intel-mitre-threatmodel
Intel Mitre Threatmodel.
- License 许可
- MIT
- 最近更新
- 2026-09-01
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01 前言 Front Matter
- name
- intel-mitre-threatmodel
- domain
- cybersecurity
- description
- Intel Mitre Threatmodel.
02 资源文件 1
- 参考文档index.json492 B
03 SKILL.md 正文
--| | MITRE ATT&CK | Knowledge base of adversary tactics, techniques, and procedures based on real-world observations | | TTP | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures — the behavioral patterns of adversary groups | | ATT&CK Navigator | Web tool for visualizing ATT&CK matrices as layered heatmaps showing coverage or threat profiles | | Gap Analysis | Process of comparing threat actor TTPs against detection coverage to identify blind spots | | Threat-Informed Defense | Security strategy prioritizing defenses based on actual adversary behaviors rather than theoretical risks | | Adversary Emulation | Controlled simulation of threat actor TTPs to validate detection and response capabilities |
Tools & Systems
- MITRE ATT&CK Navigator: Web-based visualization tool for creating and overlaying ATT&CK technique layers
- MITRE Caldera: Automated adversary emulation platform for testing detection coverage at scale
- Atomic Red Team: Open-source library of ATT&CK technique tests for security control validation
- CTID ATT&CK Workbench: MITRE tool for customizing ATT&CK knowledge base with organizational context
- Tidal Cyber: Commercial platform for threat-informed defense planning using ATT&CK framework
Common Scenarios
- Annual Threat Assessment: Map top 5 threat actors to ATT&CK, overlay against detection, produce gap analysis
- Cloud Migration Planning: Model cloud-specific threats (T1078.004, T1537) and plan detection coverage
- M&A Security Assessment: Threat model the acquired company's environment against relevant threat actors
- Budget Justification: Use gap analysis to demonstrate detection blind spots requiring tool investment
- Purple Team Planning: Select adversary emulation scenarios based on highest-priority gaps from threat model
Output Format
THREAT MODEL ASSESSMENT — Financial Services Division
━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━
Date: 2024-03-15
Threat Actors: FIN7, APT38, Lazarus Group
Techniques Total: 87 unique techniques across all actors
DETECTION COVERAGE:
Covered: 56/87 (64%)
Gaps: 31/87 (36%)
Tactic Coverage Breakdown:
Initial Access: 78% ████████░░
Execution: 82% █████████░
Persistence: 71% ████████░░
Priv Escalation: 65% ███████░░░
Defense Evasion: 52% ██████░░░░ <-- Priority gap
Credential Access: 58% ██████░░░░ <-- Priority gap
Discovery: 45% █████░░░░░
Lateral Movement: 61% ███████░░░
Collection: 50% ██████░░░░
Exfiltration: 55% ██████░░░░
C2: 67% ███████░░░
TOP PRIORITY GAPS (30-day remediation):
1. T1055 Process Injection — used by all 3 actors, 0 detections
2. T1003.006 DCSync — used by FIN7 and Lazarus, 0 detections
3. T1070.004 File Deletion — evidence destruction, 0 detections
INVESTMENT RECOMMENDATION:
Closing top 10 gaps requires: 2 detection engineer FTEs, 60 days
Expected coverage improvement: 64% -> 76%
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