[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M72HR23KXDHYEB9MWRSDWZG5":3,"skill-same:01M72HR23KXDHYEB9MWRSDWZG5":66},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":16,"sourceHtmlUrl":17,"categories":18,"keywords":19,"publishedAt":20,"linkOnly":21,"markdownContent":22,"markdownBody":23,"frontMatter":24,"refName":26,"commitSha":27,"skillDirectory":28,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":29,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":31,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M72HR23KXDHYEB9MWRSDWZG5","security-threat-model",null,"Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats\u002Fabuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.","cocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive","cocyuhao","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F269083740?v=4","01M72F908ET5R76KP9NXS6Y2GJ","Hao Yu","01M72F909376KCNJVKG8MEPY2Q",0,"Apache-2.0","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Fsecurity-threat-model\u002FLICENSE.txt","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Fsecurity-threat-model\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],"2026-11-10 22:39:42",false,"---\nname: \"security-threat-model\"\ndescription: \"Repository-grounded threat modeling that enumerates trust boundaries, assets, attacker capabilities, abuse paths, and mitigations, and writes a concise Markdown threat model. Trigger only when the user explicitly asks to threat model a codebase or path, enumerate threats\u002Fabuse paths, or perform AppSec threat modeling. Do not trigger for general architecture summaries, code review, or non-security design work.\"\nauthor: openai\n---\n\n# Threat Model Source Code Repo\n\nDeliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model that is specific to the repository or a project path, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritizing realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts over generic checklists.\n\n## Quick start\n\n1) Collect (or infer) inputs:\n- Repo root path and any in-scope paths.\n- Intended usage, deployment model, internet exposure, and auth expectations (if known).\n- Any existing repository summary or architecture spec.\n- Use prompts in `references\u002Fprompt-template.md` to generate a repository summary.\n- Follow the required output contract in `references\u002Fprompt-template.md`. Use it verbatim when possible.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1) Scope and extract the system model\n- Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo summary.\n- Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints.\n- Separate runtime behavior from CI\u002Fbuild\u002Fdev tooling and from tests\u002Fexamples.\n- Map the in-scope locations to those components and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly.\n- Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence.\n\n### 2) Derive boundaries, assets, and entry points\n- Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components, noting protocol, auth, encryption, validation, and rate limiting.\n- List assets that drive risk (data, credentials, models, config, compute resources, audit logs).\n- Identify entry points (endpoints, upload surfaces, parsers\u002Fdecoders, job triggers, admin tooling, logging\u002Ferror sinks).\n\n### 3) Calibrate assets and attacker capabilities\n- List the assets that drive risk (credentials, PII, integrity-critical state, availability-critical components, build artifacts).\n- Describe realistic attacker capabilities based on exposure and intended usage.\n- Explicitly note non-capabilities to avoid inflated severity.\n\n\n### 4) Enumerate threats as abuse paths\n- Prefer attacker goals that map to assets and boundaries (exfiltration, privilege escalation, integrity compromise, denial of service).\n- Classify each threat and tie it to impacted assets.\n- Keep the number of threats small but high quality.\n\n### 5) Prioritize with explicit likelihood and impact reasoning\n- Use qualitative likelihood and impact (low\u002Fmedium\u002Fhigh) with short justifications.\n- Set overall priority (critical\u002Fhigh\u002Fmedium\u002Flow) using likelihood x impact, adjusted for existing controls.\n- State which assumptions most influence the ranking.\n\n### 6) Validate service context and assumptions with the user\n- Summarize key assumptions that materially affect threat ranking or scope, then ask the user to confirm or correct them.\n- Ask 1–3 targeted questions to resolve missing context (service owner and environment, scale\u002Fusers, deployment model, authn\u002Fauthz, internet exposure, data sensitivity, multi-tenancy).\n- Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report.\n- If the user declines or can’t answer, state which assumptions remain and how they influence priority.\n\n### 7) Recommend mitigations and focus paths\n- Distinguish existing mitigations (with evidence) from recommended mitigations.\n- Tie mitigations to concrete locations (component, boundary, or entry point) and control types (authZ checks, input validation, schema enforcement, sandboxing, rate limits, secrets isolation, audit logging).\n- Prefer specific implementation hints over generic advice (e.g., \"enforce schema at gateway for upload payloads\" vs \"validate inputs\").\n- Base recommendations on validated user context; if assumptions remain unresolved, mark recommendations as conditional.\n\n### 8) Run a quality check before finalizing\n- Confirm all discovered entrypoints are covered.\n- Confirm each trust boundary is represented in threats.\n- Confirm runtime vs CI\u002Fdev separation.\n- Confirm user clarifications (or explicit non-responses) are reflected.\n- Confirm assumptions and open questions are explicit.