[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71EMFMHBP9CS4JVY4ECVG8Z":3,"skill-same:01M71EMFMHBP9CS4JVY4ECVG8Z":99},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":72,"commitSha":73,"skillDirectory":74,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":75,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":76,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":77,"updatedAt":78,"install":79,"resources":92},"01M71EMFMHBP9CS4JVY4ECVG8Z","forensics-memory-injection-process-detect",null,"Detect process hollowing (T1055.012) by analyzing memory-mapped sections, hollowed process indicators, and parent-child process anomalies in EDR telemetry.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Flinux\u002Fforensics\u002Fmemory\u002Finjection\u002Fprocess\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"forensics memory injection process detect","detect","forensics","process","injection","memory","analysis","child","hunting","de","cm","read","Bash","edr","threat-hunting","mitre-attack","monitoring","verification","code","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: forensics-memory-injection-process-detect\ndescription: Detect process hollowing (T1055.012) by analyzing memory-mapped sections, hollowed process indicators, and parent-child process anomalies in EDR telemetry.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- mitre-attack\n- process-hollowing\n- process-injection\n- edr\n- t1055\n- proactive-detection\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Platform Monitoring\n- Process Code Segment Verification\n- Segment Address Offset Randomization\n- Process Analysis\n- Application Hardening\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmodel: sonnet\nmaxTurns: 20\ntools: [Read, Bash, Glob, Grep]\nmitre_attack:\n- T1027\n- T1055\n- T1055.012\n- T1059\ncapec: []\n---\n\n# Detecting Process Hollowing Technique\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating suspected fileless malware or in-memory threats\n- After EDR alerts on process injection or suspicious memory operations\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques in a compromised environment\n- When threat intel reports indicate process hollowing in active campaigns\n- During purple team exercises validating T1055.012 detection coverage\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR with memory protection monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)\n- Sysmon with Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 8 (CreateRemoteThread), 25 (ProcessTampering)\n- Windows ETW providers for process hollowing (Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process)\n- Memory forensics capabilities (Volatility, WinDbg)\n- Process integrity monitoring tools\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Understand Hollowing Mechanics**: Process hollowing involves creating a legitimate process in suspended state, unmapping its memory, writing malicious code, then resuming execution.\n2. **Monitor Suspended Process Creation**: Hunt for processes created with CREATE_SUSPENDED flag followed by memory writes and thread resumption.\n3. **Detect Memory Section Anomalies**: Identify processes where the in-memory image differs from the on-disk binary (image mismatch).\n4. **Analyze Parent-Child Process Trees**: Flag processes whose behavior does not match their binary name (e.g., svchost.exe making unusual network connections).\n5. **Check Process Integrity**: Compare process memory sections against the legitimate binary on disk.\n6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Hollowed processes often establish C2 connections - correlate suspicious process behavior with network logs.\n7. **Document and Contain**: Report findings, isolate affected endpoints, and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.012 | Process Injection: Process Hollowing |\n| T1055 | Process Injection (parent technique) |\n| T1055.001 | DLL Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call |\n| CREATE_SUSPENDED | Windows flag to create a process in suspended state |\n| NtUnmapViewOfSection | API to unmap process memory sections |\n| WriteProcessMemory | API to write into another process's memory |\n| ResumeThread | API to resume a suspended thread |\n| Image Mismatch | Process memory content differs from on-disk binary |\n| Process Doppelganging | Related technique using NTFS transactions (T1055.013) |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | Memory protection and hollowing detection |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | ProcessTampering alerts |\n| Sysmon v13+ | Event ID 25 ProcessTampering detection |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics - malfind plugin |\n| pe-sieve | Process memory scanner for hollowed processes |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated hollowed process detection |\n| Process Hacker | Live process memory inspection |\n| API Monitor | Monitor NtUnmapViewOfSection calls |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Svchost.exe Hollowing**: Malware creates svchost.exe suspended, hollows it, injects backdoor code - process appears legitimate but behaves maliciously.\n2. **Explorer.exe Hollowing**: Attacker hollows explorer.exe to inherit its network permissions and trusted process context.\n3. **Rundll32 Hollowing**: Malicious loader creates rundll32.exe, replaces its memory with implant code for C2 beaconing.\n4. **Multi-Stage Hollowing**: Loader uses process hollowing as first stage, then performs additional injection into services.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-HOLLOW-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1055.012\nHollowed Process: [Process name and PID]\nOriginal Binary: [Expected on-disk path]\nParent Process: [Parent name and PID]\nMemory Mismatch: [Yes\u002FNo]\nSuspicious APIs: [NtUnmapViewOfSection, WriteProcessMemory, etc.]