[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M72XFRVHDBBQGEMDNMBQNEFP":3,"skill-same:01M72XFRVHDBBQGEMDNMBQNEFP":48},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":19,"linkOnly":20,"markdownContent":21,"markdownBody":22,"frontMatter":23,"refName":25,"commitSha":26,"skillDirectory":27,"forksCount":28,"repositoryHtmlUrl":29,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":31,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M72XFRVHDBBQGEMDNMBQNEFP","perl-security",null,"全面的Perl安全指南，涵盖污染模式、输入验证、安全进程执行、DBI参数化查询、Web安全（XSS\u002FSQLi\u002FCSRF）以及perlcritic安全策略。","SriramGandhiS\u002FSkills","SriramGandhiS","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F211849986?v=4","01M72WQCW12BYX71C6WN584TTA","Sriram S","01M72WQCWTJ2RD0ET1X31AF1RC",1,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fdocs\u002Fzh-CN\u002Fskills\u002Fperl-security\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-10 22:39:42",false,"---\nname: perl-security\ndescription: 全面的Perl安全指南，涵盖污染模式、输入验证、安全进程执行、DBI参数化查询、Web安全（XSS\u002FSQLi\u002FCSRF）以及perlcritic安全策略。\norigin: ECC\n---\n\n# Perl 安全模式\n\n涵盖输入验证、注入预防和安全编码实践的 Perl 应用程序全面安全指南。\n\n## 何时启用\n\n* 处理 Perl 应用程序中的用户输入时\n* 构建 Perl Web 应用程序时（CGI、Mojolicious、Dancer2、Catalyst）\n* 审查 Perl 代码中的安全漏洞时\n* 使用用户提供的路径执行文件操作时\n* 从 Perl 执行系统命令时\n* 编写 DBI 数据库查询时\n\n## 工作原理\n\n从污染感知的输入边界开始，然后向外扩展：验证并净化输入，保持文件系统和进程执行受限，并处处使用参数化的 DBI 查询。下面的示例展示了在交付涉及用户输入、shell 或网络的 Perl 代码之前，此技能期望您应用的安全默认做法。\n\n## 污染模式\n\nPerl 的污染模式（`-T`）跟踪来自外部源的数据，并防止其在未经明确验证的情况下用于不安全操作。\n\n### 启用污染模式\n\n```perl\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fperl -T\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Tainted: anything from outside the program\nmy $input    = $ARGV[0];        # Tainted\nmy $env_path = $ENV{PATH};      # Tainted\nmy $form     = \u003CSTDIN>;         # Tainted\nmy $query    = $ENV{QUERY_STRING}; # Tainted\n\n# Sanitize PATH early (required in taint mode)\n$ENV{PATH} = '\u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin:\u002Fusr\u002Fbin:\u002Fbin';\ndelete @ENV{qw(IFS CDPATH ENV BASH_ENV)};\n```\n\n### 净化模式\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: Validate and untaint with a specific regex\nsub untaint_username($input) {\n    if ($input =~ \u002F^([a-zA-Z0-9_]{3,30})$\u002F) {\n        return $1;  # $1 is untainted\n    }\n    die \"Invalid username: must be 3-30 alphanumeric characters\\n\";\n}\n\n# Good: Validate and untaint a file path\nsub untaint_filename($input) {\n    if ($input =~ m{^([a-zA-Z0-9._-]+)$}) {\n        return $1;\n    }\n    die \"Invalid filename: contains unsafe characters\\n\";\n}\n\n# Bad: Overly permissive untainting (defeats the purpose)\nsub bad_untaint($input) {\n    $input =~ \u002F^(.*)$\u002Fs;\n    return $1;  # Accepts ANYTHING — pointless\n}\n```\n\n## 输入验证\n\n### 允许列表优于阻止列表\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: Allowlist — define exactly what's permitted\nsub validate_sort_field($field) {\n    my %allowed = map { $_ => 1 } qw(name email created_at updated_at);\n    die \"Invalid sort field: $field\\n\" unless $allowed{$field};\n    return $field;\n}\n\n# Good: Validate with specific patterns\nsub validate_email($email) {\n    if ($email =~ \u002F^([a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+\\@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,})$\u002F) {\n        return $1;\n    }\n    die \"Invalid email address\\n\";\n}\n\nsub validate_integer($input) {\n    if ($input =~ \u002F^(-?\\d{1,10})$\u002F) {\n        return $1 + 0;  # Coerce to number\n    }\n    die \"Invalid integer\\n\";\n}\n\n# Bad: Blocklist — always incomplete\nsub bad_validate($input) {\n    die \"Invalid\" if $input =~ \u002F[\u003C>\"';&|]\u002F;  # Misses encoded attacks\n    return $input;\n}\n```\n\n### 长度约束\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\nsub validate_comment($text) {\n    die \"Comment is required\\n\"        unless length($text) > 0;\n    die \"Comment exceeds 10000 chars\\n\" if length($text) > 10_000;\n    return $text;\n}\n```\n\n## 安全正则表达式\n\n### 防止正则表达式拒绝服务\n\n嵌套的量词应用于重叠模式时会发生灾难性回溯。