[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M72WG8F92FBT6EMBEW2MN30N":3,"skill-same:01M72WG8F92FBT6EMBEW2MN30N":143},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":9,"repositoryNo":12,"starsCount":13,"licenseSpdxId":14,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":15,"categories":16,"keywords":17,"publishedAt":18,"linkOnly":19,"markdownContent":20,"markdownBody":21,"frontMatter":22,"refName":34,"commitSha":35,"skillDirectory":36,"forksCount":37,"repositoryHtmlUrl":26,"repositoryHomepageUrl":38,"ownerHtmlUrl":39,"ownerBlogUrl":38,"ownerDescription":40,"updatedAt":41,"install":42,"resources":54},"01M72WG8F92FBT6EMBEW2MN30N","github-actions",null,"Writes, reviews and hardens GitHub Actions workflows and composite actions, and bundles scripts that check permissions, pinned actions, pull_request_target checkouts and expression injection. Use when working on a file under .github\u002Fworkflows or an action.yml, when a workflow needs a GITHUB_TOKEN permissions block, OIDC instead of long-lived cloud keys, pinned actions, caching, a reusable workflow or a composite action, when a pull request changes CI, or when a failing pipeline may be caused by the workflow definition. Trigger terms: workflow, GitHub Actions, CI pipeline, permissions, pull_request_target, OIDC, pinned actions, reusable workflow, composite action, failing pipeline. Not for GitLab CI pipelines (gitlab-ci), security review of application code (security) or pull request descriptions (pr-logbook).","crewrig\u002Fcrewrig","crewrig","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F283580446?v=4","01M72WDBD9H0YW5JBHNZ0TEVWB","01M72WDBEBNRBAS94AXRPEVYNK",24,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcrewrig\u002Fcrewrig\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002F.claude\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-10 22:39:42",false,"---\nname: github-actions\ndescription: \"Writes, reviews and hardens GitHub Actions workflows and composite actions, and bundles scripts that check permissions, pinned actions, pull_request_target checkouts and expression injection. Use when working on a file under .github\u002Fworkflows or an action.yml, when a workflow needs a GITHUB_TOKEN permissions block, OIDC instead of long-lived cloud keys, pinned actions, caching, a reusable workflow or a composite action, when a pull request changes CI, or when a failing pipeline may be caused by the workflow definition. Trigger terms: workflow, GitHub Actions, CI pipeline, permissions, pull_request_target, OIDC, pinned actions, reusable workflow, composite action, failing pipeline. Not for GitLab CI pipelines (gitlab-ci), security review of application code (security) or pull request descriptions (pr-logbook).\"\nlicense: Apache-2.0\ncompatibility: \"Requires Node.js 24 (scripts run as node scripts\u002F\u003Cname>.ts). actionlint and act are optional: the checks that need them are skipped, and reported as skipped, when they are missing.\"\nallowed-tools:\n  - Read\n  - Bash\n  - Write\n  - Edit\nuser-invocable: true\nmetadata:\n  provenance:\n    canonical: \"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcrewrig\u002Fcrewrig\"\n    feedback: \"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcrewrig\u002Fcrewrig\"\n    version: \"1.4.0\"\n---\n\n\n# GitHub Actions\n\nPractitioner rules for the workflows under `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F` and for composite\nactions. The model already knows the syntax; this skill holds what it gets wrong,\nthe checks that settle the fixed questions, and the judgements a script cannot make.\n\nHand a change to the **security** skill when it adds a secret, widens `GITHUB_TOKEN`\npermissions, adds a cloud trust relationship or runs untrusted input in a shell, and\nto the **architect** skill when it restructures workflows across repositories.\n\n## Scripts\n\nRun them from this skill's directory with `node scripts\u002F\u003Cname>.ts \u003Cpath>`, where\n`\u003Cpath>` is a workflow file or a directory. They need only Node.js and write nothing.\nRun `validate-pipeline.ts` on every workflow you write or change: it runs the other\nchecks and states which ones ran.