[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FZJEMMN8AB28RV3J0M3F0":3,"skill-same:01M71FZJEMMN8AB28RV3J0M3F0":55},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":23,"linkOnly":24,"markdownContent":25,"markdownBody":26,"frontMatter":27,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":33,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M71FZJEMMN8AB28RV3J0M3F0","soc-hunting-ntlm",null,"Soc Hunting Ntlm.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-ntlm\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22],"soc","hunting","soc hunting ntlm","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: soc-hunting-ntlm\ndescription: \"Soc Hunting Ntlm.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| **Splunk \u002F Elastic SIEM** | Log aggregation and correlation for Event 4624 analysis, IP-hostname mismatch detection, and NTLM downgrade monitoring |\n| **Microsoft Sentinel** | Cloud SIEM with KQL queries for NTLM relay detection and built-in analytics rules for PetitPotam |\n| **CrowdStrike Falcon Identity Protection** | Detects NTLM relay attacks against domain controller accounts regardless of coercion method used |\n| **Responder** | LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS\u002FmDNS poisoning tool used by attackers -- understanding its behavior is essential for detection |\n| **ntlmrelayx (Impacket)** | Multi-protocol NTLM relay tool developed by Fox-IT -- used in testing and by adversaries |\n| **PingCastle** | Active Directory security assessment tool that audits SMB signing, LDAP signing, and NTLM configuration |\n| **Zeek** | Network security monitor for capturing SMB signing negotiation, LLMNR traffic, and DCE-RPC activity |\n| **Sigma** | Vendor-agnostic detection rule format for portable NTLM relay detection rules |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server\n\n**Context**: A SOC analyst observes multiple Event 4624 LogonType 3 entries on a file server (10.10.20.100) where the WorkstationName field shows different workstation names but the IpAddress field consistently shows 10.10.5.50, a host not in the IT asset inventory.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Query Event 4624 on 10.10.20.100 filtered for IpAddress=10.10.5.50: find 15 successful NTLM logons in 30 minutes from 8 different user accounts\n2. Cross-reference 10.10.5.50 with DHCP logs and DNS: host is not a registered domain member, MAC address shows a Linux-based NIC\n3. Query Zeek network logs for 10.10.5.50: identify LLMNR responses (UDP 5355) to multiple workstations and SMB connections to 10.10.20.100\n4. Confirm IP-hostname mismatch: WorkstationName values (WS-FINANCE01, WS-HR03, etc.) all resolve to different IPs in DNS, not 10.10.5.50\n5. Check SMB signing on 10.10.20.100: RequireSecuritySignature is False, enabling the relay attack\n6. Contain: block 10.10.5.50 at the switch, force password reset for all 8 affected accounts, enable SMB signing on the file server\n7. Remediate: disable LLMNR and NBT-NS via GPO, enforce SMB signing domain-wide\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Dismissing the multiple logons as normal network activity without checking the IP-hostname correlation\n- Not checking SMB signing status on the target server to understand why the relay succeeded\n- Only resetting the password for one user instead of all accounts that were relayed\n\n### Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services\n\n**Context**: During a threat hunt, an analyst finds Event 4624 LogonType 3 on the AD CS server (ADCS01) showing the domain controller machine account (DC01$) authenticating via NTLM from IP 10.10.5.50, which is not the DC's IP address (10.10.1.10).\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Confirm the anomaly: DC01$ should only authenticate from 10.10.1.10, but Event 4624 shows authentication from 10.10.5.50 via NTLM (not Kerberos)\n2. Check for certificate enrollment: query AD CS logs for certificate requests from DC01$ around the same timestamp -- find a certificate issued for DC01$\n3. Identify the attack: PetitPotam coerced DC01 to authenticate to 10.10.5.50, which relayed the authentication to ADCS01 to request a certificate for DC01$\n4. Assess impact: with a DC certificate, the attacker can authenticate as DC01$ and perform DCSync to extract all domain credentials\n5. Revoke the fraudulently issued certificate immediately\n6. Check for DCSync activity: query Event 4662 for directory replication from non-DC sources\n7. Contain: isolate 10.10.5.50, revoke certificate, patch EFS (MS-EFSRPC), enforce EPA on AD CS, require LDAP signing on all DCs\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Not recognizing that machine