[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FEPPM9AX0PR21GWK62NGD":3,"skill-same:01M71FEPPM9AX0PR21GWK62NGD":58},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":22,"linkOnly":23,"markdownContent":24,"markdownBody":25,"frontMatter":26,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M71FEPPM9AX0PR21GWK62NGD","net-layer7-dns",null,"Net Layer7 Dns.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-layer7-dns\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21],"dns","net layer7 dns","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: net-layer7-dns\ndescription: \"Net Layer7 Dns.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n--|\n| **DNS Tunneling** | Technique encoding data within DNS queries\u002Fresponses to exfiltrate data or establish C2 channels through DNS |\n| **DGA** | Domain Generation Algorithm — malware technique generating pseudo-random domain names for C2 resilience |\n| **Shannon Entropy** | Mathematical measure of randomness in a string — high entropy (>3.5) in domain names indicates DGA or tunneling |\n| **TXT Record Abuse** | Using DNS TXT records (designed for text data) as a high-bandwidth channel for data tunneling |\n| **DNS over HTTPS (DoH)** | DNS queries encrypted over HTTPS (port 443), bypassing traditional DNS monitoring |\n| **Passive DNS** | Historical record of DNS resolutions showing which IPs a domain resolved to over time |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Splunk Stream**: Network traffic capture add-on providing parsed DNS query data for SIEM analysis\n- **Zeek (Bro)**: Network security monitor generating detailed DNS transaction logs for analysis\n- **Cisco Umbrella (OpenDNS)**: Cloud DNS security platform blocking malicious domains and logging query data\n- **Infoblox DNS Firewall**: DNS-layer security providing RPZ-based blocking and detailed query logging\n- **Farsight DNSDB**: Passive DNS database for historical domain resolution lookups and infrastructure mapping\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Cobalt Strike DNS Beacon**: Detect periodic TXT queries with encoded payloads to C2 domain\n- **Data Exfiltration**: Large volumes of unique subdomain queries encoding stolen data in Base64\u002Fhex\n- **DGA Malware**: Detect DNS queries to algorithmically generated domains (high entropy, no web content)\n- **DNS-over-HTTPS Bypass**: Employee using DoH to bypass corporate DNS filtering and monitoring\n- **Slow Drip Exfiltration**: Low-volume DNS tunneling staying below threshold alerts (requires baseline comparison)\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nDNS EXFILTRATION ANALYSIS — WORKSTATION-042\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nPeriod:       2024-03-14 to 2024-03-15\nSource:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042, Finance Dept)\n\nFindings:\n  [CRITICAL] DNS tunneling detected to evil-tunnel[.]com\n    Query Volume:       12,847 queries in 18 hours\n    Avg Subdomain Len:  63 characters (normal: \u003C20)\n    Avg Entropy:        3.82 (threshold: 3.5)\n    Query Types:        TXT (89%), A (11%)\n    Estimated Data:     ~4.7 MB exfiltrated via DNS\n    Rate:               0.58 kbps (slow drip pattern)\n\n  [HIGH] DGA-like domains resolved\n    Unique DGA Domains: 247 domains resolved\n    Pattern:            15-char random alphanumeric.xyz TLD\n    Entropy Range:      3.6 - 4.1\n\nProcess Attribution:\n  Process:   svchost_update.exe (masquerading — not legitimate svchost)\n  PID:       4892\n  Parent:    explorer.exe\n  Hash:      SHA256: a1b2c3d4... (VT: 34\u002F72 malicious — Cobalt Strike beacon)\n\nContainment:\n  [DONE] Host isolated via EDR\n  [DONE] Domain evil-tunnel[.]com added to DNS sinkhole\n  [DONE] Incident IR-2024-0448 created\n```\n","--|\n| **DNS Tunneling** | Technique encoding data within DNS queries\u002Fresponses to exfiltrate data or establish C2 channels through DNS |\n| **DGA** | Domain Generation Algorithm — malware technique generating pseudo-random domain names for C2 resilience |\n| **Shannon Entropy** | Mathematical measure of randomness in a string — high entropy (>3.5) in domain names indicates DGA or tunneling |\n| **TXT Record Abuse** | Using DNS TXT records (designed for text data) as a high-bandwidth channel for data tunneling |\n| **DNS over HTTPS (DoH)** | DNS queries encrypted over HTTPS (port 443), bypassing traditional DNS monitoring |\n| **Passive DNS** | Historical record of DNS resolutions showing which IPs a domain resolved to over time |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Splunk Stream**: Network traffic capture add-on providing parsed DNS query data for SIEM analysis\n- **Zeek (Bro)**: Network security monitor generating detailed DNS transaction logs for analysis\n- **Cisco Umbrella (OpenDNS)**: