github-actions
Writes, reviews and hardens GitHub Actions workflows and composite actions, and bundles scripts that check permissions, pinned actions, pull_request_target checkouts and expression injection. Use when working on a file under .github/workflows or an action.yml, when a workflow needs a GITHUB_TOKEN permissions block, OIDC instead of long-lived cloud keys, pinned actions, caching, a reusable workflow or a composite action, when a pull request changes CI, or when a failing pipeline may be caused by the workflow definition. Trigger terms: workflow, GitHub Actions, CI pipeline, permissions, pull_request_target, OIDC, pinned actions, reusable workflow, composite action, failing pipeline. Not for GitLab CI pipelines (gitlab-ci), security review of application code (security) or pull request descriptions (pr-logbook).
- License 许可
- Apache-2.0
- 所属仓库
- crewrig/crewrig
- 最近更新
- 2026-11-15
- Stars
- ★ 24
- Forks
- 6
01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- github-actions
- license
- Apache-2.0
- metadata
- { "provenance": { "version": "1.4.0", "feedback": "https://github.com/crewrig/crewrig", "canonical": "https://github.com/crewrig/crewrig" } }
- description
- Writes, reviews and hardens GitHub Actions workflows and composite actions, and bundles scripts that check permissions, pinned actions, pull_request_target checkouts and expression injection. Use when working on a file under .github/workflows or an action.yml, when a workflow needs a GITHUB_TOKEN permissions block, OIDC instead of long-lived cloud keys, pinned actions, caching, a reusable workflow or a composite action, when a pull request changes CI, or when a failing pipeline may be caused by the workflow definition. Trigger terms: workflow, GitHub Actions, CI pipeline, permissions, pull_request_target, OIDC, pinned actions, reusable workflow, composite action, failing pipeline. Not for GitLab CI pipelines (gitlab-ci), security review of application code (security) or pull request descriptions (pr-logbook).
- allowed-tools
- [ "Read", "Bash", "Write", "Edit" ]
- compatibility
- Requires Node.js 24 (scripts run as node scripts/<name>.ts). actionlint and act are optional: the checks that need them are skipped, and reported as skipped, when they are missing.
- user-invocable
- true
02 资源文件 21
- 参考文档references/caching.md9.3 KB
- 参考文档references/ci-failure-taxonomy.md7.3 KB
- 参考文档references/ci-fix-anti-patterns.md2.4 KB
- 参考文档references/expressions.md9.5 KB
- 参考文档references/generation-rules.md7.9 KB
- 参考文档references/permissions.md8.8 KB
- 参考文档references/reusable-workflows.md11.2 KB
- 参考文档references/runners.md9.7 KB
- 参考文档references/secrets-and-vars.md9.5 KB
- 参考文档references/shared-friction-reporting.md769 B
- 参考文档references/workflow-syntax.md11.8 KB
- 脚本scripts/check-expression-injection.ts12.2 KB
- 脚本scripts/check-permissions.ts12.1 KB
- 脚本scripts/check-pinned-actions.ts6.3 KB
- 脚本scripts/check-pull-request-target.ts11.7 KB
- 脚本scripts/check-secrets-exposure.ts13.0 KB
- 脚本scripts/lint-workflow.ts9.6 KB
- 脚本scripts/resolve-engine.ts4.8 KB
- 脚本scripts/simulate-job.ts7.6 KB
- 脚本scripts/simulate-workflow.ts9.9 KB
- 脚本scripts/validate-pipeline.ts11.3 KB
03 SKILL.md 正文
GitHub Actions
Practitioner rules for the workflows under .github/workflows/ and for composite
actions. The model already knows the syntax; this skill holds what it gets wrong,
the checks that settle the fixed questions, and the judgements a script cannot make.
Hand a change to the security skill when it adds a secret, widens GITHUB_TOKEN
permissions, adds a cloud trust relationship or runs untrusted input in a shell, and
to the architect skill when it restructures workflows across repositories.
Scripts
Run them from this skill's directory with node scripts/<name>.ts <path>, where
<path> is a workflow file or a directory. They need only Node.js and write nothing.
Run validate-pipeline.ts on every workflow you write or change: it runs the other
checks and states which ones ran.
| Script | When | Exit codes |
|---|---|---|
node scripts/validate-pipeline.ts <file-or-dir> |
After writing or changing a workflow, before presenting it. One input only. | 0 every check ran clean or was skipped, 1 a check that ran found a problem, 2 usage error or no workflow file, 3 unreadable input or a check that could not run. |
node scripts/check-permissions.ts <path> |
A workflow without permissions:, or with write-all. |
0 clean, 1 a finding, 2 usage error or empty directory, 3 unreadable path. |
node scripts/check-pull-request-target.ts <path> |
A workflow triggered by pull_request_target. |
Same as above. |
node scripts/check-expression-injection.ts <path> |
A ${{ }} expression inside run: or an actions/github-script script. |
Same as above. |
node scripts/check-pinned-actions.ts <path> |
Any uses: that is not a 40-character SHA. |
0 all pinned, 1 unpinned reference or unreadable path, 2 usage error. |
node scripts/lint-workflow.ts <path> |
Syntax, contexts and shell errors; needs actionlint. |
0 clean or skipped, 1 errors or unreadable path, 2 usage error. |
node scripts/check-secrets-exposure.ts <path> |
A secret that may reach a log or an over-wide scope. | 0 nothing found, 1 a finding, 2 usage error. |
node scripts/simulate-job.ts <file> <job> [event] and node scripts/simulate-workflow.ts <file> [event] |
A local dry run with act while iterating on run: logic. |
0 ok or skipped, otherwise the status of act, 2 usage error. |
Without actionlint, lint-workflow.ts exits 0 before it looks at the path, so a
missing file also passes on such a machine.
