[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FDWT6WRNZDX4MDEWGZ96D":3,"skill-same:01M71FDWT6WRNZDX4MDEWGZ96D":70},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":21,"linkOnly":22,"markdownContent":23,"markdownBody":24,"frontMatter":25,"refName":26,"commitSha":27,"skillDirectory":28,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":29,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":30,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":31,"updatedAt":32,"install":33,"resources":46},"01M71FDWT6WRNZDX4MDEWGZ96D","net-lateral",null,"Net Lateral.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-lateral\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20],"net lateral","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: net-lateral\ndescription: \"Net Lateral.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n--|\n| **Lateral Movement** | Post-compromise technique where attackers pivot between systems to reach targets |\n| **Pass-the-Hash** | Using stolen NTLM hash for authentication without knowing the plaintext password |\n| **Pass-the-Ticket** | Using stolen Kerberos TGT\u002FTGS tickets for authentication across the domain |\n| **PsExec** | Sysinternals tool (and attack technique) for remote process execution via SMB and named pipes |\n| **WMI Execution** | Using Windows Management Instrumentation for remote command execution via DCOM or WinRM |\n| **Admin Share** | Default Windows administrative shares (C$, ADMIN$, IPC$) used for remote system management |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Splunk Enterprise Security**: SIEM platform for correlating Windows events, Sysmon, and network flows\n- **Microsoft Defender for Identity**: Cloud service detecting lateral movement via domain controller monitoring\n- **BloodHound**: Active Directory attack path analysis tool for identifying lateral movement opportunities\n- **CrowdStrike Falcon**: EDR platform with lateral movement detection and automated containment\n- **Zeek (Bro)**: Network monitor generating connection logs for SMB, RDP, and WinRM traffic analysis\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **PsExec Spread**: Attacker uses PsExec to execute malware across 20 workstations — detect via service creation events\n- **RDP Pivoting**: Compromised VPN account used to RDP through multiple internal hosts — detect via Logon_Type 10 chains\n- **WMI Recon and Execution**: Attacker uses WMI for discovery then execution — detect via WmiPrvSE child processes\n- **Pass-the-Hash Campaign**: Stolen local admin hash used across subnet — detect via NTLM Logon_Type 3 to multiple hosts\n- **Scheduled Task Persistence**: Remote scheduled task created on domain controller — detect via EventCode 4698 from non-admin source\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nLATERAL MOVEMENT DETECTION REPORT\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nPeriod:       2024-03-15 14:00 to 18:00 UTC\nSource:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042)\n\nMovement Path:\n  14:23  192.168.1.105 → 10.0.5.20  (DC-PRIMARY) — PtH via NTLM Type 3\n  14:25  10.0.5.20 → 10.0.5.21     (DC-BACKUP)  — Kerberos ticket reuse\n  14:28  10.0.5.20 → 10.0.10.15    (FILESERVER-01) — PsExec service creation\n  14:32  10.0.10.15 → 10.0.10.20   (DB-PRIMARY) — WMI remote execution\n  14:35  10.0.10.20 → 10.0.10.25   (DB-BACKUP)  — SMB admin share access\n\nTechniques Detected:\n  T1550.002 — Pass-the-Hash (NTLM authentication to DC)\n  T1021.002 — PsExec (remote service installation)\n  T1047     — WMI Execution (WmiPrvSE child process)\n  T1021.002 — SMB Admin Share (C$ access on DB-BACKUP)\n\nAffected Systems: 5 hosts across 2 network segments\nUser Account:     admin_compromised (Domain Admin)\nContainment:      All 5 hosts isolated at 14:45 UTC\n```\n","--|\n| **Lateral Movement** | Post-compromise technique where attackers pivot between systems to reach targets |\n| **Pass-the-Hash** | Using stolen NTLM hash for authentication without knowing the plaintext password |\n| **Pass-the-Ticket** | Using stolen Kerberos TGT\u002FTGS tickets for authentication across the domain |\n| **PsExec** | Sysinternals tool (and attack technique) for remote process execution via SMB and named pipes |\n| **WMI Execution** | Using Windows Management Instrumentation for remote command execution via DCOM or WinRM |\n| **Admin Share** | Default Windows administrative shares (C$, ADMIN$, IPC$) used for remote system management |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Splunk Enterprise Security**: SIEM platform for correlating Windows events, Sysmon, and network flows\n- **Microsoft Defender for Identity**: Cloud service detecting lateral movement via domain controller monitoring\n- **BloodHound**: Active Directory attack path analysis tool for identifying lateral movement opportunities\n- **CrowdStrike Falcon**: EDR platform with lateral movement detection and automated containment\n- **Zeek (Bro)**: Network monitor generating connection logs for SMB, RDP, and WinRM traffic