windows-logging-eventlog-artifact
Windows Logging Eventlog Artifact.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-01
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- ★ 0
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- windows-logging-eventlog-artifact
- domain
- cybersecurity
- description
- Windows Logging Eventlog Artifact.
02 资源文件 1
- 参考文档index.json532 B
03 SKILL.md 正文
| | Chainsaw | Sigma-based EVTX analysis and threat hunting tool | | Hayabusa | Fast Windows Event Log forensic timeline generator | | EvtxECmd | Eric Zimmerman command-line EVTX parser with CSV/JSON output | | python-evtx | Python library for EVTX file parsing | | LogParser | Microsoft SQL-like query engine for Windows logs | | Event Log Explorer | GUI tool for browsing and analyzing EVTX files | | KAPE | Automated triage collection including event logs | | Velociraptor | Endpoint agent with EVTX collection and hunting artifacts |
Common Scenarios
Scenario 1: Detecting Lateral Movement Filter for Event 4624 with Logon Type 3 (network) and Type 10 (RDP), identify unusual source-destination pairs, check for Event 4648 (explicit credentials) indicating pass-the-hash, correlate with process creation events (4688) on target systems.
Scenario 2: Privilege Escalation Detection Search for Event 4672 (special privileges assigned) for unexpected users, check for Event 4728/4732 (group membership changes) adding users to admin groups, look for Event 4697 (service installed) indicating new system-level access, correlate with 4720 (account creation).
Scenario 3: PowerShell Attack Detection Analyze PowerShell Operational log for Script Block Logging (Event 4104), search for encoded commands in Event 4688 (process creation with command line), detect AMSI bypass attempts, identify download cradles and invocation of known attack tools.
Scenario 4: Ransomware Incident Reconstruction Build timeline starting from initial access (4624 from external IP), trace privilege escalation through group membership changes, identify service installations for persistence, find process creation events for encryption executable, detect volume shadow copy deletion in System log.
Output Format
Windows Event Log Analysis Summary:
System: DC01.corp.local (Windows Server 2019)
Log Files Analyzed: 15 EVTX files
Total Events: 2,456,789
Analysis Period: 2024-01-10 to 2024-01-20
Chainsaw Detections:
Critical: 12 (Mimikatz usage, PsExec, log clearing)
High: 34 (Network NTLM logons, encoded PowerShell)
Medium: 89 (Unusual service installations, scheduled tasks)
Low: 234 (Informational)
Hayabusa Timeline:
Total Alerts: 369
Unique Rules Triggered: 45
Top Rules:
- Suspicious NTLM Authentication (34 hits)
- PowerShell Download Cradle (12 hits)
- Service Installation Suspicious Path (8 hits)
Critical Findings:
2024-01-15 14:32 - RDP brute force (234 failed, 1 success from 203.0.113.45)
2024-01-15 14:45 - Admin account created (svcbackup) - Event 4720
2024-01-16 02:30 - PsExec service installed on DC01 - Event 4697
2024-01-18 03:00 - Security log cleared - Event 1102
Reports:
Chainsaw: /analysis/chainsaw_results/
Hayabusa: /analysis/hayabusa_timeline.csv
Critical Events: /analysis/critical_events.json
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