[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FFZH2X709HW2CPYG6TTFB":3,"skill-same:01M71FFZH2X709HW2CPYG6TTFB":55},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":23,"linkOnly":24,"markdownContent":25,"markdownBody":26,"frontMatter":27,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":33,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M71FFZH2X709HW2CPYG6TTFB","net-tools-metasploit",null,"Net Tools Metasploit.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-tools-metasploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22],"Metasploit","Tools","net tools metasploit","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: net-tools-metasploit\ndescription: \"Net Tools Metasploit.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| **EternalBlue (MS17-010)** | Critical SMB vulnerability in SMBv1 allowing remote code execution as SYSTEM without authentication, originally developed by the NSA and leaked by Shadow Brokers |\n| **SMB Signing** | Cryptographic signing of SMB packets to prevent tampering and relay attacks; when disabled, attackers can relay NTLM authentication to other SMB hosts |\n| **Pass-the-Hash** | Authentication technique using captured NTLM password hashes directly instead of plaintext passwords, bypassing the need to crack the hash |\n| **NTLM Relay** | Attack where captured NTLM authentication is forwarded to a different server in real-time, granting the attacker access as the relayed user |\n| **PsExec** | Remote execution technique that uploads a service binary to the ADMIN$ share and creates a Windows service to execute commands as SYSTEM |\n| **Null Session** | Anonymous SMB connection (empty username and password) that may expose share listings, user enumeration, and policy information on misconfigured systems |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Metasploit Framework**: Exploitation framework with dedicated SMB scanner, exploit, and post-exploitation modules for comprehensive SMB testing\n- **CrackMapExec**: Swiss-army knife for SMB enumeration, credential testing, share enumeration, and command execution across Windows networks\n- **Impacket**: Python library providing psexec, smbclient, ntlmrelayx, and other tools for low-level SMB protocol interaction\n- **Responder**: LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS\u002FmDNS poisoner that captures NTLM hashes from Windows name resolution fallback behavior\n- **enum4linux-ng**: Updated SMB enumeration tool for extracting users, groups, shares, and policies from Windows\u002FSamba hosts\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Internal Penetration Test Targeting Windows Domain via SMB\n\n**Context**: During an internal penetration test for a financial services firm, the tester has network access to the corporate VLAN (10.10.0.0\u002F16). The scope includes testing all Windows servers and workstations for SMB-related vulnerabilities. Active Directory domain is CORP.EXAMPLE.COM with approximately 200 hosts.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Scan the entire \u002F16 for open SMB ports and enumerate OS versions with CrackMapExec\n2. Identify 12 hosts running Windows Server 2012 R2 without MS17-010 patch applied\n3. Exploit EternalBlue on a non-critical file server (10.10.5.23) to gain SYSTEM access\n4. Extract local administrator password hash using hashdump and discover password reuse across 47 hosts\n5. Use pass-the-hash to access a domain controller, extracting the NTDS.dit database\n6. Demonstrate that SMB signing is disabled on 83% of hosts, enabling relay attacks\n7. Document the complete attack chain showing how one unpatched system led to full domain compromise\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- EternalBlue exploit can cause a blue screen of death (BSOD) on the target, especially on older or unstable systems\n- Running psexec on heavily monitored endpoints may trigger EDR alerts and burn the engagement\n- Performing hashdump on domain controllers with large databases can cause performance degradation\n- Not checking for SMBv1 explicitly -- some scanners may miss it if SMBv2\u002Fv3 is also available\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## SMB Vulnerability Assessment Report\n\n**Engagement**: Internal Penetration Test\n**Target Range**: 10.10.0.0\u002F16 (CORP.EXAMPLE.COM)\n**SMB Hosts Discovered**: 187\n\n### Critical Findings\n\n**Finding 1: MS17-010 (EternalBlue) - 12 Unpatched Hosts**\n- Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8)\n- Affected: 10.10.5.23, 10.10.5.24, 10.10.8.10 (+ 9 others)\n- Impact: Remote code execution as SYSTEM without authentication\n- Exploited: Yes - gained SYSTEM on 10.10.5.23\n- Remediation: Apply MS17-010 patch, disable SMBv1\n\n**Finding 2: SMB Signing Disabled - 155\u002F187 Hosts**\n- Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)\n- Impact: NTLM relay attacks allow credential forwarding\n- Exploited: Yes - relayed domain admin credentials\n- Remediation: Enable SMB signing via Group Policy\n\n**Finding 3: Local Admin Password Reuse - 47 Hosts**\n- Severity: High (CVSS 7.2)\n- Impact: Compromise of one host enables lateral movement to 47 systems\n- Remediation: Deploy LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution)\n```\n","|\n| **EternalBlue (MS17-010)** | Critical SMB vulnerability in SMBv1 allowing remote code execution as SYSTEM without authentication, originally developed by the NSA and leaked by Shadow Brokers |\n| **SMB Signing** | Cryptographic signing of SMB packets to prevent tampering and relay attacks; when disabled, attackers can relay NTLM authentication to other SMB hosts |\n| **Pass-the-Hash** | Authentication technique using captured