\n- Confirm that the format of the report matches closely the required output format defined in prompt template: `references\u002Fprompt-template.md`\n- Write the final Markdown to a file named `\u003Crepo-or-dir-name>-threat-model.md` (use the basename of the repo root, or the in-scope directory if you were asked to model a subpath).\n\n\n## Risk prioritization guidance (illustrative, not exhaustive)\n- High: pre-auth RCE, auth bypass, cross-tenant access, sensitive data exfiltration, key or token theft, model or config integrity compromise, sandbox escape.\n- Medium: targeted DoS of critical components, partial data exposure, rate-limit bypass with measurable impact, log\u002Fmetrics poisoning that affects detection.\n- Low: low-sensitivity info leaks, noisy DoS with easy mitigation, issues requiring unlikely preconditions.\n\n## References\n\n- Output contract and full prompt template: `references\u002Fprompt-template.md`\n- Optional controls\u002Fasset list: `references\u002Fsecurity-controls-and-assets.md`\n\nOnly load the reference files you need. Keep the final result concise, grounded, and reviewable.\n","# Threat Model Source Code Repo\n\nDeliver an actionable AppSec-grade threat model that is specific to the repository or a project path, not a generic checklist. Anchor every architectural claim to evidence in the repo and keep assumptions explicit. Prioritizing realistic attacker goals and concrete impacts over generic checklists.\n\n## Quick start\n\n1) Collect (or infer) inputs:\n- Repo root path and any in-scope paths.\n- Intended usage, deployment model, internet exposure, and auth expectations (if known).\n- Any existing repository summary or architecture spec.\n- Use prompts in `references\u002Fprompt-template.md` to generate a repository summary.\n- Follow the required output contract in `references\u002Fprompt-template.md`. Use it verbatim when possible.\n\n## Workflow\n\n### 1) Scope and extract the system model\n- Identify primary components, data stores, and external integrations from the repo summary.\n- Identify how the system runs (server, CLI, library, worker) and its entrypoints.\n- Separate runtime behavior from CI\u002Fbuild\u002Fdev tooling and from tests\u002Fexamples.\n- Map the in-scope locations to those components and exclude out-of-scope items explicitly.\n- Do not claim components, flows, or controls without evidence.\n\n### 2) Derive boundaries, assets, and entry points\n- Enumerate trust boundaries as concrete edges between components, noting protocol, auth, encryption, validation, and rate limiting.\n- List assets that drive risk (data, credentials, models, config, compute resources, audit logs).\n- Identify entry points (endpoints, upload surfaces, parsers\u002Fdecoders, job triggers, admin tooling, logging\u002Ferror sinks).\n\n### 3) Calibrate assets and attacker capabilities\n- List the assets that drive risk (credentials, PII, integrity-critical state, availability-critical components, build artifacts).\n- Describe realistic attacker capabilities based on exposure and intended usage.\n- Explicitly note non-capabilities to avoid inflated severity.\n\n\n### 4) Enumerate threats as abuse paths\n- Prefer attacker goals that map to assets and boundaries (exfiltration, privilege escalation, integrity compromise, denial of service).\n- Classify each threat and tie it to impacted assets.\n- Keep the number of threats small but high quality.\n\n### 5) Prioritize with explicit likelihood and impact reasoning\n- Use qualitative likelihood and impact (low\u002Fmedium\u002Fhigh) with short justifications.\n- Set overall priority (critical\u002Fhigh\u002Fmedium\u002Flow) using likelihood x impact, adjusted for existing controls.\n- State which assumptions most influence the ranking.\n\n### 6) Validate service context and assumptions with the user\n- Summarize key assumptions that materially affect threat ranking or scope, then ask the user to confirm or correct them.\n- Ask 1–3 targeted questions to resolve missing context (service owner and environment, scale\u002Fusers, deployment model, authn\u002Fauthz, internet exposure, data sensitivity, multi-tenancy).\n- Pause and wait for user feedback before producing the final report.\n- If the user declines or can’t answer, state which assumptions remain and how they influence priority.\n\n### 7) Recommend mitigations and focus paths\n- Distinguish existing mitigations (with evidence) from recommended mitigations.\n- Tie mitigations to concrete locations (component, boundary, or entry point) and control types (authZ checks, input validation, schema enforcement, sandboxing, rate limits, secrets isolation, audit logging).\n- Prefer specific implementation hints over generic advice (e.g., \"enforce schema at gateway for upload payloads\" vs \"validate inputs\").\n- Base recommendations on validated user context; if assumptions remain unresolved, mark recommendations as conditional.\n\n### 8) Run a quality check before finalizing\n- Confirm all discovered entrypoints are covered.\n- Confirm each trust boundary is represented in threats.\n- Confirm runtime vs CI\u002Fdev separation.\n- Confirm user clarifications (or explicit non-responses) are reflected.\n- Confirm assumptions and open questions are explicit.\n- Confirm that the format of the report matches closely the required output format defined in prompt template: `references\u002Fprompt-template.md`\n- Write the final Markdown to a file named `\u003Crepo-or-dir-name>-threat-model.md` (use the basename of the repo root, or the in-scope directory if you were asked to model a subpath).\n\n\n## Risk prioritization guidance (illustrative, not exhaustive)\n- High: pre-auth RCE, auth bypass, cross-tenant access, sensitive data exfiltration, key or token theft, model or config integrity compromise, sandbox escape.