\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Bad: Vulnerable to ReDoS (exponential backtracking)\nmy $bad_re = qr\u002F^(a+)+$\u002F;           # Nested quantifiers\nmy $bad_re2 = qr\u002F^([a-zA-Z]+)*$\u002F;   # Nested quantifiers on class\nmy $bad_re3 = qr\u002F^(.*?,){10,}$\u002F;    # Repeated greedy\u002Flazy combo\n\n# Good: Rewrite without nesting\nmy $good_re = qr\u002F^a+$\u002F;             # Single quantifier\nmy $good_re2 = qr\u002F^[a-zA-Z]+$\u002F;     # Single quantifier on class\n\n# Good: Use possessive quantifiers or atomic groups to prevent backtracking\nmy $safe_re = qr\u002F^[a-zA-Z]++$\u002F;             # Possessive (5.10+)\nmy $safe_re2 = qr\u002F^(?>a+)$\u002F;                # Atomic group\n\n# Good: Enforce timeout on untrusted patterns\nuse POSIX qw(alarm);\nsub safe_match($string, $pattern, $timeout = 2) {\n    my $matched;\n    eval {\n        local $SIG{ALRM} = sub { die \"Regex timeout\\n\" };\n        alarm($timeout);\n        $matched = $string =~ $pattern;\n        alarm(0);\n    };\n    alarm(0);\n    die $@ if $@;\n    return $matched;\n}\n```\n\n## 安全的文件操作\n\n### 三参数 Open\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: Three-arg open, lexical filehandle, check return\nsub read_file($path) {\n    open my $fh, '\u003C:encoding(UTF-8)', $path\n        or die \"Cannot open '$path': $!\\n\";\n    local $\u002F;\n    my $content = \u003C$fh>;\n    close $fh;\n    return $content;\n}\n\n# Bad: Two-arg open with user data (command injection)\nsub bad_read($path) {\n    open my $fh, $path;        # If $path = \"|rm -rf \u002F\", runs command!\n    open my $fh, \"\u003C $path\";   # Shell metacharacter injection\n}\n```\n\n### 防止检查时使用时间和路径遍历\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\nuse Fcntl qw(:DEFAULT :flock);\nuse File::Spec;\nuse Cwd qw(realpath);\n\n# Atomic file creation\nsub create_file_safe($path) {\n    sysopen(my $fh, $path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600)\n        or die \"Cannot create '$path': $!\\n\";\n    return $fh;\n}\n\n# Validate path stays within allowed directory\nsub safe_path($base_dir, $user_path) {\n    my $real = realpath(File::Spec->catfile($base_dir, $user_path))\n        \u002F\u002F die \"Path does not exist\\n\";\n    my $base_real = realpath($base_dir)\n        \u002F\u002F die \"Base dir does not exist\\n\";\n    die \"Path traversal blocked\\n\" unless $real =~ \u002F^\\Q$base_real\\E(?:\\\u002F|\\z)\u002F;\n    return $real;\n}\n```\n\n使用 `File::Temp` 处理临时文件（`tempfile(UNLINK => 1)`），并使用 `flock(LOCK_EX)` 防止竞态条件。\n\n## 安全的进程执行\n\n### 列表形式的 system 和 exec\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: List form — no shell interpolation\nsub run_command(@cmd) {\n    system(@cmd) == 0\n        or die \"Command failed: @cmd\\n\";\n}\n\nrun_command('grep', '-r', $user_pattern, '\u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fapp\u002F');\n\n# Good: Capture output safely with IPC::Run3\nuse IPC::Run3;\nsub capture_output(@cmd) {\n    my ($stdout, $stderr);\n    run3(\\@cmd, \\undef, \\$stdout, \\$stderr);\n    if ($?) {\n        die \"Command failed (exit $?): $stderr\\n\";\n    }\n    return $stdout;\n}\n\n# Bad: String form — shell injection!\nsub bad_search($pattern) {\n    system(\"grep -r '$pattern' \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fapp\u002F\");  # If $pattern = \"'; rm -rf \u002F #\"\n}\n\n# Bad: Backticks with interpolation\nmy $output = `ls $user_dir`;   # Shell injection risk\n```\n\n也可以使用 `Capture::Tiny` 安全地捕获外部命令的标准输出和标准错误。