account NTLM authentication from an unexpected IP is a critical indicator of coercion + relay\n- Failing to check AD CS for fraudulent certificate issuance, which represents the actual objective of the attack\n- Not auditing LDAP signing and EPA on AD CS servers, which would have prevented the relay\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-NTLM-RELAY-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nMITRE Technique: T1557.001 (LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay)\n\nRelay Indicators:\n  Victim Account: [Domain\\Username or Machine$]\n  WorkstationName: [Victim hostname from Event 4624]\n  Expected Source IP: [IP matching WorkstationName in DNS\u002FDHCP]\n  Actual Source IP: [Attacker\u002Frelay IP from Event 4624 IpAddress field]\n  Target Host: [Server receiving the relayed authentication]\n\nAuthentication Details:\n  Event ID: 4624\n  LogonType: 3 (Network)\n  AuthenticationPackage: NTLM\n  LmPackageName: [NTLM V1 or NTLM V2]\n  LogonProcess: [NtLmSsp]\n  Timestamp: [Event time]\n\nSigning Status:\n  Target SMB Signing: [Required\u002FNot Required]\n  Target LDAP Signing: [Required\u002FNot Required]\n  LDAP Channel Binding: [Required\u002FNot Required]\n\nPoisoning Evidence:\n  LLMNR Activity: [Detected\u002FNot Detected from relay IP]\n  NBT-NS Activity: [Detected\u002FNot Detected from relay IP]\n  Coercion Method: [PetitPotam\u002FDFSCoerce\u002FPrinterBug\u002FUnknown]\n\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - relay from DC \u002F High - relay from user account]\nRecommended Actions:\n  - Immediate: [Block relay IP, reset affected credentials]\n  - Short-term: [Enable SMB\u002FLDAP signing, disable LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS]\n  - Long-term: [Migrate to Kerberos, enforce EPA, restrict NTLM via GPO]\n```\n","|\n| **Splunk \u002F Elastic SIEM** | Log aggregation and correlation for Event 4624 analysis, IP-hostname mismatch detection, and NTLM downgrade monitoring |\n| **Microsoft Sentinel** | Cloud SIEM with KQL queries for NTLM relay detection and built-in analytics rules for PetitPotam |\n| **CrowdStrike Falcon Identity Protection** | Detects NTLM relay attacks against domain controller accounts regardless of coercion method used |\n| **Responder** | LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS\u002FmDNS poisoning tool used by attackers -- understanding its behavior is essential for detection |\n| **ntlmrelayx (Impacket)** | Multi-protocol NTLM relay tool developed by Fox-IT -- used in testing and by adversaries |\n| **PingCastle** | Active Directory security assessment tool that audits SMB signing, LDAP signing, and NTLM configuration |\n| **Zeek** | Network security monitor for capturing SMB signing negotiation, LLMNR traffic, and DCE-RPC activity |\n| **Sigma** | Vendor-agnostic detection rule format for portable NTLM relay detection rules |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: Responder Poisoning with NTLM Relay to File Server\n\n**Context**: A SOC analyst observes multiple Event 4624 LogonType 3 entries on a file server (10.10.20.100) where the WorkstationName field shows different workstation names but the IpAddress field consistently shows 10.10.5.50, a host not in the IT asset inventory.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Query Event 4624 on 10.10.20.100 filtered for IpAddress=10.10.5.50: find 15 successful NTLM logons in 30 minutes from 8 different user accounts\n2. Cross-reference 10.10.5.50 with DHCP logs and DNS: host is not a registered domain member, MAC address shows a Linux-based NIC\n3. Query Zeek network logs for 10.10.5.50: identify LLMNR responses (UDP 5355) to multiple workstations and SMB connections to 10.10.20.100\n4. Confirm IP-hostname mismatch: WorkstationName values (WS-FINANCE01, WS-HR03, etc.) all resolve to different IPs in DNS, not 10.10.5.50\n5. Check SMB signing on 10.10.20.100: RequireSecuritySignature is False, enabling the relay attack\n6. Contain: block 10.10.5.50 at the switch, force password reset for all 8 affected accounts, enable SMB signing on the file server\n7. Remediate: disable LLMNR and NBT-NS via GPO, enforce SMB signing domain-wide\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Dismissing the multiple logons as normal network activity without checking the IP-hostname correlation\n- Not checking SMB signing status on the target server to understand why the relay succeeded\n- Only resetting the password for one user instead of all accounts that were relayed\n\n### Scenario 2: PetitPotam Relay to AD Certificate Services\n\n**Context**: During a threat hunt, an analyst finds Event 4624 LogonType 3 on the AD CS server (ADCS01) showing the domain controller machine account (DC01$) authenticating via NTLM from IP 10.10.5.50, which is not the DC's IP address (10.10.1.10).