[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71FBH9XJG398QTTBTP0FPRR":3,"skill-same:01M71FBH9XJG398QTTBTP0FPRR":54},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":22,"linkOnly":23,"markdownContent":24,"markdownBody":25,"frontMatter":26,"refName":27,"commitSha":28,"skillDirectory":29,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":30,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":31,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":32,"updatedAt":33,"install":34,"resources":47},"01M71FBH9XJG398QTTBTP0FPRR","net-assessment-net",null,"Net Assessment Net.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-assessment-net\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21],"assessment","net assessment net","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: net-assessment-net\ndescription: \"Net Assessment Net.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| Purdue Reference Model | Hierarchical architecture model (Levels 0-5) for organizing industrial control systems, defining security zones from physical process to enterprise IT |\n| IEC 62443 | International standard series for industrial automation and control systems (IACS) security, defining security levels, zones, conduits, and security requirements |\n| Zone | A grouping of logical or physical assets that share common security requirements, defined by IEC 62443-3-2 |\n| Conduit | A logical grouping of communication channels connecting two or more zones, subject to common security policies |\n| SCADA | Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition - system architecture for high-level process supervisory management of industrial processes |\n| DCS | Distributed Control System - control system architecture where control elements are distributed throughout the system |\n| Air Gap | Physical isolation of OT networks from IT\u002Finternet, increasingly replaced by managed conduits with firewalls and data diodes |\n| Safety Instrumented System (SIS) | Independent system designed to bring a process to a safe state when a hazardous condition is detected |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Nozomi Networks Guardian**: Passive OT network monitoring platform providing asset discovery, vulnerability assessment, and anomaly detection for industrial environments\n- **Dragos Platform**: OT cybersecurity platform with asset visibility, threat detection, and vulnerability management designed for critical infrastructure\n- **Claroty xDome**: Cyber-physical systems protection platform providing comprehensive asset inventory and risk scoring across OT, IoT, and IIoT\n- **Wireshark\u002Ftshark**: Network protocol analyzer with industrial protocol dissectors for Modbus, DNP3, S7comm, EtherNet\u002FIP, OPC UA, and BACnet\n- **Nmap with OT scripts**: Network scanner with NSE scripts for OT protocol enumeration (use only on Level 2+ with authorization)\n- **Grassmarlin**: NSA-developed passive OT network mapping tool for identifying SCADA\u002FICS network topology\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Flat OT Network with No Segmentation\n\n**Context**: A water utility has all OT devices on a single VLAN. Passive network monitoring reveals HMIs, PLCs, historians, and a domain controller all sharing the same Layer 2 broadcast domain. There is no DMZ between the corporate network and the OT environment.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Deploy passive monitoring on the SPAN port to capture a complete communication baseline over 2-4 weeks\n2. Map all device-to-device communication flows with protocols and data volumes\n3. Classify assets into Purdue levels based on their function and communication patterns\n4. Design zone architecture with VLANs and inter-zone firewalls per IEC 62443-3-2\n5. Prioritize DMZ creation between Level 3 and Level 4 as the highest-impact segmentation\n6. Present segmentation plan with migration phases that avoid production disruption\n\n**Pitfalls**: Active scanning PLCs during production can cause communication timeouts and process disruptions. Implementing segmentation without a complete traffic baseline will break legitimate control system communications. Relying solely on network-layer firewalls without industrial protocol inspection leaves Modbus\u002FTCP and EtherNet\u002FIP write commands unchecked.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nOT Network Security Assessment Report\n=======================================\nFacility: [Facility Name]\nAssessment Date: YYYY-MM-DD\nStandard: IEC 62443-3-3 \u002F NIST SP 800-82r3\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY:\n  [2-3 sentence overview of findings and risk level]\n\nASSET INVENTORY:\n  Level 0-1: [count] field devices\n  Level 2:   [count] control systems\n  Level 3:   [count] operations systems\n  Level 3.5: [count] DMZ systems\n  Level 4:   [count] enterprise systems\n\nFINDINGS BY SEVERITY:\n  Critical: [count] (immediate action required)\n  High:     [count] (30-day remediation)\n  Medium:   [count] (90-day remediation)\n  Low:      [count] (next maintenance window)\n\nDETAILED FINDINGS:\n  [OT-NNN] Finding Title\n    Severity: Critical|High|Medium|Low\n    Affected Assets: [list]\n    IEC 62443 Reference: [section]\n    NIST 800-82r3 Reference: [section]\n    Description: [technical detail]\n    Impact: [operational and safety impact]\n    Remediation: [specific technical remediation steps]\n```\n","|\n| Purdue Reference Model | Hierarchical architecture model (Levels 0-5) for organizing industrial control systems, defining security zones from physical process to enterprise IT |\n| IEC 62443 | International standard series for industrial automation and control systems (IACS) security, defining security levels, zones, conduits, and security requirements |\n| Zone | A grouping of logical or physical assets that share common security requirements, defined by IEC 62443-3-2 |\n| Conduit | A logical grouping of communication channels connecting two or more zones, subject to common security policies |\n| SCADA | Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition - system architecture for high-level process supervisory management of industrial processes |\n| DCS | Distributed Control System - control system architecture where control elements are distributed throughout the system |\n| Air Gap | Physical isolation