong key) |\n| `2`  | A receipt was malformed |\n\n## Step 6: Demonstrate tamper detection\n\nModify any receipt's `decision` field from `allow` to `deny`:\n\n```bash\npython3 -c \"\nimport json, os\npath = '.\u002Freceipts\u002F' + sorted(os.listdir('.\u002Freceipts'))[-1]\nr = json.loads(open(path).read())\nr['decision'] = 'deny'\nopen(path, 'w').write(json.dumps(r))\n\"\n\nnpx @veritasacta\u002Fverify .\u002Freceipts\u002F*.json\n```\n\nThe verifier exits with code `1` and reports which receipt failed. The\nEd25519 signature no longer matches the JCS-canonical bytes of the\ntampered payload.\n\nRestore the field and verification passes again.\n\n## How the cryptography works\n\nThree invariants make receipts verifiable offline across any conformant\nimplementation:\n\n1. **JCS canonicalization (RFC 8785)** before signing. Keys sorted,\n   whitespace minimized, strings NFC-normalized. Two independent\n   implementations produce byte-identical signing payloads for the same\n   receipt content.\n2. **Ed25519 signatures (RFC 8032)** over the canonical bytes.\n   Deterministic, fixed-size, no nonce dependency.\n3. **Hash chain linkage.** Each receipt's `parent_receipt_hash` is the\n   SHA-256 of the predecessor's canonical form. Insertions, deletions, and\n   reorderings break later receipts.\n\nFor the formal wire format see\n[draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fdraft-farley-acta-signed-receipts\u002F).\n\n## Cross-implementation interop\n\nThe receipt format has four independent implementations today:\n\n| Implementation | Language | Use case |\n|----------------|----------|----------|\n| [protect-mcp](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002Fprotect-mcp) | TypeScript | Claude Code, Cursor, MCP hosts |\n| [protect-mcp-adk](https:\u002F\u002Fpypi.org\u002Fproject\u002Fprotect-mcp-adk\u002F) | Python | Google Agent Development Kit |\n| [sb-runtime](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FScopeBlind\u002Fsb-runtime) | Rust | OS-level sandbox (Landlock + seccomp) |\n| APS governance hook | Python | CrewAI, LangChain |\n\nA receipt produced by any of them verifies against\n[`@veritasacta\u002Fverify`](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002F@veritasacta\u002Fverify).\nThe auditor does not need to trust the operator's tooling choice: the format\nis the contract.\n\n## CI\u002FCD integration\n\nGate merges on receipt chain verification so no build lands with a broken\nevidence chain:\n\n```yaml\n# .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fverify-receipts.yml\nname: Verify Decision Receipts\non: [push, pull_request]\n\njobs:\n  verify:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n      - uses: actions\u002Fsetup-node@v4\n        with: { node-version: '20' }\n      - name: Run governed agent\n        run: python scripts\u002Frun_agent.py > receipts.jsonl\n      - name: Verify receipt chain\n        run: npx @veritasacta\u002Fverify receipts.jsonl\n```\n\nArchive the receipts as an artifact so the chain survives beyond the job run:\n\n```yaml\n      - name: Upload receipts\n        if: always()\n        uses: actions\u002Fupload-artifact@v4\n        with:\n          name: decision-receipts\n          path: receipts\u002F\n```\n\n## Composition with SLSA provenance for agent-built software\n\nWhen Claude Code builds and releases software (running `npm install`,\n`npm build`, `npm publish` as tool calls), the receipt chain is the\nper-step build log. SLSA Provenance v1 has an extension point for this: the\n`byproducts` field can reference the receipt chain alongside the build\nattestation.\n\nThe [agent-commit build type](https:\u002F\u002Frefs.arewm.com\u002Fagent-commit\u002Fv0.2)\ndocuments the pattern using the ResourceDescriptor shape:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"decision-receipts\",\n  \"digest\": { \"sha256\": \"...