\n\n| Script | When | Exit codes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `node scripts\u002Fvalidate-pipeline.ts \u003Cfile-or-dir>` | After writing or changing a workflow, before presenting it. One input only. | `0` every check ran clean or was skipped, `1` a check that ran found a problem, `2` usage error or no workflow file, `3` unreadable input or a check that could not run. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-permissions.ts \u003Cpath>` | A workflow without `permissions:`, or with `write-all`. | `0` clean, `1` a finding, `2` usage error or empty directory, `3` unreadable path. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-pull-request-target.ts \u003Cpath>` | A workflow triggered by `pull_request_target`. | Same as above. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-expression-injection.ts \u003Cpath>` | A `${{ }}` expression inside `run:` or an `actions\u002Fgithub-script` script. | Same as above. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-pinned-actions.ts \u003Cpath>` | Any `uses:` that is not a 40-character SHA. | `0` all pinned, `1` unpinned reference or unreadable path, `2` usage error. |\n| `node scripts\u002Flint-workflow.ts \u003Cpath>` | Syntax, contexts and shell errors; needs `actionlint`. | `0` clean or skipped, `1` errors or unreadable path, `2` usage error. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-secrets-exposure.ts \u003Cpath>` | A secret that may reach a log or an over-wide scope. | `0` nothing found, `1` a finding, `2` usage error. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fsimulate-job.ts \u003Cfile> \u003Cjob> [event]` and `node scripts\u002Fsimulate-workflow.ts \u003Cfile> [event]` | A local dry run with `act` while iterating on `run:` logic. | `0` ok or skipped, otherwise the status of `act`, `2` usage error. |\n\nWithout `actionlint`, `lint-workflow.ts` exits `0` before it looks at the path, so a\nmissing file also passes on such a machine.\n\nAdd `--json` to get one `{ok, data, findings}` object on standard output (every script\nexcept `check-secrets-exposure.ts`, which rejects it). A warning\nnever changes an exit code. A check that exits `0` with a `[SKIP]` line did not look\nat your file: report it as skipped, never as passed. Exit `2` or `3` means the call\nor the environment is wrong, not the workflow. A green `act` run is necessary, not\nsufficient: it does not reproduce the hosted runner image.\n\nThe three checks `check-permissions.ts`, `check-pull-request-target.ts`\nand `check-expression-injection.ts` do not read composite actions: a file with no `jobs:` key passes\nwith no finding and the summary says it was not checked, so review the `run:` steps of\nan `action.yml` by hand, above all any `${{ inputs.* }}` in them. They also read a small\nsubset of YAML. A construct they cannot read\n(anchor, alias, merge key, multi-line flow mapping) is reported as an `unparsed`\nwarning: review that line by hand, because the file was not verified there.\n\n## Pitfalls\n\nA script catches the first four; the rest need your judgement.\n\n1. Unpinned third-party actions: pin by commit SHA (`check-pinned-actions.ts`).\n2. A `GITHUB_TOKEN` with inherited write access: set a top-level `permissions:` block\n   with `contents: read` (not `{}`, which also blocks checkout of a private\n   repository) and raise it per job (`check-permissions.ts`).\n3. Event data pasted into a shell step: bind it under `env:` (`check-expression-injection.ts`).\n4. A `pull_request_target` workflow that checks out the pull request head: a label or an\n   environment gate does not make the head's code trusted (`check-pull-request-target.ts`).\n5. Cache poisoning through a privileged event: a job triggered by `pull_request_target`,\n   `workflow_run` or `issue_comment` saves into the default branch's cache scope, so\n   untrusted code it runs can plant an entry that the main branch restores. A plain\n   pull request cannot: restore never reads a child or sibling ref. Do not run pull\n   request code in those events, and do not save a cache from them.