[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FZ6T17DMPS8MVNHFNKB2S":3,"skill-same:01M71FZ6T17DMPS8MVNHFNKB2S":55},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":23,"linkOnly":24,"markdownContent":25,"markdownBody":26,"frontMatter":27,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":33,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M71FZ6T17DMPS8MVNHFNKB2S","soc-hunting-lateralmov",null,"Soc Hunting Lateralmov.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-lateralmov\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22],"soc","hunting","soc hunting lateralmov","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: soc-hunting-lateralmov\ndescription: \"Soc Hunting Lateralmov.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| **Sysmon** | Endpoint telemetry for process creation (EID 1), network connections (EID 3), and image loads (EID 7) essential for DCOM detection |\n| **Splunk \u002F Elastic SIEM** | Log aggregation and correlation platform for DCOM detection rules and threat hunting queries |\n| **Microsoft Sentinel** | Cloud SIEM with built-in KQL queries and analytics rules for DCOM lateral movement detection |\n| **Sigma** | Vendor-agnostic detection rule format for portable DCOM detection rules |\n| **Zeek** | Network security monitor for DCE-RPC protocol analysis and RPC endpoint mapper traffic monitoring |\n| **Atomic Red Team** | MITRE ATT&CK test framework with T1021.003 atomics for validating DCOM detection coverage |\n| **Impacket (dcomexec.py)** | Python-based DCOM execution tool used by attackers and red teamers for testing DCOM lateral movement |\n| **CIMSession \u002F PowerShell** | Native Windows tooling for DCOM object instantiation used in both legitimate administration and attacks |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: MMC20.Application Lateral Movement to File Server\n\n**Context**: A SOC analyst receives an alert for mmc.exe spawning cmd.exe on a file server (10.10.20.50) at 03:22 UTC. No administrator activity is scheduled at this time.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Query Sysmon Event ID 1 on 10.10.20.50: confirm mmc.exe (parent: svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch) spawned cmd.exe with command line `\u002Fc net user \u002Fdomain > C:\\temp\\users.txt`\n2. Query Sysmon Event ID 3 on 10.10.20.50: identify inbound TCP connection on port 135 from 10.10.5.30 at 03:22:01, followed by a high-port connection at 03:22:02\n3. Correlate Event ID 4624 on 10.10.20.50: find LogonType 3 from 10.10.5.30 at 03:22:00 with admin credentials\n4. Investigate 10.10.5.30: check for compromise indicators -- find Mimikatz artifacts in memory, evidence of credential dumping at 03:15\n5. Trace the attack chain: initial phishing compromise at 02:45, credential theft at 03:15, DCOM lateral movement at 03:22\n6. Contain: isolate 10.10.5.30 and 10.10.20.50, force password reset for compromised admin account, block inbound RPC from non-admin subnets\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Dismissing mmc.exe activity as legitimate MMC administration without checking the parent process and command line\n- Not correlating the network logon (4624) with the process creation to identify the true source host\n- Failing to investigate the source host for initial compromise indicators\n\n### Scenario 2: ShellWindows Stealthy Lateral Movement\n\n**Context**: During a threat hunt, an analyst queries for explorer.exe spawning cmd.exe on domain controllers and finds several instances on DC01 with no interactive logon sessions.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Verify no interactive sessions: query Event ID 4624 LogonType 2 or 10 on DC01 -- none found during the time window\n2. Query Sysmon Event ID 1: explorer.exe spawning cmd.exe with encoded PowerShell commands at 14:05, 14:12, and 14:18\n3. Decode the PowerShell: reveals reconnaissance commands (Get-ADUser, Get-ADGroup, Get-ADComputer)\n4. Query Sysmon Event ID 3: inbound RPC connections from 10.10.3.15 preceding each process creation\n5. Identify the ShellWindows pattern: no new mmc.exe or dllhost.exe process created -- commands execute through existing explorer.exe, consistent with ShellWindows\u002FShellBrowserWindow DCOM abuse\n6. Investigate 10.10.3.15: compromised workstation with Cobalt Strike beacon artifacts\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Missing the attack because ShellWindows does not create a separate COM server process -- requires monitoring explorer.exe child processes\n- Not having Sysmon Event ID 3 configured to capture network connections from explorer.exe\n- Filtering out explorer.exe as a legitimate parent process without considering the server context\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCOM-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: High\nMITRE Technique: T1021.003 (Remote Services: DCOM)\n\nSource Host: [IP\u002FHostname of attacker's machine]\nTarget Host: [IP\u002FHostname where DCOM executed]\nDCOM Object: [MMC20.Application | ShellWindows | ShellBrowserWindow]\nCLSID: [COM object class identifier]\n\nProcess Chain:\n  Parent: [svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch | explorer.exe | mmc.exe]\n  Child:  [cmd.exe | powershell.exe | ...]\n  Command Line: [Full command executed]\n\nNetwork Indicators:\n  RPC Connection: [Source IP]:port -> [Target IP]:135 at [timestamp]\n  DCOM Port: [Source IP]:port -> [Target IP]:[high-port] at [timestamp]\n\nAuthentication Context:\n  Event 4624: LogonType 3 from [Source IP] at [timestamp]\n  Account: [Domain\\Username]\n  Logon ID: [Logon session identifier]\n\nRisk Assessment: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium]\nRecommended Action: [Isolate, investigate source, reset credentials, restrict DCOM]\n```\n","|\n| **Sysmon** | Endpoint telemetry for process creation (EID 1), network connections (EID 3), and image loads (EID 7) essential for DCOM detection |\n| **Splunk \u002F Elastic SIEM** | Log aggregation and correlation platform for DCOM detection rules and threat hunting queries |\n| **Microsoft Sentinel** | Cloud SIEM with built-in KQL queries and analytics rules for DCOM lateral movement detection |\n| **Sigma** | Vendor-agnostic detection rule format for portable DCOM detection rules |\n| **Zeek** | Network security monitor for DCE-RPC protocol analysis and RPC endpoint mapper traffic monitoring |\n| **Atomic Red Team** | MITRE ATT&CK test framework with T1021.003 atomics for validating DCOM detection coverage |\n| **Impacket (dcomexec.py)** | Python-based DCOM execution tool used by attackers and red teamers for testing DCOM lateral movement |\n| **CIMSession \u002F PowerShell** | Native Windows tooling for DCOM object instantiation used in both legitimate administration and attacks |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario 1: MMC20.Application Lateral Movement to File Server\n\n**Context**: A SOC analyst receives an alert for mmc.exe spawning cmd.exe on a file server (10.10.20.50) at 03:22 UTC. No administrator activity is scheduled at this time.