[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FYZ3QJ25RCWJC0RTGMAJQ":3,"skill-same:01M71FYZ3QJ25RCWJC0RTGMAJQ":68},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":36,"linkOnly":37,"markdownContent":38,"markdownBody":39,"frontMatter":40,"refName":41,"commitSha":42,"skillDirectory":43,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":44,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":45,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":46,"updatedAt":47,"install":48,"resources":61},"01M71FYZ3QJ25RCWJC0RTGMAJQ","soc-hunting-dns",null,"JSON report listing DNS anomalies with record type, historical changes, risk severity, and remediation recommendations for each finding.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-dns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35],"soc","dns","hunting","soc hunting dns","report","remediation","json","recommendations","changes","record","with","type","listing","cybersecurity","for","severity","risk","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: soc-hunting-dns\ndescription: \"JSON report listing DNS anomalies with record type, historical changes, risk severity, and remediation recommendations for each finding.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n# Hunting for DNS-based Persistence\n\n## Overview\n\nAttackers establish DNS-based persistence by hijacking DNS records, creating unauthorized subdomains, abusing wildcard DNS entries, or modifying NS delegations to redirect traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure. These techniques survive credential rotations, endpoint reimaging, and traditional remediation because DNS changes persist independently of compromised hosts. Detection requires passive DNS historical analysis, zone file auditing, and monitoring for unauthorized record modifications. This skill covers hunting methodologies using SecurityTrails passive DNS API, DNS audit logs from Route53\u002FAzure DNS\u002FCloudflare, and zone transfer analysis.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for dns based persistence\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- SecurityTrails API key (free tier provides 50 queries\u002Fmonth)\n- Access to DNS provider audit logs (Route53, Azure DNS, Cloudflare, or on-premises DNS)\n- Python 3.9+ with requests library\n- DNS zone file access or AXFR capability for internal zones\n- Historical DNS baseline for comparison\n\n## Steps\n\n### Step 1: Baseline DNS Records\n\nExport current DNS zone records and establish baseline for all authorized A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, and TXT records.\n\n### Step 2: Query Passive DNS History\n\nUse SecurityTrails API to retrieve historical DNS records and identify unauthorized changes, new subdomains, and CNAME records pointing to decommissioned services (dangling CNAMEs).\n\n### Step 3: Detect Anomalies\n\nCompare current records against baseline to identify unauthorized modifications, wildcard records that resolve all subdomains, NS delegation changes, and MX record hijacking.\n\n### Step 4: Investigate Findings\n\nCorrelate DNS anomalies with threat intelligence feeds, check resolution targets against known malicious infrastructure, and validate record ownership.\n\n## Expected Output\n\nJSON report listing DNS anomalies with record type, historical changes, risk severity, and remediation recommendations for each finding.\n","# Hunting for DNS-based Persistence\n\n## Overview\n\nAttackers establish DNS-based persistence by hijacking DNS records, creating unauthorized subdomains, abusing wildcard DNS entries, or modifying NS delegations to redirect traffic through attacker-controlled infrastructure. These techniques survive credential rotations, endpoint reimaging, and traditional remediation because DNS changes persist independently of compromised hosts. Detection requires passive DNS historical analysis, zone file auditing, and monitoring for unauthorized record modifications. This skill covers hunting methodologies using SecurityTrails passive DNS API, DNS audit logs from Route53\u002FAzure DNS\u002FCloudflare, and zone transfer analysis.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require hunting for dns based persistence\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- SecurityTrails API key (free tier provides 50 queries\u002Fmonth)\n- Access to DNS provider audit logs (Route53, Azure DNS, Cloudflare, or on-premises DNS)\n- Python 3.9+ with requests library\n- DNS zone file access or AXFR capability for internal zones\n- Historical DNS baseline for comparison\n\n## Steps\n\n### Step 1: Baseline DNS Records\n\nExport current DNS zone records and establish baseline for all authorized A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, and TXT records.\n\n### Step 2: Query Passive DNS History\n\nUse SecurityTrails API to retrieve historical DNS records and identify unauthorized changes, new subdomains, and CNAME records pointing to decommissioned services (dangling CNAMEs).\n\n### Step 3: Detect Anomalies\n\nCompare current records against baseline to identify unauthorized modifications, wildcard records that resolve all subdomains, NS delegation changes, and MX record hijacking.\n\n### Step 4: Investigate Findings\n\nCorrelate DNS anomalies with threat intelligence feeds, check resolution targets against known malicious infrastructure, and validate record ownership.\n\n## Expected Output\n\nJSON report listing DNS anomalies with record type, historical changes, risk severity, and remediation recommendations for each finding.\n",{"name":5,"domain":32,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fsoc-hunting-dns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":49,"prompt":59,"zipAvailable":60},[50,53,56],{"tool":51,"command":52},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-dns",{"tool":54,"command":55},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-dns",{"tool":57,"command":58},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-hunting-dns","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-dns\u002FSKILL.md",true,[62],{"path":63,"resourceType":64,"resourceTypeDesc":65,"sizeBytes":66,"sourceHtmlUrl":67},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",580,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-hunting-dns\u002Findex.json",[69,94,117,139,161,177],{"skillNo":70,"name":71,"nameZh":6,"description":72,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":73,"categories":74,"keywords":75,"publishedAt":36},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,32,93],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":95,"name":96,"nameZh":6,"description":97,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":98,"categories":99,"keywords":100,"publishedAt":36},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[101,76,102,79,103,104,105,32,106,107,108,109,110,111,81,112,113,114,115,116],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":118,"name":119,"nameZh":6,"description":120,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":121,"categories":122,"keywords":123,"publishedAt":36},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[124,125,126,127,128,129,32,106,130,107,131,132,81,114,133,134,135,136,137,138],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":140,"name":141,"nameZh":6,"description":142,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":143,"categories":144,"keywords":145,"publishedAt":36},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[77,146,147,148,149,150,151,82,152,32,93,153,154,155,156,157,158,159,160,81],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":162,"name":163,"nameZh":6,"description":164,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":165,"categories":166,"keywords":167,"publishedAt":36},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[168,169,77,170,148,150,171,82,172,152,32,93,107,173,174,175,176,160,81,83],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":178,"name":179,"nameZh":6,"description":180,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":181,"categories":182,"keywords":183,"publishedAt":36},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[184,77,148,185,171,82,186,187,32,93,188,189,190,191,192,29,81,83,193,194],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","mismatched","headers"]