\n\n## SQL 注入预防\n\n### DBI 占位符\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\nuse DBI;\n\nmy $dbh = DBI->connect($dsn, $user, $pass, {\n    RaiseError => 1,\n    PrintError => 0,\n    AutoCommit => 1,\n});\n\n# Good: Parameterized queries — always use placeholders\nsub find_user($dbh, $email) {\n    my $sth = $dbh->prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?');\n    $sth->execute($email);\n    return $sth->fetchrow_hashref;\n}\n\nsub search_users($dbh, $name, $status) {\n    my $sth = $dbh->prepare(\n        'SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE ? AND status = ? ORDER BY name'\n    );\n    $sth->execute(\"%$name%\", $status);\n    return $sth->fetchall_arrayref({});\n}\n\n# Bad: String interpolation in SQL (SQLi vulnerability!)\nsub bad_find($dbh, $email) {\n    my $sth = $dbh->prepare(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '$email'\");\n    # If $email = \"' OR 1=1 --\", returns all users\n    $sth->execute;\n    return $sth->fetchrow_hashref;\n}\n```\n\n### 动态列允许列表\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: Validate column names against an allowlist\nsub order_by($dbh, $column, $direction) {\n    my %allowed_cols = map { $_ => 1 } qw(name email created_at);\n    my %allowed_dirs = map { $_ => 1 } qw(ASC DESC);\n\n    die \"Invalid column: $column\\n\"    unless $allowed_cols{$column};\n    die \"Invalid direction: $direction\\n\" unless $allowed_dirs{uc $direction};\n\n    my $sth = $dbh->prepare(\"SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY $column $direction\");\n    $sth->execute;\n    return $sth->fetchall_arrayref({});\n}\n\n# Bad: Directly interpolating user-chosen column\nsub bad_order($dbh, $column) {\n    $dbh->prepare(\"SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY $column\");  # SQLi!\n}\n```\n\n### DBIx::Class（ORM 安全性）\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# DBIx::Class generates safe parameterized queries\nmy @users = $schema->resultset('User')->search({\n    status => 'active',\n    email  => { -like => '%@example.com' },\n}, {\n    order_by => { -asc => 'name' },\n    rows     => 50,\n});\n```\n\n## Web 安全\n\n### XSS 预防\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\nuse HTML::Entities qw(encode_entities);\nuse URI::Escape qw(uri_escape_utf8);\n\n# Good: Encode output for HTML context\nsub safe_html($user_input) {\n    return encode_entities($user_input);\n}\n\n# Good: Encode for URL context\nsub safe_url_param($value) {\n    return uri_escape_utf8($value);\n}\n\n# Good: Encode for JSON context\nuse JSON::MaybeXS qw(encode_json);\nsub safe_json($data) {\n    return encode_json($data);  # Handles escaping\n}\n\n# Template auto-escaping (Mojolicious)\n# \u003C%= $user_input %>   — auto-escaped (safe)\n# \u003C%== $raw_html %>    — raw output (dangerous, use only for trusted content)\n\n# Template auto-escaping (Template Toolkit)\n# [% user_input | html %]  — explicit HTML encoding\n\n# Bad: Raw output in HTML\nsub bad_html($input) {\n    print \"\u003Cdiv>$input\u003C\u002Fdiv>\";  # XSS if $input contains \u003Cscript>\n}\n```\n\n### CSRF 保护\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\nuse Crypt::URandom qw(urandom);\nuse MIME::Base64 qw(encode_base64url);\n\nsub generate_csrf_token() {\n    return encode_base64url(urandom(32));\n}\n```\n\n验证令牌时使用恒定时间比较。大多数 Web 框架（Mojolicious、Dancer2、Catalyst）都提供内置的 CSRF 保护——优先使用这些而非自行实现的解决方案。\n\n### 会话和标头安全\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Mojolicious session + headers\n$app->secrets(['long-random-secret-rotated-regularly']);\n$app->sessions->secure(1);          # HTTPS only\n$app->sessions->samesite('Lax');\n\n$app->hook(after_dispatch => sub ($c) {\n    $c->res->headers->header('X-Content-Type-Options' => 'nosniff');\n    $c->res->headers->header('X-Frame-Options'        => 'DENY');\n    $c->res->headers->header('Content-Security-Policy' => \"default-src 'self'\");\n    $c->res->headers->header('Strict-Transport-Security' => 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains');\n});\n```\n\n## 输出编码\n\n始终根据上下文对输出进行编码：HTML 使用 `HTML::Entities::encode_entities()`，URL 使用 `URI::Escape::uri_escape_utf8()`，JSON 使用 `JSON::MaybeXS::encode_json()`。