[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FXP5V9G4YGQMWE0MCJSWF":3,"skill-same:01M71FXP5V9G4YGQMWE0MCJSWF":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":24,"linkOnly":25,"markdownContent":26,"markdownBody":27,"frontMatter":28,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":34,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M71FXP5V9G4YGQMWE0MCJSWF","soc-containment-active",null,"Soc Containment Active.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-containment-active\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23],"soc","containment","active","soc containment active","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: soc-containment-active\ndescription: \"Soc Containment Active.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| **Short-Term Containment** | Immediate actions to stop active adversary operations; typically network isolation and credential disablement |\n| **Long-Term Containment** | Sustainable measures allowing continued investigation while preventing adversary re-access |\n| **KRBTGT Double Reset** | Resetting the KRBTGT password twice to invalidate all existing Kerberos tickets including golden tickets |\n| **Network Containment** | EDR feature that isolates an endpoint from all network communication except the EDR management channel |\n| **Lateral Movement** | Adversary technique of moving from one compromised system to another within a network using stolen credentials or exploits |\n| **C2 Sinkholing** | Redirecting DNS queries for C2 domains to an internal server to prevent adversary communication and detect additional victims |\n| **Microsegmentation** | Granular network access controls between workloads that limit lateral communication paths |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **CrowdStrike Falcon**: Endpoint containment with one-click network isolation preserving agent connectivity\n- **Microsoft Defender for Endpoint**: Live response console for remote containment actions and evidence collection\n- **Palo Alto Networks NGFW**: Application-aware firewall rules for C2 traffic blocking and microsegmentation\n- **Velociraptor**: Open-source endpoint monitoring and response tool for artifact collection during containment\n- **BloodHound**: Active Directory attack path mapping to identify potential lateral movement routes the adversary may exploit\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Ransomware Lateral Propagation via SMB\n\n**Context**: EDR alerts on three file servers showing rapid file encryption. The ransomware is spreading via SMB using a compromised domain service account.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Immediately isolate all three file servers via EDR network containment\n2. Disable the compromised service account in Active Directory\n3. Block SMB (TCP 445) between all server VLANs at the network switch layer\n4. Deploy an emergency GPO disabling the SMB server service on non-critical endpoints\n5. Capture memory from one encrypted server before it reboots\n6. Search for the ransomware binary hash across all endpoints using EDR threat hunting\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Shutting down servers immediately, destroying volatile memory evidence\n- Only disabling the known compromised account without checking for other persistence mechanisms\n- Restoring from backup before confirming the adversary's access has been fully revoked\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nCONTAINMENT STATUS REPORT\n=========================\nIncident:        INC-2025-1547\nStatus:          CONTAINED (Short-Term)\nTimestamp:       2025-11-15T15:47:00Z\nContainment Lead: [Name]\n\nACTIONS TAKEN\nNetwork:\n- [x] 5 hosts isolated via CrowdStrike containment\n- [x] C2 IP 185.220.x.x blocked at perimeter FW (rule #4521)\n- [x] C2 domain evil.example[.]com sinkholed to 10.0.0.99\n\nIdentity:\n- [x] jsmith account disabled\n- [x] svc-backup account disabled, password rotated\n- [x] admin-tier0 account disabled\n- [x] KRBTGT first reset completed at 15:30 UTC\n\nEndpoint:\n- [x] Malicious hash blocked in EDR prevention policy\n- [x] Malware processes terminated on all contained hosts\n\nEVIDENCE PRESERVED\n- Memory dumps: 3 of 5 hosts completed\n- Event logs exported: all 5 hosts\n- Network capture: running on finance VLAN\n\nREMAINING RISKS\n- Possible undiscovered implants on non-EDR endpoints (15 legacy hosts)\n- KRBTGT second reset pending (scheduled 03:30 UTC +1 day)\n- Adversary may have exfiltrated data before containment\n\nBUSINESS IMPACT\n- Finance file share offline (affects 42 users)\n- 3 user workstations isolated (users reassigned to loaners)\n- Estimated restoration: pending eradication completion\n```\n","|\n| **Short-Term Containment** | Immediate actions to stop active adversary operations; typically network isolation and credential disablement |\n| **Long-Term Containment** | Sustainable measures allowing continued investigation while preventing adversary re-access |\n| **KRBTGT Double Reset** | Resetting the KRBTGT password twice to invalidate all existing Kerberos tickets including golden tickets |\n| **Network Containment** | EDR feature that isolates an endpoint from all network communication except the EDR management channel |\n| **Lateral Movement** | Adversary technique of moving from one compromised system to another within a network using stolen credentials or exploits |\n| **C2 Sinkholing** | Redirecting DNS queries