[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FZ1SMMQCV4FMWZFFMFNWD":3,"skill-same:01M71FZ1SMMQCV4FMWZFFMFNWD":61},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":29,"linkOnly":30,"markdownContent":31,"markdownBody":32,"frontMatter":33,"refName":34,"commitSha":35,"skillDirectory":36,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":37,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":38,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":39,"updatedAt":40,"install":41,"resources":54},"01M71FZ1SMMQCV4FMWZFFMFNWD","soc-hunting-edr",null,"-| | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process | | T1003.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-edr\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28],"edr","soc","soc hunting edr","hunting","memory","cybersecurity","lsass","credentials","process","t1003","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: soc-hunting-edr\ndescription: \"-| | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process | | T1003.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n-|\n| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process |\n| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM |\n| T1003.003 | NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database |\n| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords |\n| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes |\n| T1003.006 | DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller |\n| Credential Guard | Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets |\n| RunAsPPL | Protected Process Light for LSASS |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)lsass\\.exe$\")\n| where GrantedAccess IN (\"0x1FFFFF\", \"0x1F3FFF\", \"0x143A\", \"0x1F0FFF\", \"0x0040\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1410\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(CommandLine, \"(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)comsvcs\\.dll.*MiniDump\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)ntdsutil.*\\\"ac i ntds\\\".*ifm\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)reg\\s+save\\s+hklm\\\\\\\\(sam|security|system)\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)vssadmin.*create\\s+shadow\")\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType in (\"LsassAccess\", \"CredentialDumpingActivity\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields\n| sort by Timestamp desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping\n```yaml\ntitle: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: process_access\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith: '\\lsass.exe'\n        GrantedAccess|contains:\n            - '0x1FFFFF'\n            - '0x1F3FFF'\n            - '0x143A'\n            - '0x0040'\n    filter:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.001\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz sekurlsa**: Direct LSASS memory reading via `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.\n2. **ProcDump LSASS**: `procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.\n3. **Comsvcs.dll MiniDump**: `rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full` using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.\n4. **NTDS.dit Extraction**: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.\n5. **SAM Hive Export**: `reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.save` followed by `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.save` for local account hash extraction.\n6. **Task Manager Dump**: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nDumping Method: [LSASS_Access\u002FNTDS\u002FSAM\u002FDCSync]\nSource Process: [Tool or process used]\nTarget: [LSASS\u002FNTDS.dit\u002FSAM\u002FSECURITY]\nAccess Rights: [Granted access mask]\nUser Context: [Account performing the dump]\nATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium]\nCredentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]\n```\n","-|\n| T1003.001 | LSASS Memory -- dumping credentials from LSASS process |\n| T1003.002 | Security Account Manager -- extracting local account hashes from SAM |\n| T1003.003 | NTDS -- extracting domain hashes from Active Directory database |\n| T1003.004 | LSA Secrets -- extracting service account passwords |\n| T1003.005 | Cached Domain Credentials -- extracting DCC2 hashes |\n| T1003.006 | DCSync -- replicating credentials from domain controller |\n| Credential Guard | Virtualization-based isolation of LSASS secrets |\n| RunAsPPL | Protected Process Light for LSASS |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- LSASS Access Detection\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=10\n| where match(TargetImage, \"(?i)lsass\\.exe$\")\n| where GrantedAccess IN (\"0x1FFFFF\", \"0x1F3FFF\", \"0x143A\", \"0x1F0FFF\", \"0x0040\", \"0x1010\", \"0x1410\")\n| where NOT match(SourceImage, \"(?i)(csrss|lsass|svchost|MsMpEng|WmiPrvSE|taskmgr|procexp|SecurityHealthService)\\.exe$\")\n| table _time Computer SourceImage SourceProcessId GrantedAccess CallTrace\n```\n\n### Splunk -- Credential Dumping Tool Detection\n```spl\nindex=sysmon EventCode=1\n| where match(CommandLine, \"(?i)(sekurlsa|lsadump|kerberos::list|crypto::certificates)\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)procdump.