Cloud DNS security platform blocking malicious domains and logging query data\n- **Infoblox DNS Firewall**: DNS-layer security providing RPZ-based blocking and detailed query logging\n- **Farsight DNSDB**: Passive DNS database for historical domain resolution lookups and infrastructure mapping\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Cobalt Strike DNS Beacon**: Detect periodic TXT queries with encoded payloads to C2 domain\n- **Data Exfiltration**: Large volumes of unique subdomain queries encoding stolen data in Base64\u002Fhex\n- **DGA Malware**: Detect DNS queries to algorithmically generated domains (high entropy, no web content)\n- **DNS-over-HTTPS Bypass**: Employee using DoH to bypass corporate DNS filtering and monitoring\n- **Slow Drip Exfiltration**: Low-volume DNS tunneling staying below threshold alerts (requires baseline comparison)\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nDNS EXFILTRATION ANALYSIS — WORKSTATION-042\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nPeriod:       2024-03-14 to 2024-03-15\nSource:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042, Finance Dept)\n\nFindings:\n  [CRITICAL] DNS tunneling detected to evil-tunnel[.]com\n    Query Volume:       12,847 queries in 18 hours\n    Avg Subdomain Len:  63 characters (normal: \u003C20)\n    Avg Entropy:        3.82 (threshold: 3.5)\n    Query Types:        TXT (89%), A (11%)\n    Estimated Data:     ~4.7 MB exfiltrated via DNS\n    Rate:               0.58 kbps (slow drip pattern)\n\n  [HIGH] DGA-like domains resolved\n    Unique DGA Domains: 247 domains resolved\n    Pattern:            15-char random alphanumeric.xyz TLD\n    Entropy Range:      3.6 - 4.1\n\nProcess Attribution:\n  Process:   svchost_update.exe (masquerading — not legitimate svchost)\n  PID:       4892\n  Parent:    explorer.exe\n  Hash:      SHA256: a1b2c3d4... (VT: 34\u002F72 malicious — Cobalt Strike beacon)\n\nContainment:\n  [DONE] Host isolated via EDR\n  [DONE] Domain evil-tunnel[.]com added to DNS sinkhole\n  [DONE] Incident IR-2024-0448 created\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":21,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fnet-layer7-dns","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-layer7-dns",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-layer7-dns",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-layer7-dns","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-layer7-dns\u002FSKILL.md",true,[48,54],{"path":49,"resourceType":50,"resourceTypeDesc":51,"sizeBytes":52,"sourceHtmlUrl":53},"dnsexfil\u002Findex.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",382,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-layer7-dns\u002Fdnsexfil\u002Findex.json",{"path":55,"resourceType":50,"resourceTypeDesc":51,"sizeBytes":56,"sourceHtmlUrl":57},"index.json",747,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-layer7-dns\u002Findex.json",[59,84,107,129,151,167],{"skillNo":60,"name":61,"nameZh":6,"description":62,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":63,"categories":64,"keywords":65,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,21,83],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":85,"name":86,"nameZh":6,"description":87,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":88,"categories":89,"keywords":90,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[91,66,92,69,93,94,95,21,96,97,98,99,100,101,71,102,103,104,105,106],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":108,"name":109,"nameZh":6,"description":110,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":111,"categories":112,"keywords":113,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[114,115,116,117,118,119,21,96,120,97,121,122,71,104,123,124,125,126,127,128],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":130,"name":131,"nameZh":6,"description":132,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":135,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[67,136,137,138,139,140,141,72,142,21,83,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,71],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":152,"name":153,"nameZh":6,"description":154,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":155,"categories":156,"keywords":157,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[158,159,67,160,138,140,161,72,162,142,21,83,97,163,164,165,166,150,71,73],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":168,"name":169,"nameZh":6,"description":170,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":171,"categories":172,"keywords":173,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[174,67,138,175,161,72,176,177,21,83,178,179,180,181,182,183,71,73,184,185],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]