\n6. `hashFiles()` over a glob that also matches vendored copies yields a key that\n   changes whenever any of those files does, often after an install. Name the real\n   lockfile path.\n7. `continue-on-error: true` on a flaky step ends up hiding a real regression. Retry\n   explicitly and handle the failure instead.\n8. `if: always()` on a cleanup or upload step: `always()` also runs after a\n   cancellation, so a step that can hang keeps the run alive until it times out.\n   Use `if: ${{ !cancelled() }}`.\n9. A boolean or an enum declared as a `string` input of `workflow_dispatch` is not\n   validated. Declare `type: boolean`, or `type: choice` with `options:`.\n10. A self-hosted runner attached to a public repository runs any fork's code on your\n    hardware. Require approval for outside contributors and keep such runners off\n    public repositories.\n\n## Judgement rules\n\nThese are decisions; the detail and examples are in `references\u002Fgeneration-rules.md`.\n\n- Use OIDC for cloud access, because a short-lived token has nothing to rotate or leak.\n- Install Node dependencies with `npm ci`, because it fails on a lockfile mismatch;\n  when there is no lockfile, report it to the user to commit instead of using\n  `npm install`.\n- Bind a secret to the step that needs it, at most the job, because workflow-level\n  `env:` reaches every job and action.\n- Set `timeout-minutes:` on every job and `concurrency:` on branch workflows, because the\n  default timeout is six hours and superseded runs keep spending.\n- Send production deployments through an environment with required reviewers, because\n  an approval protects only the secrets stored in that environment.\n- Make the checks that enforce these rules required on the protected branch, because\n  a rule nothing blocks on drifts.\n\nRecord a deliberate exception next to the rule it breaks and in the project's decision\nrecords, so a reviewer sees that it was chosen.\n\n## What a script cannot know\n\n`check-expression-injection.ts` warns on every `inputs.*` expression inside a `run:`\nvalue, because one file cannot know who calls a reusable workflow or a\n`workflow_dispatch`. The risk stays real after you silence the warning, since a caller\nmay pass untrusted text. Bind the input under `env:` and quote it:\n\n```yaml\n- env:\n    PR_TITLE: ${{ inputs.title }}\n  run: printf 'Title: %s\\n' \"$PR_TITLE\"\n```\n\n## References\n\nRead one only when its subject is the task.\n\n- `references\u002Fgeneration-rules.md`: the interview and the rules for a new workflow,\n  with a secure skeleton and an OIDC job.\n- `references\u002Fworkflow-syntax.md`: keys of `on:`, `jobs:`, `steps:`, `strategy:`.\n- `references\u002Fexpressions.md`: contexts, functions and `if:` evaluation.\n- `references\u002Fpermissions.md`: the `GITHUB_TOKEN` model and per-use-case grants.\n- `references\u002Fsecrets-and-vars.md`: scopes, OIDC trust policies, masking.\n- `references\u002Freusable-workflows.md`: `workflow_call` contracts and limits.\n- `references\u002Fcaching.md`: key and `restore-keys` semantics, per-language recipes.\n- `references\u002Frunners.md`: hosted and self-hosted runners, labels, limits.\n- `references\u002Fci-failure-taxonomy.md` and `references\u002Fci-fix-anti-patterns.md`: the failure categories of a failing run, and the fixes never to propose.\n\n## Friction\n\nSee `references\u002Fshared-friction-reporting.md`.\n","# GitHub Actions\n\nPractitioner rules for the workflows under `.github\u002Fworkflows\u002F` and for composite\nactions. The model already knows the syntax; this skill holds what it gets wrong,\nthe checks that settle the fixed questions, and the judgements a script cannot make.\n\nHand a change to the **security** skill when it adds a secret, widens `GITHUB_TOKEN`\npermissions, adds a cloud trust relationship or runs untrusted input in a shell, and\nto the **architect** skill when it restructures workflows across repositories.\n\n## Scripts\n\nRun them from this skill's directory with `node scripts\u002F\u003Cname>.ts \u003Cpath>`, where\n`\u003Cpath>` is a workflow file or a directory. They need only Node.js and write nothing.