for C2 domains to an internal server to prevent adversary communication and detect additional victims |\n| **Microsegmentation** | Granular network access controls between workloads that limit lateral communication paths |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **CrowdStrike Falcon**: Endpoint containment with one-click network isolation preserving agent connectivity\n- **Microsoft Defender for Endpoint**: Live response console for remote containment actions and evidence collection\n- **Palo Alto Networks NGFW**: Application-aware firewall rules for C2 traffic blocking and microsegmentation\n- **Velociraptor**: Open-source endpoint monitoring and response tool for artifact collection during containment\n- **BloodHound**: Active Directory attack path mapping to identify potential lateral movement routes the adversary may exploit\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Ransomware Lateral Propagation via SMB\n\n**Context**: EDR alerts on three file servers showing rapid file encryption. The ransomware is spreading via SMB using a compromised domain service account.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Immediately isolate all three file servers via EDR network containment\n2. Disable the compromised service account in Active Directory\n3. Block SMB (TCP 445) between all server VLANs at the network switch layer\n4. Deploy an emergency GPO disabling the SMB server service on non-critical endpoints\n5. Capture memory from one encrypted server before it reboots\n6. Search for the ransomware binary hash across all endpoints using EDR threat hunting\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- Shutting down servers immediately, destroying volatile memory evidence\n- Only disabling the known compromised account without checking for other persistence mechanisms\n- Restoring from backup before confirming the adversary's access has been fully revoked\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nCONTAINMENT STATUS REPORT\n=========================\nIncident:        INC-2025-1547\nStatus:          CONTAINED (Short-Term)\nTimestamp:       2025-11-15T15:47:00Z\nContainment Lead: [Name]\n\nACTIONS TAKEN\nNetwork:\n- [x] 5 hosts isolated via CrowdStrike containment\n- [x] C2 IP 185.220.x.x blocked at perimeter FW (rule #4521)\n- [x] C2 domain evil.example[.]com sinkholed to 10.0.0.99\n\nIdentity:\n- [x] jsmith account disabled\n- [x] svc-backup account disabled, password rotated\n- [x] admin-tier0 account disabled\n- [x] KRBTGT first reset completed at 15:30 UTC\n\nEndpoint:\n- [x] Malicious hash blocked in EDR prevention policy\n- [x] Malware processes terminated on all contained hosts\n\nEVIDENCE PRESERVED\n- Memory dumps: 3 of 5 hosts completed\n- Event logs exported: all 5 hosts\n- Network capture: running on finance VLAN\n\nREMAINING RISKS\n- Possible undiscovered implants on non-EDR endpoints (15 legacy hosts)\n- KRBTGT second reset pending (scheduled 03:30 UTC +1 day)\n- Adversary may have exfiltrated data before containment\n\nBUSINESS IMPACT\n- Finance file share offline (affects 42 users)\n- 3 user workstations isolated (users reassigned to loaners)\n- Estimated restoration: pending eradication completion\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":23,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fsoc-containment-active","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-containment-active",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-containment-active",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill soc-containment-active","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-containment-active\u002FSKILL.md",true,[50],{"path":51,"resourceType":52,"resourceTypeDesc":53,"sizeBytes":54,"sourceHtmlUrl":55},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",488,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fsoc-containment-active\u002Findex.json",[57,82,105,127,149,165],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,23,81],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[89,64,90,67,91,92,93,23,94,95,96,97,98,99,69,100,101,102,103,104],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":106,"name":107,"nameZh":6,"description":108,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":109,"categories":110,"keywords":111,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[112,113,114,115,116,117,23,94,118,95,119,120,69,102,121,122,123,124,125,126],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":128,"name":129,"nameZh":6,"description":130,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":131,"categories":132,"keywords":133,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[65,134,135,136,137,138,139,70,140,23,81,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,148,69],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":150,"name":151,"nameZh":6,"description":152,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":153,"categories":154,"keywords":155,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[156,157,65,158,136,138,159,70,160,140,23,81,95,161,162,163,164,148,69,71],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":166,"name":167,"nameZh":6,"description":168,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":169,"categories":170,"keywords":171,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[172,65,136,173,159,70,174,175,23,81,176,177,178,179,180,181,69,71,182,183],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]