Add --json to get one {ok, data, findings} object on standard output (every script
except check-secrets-exposure.ts, which rejects it). A warning
never changes an exit code. A check that exits 0 with a [SKIP] line did not look
at your file: report it as skipped, never as passed. Exit 2 or 3 means the call
or the environment is wrong, not the workflow. A green act run is necessary, not
sufficient: it does not reproduce the hosted runner image.
The three checks check-permissions.ts, check-pull-request-target.ts
and check-expression-injection.ts do not read composite actions: a file with no jobs: key passes
with no finding and the summary says it was not checked, so review the run: steps of
an action.yml by hand, above all any ${{ inputs.* }} in them. They also read a small
subset of YAML. A construct they cannot read
(anchor, alias, merge key, multi-line flow mapping) is reported as an unparsed
warning: review that line by hand, because the file was not verified there.
Pitfalls
A script catches the first four; the rest need your judgement.
- Unpinned third-party actions: pin by commit SHA (
check-pinned-actions.ts). - A
GITHUB_TOKENwith inherited write access: set a top-levelpermissions:block withcontents: read(not{}, which also blocks checkout of a private repository) and raise it per job (check-permissions.ts). - Event data pasted into a shell step: bind it under
env:(check-expression-injection.ts). - A
pull_request_targetworkflow that checks out the pull request head: a label or an environment gate does not make the head's code trusted (check-pull-request-target.ts). - Cache poisoning through a privileged event: a job triggered by
pull_request_target,workflow_runorissue_commentsaves into the default branch's cache scope, so untrusted code it runs can plant an entry that the main branch restores. A plain pull request cannot: restore never reads a child or sibling ref. Do not run pull request code in those events, and do not save a cache from them. hashFiles()over a glob that also matches vendored copies yields a key that changes whenever any of those files does, often after an install. Name the real lockfile path.continue-on-error: trueon a flaky step ends up hiding a real regression. Retry explicitly and handle the failure instead.if: always()on a cleanup or upload step:always()also runs after a cancellation, so a step that can hang keeps the run alive until it times out. Useif: ${{ !cancelled() }}.- A boolean or an enum declared as a
stringinput ofworkflow_dispatchis not validated. Declaretype: boolean, ortype: choicewithoptions:. - A self-hosted runner attached to a public repository runs any fork's code on your hardware. Require approval for outside contributors and keep such runners off public repositories.
Judgement rules
These are decisions; the detail and examples are in references/generation-rules.md.
- Use OIDC for cloud access, because a short-lived token has nothing to rotate or leak.
- Install Node dependencies with
npm ci, because it fails on a lockfile mismatch; when there is no lockfile, report it to the user to commit instead of usingnpm install. - Bind a secret to the step that needs it, at most the job, because workflow-level
env:reaches every job and action. - Set
timeout-minutes:on every job andconcurrency:on branch workflows, because the default timeout is six hours and superseded runs keep spending. - Send production deployments through an environment with required reviewers, because an approval protects only the secrets stored in that environment.
- Make the checks that enforce these rules required on the protected branch, because a rule nothing blocks on drifts.
Record a deliberate exception next to the rule it breaks and in the project's decision records, so a reviewer sees that it was chosen.
What a script cannot know
check-expression-injection.ts warns on every inputs.* expression inside a run:
value, because one file cannot know who calls a reusable workflow or a
workflow_dispatch. The risk stays real after you silence the warning, since a caller
may pass untrusted text. Bind the input under env: and quote it:
- env:
PR_TITLE: ${{ inputs.title }}
run: printf 'Title: %s\n' "$PR_TITLE"
References
Read one only when its subject is the task.
references/generation-rules.md: the interview and the rules for a new workflow, with a secure skeleton and an OIDC job.references/workflow-syntax.md: keys ofon:,jobs:,steps:,strategy:.references/expressions.md: contexts, functions andif:evaluation.references/permissions.md: theGITHUB_TOKENmodel and per-use-case grants.references/secrets-and-vars.md: scopes, OIDC trust policies, masking.references/reusable-workflows.md:workflow_callcontracts and limits.references/caching.md: key andrestore-keyssemantics, per-language recipes.references/runners.md: hosted and self-hosted runners, labels, limits.references/ci-failure-taxonomy.mdandreferences/ci-fix-anti-patterns.md: the failure categories of a failing run, and the fixes never to propose.
Friction
See references/shared-friction-reporting.md.
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