\nRun `validate-pipeline.ts` on every workflow you write or change: it runs the other\nchecks and states which ones ran.\n\n| Script | When | Exit codes |\n|---|---|---|\n| `node scripts\u002Fvalidate-pipeline.ts \u003Cfile-or-dir>` | After writing or changing a workflow, before presenting it. One input only. | `0` every check ran clean or was skipped, `1` a check that ran found a problem, `2` usage error or no workflow file, `3` unreadable input or a check that could not run. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-permissions.ts \u003Cpath>` | A workflow without `permissions:`, or with `write-all`. | `0` clean, `1` a finding, `2` usage error or empty directory, `3` unreadable path. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-pull-request-target.ts \u003Cpath>` | A workflow triggered by `pull_request_target`. | Same as above. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-expression-injection.ts \u003Cpath>` | A `${{ }}` expression inside `run:` or an `actions\u002Fgithub-script` script. | Same as above. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-pinned-actions.ts \u003Cpath>` | Any `uses:` that is not a 40-character SHA. | `0` all pinned, `1` unpinned reference or unreadable path, `2` usage error. |\n| `node scripts\u002Flint-workflow.ts \u003Cpath>` | Syntax, contexts and shell errors; needs `actionlint`. | `0` clean or skipped, `1` errors or unreadable path, `2` usage error. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fcheck-secrets-exposure.ts \u003Cpath>` | A secret that may reach a log or an over-wide scope. | `0` nothing found, `1` a finding, `2` usage error. |\n| `node scripts\u002Fsimulate-job.ts \u003Cfile> \u003Cjob> [event]` and `node scripts\u002Fsimulate-workflow.ts \u003Cfile> [event]` | A local dry run with `act` while iterating on `run:` logic. | `0` ok or skipped, otherwise the status of `act`, `2` usage error. |\n\nWithout `actionlint`, `lint-workflow.ts` exits `0` before it looks at the path, so a\nmissing file also passes on such a machine.\n\nAdd `--json` to get one `{ok, data, findings}` object on standard output (every script\nexcept `check-secrets-exposure.ts`, which rejects it). A warning\nnever changes an exit code. A check that exits `0` with a `[SKIP]` line did not look\nat your file: report it as skipped, never as passed. Exit `2` or `3` means the call\nor the environment is wrong, not the workflow. A green `act` run is necessary, not\nsufficient: it does not reproduce the hosted runner image.\n\nThe three checks `check-permissions.ts`, `check-pull-request-target.ts`\nand `check-expression-injection.ts` do not read composite actions: a file with no `jobs:` key passes\nwith no finding and the summary says it was not checked, so review the `run:` steps of\nan `action.yml` by hand, above all any `${{ inputs.* }}` in them. They also read a small\nsubset of YAML. A construct they cannot read\n(anchor, alias, merge key, multi-line flow mapping) is reported as an `unparsed`\nwarning: review that line by hand, because the file was not verified there.\n\n## Pitfalls\n\nA script catches the first four; the rest need your judgement.\n\n1. Unpinned third-party actions: pin by commit SHA (`check-pinned-actions.ts`).\n2. A `GITHUB_TOKEN` with inherited write access: set a top-level `permissions:` block\n   with `contents: read` (not `{}`, which also blocks checkout of a private\n   repository) and raise it per job (`check-permissions.ts`).\n3. Event data pasted into a shell step: bind it under `env:` (`check-expression-injection.ts`).\n4. A `pull_request_target` workflow that checks out the pull request head: a label or an\n   environment gate does not make the head's code trusted (`check-pull-request-target.ts`).\n5. Cache poisoning through a privileged event: a job triggered by `pull_request_target`,\n   `workflow_run` or `issue_comment` saves into the default branch's cache scope, so\n   untrusted code it runs can plant an entry that the main branch restores. A plain\n   pull request cannot: restore never reads a child or sibling ref. Do not run pull\n   request code in those events, and do not save a cache from them.