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Query Sysmon Event ID 1 on 10.10.20.50: confirm mmc.exe (parent: svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch) spawned cmd.exe with command line `\u002Fc net user \u002Fdomain > C:\\temp\\users.txt`\n2. Query Sysmon Event ID 3 on 10.10.20.50: identify inbound TCP connection on port 135 from 10.10.5.30 at 03:22:01, followed by a high-port connection at 03:22:02\n3. Correlate Event ID 4624 on 10.10.20.50: find LogonType 3 from 10.10.5.30 at 03:22:00 with admin credentials\n4. Investigate 10.10.5.30: check for compromise indicators -- find Mimikatz artifacts in memory, evidence of credential dumping at 03:15\n5. Trace the attack chain: initial phishing compromise at 02:45, credential theft at 03:15, DCOM lateral movement at 03:22\n6. Contain: isolate 10.10.5.30 and 10.10.20.50, force password reset for compromised admin account, block inbound RPC from non-admin subnets\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Dismissing mmc.exe activity as legitimate MMC administration without checking the parent process and command line\n- Not correlating the network logon (4624) with the process creation to identify the true source host\n- Failing to investigate the source host for initial compromise indicators\n\n### Scenario 2: ShellWindows Stealthy Lateral Movement\n\n**Context**: During a threat hunt, an analyst queries for explorer.exe spawning cmd.exe on domain controllers and finds several instances on DC01 with no interactive logon sessions.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Verify no interactive sessions: query Event ID 4624 LogonType 2 or 10 on DC01 -- none found during the time window\n2. Query Sysmon Event ID 1: explorer.exe spawning cmd.exe with encoded PowerShell commands at 14:05, 14:12, and 14:18\n3. Decode the PowerShell: reveals reconnaissance commands (Get-ADUser, Get-ADGroup, Get-ADComputer)\n4. Query Sysmon Event ID 3: inbound RPC connections from 10.10.3.15 preceding each process creation\n5. Identify the ShellWindows pattern: no new mmc.exe or dllhost.exe process created -- commands execute through existing explorer.exe, consistent with ShellWindows\u002FShellBrowserWindow DCOM abuse\n6. Investigate 10.10.3.15: compromised workstation with Cobalt Strike beacon artifacts\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Missing the attack because ShellWindows does not create a separate COM server process -- requires monitoring explorer.exe child processes\n- Not having Sysmon Event ID 3 configured to capture network connections from explorer.exe\n- Filtering out explorer.exe as a legitimate parent process without considering the server context\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCOM-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: High\nMITRE Technique: T1021.003 (Remote Services: DCOM)\n\nSource Host: [IP\u002FHostname of attacker's machine]\nTarget Host: [IP\u002FHostname where DCOM executed]\nDCOM Object: [MMC20.Application | ShellWindows | ShellBrowserWindow]\nCLSID: [COM object class identifier]\n\nProcess Chain:\n  Parent: [svchost.exe -k DcomLaunch | explorer.exe | mmc.exe]\n  Child:  [cmd.exe | powershell.exe | ...]\n  Command Line: [Full command executed]\n\nNetwork Indicators:\n  RPC Connection: [Source IP]:port -> [Target IP]:135 at [timestamp]\n  DCOM Port: [Source IP]:port -> [Target IP]:[high-port] at [timestamp]\n\nAuthentication Context:\n  Event 4624: LogonType 3 from [Source IP] at [timestamp]\n  Account: [Domain\\Username]\n  Logon ID: [Logon session identifier]\n\nRisk Assessment: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium]\nRecommended Action: [Isolate, investigate source, reset credentials, restrict DCOM]\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":22,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fsoc-hunting-lateralmov","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-lateralmov",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-lateralmov",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-lateralmov","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-lateralmov\u002FSKILL.md",true,[49],{"path":50,"resourceType":51,"resourceTypeDesc":52,"sizeBytes":53,"sourceHtmlUrl":54},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",488,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-lateralmov\u002Findex.json",[56,81,104,126,148,164],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,22,80],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[88,63,89,66,90,91,92,22,93,94,95,96,97,98,68,99,100,101,102,103],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[111,112,113,114,115,116,22,93,117,94,118,119,68,101,120,121,122,123,124,125],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":127,"name":128,"nameZh":6,"description":129,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":130,"categories":131,"keywords":132,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,133,134,135,136,137,138,69,139,22,80,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,68],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[155,156,64,157,135,137,158,69,159,139,22,80,94,160,161,162,163,147,68,70],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":165,"name":166,"nameZh":6,"description":167,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":168,"categories":169,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[171,64,135,172,158,69,173,174,22,80,175,176,177,178,179,180,68,70,181,182],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]