\n\n## CPAN 模块安全\n\n* **固定版本** 在 cpanfile 中：`requires 'DBI', '== 1.643';`\n* **优先使用维护中的模块**：在 MetaCPAN 上检查最新发布版本\n* **最小化依赖项**：每个依赖项都是一个攻击面\n\n## 安全工具\n\n### perlcritic 安全策略\n\n```ini\n# .perlcriticrc — security-focused configuration\nseverity = 3\ntheme = security + core\n\n# Require three-arg open\n[InputOutput::RequireThreeArgOpen]\nseverity = 5\n\n# Require checked system calls\n[InputOutput::RequireCheckedSyscalls]\nfunctions = :builtins\nseverity = 4\n\n# Prohibit string eval\n[BuiltinFunctions::ProhibitStringyEval]\nseverity = 5\n\n# Prohibit backtick operators\n[InputOutput::ProhibitBacktickOperators]\nseverity = 4\n\n# Require taint checking in CGI\n[Modules::RequireTaintChecking]\nseverity = 5\n\n# Prohibit two-arg open\n[InputOutput::ProhibitTwoArgOpen]\nseverity = 5\n\n# Prohibit bare-word filehandles\n[InputOutput::ProhibitBarewordFileHandles]\nseverity = 5\n```\n\n### 运行 perlcritic\n\n```bash\n# Check a file\nperlcritic --severity 3 --theme security lib\u002FMyApp\u002FHandler.pm\n\n# Check entire project\nperlcritic --severity 3 --theme security lib\u002F\n\n# CI integration\nperlcritic --severity 4 --theme security --quiet lib\u002F || exit 1\n```\n\n## 快速安全检查清单\n\n| 检查项 | 需验证的内容 |\n|---|---|\n| 污染模式 | CGI\u002Fweb 脚本上使用 `-T` 标志 |\n| 输入验证 | 允许列表模式，长度限制 |\n| 文件操作 | 三参数 open，路径遍历检查 |\n| 进程执行 | 列表形式的 system，无 shell 插值 |\n| SQL 查询 | DBI 占位符，绝不插值 |\n| HTML 输出 | `encode_entities()`，模板自动转义 |\n| CSRF 令牌 | 生成令牌，并在状态更改请求时验证 |\n| 会话配置 | 安全、HttpOnly、SameSite Cookie |\n| HTTP 标头 | CSP、X-Frame-Options、HSTS |\n| 依赖项 | 固定版本，已审计模块 |\n| 正则表达式安全 | 无嵌套量词，锚定模式 |\n| 错误消息 | 不向用户泄露堆栈跟踪或路径 |\n\n## 反模式\n\n```perl\n# 1. Two-arg open with user data (command injection)\nopen my $fh, $user_input;               # CRITICAL vulnerability\n\n# 2. String-form system (shell injection)\nsystem(\"convert $user_file output.png\"); # CRITICAL vulnerability\n\n# 3. SQL string interpolation\n$dbh->do(\"DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $id\");  # SQLi\n\n# 4. eval with user input (code injection)\neval $user_code;                         # Remote code execution\n\n# 5. Trusting $ENV without sanitizing\nmy $path = $ENV{UPLOAD_DIR};             # Could be manipulated\nsystem(\"ls $path\");                      # Double vulnerability\n\n# 6. Disabling taint without validation\n($input) = $input =~ \u002F(.*)\u002Fs;           # Lazy untaint — defeats purpose\n\n# 7. Raw user data in HTML\nprint \"\u003Cdiv>Welcome, $username!\u003C\u002Fdiv>\";  # XSS\n\n# 8. Unvalidated redirects\nprint $cgi->redirect($user_url);         # Open redirect\n```\n\n**请记住**：Perl 的灵活性很强大，但需要纪律。对面向 Web 的代码使用污染模式，使用允许列表验证所有输入，对每个查询使用 DBI 占位符，并根据上下文对所有输出进行编码。纵深防御——绝不依赖单一防护层。\n","# Perl 安全模式\n\n涵盖输入验证、注入预防和安全编码实践的 Perl 应用程序全面安全指南。\n\n## 何时启用\n\n* 处理 Perl 应用程序中的用户输入时\n* 构建 Perl Web 应用程序时（CGI、Mojolicious、Dancer2、Catalyst）\n* 审查 Perl 代码中的安全漏洞时\n* 使用用户提供的路径执行文件操作时\n* 从 Perl 执行系统命令时\n* 编写 DBI 数据库查询时\n\n## 工作原理\n\n从污染感知的输入边界开始，然后向外扩展：验证并净化输入，保持文件系统和进程执行受限，并处处使用参数化的 DBI 查询。下面的示例展示了在交付涉及用户输入、shell 或网络的 Perl 代码之前，此技能期望您应用的安全默认做法。\n\n## 污染模式\n\nPerl 的污染模式（`-T`）跟踪来自外部源的数据，并防止其在未经明确验证的情况下用于不安全操作。\n\n### 启用污染模式\n\n```perl\n#!\u002Fusr\u002Fbin\u002Fperl -T\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Tainted: anything from outside the program\nmy $input    = $ARGV[0];        # Tainted\nmy $env_path = $ENV{PATH};      # Tainted\nmy $form     = \u003CSTDIN>;         # Tainted\nmy $query    = $ENV{QUERY_STRING}; # Tainted\n\n# Sanitize PATH early (required in taint mode)\n$ENV{PATH} = '\u002Fusr\u002Flocal\u002Fbin:\u002Fusr\u002Fbin:\u002Fbin';\ndelete @ENV{qw(IFS CDPATH ENV BASH_ENV)};\n```\n\n### 净化模式\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: Validate and untaint with a specific regex\nsub untaint_username($input) {\n    if ($input =~ \u002F^([a-zA-Z0-9_]{3,30})$\u002F) {\n        return $1;  # $1 is untainted\n    }\n    die \"Invalid username: must be 3-30 alphanumeric characters\\n\";\n}\n\n# Good: Validate and untaint a file path\nsub untaint_filename($input) {\n    if ($input =~ m{^([a-zA-Z0-9._-]+)$}) {\n        return $1;\n    }\n    die \"Invalid filename: contains unsafe characters\\n\";\n}\n\n# Bad: Overly permissive untainting (defeats the purpose)\nsub bad_untaint($input) {\n    $input =~ \u002F^(.