\nNetwork Activity: [C2 connections if any]\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n","# Detecting Process Hollowing Technique\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating suspected fileless malware or in-memory threats\n- After EDR alerts on process injection or suspicious memory operations\n- When hunting for defense evasion techniques in a compromised environment\n- When threat intel reports indicate process hollowing in active campaigns\n- During purple team exercises validating T1055.012 detection coverage\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR with memory protection monitoring (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)\n- Sysmon with Event IDs 1 (Process Create), 8 (CreateRemoteThread), 25 (ProcessTampering)\n- Windows ETW providers for process hollowing (Microsoft-Windows-Kernel-Process)\n- Memory forensics capabilities (Volatility, WinDbg)\n- Process integrity monitoring tools\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Understand Hollowing Mechanics**: Process hollowing involves creating a legitimate process in suspended state, unmapping its memory, writing malicious code, then resuming execution.\n2. **Monitor Suspended Process Creation**: Hunt for processes created with CREATE_SUSPENDED flag followed by memory writes and thread resumption.\n3. **Detect Memory Section Anomalies**: Identify processes where the in-memory image differs from the on-disk binary (image mismatch).\n4. **Analyze Parent-Child Process Trees**: Flag processes whose behavior does not match their binary name (e.g., svchost.exe making unusual network connections).\n5. **Check Process Integrity**: Compare process memory sections against the legitimate binary on disk.\n6. **Correlate with Network Activity**: Hollowed processes often establish C2 connections - correlate suspicious process behavior with network logs.\n7. **Document and Contain**: Report findings, isolate affected endpoints, and update detection rules.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1055.012 | Process Injection: Process Hollowing |\n| T1055 | Process Injection (parent technique) |\n| T1055.001 | DLL Injection |\n| T1055.003 | Thread Execution Hijacking |\n| T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure Call |\n| CREATE_SUSPENDED | Windows flag to create a process in suspended state |\n| NtUnmapViewOfSection | API to unmap process memory sections |\n| WriteProcessMemory | API to write into another process's memory |\n| ResumeThread | API to resume a suspended thread |\n| Image Mismatch | Process memory content differs from on-disk binary |\n| Process Doppelganging | Related technique using NTFS transactions (T1055.013) |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | Memory protection and hollowing detection |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | ProcessTampering alerts |\n| Sysmon v13+ | Event ID 25 ProcessTampering detection |\n| Volatility | Memory forensics - malfind plugin |\n| pe-sieve | Process memory scanner for hollowed processes |\n| Hollows Hunter | Automated hollowed process detection |\n| Process Hacker | Live process memory inspection |\n| API Monitor | Monitor NtUnmapViewOfSection calls |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Svchost.exe Hollowing**: Malware creates svchost.exe suspended, hollows it, injects backdoor code - process appears legitimate but behaves maliciously.\n2. **Explorer.exe Hollowing**: Attacker hollows explorer.exe to inherit its network permissions and trusted process context.\n3. **Rundll32 Hollowing**: Malicious loader creates rundll32.exe, replaces its memory with implant code for C2 beaconing.\n4. **Multi-Stage Hollowing**: Loader uses process hollowing as first stage, then performs additional injection into services.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-HOLLOW-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1055.012\nHollowed Process: [Process name and PID]\nOriginal Binary: [Expected on-disk path]\nParent Process: [Parent name and PID]\nMemory Mismatch: [Yes\u002FNo]\nSuspicious APIs: [NtUnmapViewOfSection, WriteProcessMemory, etc.]\nNetwork Activity: [C2 connections if any]\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":44,"capec":49,"model":50,"tools":51,"domain":38,"maxTurns":55,"nist_csf":56,"subdomain":33,"description":7,"mitre_attack":61,"d3fend_techniques":66},[33,34,45,46,32,47,48],"process-hollowing","process-injection","t1055","proactive-detection",[],"sonnet",[52,31,53,54],"Read","Glob","Grep",20,[57,58,59,60],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[62,63,64,65],"T1027","T1055","T1055.012","T1059",[67,68,69,70,71],"Platform Monitoring","Process Code Segment Verification","Segment Address Offset Randomization","Process Analysis","Application Hardening","main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Flinux\u002Fforensics\u002Fmemory\u002Finjection\u002Fprocess\u002Fdetect","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 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persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[107,20,108,109,110,28,29,22,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,21,38,119],"services","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","process-forensics",{"skillNo":121,"name":122,"nameZh":6,"description":123,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":124,"categories":125,"keywords":126,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[127,107,128,109,129,130,131,38,31,25,132,133,134,135,28,136,137,30,138,139],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":141,"name":142,"nameZh":6,"description":143,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":144,"categories":145,"keywords":146,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze 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