*-ma.*lsass\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)comsvcs\\.dll.*MiniDump\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)ntdsutil.*\\\"ac i ntds\\\".*ifm\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)reg\\s+save\\s+hklm\\\\\\\\(sam|security|system)\")\n    OR match(CommandLine, \"(?i)vssadmin.*create\\s+shadow\")\n| table _time Computer User Image CommandLine ParentImage\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Defender for Endpoint\n```kql\nDeviceEvents\n| where Timestamp > ago(7d)\n| where ActionType in (\"LsassAccess\", \"CredentialDumpingActivity\")\n| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName,\n    InitiatingProcessCommandLine, ActionType, AdditionalFields\n| sort by Timestamp desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- LSASS Credential Dumping\n```yaml\ntitle: LSASS Memory Credential Dumping Attempt\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    category: process_access\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        TargetImage|endswith: '\\lsass.exe'\n        GrantedAccess|contains:\n            - '0x1FFFFF'\n            - '0x1F3FFF'\n            - '0x143A'\n            - '0x0040'\n    filter:\n        SourceImage|endswith:\n            - '\\csrss.exe'\n            - '\\lsass.exe'\n            - '\\MsMpEng.exe'\n            - '\\svchost.exe'\n    condition: selection and not filter\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.001\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz sekurlsa**: Direct LSASS memory reading via `sekurlsa::logonpasswords` to extract plaintext passwords, NTLM hashes, and Kerberos tickets.\n2. **ProcDump LSASS**: `procdump.exe -ma lsass.exe lsass.dmp` creating a memory dump for offline credential extraction.\n3. **Comsvcs.dll MiniDump**: `rundll32.exe comsvcs.dll MiniDump [LSASS_PID] dump.bin full` using a built-in Windows DLL for LSASS dumping.\n4. **NTDS.dit Extraction**: Creating a Volume Shadow Copy and copying NTDS.dit + SYSTEM hive for offline domain hash extraction with secretsdump.\n5. **SAM Hive Export**: `reg save HKLM\\SAM sam.save` followed by `reg save HKLM\\SYSTEM system.save` for local account hash extraction.\n6. **Task Manager Dump**: Right-clicking LSASS in Task Manager to create a memory dump -- a legitimate tool abused for credential theft.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-CRED-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nHost: [Hostname]\nDumping Method: [LSASS_Access\u002FNTDS\u002FSAM\u002FDCSync]\nSource Process: [Tool or process used]\nTarget: [LSASS\u002FNTDS.dit\u002FSAM\u002FSECURITY]\nAccess Rights: [Granted access mask]\nUser Context: [Account performing the dump]\nATT&CK Technique: [T1003.00x]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium]\nCredentials at Risk: [Scope assessment]\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":24,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fsoc-hunting-edr","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":42,"prompt":52,"zipAvailable":53},[43,46,49],{"tool":44,"command":45},"npx","npx skills add 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repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[69,70,71,72,73,74,75,27,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,24,85],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":87,"name":88,"nameZh":6,"description":89,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":90,"categories":91,"keywords":92,"publishedAt":29},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[93,69,94,72,95,96,97,24,98,99,100,101,102,103,74,104,105,106,107,108],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":110,"name":111,"nameZh":6,"description":112,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":113,"categories":114,"keywords":115,"publishedAt":29},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[116,117,118,119,120,121,24,98,122,99,123,124,74,106,125,126,127,128,129,130],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":132,"name":133,"nameZh":6,"description":134,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":135,"categories":136,"keywords":137,"publishedAt":29},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[70,138,139,140,141,142,143,75,144,24,85,145,146,147,148,149,150,151,152,74],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":154,"name":155,"nameZh":6,"description":156,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":157,"categories":158,"keywords":159,"publishedAt":29},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[160,161,70,162,140,142,23,75,163,144,24,85,99,164,165,166,167,152,74,27],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":169,"name":170,"nameZh":6,"description":171,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":172,"categories":173,"keywords":174,"publishedAt":29},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[175,70,140,176,23,75,177,178,24,85,179,180,181,182,183,184,74,27,185,186],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]