[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FZMBHKF98CHRWKXJVAFEA":3,"skill-same:01M71FZMBHKF98CHRWKXJVAFEA":70},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":38,"linkOnly":39,"markdownContent":40,"markdownBody":41,"frontMatter":42,"refName":43,"commitSha":44,"skillDirectory":45,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":46,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":47,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":48,"updatedAt":49,"install":50,"resources":63},"01M71FZMBHKF98CHRWKXJVAFEA","soc-hunting-ntlmrelay",null,"JSON report with suspected relay events, IP-hostname correlation anomalies, SMB signing audit results, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping to T1557.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-ntlmrelay\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37],"hunting","soc hunting ntlmrelay","soc","events","mapping","ck","report","correlation","json","audit","results","signing","smb","with","hostname","cybersecurity","ip","ATT&CK","relay","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: soc-hunting-ntlmrelay\ndescription: \"JSON report with suspected relay events, IP-hostname correlation anomalies, SMB signing audit results, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping to T1557.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n# Hunting for NTLM Relay Attacks\n\n## Overview\n\nNTLM relay attacks intercept and forward NTLM authentication messages to gain unauthorized access to network resources. Attackers use tools like Responder for LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS poisoning and ntlmrelayx for credential relay. This skill detects relay activity by querying Windows Security Event 4624 (successful logon) for type 3 network logons with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying mismatches between WorkstationName and source IpAddress, detecting rapid multi-host authentication from single accounts, and auditing SMB signing configuration across domain hosts.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for ntlm relay attacks\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.9+ with Windows Event Log access or exported logs\n- Windows Security audit logging enabled (Event ID 4624, 4625, 5145)\n- Network access for SMB signing status checks\n\n## Key Detection Areas\n\n1. **IP-hostname mismatch** — WorkstationName in Event 4624 does not resolve to the source IpAddress\n2. **NTLMSSP authentication** — logon events using NTLM instead of Kerberos from domain-joined hosts\n3. **Machine account relay** — computer accounts (ending in $) authenticating from unexpected IPs\n4. **Rapid authentication** — single account authenticating to multiple hosts within seconds\n5. **Named pipe access** — Event 5145 showing access to Spoolss, lsarpc, netlogon, samr pipes\n6. **SMB signing disabled** — hosts not enforcing SMB signing, enabling relay attacks\n\n## Output\n\nJSON report with suspected relay events, IP-hostname correlation anomalies, SMB signing audit results, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping to T1557.001.\n","# Hunting for NTLM Relay Attacks\n\n## Overview\n\nNTLM relay attacks intercept and forward NTLM authentication messages to gain unauthorized access to network resources. Attackers use tools like Responder for LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS poisoning and ntlmrelayx for credential relay. This skill detects relay activity by querying Windows Security Event 4624 (successful logon) for type 3 network logons with NTLMSSP authentication, identifying mismatches between WorkstationName and source IpAddress, detecting rapid multi-host authentication from single accounts, and auditing SMB signing configuration across domain hosts.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for ntlm relay attacks\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Python 3.9+ with Windows Event Log access or exported logs\n- Windows Security audit logging enabled (Event ID 4624, 4625, 5145)\n- Network access for SMB signing status checks\n\n## Key Detection Areas\n\n1. **IP-hostname mismatch** — WorkstationName in Event 4624 does not resolve to the source IpAddress\n2. **NTLMSSP authentication** — logon events using NTLM instead of Kerberos from domain-joined hosts\n3. **Machine account relay** — computer accounts (ending in $) authenticating from unexpected IPs\n4. **Rapid authentication** — single account authenticating to multiple hosts within seconds\n5. **Named pipe access** — Event 5145 showing access to Spoolss, lsarpc, netlogon, samr pipes\n6. **SMB signing disabled** — hosts not enforcing SMB signing, enabling relay attacks\n\n## Output\n\nJSON report with suspected relay events, IP-hostname correlation anomalies, SMB signing audit results, and MITRE ATT&CK mapping to T1557.001.\n",{"name":5,"domain":34,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fsoc-hunting-ntlmrelay","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 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soc-hunting-ntlmrelay","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-ntlmrelay\u002FSKILL.md",true,[64],{"path":65,"resourceType":66,"resourceTypeDesc":67,"sizeBytes":68,"sourceHtmlUrl":69},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",599,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-ntlmrelay\u002Findex.json",[71,96,119,141,163,179],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":38},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,34,95],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":38},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[103,78,104,81,105,106,107,34,108,109,110,111,112,113,83,114,115,116,117,118],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":38},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[126,127,128,129,130,131,34,108,132,109,133,134,83,116,135,136,137,138,139,140],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":142,"name":143,"nameZh":6,"description":144,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":145,"categories":146,"keywords":147,"publishedAt":38},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[79,148,149,150,151,152,153,84,154,34,95,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,83],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":164,"name":165,"nameZh":6,"description":166,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":167,"categories":168,"keywords":169,"publishedAt":38},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[170,171,79,172,150,152,173,84,174,154,34,95,109,175,176,177,178,162,83,85],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":180,"name":181,"nameZh":6,"description":182,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":183,"categories":184,"keywords":185,"publishedAt":38},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[186,79,150,187,173,84,188,189,34,95,190,191,192,193,194,32,83,85,195,196],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","mismatched","headers"]