\" },\n  \"uri\": \"oci:\u002F\u002Fregistry\u002Forg\u002Fbuild-xyz\u002Freceipts:sha256-...\",\n  \"annotations\": {\n    \"predicateType\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fveritasacta.com\u002Fattestation\u002Fdecision-receipt\u002Fv0.1\",\n    \"signerRole\": \"supervisor-hook\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe SLSA provenance is signed by the builder identity; the receipt\nattestation is signed by the supervisor-hook identity. Two trust domains,\ncross-referenced at the byproduct layer. See\n[slsa-framework\u002Fslsa#1594](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fslsa-framework\u002Fslsa\u002Fissues\u002F1594)\nfor the composition discussion.\n\n## Common pitfalls\n\n**Private key in version control.** The generated `.\u002Fprotect-mcp.key` must\nnot be committed. The examples above add it to `.gitignore`. If a key is\naccidentally committed, rotate immediately (delete the key file and let the\nhook regenerate on next run).\n\n**Hook command quoting.** The hooks receive `$TOOL_NAME` and `$TOOL_INPUT`\nas environment variables. Keep the quoting `\"$TOOL_INPUT\"` so inputs with\nspaces or special characters pass through intact.\n\n**Receipts directory in CI.** If Claude Code runs in CI, upload receipts as\nan artifact at the end of the job or the chain is lost at job end.\n\n**Policy is missing.** The example `PreToolUse` hook uses\n`--fail-on-missing-policy false` so an absent `.\u002Fprotect.cedar` does not\nbreak Claude Code out of the box. Remove this flag in production so a\nmissing policy is treated as a hard failure.\n\n## Related in this marketplace\n\n- [`protect-mcp`](..\u002F..\u002Fprotect-mcp\u002F) — the runtime hook implementation\n  (use this plugin in production)\n- [`review-agent-governance`](..\u002F..\u002Freview-agent-governance\u002F) — require\n  human approval before review-surface actions; composes with protect-mcp\n\n## References\n\n- [`draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts`](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fdraft-farley-acta-signed-receipts\u002F) — IETF draft, receipt wire format\n- [RFC 8032](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fhtml\u002Frfc8032) — Ed25519\n- [RFC 8785](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fhtml\u002Frfc8785) — JCS\n- [Cedar policy language](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.cedarpolicy.com\u002F)\n- [protect-mcp on npm](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002Fprotect-mcp)\n- [@veritasacta\u002Fverify on npm](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002F@veritasacta\u002Fverify)\n- [in-toto\u002Fattestation#549](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fin-toto\u002Fattestation\u002Fpull\u002F549) — Decision Receipt predicate proposal\n- [agent-commit build type](https:\u002F\u002Frefs.arewm.com\u002Fagent-commit\u002Fv0.2) — SLSA provenance for agent-produced commits\n- [Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmicrosoft\u002Fagent-governance-toolkit) (`examples\u002Fprotect-mcp-governed\u002F`)\n- [AWS Cedar for Agents](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcedar-policy\u002Fcedar-for-agents)\n","# Signed Audit Trails for Claude Code Tool Calls\n\nCookbook-style walkthrough for cryptographically signed receipts on every\nClaude Code tool call. This is the teaching skill. For the runtime\nimplementation, install the [`protect-mcp`](..\u002F..\u002Fprotect-mcp\u002F) plugin.\n\n## What this gives you\n\nEvery tool call (`Bash`, `Edit`, `Write`, `WebFetch`) is:\n\n1. **Evaluated against a Cedar policy** before execution. If the policy denies\n   the call, the tool does not run.\n2. **Signed as an Ed25519 receipt** after execution. Receipts are\n   JCS-canonical, hash-chained, and verifiable offline by anyone with the\n   public key.