soc-playbooks-otirplaybook-respond
Soc Playbooks Otirplaybook Respond.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-01
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- soc-playbooks-otirplaybook-respond
- domain
- cybersecurity
- description
- Soc Playbooks Otirplaybook Respond.
02 资源文件 1
- 参考文档index.json536 B
03 SKILL.md 正文
| | PICERL | SANS incident response lifecycle: Preparation, Identification, Containment, Eradication, Recovery, Lessons Learned | | ICS4ICS | Incident Command System for Industrial Control Systems -- adapts FEMA ICS to OT cybersecurity response | | Safety Instrumented System (SIS) | Independent safety controller that prevents hazardous conditions; compromising SIS can cause physical harm | | Manual/Local Mode | Operating PLCs with local panel controls instead of remote SCADA; used when remote access is compromised | | CIRCIA | Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act requiring reporting to CISA within 72 hours | | Known-Good Backup | Verified, offline copy of PLC programs and configurations used as the trusted baseline for recovery |
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Ransomware Spreads from IT to OT Level 3
Context: Ransomware encrypts enterprise IT systems and spreads through an inadequately protected IT/OT conduit to Level 3 historian servers. HMIs at Level 2 begin showing connectivity errors.
Approach:
- Activate the OT IR playbook for ransomware immediately
- Sever IT-OT connectivity at the DMZ firewall (both north and south firewalls)
- Verify PLCs are still running and process is stable (PLCs run independently of IT)
- Switch operators to local HMI panels if networked HMIs are affected
- Assess which Level 2/3 systems are encrypted vs operational
- Prioritize restoring HMI visibility, then historian, then engineering workstations
- Restore from offline backups -- never attempt to decrypt using attacker-provided tools without sandbox testing
- Report to CISA within 72 hours per CIRCIA requirements
Pitfalls: Do not shut down PLCs to "protect" them from ransomware -- PLCs run firmware, not Windows, and are typically unaffected by ransomware. Shutting down PLCs disrupts the physical process. Never reconnect IT-OT conduit until the IT side is fully remediated.
Output Format
OT INCIDENT RESPONSE REPORT
==============================
Incident ID: OT-IR-YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS
Severity: SEV[1-5]
Category: [category]
Status: [Active/Contained/Eradicated/Recovered/Closed]
TIMELINE:
[timestamp] - [phase] - [action] - [actor]
AFFECTED SYSTEMS:
Safety Systems: [status]
Process Controllers: [status]
HMI/SCADA: [status]
Historian: [status]
DECISIONS LOG:
[timestamp] - [decision] - [rationale] - [approver]
CONTAINMENT ACTIONS TAKEN:
1. [action and timestamp]
RECOVERY STATUS:
[system] - [restored/pending] - [ETA]
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