\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Confirm the anomaly: DC01$ should only authenticate from 10.10.1.10, but Event 4624 shows authentication from 10.10.5.50 via NTLM (not Kerberos)\n2. Check for certificate enrollment: query AD CS logs for certificate requests from DC01$ around the same timestamp -- find a certificate issued for DC01$\n3. Identify the attack: PetitPotam coerced DC01 to authenticate to 10.10.5.50, which relayed the authentication to ADCS01 to request a certificate for DC01$\n4. Assess impact: with a DC certificate, the attacker can authenticate as DC01$ and perform DCSync to extract all domain credentials\n5. Revoke the fraudulently issued certificate immediately\n6. Check for DCSync activity: query Event 4662 for directory replication from non-DC sources\n7. Contain: isolate 10.10.5.50, revoke certificate, patch EFS (MS-EFSRPC), enforce EPA on AD CS, require LDAP signing on all DCs\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Not recognizing that machine account NTLM authentication from an unexpected IP is a critical indicator of coercion + relay\n- Failing to check AD CS for fraudulent certificate issuance, which represents the actual objective of the attack\n- Not auditing LDAP signing and EPA on AD CS servers, which would have prevented the relay\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-NTLM-RELAY-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nMITRE Technique: T1557.001 (LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay)\n\nRelay Indicators:\n  Victim Account: [Domain\\Username or Machine$]\n  WorkstationName: [Victim hostname from Event 4624]\n  Expected Source IP: [IP matching WorkstationName in DNS\u002FDHCP]\n  Actual Source IP: [Attacker\u002Frelay IP from Event 4624 IpAddress field]\n  Target Host: [Server receiving the relayed authentication]\n\nAuthentication Details:\n  Event ID: 4624\n  LogonType: 3 (Network)\n  AuthenticationPackage: NTLM\n  LmPackageName: [NTLM V1 or NTLM V2]\n  LogonProcess: [NtLmSsp]\n  Timestamp: [Event time]\n\nSigning Status:\n  Target SMB Signing: [Required\u002FNot Required]\n  Target LDAP Signing: [Required\u002FNot Required]\n  LDAP Channel Binding: [Required\u002FNot Required]\n\nPoisoning Evidence:\n  LLMNR Activity: [Detected\u002FNot Detected from relay IP]\n  NBT-NS Activity: [Detected\u002FNot Detected from relay IP]\n  Coercion Method: [PetitPotam\u002FDFSCoerce\u002FPrinterBug\u002FUnknown]\n\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - relay from DC \u002F High - relay from user account]\nRecommended Actions:\n  - Immediate: [Block relay IP, reset affected credentials]\n  - Short-term: [Enable SMB\u002FLDAP signing, disable LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS]\n  - Long-term: [Migrate to Kerberos, enforce EPA, restrict NTLM via GPO]\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":22,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fsoc-hunting-ntlm","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-ntlm",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-ntlm",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-ntlm","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-ntlm\u002FSKILL.md",true,[49],{"path":50,"resourceType":51,"resourceTypeDesc":52,"sizeBytes":53,"sourceHtmlUrl":54},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",464,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-ntlm\u002Findex.json",[56,81,104,126,148,164],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,22,80],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[88,63,89,66,90,91,92,22,93,94,95,96,97,98,68,99,100,101,102,103],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[111,112,113,114,115,116,22,93,117,94,118,119,68,101,120,121,122,123,124,125],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":127,"name":128,"nameZh":6,"description":129,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":130,"categories":131,"keywords":132,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,133,134,135,136,137,138,69,139,22,80,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,68],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[155,156,64,157,135,137,158,69,159,139,22,80,94,160,161,162,163,147,68,70],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":165,"name":166,"nameZh":6,"description":167,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":168,"categories":169,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[171,64,135,172,158,69,173,174,22,80,175,176,177,178,179,180,68,70,181,182],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]