NTLM password hashes directly instead of plaintext passwords, bypassing the need to crack the hash |\n| **NTLM Relay** | Attack where captured NTLM authentication is forwarded to a different server in real-time, granting the attacker access as the relayed user |\n| **PsExec** | Remote execution technique that uploads a service binary to the ADMIN$ share and creates a Windows service to execute commands as SYSTEM |\n| **Null Session** | Anonymous SMB connection (empty username and password) that may expose share listings, user enumeration, and policy information on misconfigured systems |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Metasploit Framework**: Exploitation framework with dedicated SMB scanner, exploit, and post-exploitation modules for comprehensive SMB testing\n- **CrackMapExec**: Swiss-army knife for SMB enumeration, credential testing, share enumeration, and command execution across Windows networks\n- **Impacket**: Python library providing psexec, smbclient, ntlmrelayx, and other tools for low-level SMB protocol interaction\n- **Responder**: LLMNR\u002FNBT-NS\u002FmDNS poisoner that captures NTLM hashes from Windows name resolution fallback behavior\n- **enum4linux-ng**: Updated SMB enumeration tool for extracting users, groups, shares, and policies from Windows\u002FSamba hosts\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Internal Penetration Test Targeting Windows Domain via SMB\n\n**Context**: During an internal penetration test for a financial services firm, the tester has network access to the corporate VLAN (10.10.0.0\u002F16). The scope includes testing all Windows servers and workstations for SMB-related vulnerabilities. Active Directory domain is CORP.EXAMPLE.COM with approximately 200 hosts.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Scan the entire \u002F16 for open SMB ports and enumerate OS versions with CrackMapExec\n2. Identify 12 hosts running Windows Server 2012 R2 without MS17-010 patch applied\n3. Exploit EternalBlue on a non-critical file server (10.10.5.23) to gain SYSTEM access\n4. Extract local administrator password hash using hashdump and discover password reuse across 47 hosts\n5. Use pass-the-hash to access a domain controller, extracting the NTDS.dit database\n6. Demonstrate that SMB signing is disabled on 83% of hosts, enabling relay attacks\n7. Document the complete attack chain showing how one unpatched system led to full domain compromise\n\n**Pitfalls**:\n- EternalBlue exploit can cause a blue screen of death (BSOD) on the target, especially on older or unstable systems\n- Running psexec on heavily monitored endpoints may trigger EDR alerts and burn the engagement\n- Performing hashdump on domain controllers with large databases can cause performance degradation\n- Not checking for SMBv1 explicitly -- some scanners may miss it if SMBv2\u002Fv3 is also available\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\n## SMB Vulnerability Assessment Report\n\n**Engagement**: Internal Penetration Test\n**Target Range**: 10.10.0.0\u002F16 (CORP.EXAMPLE.COM)\n**SMB Hosts Discovered**: 187\n\n### Critical Findings\n\n**Finding 1: MS17-010 (EternalBlue) - 12 Unpatched Hosts**\n- Severity: Critical (CVSS 9.8)\n- Affected: 10.10.5.23, 10.10.5.24, 10.10.8.10 (+ 9 others)\n- Impact: Remote code execution as SYSTEM without authentication\n- Exploited: Yes - gained SYSTEM on 10.10.5.23\n- Remediation: Apply MS17-010 patch, disable SMBv1\n\n**Finding 2: SMB Signing Disabled - 155\u002F187 Hosts**\n- Severity: High (CVSS 7.5)\n- Impact: NTLM relay attacks allow credential forwarding\n- Exploited: Yes - relayed domain admin credentials\n- Remediation: Enable SMB signing via Group Policy\n\n**Finding 3: Local Admin Password Reuse - 47 Hosts**\n- Severity: High (CVSS 7.2)\n- Impact: Compromise of one host enables lateral movement to 47 systems\n- Remediation: Deploy LAPS (Local Administrator Password Solution)\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":22,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fnet-tools-metasploit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill 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net-tools-metasploit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-tools-metasploit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[49],{"path":50,"resourceType":51,"resourceTypeDesc":52,"sizeBytes":53,"sourceHtmlUrl":54},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",480,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-tools-metasploit\u002Findex.json",[56,81,104,126,148,164],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,22,80],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[88,63,89,66,90,91,92,22,93,94,95,96,97,98,68,99,100,101,102,103],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[111,112,113,114,115,116,22,93,117,94,118,119,68,101,120,121,122,123,124,125],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":127,"name":128,"nameZh":6,"description":129,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":130,"categories":131,"keywords":132,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,133,134,135,136,137,138,69,139,22,80,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,68],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[155,156,64,157,135,137,158,69,159,139,22,80,94,160,161,162,163,147,68,70],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":165,"name":166,"nameZh":6,"description":167,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":168,"categories":169,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[171,64,135,172,158,69,173,174,22,80,175,176,177,178,179,180,68,70,181,182],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]