[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FZ3ZATB0C20RCPTCQD0BB":3,"skill-same:01M71FZ3ZATB0C20RCPTCQD0BB":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":24,"linkOnly":25,"markdownContent":26,"markdownBody":27,"frontMatter":28,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":34,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M71FZ3ZATB0C20RCPTCQD0BB","soc-hunting-elastic",null,"Soc Hunting Elastic.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-elastic\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23],"soc","elastic","hunting","soc hunting elastic","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: soc-hunting-elastic\ndescription: \"Soc Hunting Elastic.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n--|\n| **KQL** | Kibana Query Language — simplified query syntax for filtering data in Kibana Discover and dashboards |\n| **EQL** | Event Query Language — Elastic's sequence-aware query language for detecting multi-step attack patterns |\n| **ECS** | Elastic Common Schema — standardized field naming convention enabling cross-source correlation |\n| **Timeline** | Elastic Security investigation workspace for collaborative event analysis and annotation |\n| **Hypothesis-Driven Hunting** | Structured approach starting with a theory about attacker behavior, tested against telemetry data |\n| **LOLBins** | Living Off the Land Binaries — legitimate Windows tools (certutil, mshta, rundll32) abused by attackers |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Elastic Security**: SIEM platform built on Elasticsearch with detection rules, Timeline, and case management\n- **Elastic Agent**: Unified data collection agent replacing Beats for endpoint and network telemetry\n- **Elastic Endpoint Security**: EDR capabilities integrated into Elastic Agent for process, file, and network monitoring\n- **ATT&CK Navigator**: MITRE tool for tracking detection and hunting coverage across the ATT&CK matrix\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **LOLBin Abuse**: Hunt for mshta.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe with suspicious arguments\n- **Persistence Mechanisms**: Query for scheduled task creation, registry run key modification, WMI subscriptions\n- **C2 Beaconing**: Analyze network flow data for periodic outbound connections with consistent intervals\n- **Data Staging**: Hunt for large file compression (7z, rar, zip) followed by outbound transfers\n- **Account Manipulation**: Search for net.exe user creation, group membership changes, or password resets by non-admin users\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nTHREAT HUNT REPORT — TH-2024-012\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nHypothesis:   Attackers using certutil.exe for tool download (T1105)\nPeriod:       2024-02-15 to 2024-03-15\nData Sources: Elastic Endpoint (process events), Sysmon\n\nFindings:\n  Total certutil executions:     342\n  With -urlcache flag:           12 (3.5%)\n  Suspicious (non-SCCM):        3 confirmed anomalous\n\nAffected Hosts:\n  WORKSTATION-042 (Finance)  — certutil downloading payload.exe from external IP\n  SERVER-DB-03 (Database)    — certutil decoding base64 encoded binary\n  LAPTOP-EXEC-07 (Executive) — certutil downloading script from Pastebin\n\nActions Taken:\n  [DONE] 3 hosts isolated for forensic investigation\n  [DONE] Detection rule \"Certutil Download Activity\" deployed (ID: elastic-th012)\n  [DONE] ATT&CK Navigator updated: T1105 coverage = GREEN\n\nVerdict:      HYPOTHESIS CONFIRMED — 3 true positive findings escalated to IR\n```\n","--|\n| **KQL** | Kibana Query Language — simplified query syntax for filtering data in Kibana Discover and dashboards |\n| **EQL** | Event Query Language — Elastic's sequence-aware query language for detecting multi-step attack patterns |\n| **ECS** | Elastic Common Schema — standardized field naming convention enabling cross-source correlation |\n| **Timeline** | Elastic Security investigation workspace for collaborative event analysis and annotation |\n| **Hypothesis-Driven Hunting** | Structured approach starting with a theory about attacker behavior, tested against telemetry data |\n| **LOLBins** | Living Off the Land Binaries — legitimate Windows tools (certutil, mshta, rundll32) abused by attackers |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Elastic Security**: SIEM platform built on Elasticsearch with detection rules, Timeline, and case management\n- **Elastic Agent**: Unified data collection agent replacing Beats for endpoint and network telemetry\n- **Elastic Endpoint Security**: EDR capabilities integrated into Elastic Agent for process, file, and network monitoring\n- **ATT&CK Navigator**: MITRE tool for tracking detection and hunting coverage across the ATT&CK matrix\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **LOLBin Abuse**: Hunt for mshta.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe with suspicious arguments\n- **Persistence Mechanisms**: Query for scheduled task creation, registry run key modification, WMI subscriptions\n- **C2 Beaconing**: Analyze network flow data for periodic outbound connections with consistent intervals\n- **Data Staging**: Hunt for large file compression (7z, rar, zip) followed by outbound transfers\n- **Account Manipulation**: Search for net.exe user creation, group membership changes, or password resets by non-admin users\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nTHREAT HUNT REPORT — TH-2024-012\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nHypothesis:   Attackers using certutil.exe for tool download (T1105)\nPeriod:       2024-02-15 to 2024-03-15\nData Sources: Elastic Endpoint (process events), Sysmon\n\nFindings:\n  Total certutil executions:     342\n  With -urlcache flag:           12 (3.5%)\n  Suspicious (non-SCCM):        3 confirmed anomalous\n\nAffected Hosts:\n  WORKSTATION-042 (Finance)  — certutil downloading payload.exe from external IP\n  SERVER-DB-03 (Database)    — certutil decoding base64 encoded binary\n  LAPTOP-EXEC-07 (Executive) — certutil downloading script from Pastebin\n\nActions Taken:\n  [DONE] 3 hosts isolated for forensic investigation\n  [DONE] Detection rule \"Certutil Download Activity\" deployed (ID: elastic-th012)\n  [DONE] ATT&CK Navigator updated: T1105 coverage = GREEN\n\nVerdict:      HYPOTHESIS CONFIRMED — 3 true positive findings escalated to IR\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":23,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fsoc-hunting-elastic","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-elastic",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-elastic",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-elastic","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-elastic\u002FSKILL.md",true,[50],{"path":51,"resourceType":52,"resourceTypeDesc":53,"sizeBytes":54,"sourceHtmlUrl":55},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",476,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-elastic\u002Findex.json",[57,82,105,127,149,165],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,23,81],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[89,64,90,67,91,92,93,23,94,95,96,97,98,99,69,100,101,102,103,104],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":109,"categories":110,"keywords":111,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[112,113,114,115,116,117,23,94,118,95,119,120,69,102,121,122,123,124,125,126],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":128,"name":129,"nameZh":6,"description":130,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":131,"categories":132,"keywords":133,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[65,134,135,136,137,138,139,70,140,23,81,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,69],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":150,"name":151,"nameZh":6,"description":152,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":153,"categories":154,"keywords":155,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[156,157,65,158,136,138,159,70,160,140,23,81,95,161,162,163,164,148,69,71],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":166,"name":167,"nameZh":6,"description":168,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":169,"categories":170,"keywords":171,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[172,65,136,173,159,70,174,175,23,81,176,177,178,179,180,181,69,71,182,183],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]