soc-hunting-elastic
Soc Hunting Elastic.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-01
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- soc-hunting-elastic
- domain
- cybersecurity
- description
- Soc Hunting Elastic.
02 资源文件 1
- 参考文档index.json476 B
03 SKILL.md 正文
--| | KQL | Kibana Query Language — simplified query syntax for filtering data in Kibana Discover and dashboards | | EQL | Event Query Language — Elastic's sequence-aware query language for detecting multi-step attack patterns | | ECS | Elastic Common Schema — standardized field naming convention enabling cross-source correlation | | Timeline | Elastic Security investigation workspace for collaborative event analysis and annotation | | Hypothesis-Driven Hunting | Structured approach starting with a theory about attacker behavior, tested against telemetry data | | LOLBins | Living Off the Land Binaries — legitimate Windows tools (certutil, mshta, rundll32) abused by attackers |
Tools & Systems
- Elastic Security: SIEM platform built on Elasticsearch with detection rules, Timeline, and case management
- Elastic Agent: Unified data collection agent replacing Beats for endpoint and network telemetry
- Elastic Endpoint Security: EDR capabilities integrated into Elastic Agent for process, file, and network monitoring
- ATT&CK Navigator: MITRE tool for tracking detection and hunting coverage across the ATT&CK matrix
Common Scenarios
- LOLBin Abuse: Hunt for mshta.exe, regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe, certutil.exe with suspicious arguments
- Persistence Mechanisms: Query for scheduled task creation, registry run key modification, WMI subscriptions
- C2 Beaconing: Analyze network flow data for periodic outbound connections with consistent intervals
- Data Staging: Hunt for large file compression (7z, rar, zip) followed by outbound transfers
- Account Manipulation: Search for net.exe user creation, group membership changes, or password resets by non-admin users
Output Format
THREAT HUNT REPORT — TH-2024-012
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Hypothesis: Attackers using certutil.exe for tool download (T1105)
Period: 2024-02-15 to 2024-03-15
Data Sources: Elastic Endpoint (process events), Sysmon
Findings:
Total certutil executions: 342
With -urlcache flag: 12 (3.5%)
Suspicious (non-SCCM): 3 confirmed anomalous
Affected Hosts:
WORKSTATION-042 (Finance) — certutil downloading payload.exe from external IP
SERVER-DB-03 (Database) — certutil decoding base64 encoded binary
LAPTOP-EXEC-07 (Executive) — certutil downloading script from Pastebin
Actions Taken:
[DONE] 3 hosts isolated for forensic investigation
[DONE] Detection rule "Certutil Download Activity" deployed (ID: elastic-th012)
[DONE] ATT&CK Navigator updated: T1105 coverage = GREEN
Verdict: HYPOTHESIS CONFIRMED — 3 true positive findings escalated to IR
04 同仓库更多 Skills
services-wmi-persistence-detect
Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.
services-wmi-exec-exploit
Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.
registry-artifact-extract
Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.
processes-token-impersonate-detect
Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.
processes-thread-injection-detect
Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.
processes-hollow-technique-detect
Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.