\n\nAn auditor, regulator, or counterparty can verify the full chain later with a\nsingle CLI command (`npx @veritasacta\u002Fverify receipts\u002F*.json`). No network\ncall, no vendor lookup, no trust in the operator.\n\n## When to use the pattern\n\n- **Regulated environments** (finance, healthcare, critical infrastructure)\n  where you need tamper-evident evidence of agent behavior\n- **CI\u002FCD pipelines** where you want to prove that a policy gate held for\n  every automated build step\n- **Multi-party collaboration** where a counterparty wants to verify your\n  agent's behavior without trusting your operator\n- **Compliance contexts** (EU AI Act Article 12, SLSA provenance for\n  agent-built software) where standard logging is not sufficient\n\n## Step 1: Install the hook configuration\n\nCreate `.claude\u002Fsettings.json` in your project root:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"hooks\": {\n    \"PreToolUse\": [\n      {\n        \"matcher\": \".*\",\n        \"hook\": {\n          \"type\": \"command\",\n          \"command\": \"npx protect-mcp@latest evaluate --policy .\u002Fprotect.cedar --tool \\\"$TOOL_NAME\\\" --input \\\"$TOOL_INPUT\\\" --fail-on-missing-policy false\"\n        }\n      }\n    ],\n    \"PostToolUse\": [\n      {\n        \"matcher\": \".*\",\n        \"hook\": {\n          \"type\": \"command\",\n          \"command\": \"npx protect-mcp@latest sign --tool \\\"$TOOL_NAME\\\" --input \\\"$TOOL_INPUT\\\" --output \\\"$TOOL_OUTPUT\\\" --receipts .\u002Freceipts\u002F --key .\u002Fprotect-mcp.key\"\n        }\n      }\n    ]\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe first run of `protect-mcp sign` generates `.\u002Fprotect-mcp.key` (Ed25519\nprivate key) if one does not exist. Commit the **public** key fingerprint\n(visible in any receipt's `public_key` field); do not commit the private\nkey.\n\nAdd the private key and receipt directory to `.gitignore`:\n\n```bash\necho \".\u002Fprotect-mcp.key\" >> .gitignore\necho \".\u002Freceipts\u002F\" >> .gitignore\n```\n\n## Step 2: Write a Cedar policy\n\nCreate `.\u002Fprotect.cedar`:\n\n```cedar\n\u002F\u002F Allow all read-oriented tools by default.\npermit (\n    principal,\n    action in [Action::\"Read\", Action::\"Glob\", Action::\"Grep\", Action::\"WebSearch\"],\n    resource\n);\n\n\u002F\u002F Allow Bash commands from a safe list only.\npermit (\n    principal,\n    action == Action::\"Bash\",\n    resource\n) when {\n    context.command_pattern in [\n        \"git\", \"npm\", \"pnpm\", \"yarn\", \"ls\", \"cat\", \"pwd\",\n        \"echo\", \"test\", \"node\", \"python\", \"make\"\n    ]\n};\n\n\u002F\u002F Explicit deny on destructive commands. Cedar deny is authoritative.\nforbid (\n    principal,\n    action == Action::\"Bash\",\n    resource\n) when {\n    context.command_pattern in [\"rm -rf\", \"dd\", \"mkfs\", \"shred\"]\n};\n\n\u002F\u002F Restrict writes to the project directory.\npermit (\n    principal,\n    action in [Action::\"Write\", Action::\"Edit\"],\n    resource\n) when {\n    context.path_starts_with == \".\u002F\"\n};\n```\n\nFour rules:\n\n- Read-oriented tools always allowed\n- `Bash` allowed for safe command patterns (`git`, `npm`, etc.)\n- `Bash rm -rf` and similar destructive commands explicitly denied\n- Writes allowed only within the project (`.\u002F` prefix)\n\nCedar `forbid` rules take precedence over `permit` rules, so destructive\ncommands cannot be bypassed by a later permissive rule.\n\n## Step 3: Use Claude Code normally\n\nStart Claude Code. Every tool call goes through both hooks:\n\n```\nYou: Please read the README and summarize it.\n\nClaude: I will read README.md.\n  [PreToolUse: Read .\u002FREADME.md -> allow]\n  [Tool: Read executes]\n  [PostToolUse: receipt rcpt-a8f3c9d2 signed to .\u002Freceipts\u002F]\n\n... summary of README ...\n```\n\nA session of 20 tool calls produces 20 receipts, each hash-chained to its\npredecessor.