*)$\u002Fs;\n    return $1;  # Accepts ANYTHING — pointless\n}\n```\n\n## 输入验证\n\n### 允许列表优于阻止列表\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: Allowlist — define exactly what's permitted\nsub validate_sort_field($field) {\n    my %allowed = map { $_ => 1 } qw(name email created_at updated_at);\n    die \"Invalid sort field: $field\\n\" unless $allowed{$field};\n    return $field;\n}\n\n# Good: Validate with specific patterns\nsub validate_email($email) {\n    if ($email =~ \u002F^([a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+\\@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\\.[a-zA-Z]{2,})$\u002F) {\n        return $1;\n    }\n    die \"Invalid email address\\n\";\n}\n\nsub validate_integer($input) {\n    if ($input =~ \u002F^(-?\\d{1,10})$\u002F) {\n        return $1 + 0;  # Coerce to number\n    }\n    die \"Invalid integer\\n\";\n}\n\n# Bad: Blocklist — always incomplete\nsub bad_validate($input) {\n    die \"Invalid\" if $input =~ \u002F[\u003C>\"';&|]\u002F;  # Misses encoded attacks\n    return $input;\n}\n```\n\n### 长度约束\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\nsub validate_comment($text) {\n    die \"Comment is required\\n\"        unless length($text) > 0;\n    die \"Comment exceeds 10000 chars\\n\" if length($text) > 10_000;\n    return $text;\n}\n```\n\n## 安全正则表达式\n\n### 防止正则表达式拒绝服务\n\n嵌套的量词应用于重叠模式时会发生灾难性回溯。\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Bad: Vulnerable to ReDoS (exponential backtracking)\nmy $bad_re = qr\u002F^(a+)+$\u002F;           # Nested quantifiers\nmy $bad_re2 = qr\u002F^([a-zA-Z]+)*$\u002F;   # Nested quantifiers on class\nmy $bad_re3 = qr\u002F^(.*?,){10,}$\u002F;    # Repeated greedy\u002Flazy combo\n\n# Good: Rewrite without nesting\nmy $good_re = qr\u002F^a+$\u002F;             # Single quantifier\nmy $good_re2 = qr\u002F^[a-zA-Z]+$\u002F;     # Single quantifier on class\n\n# Good: Use possessive quantifiers or atomic groups to prevent backtracking\nmy $safe_re = qr\u002F^[a-zA-Z]++$\u002F;             # Possessive (5.10+)\nmy $safe_re2 = qr\u002F^(?>a+)$\u002F;                # Atomic group\n\n# Good: Enforce timeout on untrusted patterns\nuse POSIX qw(alarm);\nsub safe_match($string, $pattern, $timeout = 2) {\n    my $matched;\n    eval {\n        local $SIG{ALRM} = sub { die \"Regex timeout\\n\" };\n        alarm($timeout);\n        $matched = $string =~ $pattern;\n        alarm(0);\n    };\n    alarm(0);\n    die $@ if $@;\n    return $matched;\n}\n```\n\n## 安全的文件操作\n\n### 三参数 Open\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: Three-arg open, lexical filehandle, check return\nsub read_file($path) {\n    open my $fh, '\u003C:encoding(UTF-8)', $path\n        or die \"Cannot open '$path': $!\\n\";\n    local $\u002F;\n    my $content = \u003C$fh>;\n    close $fh;\n    return $content;\n}\n\n# Bad: Two-arg open with user data (command injection)\nsub bad_read($path) {\n    open my $fh, $path;        # If $path = \"|rm -rf \u002F\", runs command!\n    open my $fh, \"\u003C $path\";   # Shell metacharacter injection\n}\n```\n\n### 防止检查时使用时间和路径遍历\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\nuse Fcntl qw(:DEFAULT :flock);\nuse File::Spec;\nuse Cwd qw(realpath);\n\n# Atomic file creation\nsub create_file_safe($path) {\n    sysopen(my $fh, $path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_EXCL, 0600)\n        or die \"Cannot create '$path': $!