\n6. `hashFiles()` over a glob that also matches vendored copies yields a key that\n   changes whenever any of those files does, often after an install. Name the real\n   lockfile path.\n7. `continue-on-error: true` on a flaky step ends up hiding a real regression. Retry\n   explicitly and handle the failure instead.\n8. `if: always()` on a cleanup or upload step: `always()` also runs after a\n   cancellation, so a step that can hang keeps the run alive until it times out.\n   Use `if: ${{ !cancelled() }}`.\n9. A boolean or an enum declared as a `string` input of `workflow_dispatch` is not\n   validated. Declare `type: boolean`, or `type: choice` with `options:`.\n10. A self-hosted runner attached to a public repository runs any fork's code on your\n    hardware. Require approval for outside contributors and keep such runners off\n    public repositories.\n\n## Judgement rules\n\nThese are decisions; the detail and examples are in `references\u002Fgeneration-rules.md`.\n\n- Use OIDC for cloud access, because a short-lived token has nothing to rotate or leak.\n- Install Node dependencies with `npm ci`, because it fails on a lockfile mismatch;\n  when there is no lockfile, report it to the user to commit instead of using\n  `npm install`.\n- Bind a secret to the step that needs it, at most the job, because workflow-level\n  `env:` reaches every job and action.\n- Set `timeout-minutes:` on every job and `concurrency:` on branch workflows, because the\n  default timeout is six hours and superseded runs keep spending.\n- Send production deployments through an environment with required reviewers, because\n  an approval protects only the secrets stored in that environment.\n- Make the checks that enforce these rules required on the protected branch, because\n  a rule nothing blocks on drifts.\n\nRecord a deliberate exception next to the rule it breaks and in the project's decision\nrecords, so a reviewer sees that it was chosen.\n\n## What a script cannot know\n\n`check-expression-injection.ts` warns on every `inputs.*` expression inside a `run:`\nvalue, because one file cannot know who calls a reusable workflow or a\n`workflow_dispatch`. The risk stays real after you silence the warning, since a caller\nmay pass untrusted text. Bind the input under `env:` and quote it:\n\n```yaml\n- env:\n    PR_TITLE: ${{ inputs.title }}\n  run: printf 'Title: %s\\n' \"$PR_TITLE\"\n```\n\n## References\n\nRead one only when its subject is the task.\n\n- `references\u002Fgeneration-rules.md`: the interview and the rules for a new workflow,\n  with a secure skeleton and an OIDC job.\n- `references\u002Fworkflow-syntax.md`: keys of `on:`, `jobs:`, `steps:`, `strategy:`.\n- `references\u002Fexpressions.md`: contexts, functions and `if:` evaluation.\n- `references\u002Fpermissions.md`: the `GITHUB_TOKEN` model and per-use-case grants.\n- `references\u002Fsecrets-and-vars.md`: scopes, OIDC trust policies, masking.\n- `references\u002Freusable-workflows.md`: `workflow_call` contracts and limits.\n- `references\u002Fcaching.md`: key and `restore-keys` semantics, per-language recipes.\n- `references\u002Frunners.md`: hosted and self-hosted runners, labels, limits.\n- `references\u002Fci-failure-taxonomy.md` and `references\u002Fci-fix-anti-patterns.md`: the failure categories of a failing run, and the fixes never to propose.\n\n## Friction\n\nSee `references\u002Fshared-friction-reporting.md`.\n",{"name":5,"license":14,"metadata":23,"description":7,"allowed-tools":27,"compatibility":32,"user-invocable":33},{"provenance":24},{"version":25,"feedback":26,"canonical":26},"1.4.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcrewrig\u002Fcrewrig",[28,29,30,31],"Read","Bash","Write","Edit","Requires Node.js 24 (scripts run as node scripts\u002F\u003Cname>.ts). actionlint and act are optional: the checks that need them are skipped, and reported as skipped, when they are missing.",true,"main","6d7f2262eb86a02d21a60a8147ed6f8a27d7b8eb",".claude\u002Fskills\u002Fgithub-actions",6,"https:\u002F\u002Fcrewrig.org","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcrewrig","This is the organisation behind the crewrig framework","2026-11-15 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