\n\n## Step 4: Inspect a receipt\n\n```bash\ncat .\u002Freceipts\u002F$(ls -t .\u002Freceipts\u002F | head -1)\n```\n\n```json\n{\n  \"receipt_id\": \"rcpt-a8f3c9d2\",\n  \"receipt_version\": \"1.0\",\n  \"issuer_id\": \"claude-code-protect-mcp\",\n  \"event_time\": \"2026-04-17T12:34:56.123Z\",\n  \"tool_name\": \"Read\",\n  \"input_hash\": \"sha256:a3f8c9d2e1b7465f...\",\n  \"decision\": \"allow\",\n  \"policy_id\": \"protect.cedar\",\n  \"policy_digest\": \"sha256:b7e2f4a6c8d0e1f3...\",\n  \"parent_receipt_id\": \"rcpt-3d1ab7c2\",\n  \"public_key\": \"4437ca56815c0516...\",\n  \"signature\": \"4cde814b7889e987...\"\n}\n```\n\nEvery field except `signature` and `public_key` is covered by the Ed25519\nsignature. Modifying any field after signing invalidates the signature.\n\n## Step 5: Verify the receipt chain\n\n```bash\nnpx @veritasacta\u002Fverify .\u002Freceipts\u002F*.json\n```\n\nExit codes:\n\n| Code | Meaning |\n|------|---------|\n| `0`  | All receipts verified; chain intact |\n| `1`  | A receipt failed signature verification (tampered, or wrong key) |\n| `2`  | A receipt was malformed |\n\n## Step 6: Demonstrate tamper detection\n\nModify any receipt's `decision` field from `allow` to `deny`:\n\n```bash\npython3 -c \"\nimport json, os\npath = '.\u002Freceipts\u002F' + sorted(os.listdir('.\u002Freceipts'))[-1]\nr = json.loads(open(path).read())\nr['decision'] = 'deny'\nopen(path, 'w').write(json.dumps(r))\n\"\n\nnpx @veritasacta\u002Fverify .\u002Freceipts\u002F*.json\n```\n\nThe verifier exits with code `1` and reports which receipt failed. The\nEd25519 signature no longer matches the JCS-canonical bytes of the\ntampered payload.\n\nRestore the field and verification passes again.\n\n## How the cryptography works\n\nThree invariants make receipts verifiable offline across any conformant\nimplementation:\n\n1. **JCS canonicalization (RFC 8785)** before signing. Keys sorted,\n   whitespace minimized, strings NFC-normalized. Two independent\n   implementations produce byte-identical signing payloads for the same\n   receipt content.\n2. **Ed25519 signatures (RFC 8032)** over the canonical bytes.\n   Deterministic, fixed-size, no nonce dependency.\n3. **Hash chain linkage.** Each receipt's `parent_receipt_hash` is the\n   SHA-256 of the predecessor's canonical form. Insertions, deletions, and\n   reorderings break later receipts.\n\nFor the formal wire format see\n[draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fdraft-farley-acta-signed-receipts\u002F).\n\n## Cross-implementation interop\n\nThe receipt format has four independent implementations today:\n\n| Implementation | Language | Use case |\n|----------------|----------|----------|\n| [protect-mcp](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002Fprotect-mcp) | TypeScript | Claude Code, Cursor, MCP hosts |\n| [protect-mcp-adk](https:\u002F\u002Fpypi.org\u002Fproject\u002Fprotect-mcp-adk\u002F) | Python | Google Agent Development Kit |\n| [sb-runtime](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FScopeBlind\u002Fsb-runtime) | Rust | OS-level sandbox (Landlock + seccomp) |\n| APS governance hook | Python | CrewAI, LangChain |\n\nA receipt produced by any of them verifies against\n[`@veritasacta\u002Fverify`](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002F@veritasacta\u002Fverify).\nThe auditor does not need to trust the operator's tooling choice: the format\nis the contract.