of OT networks from IT\u002Finternet, increasingly replaced by managed conduits with firewalls and data diodes |\n| Safety Instrumented System (SIS) | Independent system designed to bring a process to a safe state when a hazardous condition is detected |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Nozomi Networks Guardian**: Passive OT network monitoring platform providing asset discovery, vulnerability assessment, and anomaly detection for industrial environments\n- **Dragos Platform**: OT cybersecurity platform with asset visibility, threat detection, and vulnerability management designed for critical infrastructure\n- **Claroty xDome**: Cyber-physical systems protection platform providing comprehensive asset inventory and risk scoring across OT, IoT, and IIoT\n- **Wireshark\u002Ftshark**: Network protocol analyzer with industrial protocol dissectors for Modbus, DNP3, S7comm, EtherNet\u002FIP, OPC UA, and BACnet\n- **Nmap with OT scripts**: Network scanner with NSE scripts for OT protocol enumeration (use only on Level 2+ with authorization)\n- **Grassmarlin**: NSA-developed passive OT network mapping tool for identifying SCADA\u002FICS network topology\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Flat OT Network with No Segmentation\n\n**Context**: A water utility has all OT devices on a single VLAN. Passive network monitoring reveals HMIs, PLCs, historians, and a domain controller all sharing the same Layer 2 broadcast domain. There is no DMZ between the corporate network and the OT environment.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Deploy passive monitoring on the SPAN port to capture a complete communication baseline over 2-4 weeks\n2. Map all device-to-device communication flows with protocols and data volumes\n3. Classify assets into Purdue levels based on their function and communication patterns\n4. Design zone architecture with VLANs and inter-zone firewalls per IEC 62443-3-2\n5. Prioritize DMZ creation between Level 3 and Level 4 as the highest-impact segmentation\n6. Present segmentation plan with migration phases that avoid production disruption\n\n**Pitfalls**: Active scanning PLCs during production can cause communication timeouts and process disruptions. Implementing segmentation without a complete traffic baseline will break legitimate control system communications. Relying solely on network-layer firewalls without industrial protocol inspection leaves Modbus\u002FTCP and EtherNet\u002FIP write commands unchecked.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nOT Network Security Assessment Report\n=======================================\nFacility: [Facility Name]\nAssessment Date: YYYY-MM-DD\nStandard: IEC 62443-3-3 \u002F NIST SP 800-82r3\n\nEXECUTIVE SUMMARY:\n  [2-3 sentence overview of findings and risk level]\n\nASSET INVENTORY:\n  Level 0-1: [count] field devices\n  Level 2:   [count] control systems\n  Level 3:   [count] operations systems\n  Level 3.5: [count] DMZ systems\n  Level 4:   [count] enterprise systems\n\nFINDINGS BY SEVERITY:\n  Critical: [count] (immediate action required)\n  High:     [count] (30-day remediation)\n  Medium:   [count] (90-day remediation)\n  Low:      [count] (next maintenance window)\n\nDETAILED FINDINGS:\n  [OT-NNN] Finding Title\n    Severity: Critical|High|Medium|Low\n    Affected Assets: [list]\n    IEC 62443 Reference: [section]\n    NIST 800-82r3 Reference: [section]\n    Description: [technical detail]\n    Impact: [operational and safety impact]\n    Remediation: [specific technical remediation steps]\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":21,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fnet-assessment-net","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":35,"prompt":45,"zipAvailable":46},[36,39,42],{"tool":37,"command":38},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-assessment-net",{"tool":40,"command":41},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-assessment-net",{"tool":43,"command":44},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill net-assessment-net","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-assessment-net\u002FSKILL.md",true,[48],{"path":49,"resourceType":50,"resourceTypeDesc":51,"sizeBytes":52,"sourceHtmlUrl":53},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",472,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fnet-assessment-net\u002Findex.json",[55,80,103,125,147,163],{"skillNo":56,"name":57,"nameZh":6,"description":58,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":59,"categories":60,"keywords":61,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[62,63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,21,79],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":81,"name":82,"nameZh":6,"description":83,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":84,"categories":85,"keywords":86,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[87,62,88,65,89,90,91,21,92,93,94,95,96,97,67,98,99,100,101,102],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":104,"name":105,"nameZh":6,"description":106,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":107,"categories":108,"keywords":109,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[110,111,112,113,114,115,21,92,116,93,117,118,67,100,119,120,121,122,123,124],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":126,"name":127,"nameZh":6,"description":128,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":129,"categories":130,"keywords":131,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[63,132,133,134,135,136,137,68,138,21,79,139,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,67],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":148,"name":149,"nameZh":6,"description":150,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":151,"categories":152,"keywords":153,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[154,155,63,156,134,136,157,68,158,138,21,79,93,159,160,161,162,146,67,69],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":164,"name":165,"nameZh":6,"description":166,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":167,"categories":168,"keywords":169,"publishedAt":22},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[170,63,134,171,157,68,172,173,21,79,174,175,176,177,178,179,67,69,180,181],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]