[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71G7A7BTZZK2B81VSDFEGVC":3,"skill-same:01M71G7A7BTZZK2B81VSDFEGVC":91},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":64,"commitSha":65,"skillDirectory":66,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":67,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":68,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":69,"updatedAt":70,"install":71,"resources":84},"01M71G7A7BTZZK2B81VSDFEGVC","hunting-wmilateral-detect",null,"Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc\u002Fhunting\u002Fwmilateral\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"hunting wmilateral detect","hunting","detect","creation","subscription","process execution","child","lateral movement","remote","de","cybersecurity","cm","read","Bash","lateral-movement","sysmon","T1059.001","analyzing","threat-hunting","mitre-attack","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: hunting-wmilateral-detect\ndescription: Detect WMI-based lateral movement by analyzing Windows Event ID 4688 process creation and Sysmon Event ID 1 for WmiPrvSE.exe child process patterns, remote process execution, and WMI event subscription persistence.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- lateral-movement\n- wmi\n- sysmon\n- mitre-attack\n- process-creation\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmodel: sonnet\nmaxTurns: 20\ntools: [Read, Bash, Glob, Grep]\nmitre_attack:\n- T1021\n- T1047\n- T1059\n- T1059.001\n- T1547\ncapec: []\n---\n\n# Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI\n\n## Overview\n\nWindows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via `wmic process call create` or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity\u002FOperational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line)\n- Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured\n- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries\n- Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior\n\n## Steps\n\n### Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events\nExtract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files.\n\n### Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes\nFlag processes where ParentImage\u002FParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution.\n\n### Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns\nIdentify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe \u002Fq \u002Fc, output redirection to admin$ share).\n\n### Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions\nParse WMI-Activity\u002FOperational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence.\n\n## Expected Output\n\nJSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.\n","# Hunting for Lateral Movement via WMI\n\n## Overview\n\nWindows Management Instrumentation (WMI) is commonly abused for lateral movement via `wmic process call create` or Win32_Process.Create() to execute commands on remote hosts. Detection focuses on identifying WmiPrvSE.exe spawning child processes (cmd.exe, powershell.exe) in Windows Security Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event ID 1 logs, along with WMI-Activity\u002FOperational events (5857, 5860, 5861) for event subscription persistence.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for lateral movement via wmi\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event Logs with Process Creation auditing enabled (Event 4688 with command line)\n- Sysmon installed with Event ID 1 (Process Creation) configured\n- Python 3.9+ with `python-evtx`, `lxml` libraries\n- Understanding of WMI architecture and WmiPrvSE.exe behavior\n\n## Steps\n\n### Step 1: Parse Process Creation Events\nExtract Event ID 4688 and Sysmon Event 1 entries from EVTX files.\n\n### Step 2: Detect WmiPrvSE Child Processes\nFlag processes where ParentImage\u002FParentProcessName is WmiPrvSE.exe, indicating remote WMI execution.\n\n### Step 3: Analyze Command Line Patterns\nIdentify suspicious command lines matching WMI lateral movement patterns (cmd.exe \u002Fq \u002Fc, output redirection to admin$ share).\n\n### Step 4: Check WMI Event Subscriptions\nParse WMI-Activity\u002FOperational log for event consumer creation indicating persistence.\n\n## Expected Output\n\nJSON report with WMI-spawned processes, suspicious command lines, WMI event subscription alerts, and timeline of lateral movement activity.\n",{"name":5,"tags":44,"capec":47,"model":48,"tools":49,"domain":29,"maxTurns":53,"nist_csf":54,"subdomain":37,"description":7,"mitre_attack":59},[37,33,45,34,38,46],"wmi","process-creation",[],"sonnet",[50,32,51,52],"Read","Glob","Grep",20,[55,56,57,58],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[60,61,62,35,63],"T1021","T1047","T1059","T1547","main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fsoc\u002Fhunting\u002Fwmilateral\u002Fdetect","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":72,"prompt":82,"zipAvailable":83},[73,76,79],{"tool":74,"command":75},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill hunting-wmilateral-detect",{"tool":77,"command":78},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill hunting-wmilateral-detect",{"tool":80,"command":81},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill hunting-wmilateral-detect","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc\u002Fhunting\u002Fwmilateral\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",true,[85],{"path":86,"resourceType":87,"resourceTypeDesc":88,"sizeBytes":89,"sourceHtmlUrl":90},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",682,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc\u002Fhunting\u002Fwmilateral\u002Fdetect\u002Findex.json",[92,112,130,151,173,189],{"skillNo":93,"name":94,"nameZh":6,"description":95,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":96,"categories":97,"keywords":98,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[99,21,100,45,101,28,30,102,103,104,105,106,107,23,108,109,110,29,111],"services","services wmi persistence detect","persistence","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":113,"name":114,"nameZh":6,"description":115,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":116,"categories":117,"keywords":118,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[119,99,120,45,121,27,122,29,32,123,124,125,126,127,28,128,26,31,33,129],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","traffic","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","Impacket",{"skillNo":131,"name":132,"nameZh":6,"description":133,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":134,"categories":135,"keywords":136,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[137,138,139,140,141,142,29,32,143,123,144,145,28,31,146,147,148,149,150,48],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper",{"skillNo":152,"name":153,"nameZh":6,"description":154,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":155,"categories":156,"keywords":157,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[21,158,159,160,161,162,163,30,164,29,111,165,166,167,168,169,170,171,172,28],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":174,"name":175,"nameZh":6,"description":176,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":177,"categories":178,"keywords":179,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[180,181,21,182,160,162,183,30,184,164,29,111,123,185,186,187,188,172,28,102],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":190,"name":191,"nameZh":6,"description":192,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":193,"categories":194,"keywords":195,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[196,21,160,197,183,30,198,199,29,111,200,201,202,203,204,205,28,102,206,207],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]