\n\n## CI\u002FCD integration\n\nGate merges on receipt chain verification so no build lands with a broken\nevidence chain:\n\n```yaml\n# .github\u002Fworkflows\u002Fverify-receipts.yml\nname: Verify Decision Receipts\non: [push, pull_request]\n\njobs:\n  verify:\n    runs-on: ubuntu-latest\n    steps:\n      - uses: actions\u002Fcheckout@v4\n      - uses: actions\u002Fsetup-node@v4\n        with: { node-version: '20' }\n      - name: Run governed agent\n        run: python scripts\u002Frun_agent.py > receipts.jsonl\n      - name: Verify receipt chain\n        run: npx @veritasacta\u002Fverify receipts.jsonl\n```\n\nArchive the receipts as an artifact so the chain survives beyond the job run:\n\n```yaml\n      - name: Upload receipts\n        if: always()\n        uses: actions\u002Fupload-artifact@v4\n        with:\n          name: decision-receipts\n          path: receipts\u002F\n```\n\n## Composition with SLSA provenance for agent-built software\n\nWhen Claude Code builds and releases software (running `npm install`,\n`npm build`, `npm publish` as tool calls), the receipt chain is the\nper-step build log. SLSA Provenance v1 has an extension point for this: the\n`byproducts` field can reference the receipt chain alongside the build\nattestation.\n\nThe [agent-commit build type](https:\u002F\u002Frefs.arewm.com\u002Fagent-commit\u002Fv0.2)\ndocuments the pattern using the ResourceDescriptor shape:\n\n```json\n{\n  \"name\": \"decision-receipts\",\n  \"digest\": { \"sha256\": \"...\" },\n  \"uri\": \"oci:\u002F\u002Fregistry\u002Forg\u002Fbuild-xyz\u002Freceipts:sha256-...\",\n  \"annotations\": {\n    \"predicateType\": \"https:\u002F\u002Fveritasacta.com\u002Fattestation\u002Fdecision-receipt\u002Fv0.1\",\n    \"signerRole\": \"supervisor-hook\"\n  }\n}\n```\n\nThe SLSA provenance is signed by the builder identity; the receipt\nattestation is signed by the supervisor-hook identity. Two trust domains,\ncross-referenced at the byproduct layer. See\n[slsa-framework\u002Fslsa#1594](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fslsa-framework\u002Fslsa\u002Fissues\u002F1594)\nfor the composition discussion.\n\n## Common pitfalls\n\n**Private key in version control.** The generated `.\u002Fprotect-mcp.key` must\nnot be committed. The examples above add it to `.gitignore`. If a key is\naccidentally committed, rotate immediately (delete the key file and let the\nhook regenerate on next run).\n\n**Hook command quoting.** The hooks receive `$TOOL_NAME` and `$TOOL_INPUT`\nas environment variables. Keep the quoting `\"$TOOL_INPUT\"` so inputs with\nspaces or special characters pass through intact.\n\n**Receipts directory in CI.** If Claude Code runs in CI, upload receipts as\nan artifact at the end of the job or the chain is lost at job end.\n\n**Policy is missing.** The example `PreToolUse` hook uses\n`--fail-on-missing-policy false` so an absent `.\u002Fprotect.cedar` does not\nbreak Claude Code out of the box. Remove this flag in production so a\nmissing policy is treated as a hard failure.\n\n## Related in this marketplace\n\n- [`protect-mcp`](..\u002F..\u002Fprotect-mcp\u002F) — the runtime hook implementation\n  (use this plugin in production)\n- [`review-agent-governance`](..\u002F..\u002Freview-agent-governance\u002F) — require\n  human approval before review-surface actions; composes with protect-mcp\n\n## References\n\n- [`draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts`](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fdraft-farley-acta-signed-receipts\u002F) — IETF draft, receipt wire format\n- [RFC 8032](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fhtml\u002Frfc8032) — Ed25519\n- [RFC 8785](https:\u002F\u002Fdatatracker.ietf.org\u002Fdoc\u002Fhtml\u002Frfc8785) — JCS\n- [Cedar policy language](https:\u002F\u002Fdocs.cedarpolicy.com\u002F)\n- [protect-mcp on npm](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002Fprotect-mcp)\n- [@veritasacta\u002Fverify on npm](https:\u002F\u002Fwww.npmjs.com\u002Fpackage\u002F@veritasacta\u002Fverify)\n- [in-toto\u002Fattestation#549](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fin-toto\u002Fattestation\u002Fpull\u002F549) — Decision Receipt predicate proposal\n- [agent-commit build type](https:\u002F\u002Frefs.arewm.com\u002Fagent-commit\u002Fv0.2) — SLSA