\\n\";\n    return $fh;\n}\n\n# Validate path stays within allowed directory\nsub safe_path($base_dir, $user_path) {\n    my $real = realpath(File::Spec->catfile($base_dir, $user_path))\n        \u002F\u002F die \"Path does not exist\\n\";\n    my $base_real = realpath($base_dir)\n        \u002F\u002F die \"Base dir does not exist\\n\";\n    die \"Path traversal blocked\\n\" unless $real =~ \u002F^\\Q$base_real\\E(?:\\\u002F|\\z)\u002F;\n    return $real;\n}\n```\n\n使用 `File::Temp` 处理临时文件（`tempfile(UNLINK => 1)`），并使用 `flock(LOCK_EX)` 防止竞态条件。\n\n## 安全的进程执行\n\n### 列表形式的 system 和 exec\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: List form — no shell interpolation\nsub run_command(@cmd) {\n    system(@cmd) == 0\n        or die \"Command failed: @cmd\\n\";\n}\n\nrun_command('grep', '-r', $user_pattern, '\u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fapp\u002F');\n\n# Good: Capture output safely with IPC::Run3\nuse IPC::Run3;\nsub capture_output(@cmd) {\n    my ($stdout, $stderr);\n    run3(\\@cmd, \\undef, \\$stdout, \\$stderr);\n    if ($?) {\n        die \"Command failed (exit $?): $stderr\\n\";\n    }\n    return $stdout;\n}\n\n# Bad: String form — shell injection!\nsub bad_search($pattern) {\n    system(\"grep -r '$pattern' \u002Fvar\u002Flog\u002Fapp\u002F\");  # If $pattern = \"'; rm -rf \u002F #\"\n}\n\n# Bad: Backticks with interpolation\nmy $output = `ls $user_dir`;   # Shell injection risk\n```\n\n也可以使用 `Capture::Tiny` 安全地捕获外部命令的标准输出和标准错误。\n\n## SQL 注入预防\n\n### DBI 占位符\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\nuse DBI;\n\nmy $dbh = DBI->connect($dsn, $user, $pass, {\n    RaiseError => 1,\n    PrintError => 0,\n    AutoCommit => 1,\n});\n\n# Good: Parameterized queries — always use placeholders\nsub find_user($dbh, $email) {\n    my $sth = $dbh->prepare('SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = ?');\n    $sth->execute($email);\n    return $sth->fetchrow_hashref;\n}\n\nsub search_users($dbh, $name, $status) {\n    my $sth = $dbh->prepare(\n        'SELECT * FROM users WHERE name LIKE ? AND status = ? ORDER BY name'\n    );\n    $sth->execute(\"%$name%\", $status);\n    return $sth->fetchall_arrayref({});\n}\n\n# Bad: String interpolation in SQL (SQLi vulnerability!)\nsub bad_find($dbh, $email) {\n    my $sth = $dbh->prepare(\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE email = '$email'\");\n    # If $email = \"' OR 1=1 --\", returns all users\n    $sth->execute;\n    return $sth->fetchrow_hashref;\n}\n```\n\n### 动态列允许列表\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Good: Validate column names against an allowlist\nsub order_by($dbh, $column, $direction) {\n    my %allowed_cols = map { $_ => 1 } qw(name email created_at);\n    my %allowed_dirs = map { $_ => 1 } qw(ASC DESC);\n\n    die \"Invalid column: $column\\n\"    unless $allowed_cols{$column};\n    die \"Invalid direction: $direction\\n\" unless $allowed_dirs{uc $direction};\n\n    my $sth = $dbh->prepare(\"SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY $column $direction\");\n    $sth->execute;\n    return $sth->fetchall_arrayref({});\n}\n\n# Bad: Directly interpolating user-chosen column\nsub bad_order($dbh, $column) {\n    $dbh->prepare(\"SELECT * FROM users ORDER BY $column\");  # SQLi!\n}\n```\n\n### DBIx::Class（ORM 安全性）\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# DBIx::Class generates safe parameterized queries\nmy @users = $schema->resultset('User')->search({\n    status => 'active',\n    email  => { -like => '%@example.com' },\n}, {\n    order_by => { -asc => 'name' },\n    rows     => 50,\n});\n```\n\n## Web 安全\n\n### XSS 预防\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\nuse HTML::Entities qw(encode_entities);\nuse URI::Escape qw(uri_escape_utf8);\n\n# Good: Encode output for HTML context\nsub safe_html($user_input) {\n    return encode_entities($user_input);\n}\n\n# Good: Encode for URL context\nsub safe_url_param($value) {\n    return uri_escape_utf8($value);\n}\n\n# Good: Encode for JSON context\nuse JSON::MaybeXS qw(encode_json);\nsub safe_json($data) {\n    return encode_json($data);  # Handles