soc-playbooks-ir-respond
Soc Playbooks Ir Respond.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-01
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- soc-playbooks-ir-respond
- domain
- cybersecurity
- description
- Soc Playbooks Ir Respond.
02 资源文件 1
- 参考文档index.json496 B
03 SKILL.md 正文
| | Playbook | Documented, repeatable set of procedures for responding to a specific incident type | | Runbook | More granular than a playbook; step-by-step technical instructions for a specific task within a playbook | | RACI Matrix | Responsibility assignment chart defining who is Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, and Informed for each activity | | Decision Tree | Flowchart-based logic defining the response path based on binary conditions at each decision point | | Escalation Criteria | Predefined conditions that trigger notification of higher-level personnel or external parties | | SOAR Playbook | Automated workflow in a Security Orchestration, Automation, and Response platform executing playbook steps |
Tools & Systems
- Cortex XSOAR: SOAR platform with visual playbook editor, 700+ integrations, and collaborative War Room
- Splunk SOAR: SOAR platform integrated with Splunk ES, drag-and-drop playbook builder with 2,800+ automated actions
- TheHive: Open-source incident response platform with case templates that function as playbook frameworks
- Confluence / GitLab Wiki: Documentation platforms for maintaining human-readable playbook documents with version control
- Tines: No-code security automation platform for building playbook workflows without programming
Common Scenarios
Scenario: Building a Phishing Response Playbook from Scratch
Context: An organization with a 5-person SOC has no documented phishing response procedure. Analysts handle phishing reports inconsistently.
Approach:
- Interview SOC analysts to document their current ad hoc process
- Define the trigger: user reports phishing email via abuse@ mailbox or phishing button
- Write triage steps: extract email headers, check sender reputation, analyze URLs/attachments in sandbox
- Define containment: quarantine email from all mailboxes, block sender domain, reset passwords if credentials entered
- Build SOAR automation: auto-extract IOCs from reported email, enrich via VirusTotal, create case in TheHive
- Test with simulated phishing email and measure response time improvement
Pitfalls:
- Writing overly generic procedures that don't reference specific tool interfaces or commands
- Not including the communication plan for notifying users who received the phishing email
- Forgetting to define the criteria for when a phishing report becomes a full incident investigation
- Not versioning the playbook or scheduling regular review cycles
Output Format
INCIDENT RESPONSE PLAYBOOK
============================
Playbook Name: Phishing Incident Response
Version: 2.1
Owner: SOC Manager
Last Reviewed: 2025-11-01
Next Review: 2026-02-01
Trigger: Phishing email reported via abuse@corp.com or phish button
RACI MATRIX
Activity | SOC L1 | SOC L2 | IR Lead | Legal | Comms
Initial Triage | R | C | I | |
Email Analysis | R | A | I | |
Containment | | R | A | I |
Credential Reset | | R | A | |
User Notification | | C | A | | R
Regulatory Notification | | | C | R | A
Lessons Learned | C | C | R | I | I
PROCEDURE STEPS
[Detailed steps with tool-specific instructions]
DECISION TREE
[Flowchart logic]
ESCALATION MATRIX
[Conditions and contacts]
METRICS
Target MTTA: 15 minutes
Target MTTC: 1 hour
Target MTTR: 4 hours
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