\n- Medium: targeted DoS of critical components, partial data exposure, rate-limit bypass with measurable impact, log\u002Fmetrics poisoning that affects detection.\n- Low: low-sensitivity info leaks, noisy DoS with easy mitigation, issues requiring unlikely preconditions.\n\n## References\n\n- Output contract and full prompt template: `references\u002Fprompt-template.md`\n- Optional controls\u002Fasset list: `references\u002Fsecurity-controls-and-assets.md`\n\nOnly load the reference files you need. Keep the final result concise, grounded, and reviewable.\n",{"name":5,"author":25,"description":7},"openai","main","f4a24bd1ab047411d4ae57ee9a96701a7706e779","claude-code-templates\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Fsecurity-threat-model","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao","Beijing Wuzi University","2026-05-12 10:57:02",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add cocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive --skill security-threat-model",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add cocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive --skill security-threat-model",{"tool":42,"command":43},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add cocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive --skill security-threat-model","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Fsecurity-threat-model\u002FSKILL.md",true,[47,53,58,62],{"path":48,"resourceType":49,"resourceTypeDesc":50,"sizeBytes":51,"sourceHtmlUrl":52},"agents\u002Fopenai.yaml","REFERENCE","参考文档",254,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Fsecurity-threat-model\u002Fagents\u002Fopenai.yaml",{"path":54,"resourceType":55,"resourceTypeDesc":56,"sizeBytes":57,"sourceHtmlUrl":16},"LICENSE.txt","LICENSE","许可证",10776,{"path":59,"resourceType":49,"resourceTypeDesc":50,"sizeBytes":60,"sourceHtmlUrl":61},"references\u002Fprompt-template.md",12642,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Fsecurity-threat-model\u002Freferences\u002Fprompt-template.md",{"path":63,"resourceType":49,"resourceTypeDesc":50,"sizeBytes":64,"sourceHtmlUrl":65},"references\u002Fsecurity-controls-and-assets.md",1680,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fclaude-code-templates\u002Fcli-tool\u002Fcomponents\u002Fskills\u002Fsecurity\u002Fsecurity-threat-model\u002Freferences\u002Fsecurity-controls-and-assets.md",[67,75,83,90,97,104],{"skillNo":68,"name":69,"nameZh":6,"description":70,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":71,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":72,"categories":73,"keywords":74,"publishedAt":20},"01M72JQ593HE3SRJD3446CCKA8","web-access","所有联网操作必须通过此 skill 处理，包括：搜索、网页抓取、登录后操作、网络交互等。 触发场景：用户要求搜索信息、查看网页内容、访问需要登录的网站、操作网页界面、抓取社交媒体内容（小红书、微博、推特等）、读取动态渲染页面、以及任何需要真实浏览器环境的网络任务。","MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fweb-access\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":76,"name":77,"nameZh":6,"description":78,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":71,"licenseFileUrl":79,"sourceHtmlUrl":80,"categories":81,"keywords":82,"publishedAt":20},"01M72JKXJYFT2RBJ2HP5ZRA853","last30days","Multi-query social research across Reddit, X, YouTube, TikTok, Instagram, Hacker News, Polymarket, and the web. Intelligent query planning with Gemini\u002FOpenAI fallback.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Flast30days-skill\u002FLICENSE","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Flast30days-skill\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":84,"name":85,"nameZh":6,"description":86,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":71,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":87,"categories":88,"keywords":89,"publishedAt":20},"01M72JKMRQSD0ZY66KQ863HVY5","writing-plans","Use when you have a spec or requirements for a multi-step task. Creates comprehensive implementation plans with bite-sized tasks, exact file paths, and complete code examples.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fhermes-agent\u002Fskills\u002Fsoftware-development\u002Fwriting-plans\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":91,"name":92,"nameZh":6,"description":93,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":71,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":94,"categories":95,"keywords":96,"publishedAt":20},"01M72JKHCV8DT6VWSD4KS5YWT9","test-driven-development","Use when implementing any feature or bugfix, before writing implementation code. Enforces RED-GREEN-REFACTOR cycle with test-first approach.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fhermes-agent\u002Fskills\u002Fsoftware-development\u002Ftest-driven-development\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":98,"name":99,"nameZh":6,"description":100,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":71,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":101,"categories":102,"keywords":103,"publishedAt":20},"01M72JKD7VX7EQM38R704F3KT1","systematic-debugging","Use when encountering any bug, test failure, or unexpected behavior. 4-phase root cause investigation — NO fixes without understanding the problem first.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fhermes-agent\u002Fskills\u002Fsoftware-development\u002Fsystematic-debugging\u002FSKILL.md",[],[],{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":71,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":20},"01M72JKA9XXB92FS8JHPCYW8CM","subagent-driven-development","Use when executing implementation plans with independent tasks. Dispatches fresh delegate_task per task with two-stage review (spec compliance then code quality).","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Fcocyuhao\u002Fai-dev-tooling-research-archive\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fhermes-agent\u002Fskills\u002Fsoftware-development\u002Fsubagent-driven-development\u002FSKILL.md",[],[]]