escaping\n}\n\n# Template auto-escaping (Mojolicious)\n# \u003C%= $user_input %>   — auto-escaped (safe)\n# \u003C%== $raw_html %>    — raw output (dangerous, use only for trusted content)\n\n# Template auto-escaping (Template Toolkit)\n# [% user_input | html %]  — explicit HTML encoding\n\n# Bad: Raw output in HTML\nsub bad_html($input) {\n    print \"\u003Cdiv>$input\u003C\u002Fdiv>\";  # XSS if $input contains \u003Cscript>\n}\n```\n\n### CSRF 保护\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\nuse Crypt::URandom qw(urandom);\nuse MIME::Base64 qw(encode_base64url);\n\nsub generate_csrf_token() {\n    return encode_base64url(urandom(32));\n}\n```\n\n验证令牌时使用恒定时间比较。大多数 Web 框架（Mojolicious、Dancer2、Catalyst）都提供内置的 CSRF 保护——优先使用这些而非自行实现的解决方案。\n\n### 会话和标头安全\n\n```perl\nuse v5.36;\n\n# Mojolicious session + headers\n$app->secrets(['long-random-secret-rotated-regularly']);\n$app->sessions->secure(1);          # HTTPS only\n$app->sessions->samesite('Lax');\n\n$app->hook(after_dispatch => sub ($c) {\n    $c->res->headers->header('X-Content-Type-Options' => 'nosniff');\n    $c->res->headers->header('X-Frame-Options'        => 'DENY');\n    $c->res->headers->header('Content-Security-Policy' => \"default-src 'self'\");\n    $c->res->headers->header('Strict-Transport-Security' => 'max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains');\n});\n```\n\n## 输出编码\n\n始终根据上下文对输出进行编码：HTML 使用 `HTML::Entities::encode_entities()`，URL 使用 `URI::Escape::uri_escape_utf8()`，JSON 使用 `JSON::MaybeXS::encode_json()`。\n\n## CPAN 模块安全\n\n* **固定版本** 在 cpanfile 中：`requires 'DBI', '== 1.643';`\n* **优先使用维护中的模块**：在 MetaCPAN 上检查最新发布版本\n* **最小化依赖项**：每个依赖项都是一个攻击面\n\n## 安全工具\n\n### perlcritic 安全策略\n\n```ini\n# .perlcriticrc — security-focused configuration\nseverity = 3\ntheme = security + core\n\n# Require three-arg open\n[InputOutput::RequireThreeArgOpen]\nseverity = 5\n\n# Require checked system calls\n[InputOutput::RequireCheckedSyscalls]\nfunctions = :builtins\nseverity = 4\n\n# Prohibit string eval\n[BuiltinFunctions::ProhibitStringyEval]\nseverity = 5\n\n# Prohibit backtick operators\n[InputOutput::ProhibitBacktickOperators]\nseverity = 4\n\n# Require taint checking in CGI\n[Modules::RequireTaintChecking]\nseverity = 5\n\n# Prohibit two-arg open\n[InputOutput::ProhibitTwoArgOpen]\nseverity = 5\n\n# Prohibit bare-word filehandles\n[InputOutput::ProhibitBarewordFileHandles]\nseverity = 5\n```\n\n### 运行 perlcritic\n\n```bash\n# Check a file\nperlcritic --severity 3 --theme security lib\u002FMyApp\u002FHandler.pm\n\n# Check entire project\nperlcritic --severity 3 --theme security lib\u002F\n\n# CI integration\nperlcritic --severity 4 --theme security --quiet lib\u002F || exit 1\n```\n\n## 快速安全检查清单\n\n| 检查项 | 需验证的内容 |\n|---|---|\n| 污染模式 | CGI\u002Fweb 脚本上使用 `-T` 标志 |\n| 输入验证 | 允许列表模式，长度限制 |\n| 文件操作 | 三参数 open，路径遍历检查 |\n| 进程执行 | 列表形式的 system，无 shell 插值 |\n| SQL 查询 | DBI 占位符，绝不插值 |\n| HTML 输出 | `encode_entities()`，模板自动转义 |\n| CSRF 令牌 | 生成令牌，并在状态更改请求时验证 |\n| 会话配置 | 安全、HttpOnly、SameSite Cookie |\n| HTTP 标头 | CSP、X-Frame-Options、HSTS |\n| 依赖项 | 固定版本，已审计模块 |\n| 正则表达式安全 | 无嵌套量词，锚定模式 |\n| 错误消息 | 不向用户泄露堆栈跟踪或路径 |\n\n## 反模式\n\n```perl\n# 1. Two-arg open with user data (command injection)\nopen my $fh, $user_input;               # CRITICAL vulnerability\n\n# 2. String-form system (shell injection)\nsystem(\"convert $user_file output.png\"); # CRITICAL vulnerability\n\n# 3. SQL string interpolation\n$dbh->do(\"DELETE FROM users WHERE id = $id\");  # SQLi\n\n# 4. eval with user input (code injection)\neval $user_code;                         # Remote code execution\n\n# 5. Trusting $ENV without sanitizing\nmy $path = $ENV{UPLOAD_DIR};             # Could be manipulated\nsystem(\"ls $path\");                      # Double vulnerability\n\n# 6. Disabling taint without validation\n($input) = $input =~ \u002F(.*)\u002Fs;           # Lazy untaint — defeats purpose\n\n# 7. Raw user data in HTML\nprint \"\u003Cdiv>Welcome, $username!