analysis\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **PsExec Spread**: Attacker uses PsExec to execute malware across 20 workstations — detect via service creation events\n- **RDP Pivoting**: Compromised VPN account used to RDP through multiple internal hosts — detect via Logon_Type 10 chains\n- **WMI Recon and Execution**: Attacker uses WMI for discovery then execution — detect via WmiPrvSE child processes\n- **Pass-the-Hash Campaign**: Stolen local admin hash used across subnet — detect via NTLM Logon_Type 3 to multiple hosts\n- **Scheduled Task Persistence**: Remote scheduled task created on domain controller — detect via EventCode 4698 from non-admin source\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nLATERAL MOVEMENT DETECTION REPORT\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nPeriod:       2024-03-15 14:00 to 18:00 UTC\nSource:       192.168.1.105 (WORKSTATION-042)\n\nMovement Path:\n  14:23  192.168.1.105 → 10.0.5.20  (DC-PRIMARY) — PtH via NTLM Type 3\n  14:25  10.0.5.20 → 10.0.5.21     (DC-BACKUP)  — Kerberos ticket reuse\n  14:28  10.0.5.20 → 10.0.10.15    (FILESERVER-01) — PsExec service creation\n  14:32  10.0.10.15 → 10.0.10.20   (DB-PRIMARY) — WMI remote execution\n  14:35  10.0.10.20 → 10.0.10.25   (DB-BACKUP)  — SMB admin share access\n\nTechniques Detected:\n  T1550.002 — Pass-the-Hash (NTLM authentication to DC)\n  T1021.002 — PsExec (remote service installation)\n  T1047     — WMI Execution (WmiPrvSE child process)\n  T1021.002 — SMB Admin Share (C$ access on DB-BACKUP)\n\nAffected Systems: 5 hosts across 2 network segments\nUser Account:     admin_compromised (Domain Admin)\nContainment:      All 5 hosts isolated at 14:45 UTC\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":20,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fnet-lateral","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":34,"prompt":44,"zipAvailable":45},[35,38,41],{"tool":36,"command":37},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-lateral",{"tool":39,"command":40},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-lateral",{"tool":42,"command":43},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-lateral","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-lateral\u002FSKILL.md",true,[47,53,57,61,67],{"path":48,"resourceType":49,"resourceTypeDesc":50,"sizeBytes":51,"sourceHtmlUrl":52},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",1022,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-lateral\u002Findex.json",{"path":54,"resourceType":49,"resourceTypeDesc":50,"sizeBytes":55,"sourceHtmlUrl":56},"references\u002Fapi-reference.md",1793,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-lateral\u002Freferences\u002Fapi-reference.md",{"path":58,"resourceType":49,"resourceTypeDesc":50,"sizeBytes":59,"sourceHtmlUrl":60},"references\u002Findex.json",84,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-lateral\u002Freferences\u002Findex.json",{"path":62,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":65,"sourceHtmlUrl":66},"scripts\u002Fagent.py","SCRIPT","脚本",8962,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-lateral\u002Fscripts\u002Fagent.py",{"path":68,"resourceType":63,"resourceTypeDesc":64,"sizeBytes":59,"sourceHtmlUrl":69},"scripts\u002Findex.json","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-lateral\u002Fscripts\u002Findex.json",[71,96,119,141,163,179],{"skillNo":72,"name":73,"nameZh":6,"description":74,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":75,"categories":76,"keywords":77,"publishedAt":21},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,20,95],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":21},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[103,78,104,81,105,106,107,20,108,109,110,111,112,113,83,114,115,116,117,118],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":21},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[126,127,128,129,130,131,20,108,132,109,133,134,83,116,135,136,137,138,139,140],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":142,"name":143,"nameZh":6,"description":144,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":145,"categories":146,"keywords":147,"publishedAt":21},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[79,148,149,150,151,152,153,84,154,20,95,155,156,157,158,159,160,161,162,83],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":164,"name":165,"nameZh":6,"description":166,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":167,"categories":168,"keywords":169,"publishedAt":21},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[170,171,79,172,150,152,173,84,174,154,20,95,109,175,176,177,178,162,83,85],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":180,"name":181,"nameZh":6,"description":182,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":183,"categories":184,"keywords":185,"publishedAt":21},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[186,79,150,187,173,84,188,189,20,95,190,191,192,193,194,195,83,85,196,197],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]