provenance for agent-produced commits\n- [Microsoft Agent Governance Toolkit](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fmicrosoft\u002Fagent-governance-toolkit) (`examples\u002Fprotect-mcp-governed\u002F`)\n- [AWS Cedar for Agents](https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcedar-policy\u002Fcedar-for-agents)\n",{"name":5,"description":7},"main","900bb95bbe72cdb94af6f5a620aa5081264b7b6d",".claude\u002Fmarketplaces\u002Fwshobson\u002Fplugins\u002Fsigned-audit-trails\u002Fskills\u002Fsigned-audit-trails-recipe",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up#readme","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech","2026-05-16 00:03:30",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":32,"prompt":42,"zipAvailable":43},[33,36,39],{"tool":34,"command":35},"npx","npx skills add steph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up --skill signed-audit-trails-recipe",{"tool":37,"command":38},"bunx","bunx skills add steph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up --skill signed-audit-trails-recipe",{"tool":40,"command":41},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add steph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up --skill signed-audit-trails-recipe","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fmarketplaces\u002Fwshobson\u002Fplugins\u002Fsigned-audit-trails\u002Fskills\u002Fsigned-audit-trails-recipe\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[46,53,60,67,74,81],{"skillNo":47,"name":48,"nameZh":6,"description":49,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":50,"categories":51,"keywords":52,"publishedAt":18},"01M72Y1BY6X8TX3DS19Y04NEBQ","example","One-line summary of what this skill does","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fexample\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":54,"name":55,"nameZh":6,"description":56,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":57,"categories":58,"keywords":59,"publishedAt":18},"01M72Y1A38EYR8S9P1MBYDAQTW","writing-plans","Use when you have a spec or requirements for a multi-step task, before touching code","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fsuperpowers__writing-plans\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":18},"01M72Y174QSV1B5NV1E4KWHQBR","using-git-worktrees","Use when starting feature work that needs isolation from current workspace or before executing implementation plans - ensures an isolated workspace exists via native tools or git worktree fallback","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fsuperpowers__using-git-worktrees\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":71,"categories":72,"keywords":73,"publishedAt":18},"01M72Y14SQRHHMKG316HGB2CGK","test-driven-development","Use when implementing any feature or bugfix, before writing implementation code","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fsuperpowers__test-driven-development\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":75,"name":76,"nameZh":6,"description":77,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":78,"categories":79,"keywords":80,"publishedAt":18},"01M72Y127BCPRH3BRKPJC3Q3G2","systematic-debugging","Use when encountering any bug, test failure, or unexpected behavior, before proposing fixes","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fsuperpowers__systematic-debugging\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":6,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":18},"01M72Y1090GJA6B67KPD60WPHH","subagent-driven-development","Use when executing implementation plans with independent tasks in the current session","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fsteph-frtech\u002Fclaude-code-up\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fsuperpowers__subagent-driven-development\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]