\u003C\u002Fdiv>\";  # XSS\n\n# 8. Unvalidated redirects\nprint $cgi->redirect($user_url);         # Open redirect\n```\n\n**请记住**：Perl 的灵活性很强大，但需要纪律。对面向 Web 的代码使用污染模式，使用允许列表验证所有输入，对每个查询使用 DBI 占位符，并根据上下文对所有输出进行编码。纵深防御——绝不依赖单一防护层。\n",{"name":5,"origin":24,"description":7},"ECC","master","d6ca01da0f24a3b0e26e4a8b7b66cbd25d429f5d","docs\u002Fzh-CN\u002Fskills\u002Fperl-security",0,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS","https:\u002F\u002Fsriram.website\u002F","Curious guy who keeps tinkering until something works","2026-05-20 16:21:34",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add SriramGandhiS\u002FSkills --skill perl-security",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add SriramGandhiS\u002FSkills --skill perl-security",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add SriramGandhiS\u002FSkills --skill perl-security","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fdocs\u002Fzh-CN\u002Fskills\u002Fperl-security\u002FSKILL.md",true,[],[49,57,62,68,75,82],{"skillNo":50,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":53,"categories":54,"keywords":55,"publishedAt":56},"01M732609EPJWV13PVTX3GT4TM","webgpu-threejs-tsl","Comprehensive guide for developing WebGPU-enabled Three.js applications using TSL (Three.js Shading Language). Covers WebGPU renderer setup, TSL syntax and node materials, compute shaders, post-processing effects, and WGSL integration. Use this skill when working with Three.js WebGPU, TSL shaders, node materials, or GPU compute in Three.js.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fwebgpu-threejs-tsl\u002Fskills\u002Fwebgpu-threejs-tsl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-11 15:11:14",{"skillNo":58,"name":51,"nameZh":6,"description":52,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":59,"categories":60,"keywords":61,"publishedAt":56},"01M7325XM47AGWB6K6C4VXKE6B","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fwebgpu-threejs-tsl\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":63,"name":64,"nameZh":6,"description":6,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":65,"categories":66,"keywords":67,"publishedAt":56},"01M7325WP6DES69JKC840VMFEP","verification-loop","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fweb-assets\u002Fdocs\u002Fzh-TW\u002Fskills\u002Fverification-loop\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":69,"name":70,"nameZh":6,"description":71,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":72,"categories":73,"keywords":74,"publishedAt":56},"01M7325TFQF1DZTQ6J3WGQQ1VR","tdd-workflow","Use this skill when writing new features, fixing bugs, or refactoring code. Enforces test-driven development with 80%+ coverage including unit, integration, and E2E tests.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fweb-assets\u002Fdocs\u002Fzh-TW\u002Fskills\u002Ftdd-workflow\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":76,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":79,"categories":80,"keywords":81,"publishedAt":56},"01M7325RGV9AY9PK92D2V8KKPW","strategic-compact","Suggests manual context compaction at logical intervals to preserve context through task phases rather than arbitrary auto-compaction.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fweb-assets\u002Fdocs\u002Fzh-TW\u002Fskills\u002Fstrategic-compact\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":56},"01M7325MZC28SE86E7NMCNEFS4","security-review","Use this skill when adding authentication, handling user input, working with secrets, creating API endpoints, or implementing payment\u002Fsensitive features. Provides comprehensive security checklist and patterns.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FSriramGandhiS\u002FSkills\u002Fblob\u002Fmaster\u002Fweb-assets\u002Fdocs\u002Fzh-TW\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity-review\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]