[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71DQECZ5DA59P2DTCA1SWY9":3,"skill-same:01M71DQECZ5DA59P2DTCA1SWY9":99},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":72,"commitSha":73,"skillDirectory":74,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":75,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":76,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":77,"updatedAt":78,"install":79,"resources":92},"01M71DQECZ5DA59P2DTCA1SWY9","serviceaccount-service-detect",null,"Detect abuse of service accounts through anomalous interactive logons, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and unauthorized access patterns.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Fservice\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"serviceaccount service detect","service","detect","t1078","service-accounts","id","password policy","mitre-attack","privilege-escalation","interactive","Bash","access","password","cybersecurity","t1059","restore","policy","authentication","cm","escalation","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: serviceaccount-service-detect\ndescription: Detect abuse of service accounts through anomalous interactive logons, privilege escalation, lateral movement, and unauthorized access patterns.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- mitre-attack\n- service-accounts\n- privilege-escalation\n- t1078\n- proactive-detection\nd3fend_techniques:\n- Restore Access\n- Password Authentication\n- Biometric Authentication\n- Strong Password Policy\n- Restore User Account Access\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmodel: sonnet\nmaxTurns: 20\ntools: [Read, Bash, Glob, Grep]\nmitre_attack:\n- T1021\n- T1059\n- T1068\n- T1070\ncwe:\n- CWE-269\ncapec: []\n---\n\n# Detecting Service Account Abuse\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting service account abuse in the environment\n- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques\n- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques\n- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators\n- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)\n- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)\n- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration\n- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled\n- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Formulate Hypothesis**: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.\n2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.\n3. **Execute Queries**: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.\n4. **Analyze Results**: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.\n5. **Validate Findings**: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.\n6. **Correlate Activity**: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.\n7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts |\n| T1078.001 | Default Accounts |\n| T1021 | Remote Services |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |\n| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |\n| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |\n| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |\n| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |\n| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Scenario 1**: Service account RDP to domain controller\n2. **Scenario 2**: SQL service accessing file shares outside scope\n3. **Scenario 3**: Backup service lateral movement off-hours\n4. **Scenario 4**: Compromised svc with DA privileges used for DCSync\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DETECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1078.002\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nEvidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nConfidence: [High\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nRecommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]\n```\n","# Detecting Service Account Abuse\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When proactively hunting for indicators of detecting service account abuse in the environment\n- After threat intelligence indicates active campaigns using these techniques\n- During incident response to scope compromise related to these techniques\n- When EDR or SIEM alerts trigger on related indicators\n- During periodic security assessments and purple team exercises\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- EDR platform with process and network telemetry (CrowdStrike, MDE, SentinelOne)\n- SIEM with relevant log data ingested (Splunk, Elastic, Sentinel)\n- Sysmon deployed with comprehensive configuration\n- Windows Security Event Log forwarding enabled\n- Threat intelligence feeds for IOC correlation\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Formulate Hypothesis**: Define a testable hypothesis based on threat intelligence or ATT&CK gap analysis.\n2. **Identify Data Sources**: Determine which logs and telemetry are needed to validate or refute the hypothesis.\n3. **Execute Queries**: Run detection queries against SIEM and EDR platforms to collect relevant events.\n4. **Analyze Results**: Examine query results for anomalies, correlating across multiple data sources.\n5. **Validate Findings**: Distinguish true positives from false positives through contextual analysis.\n6. **Correlate Activity**: Link findings to broader attack chains and threat actor TTPs.\n7. **Document and Report**: Record findings, update detection rules, and recommend response actions.\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Concept | Description |\n|---------|-------------|\n| T1078.002 | Domain Accounts |\n| T1078.001 | Default Accounts |\n| T1021 | Remote Services |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n| Tool | Purpose |\n|------|---------|\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR telemetry and threat detection |\n| Microsoft Defender for Endpoint | Advanced hunting with KQL |\n| Splunk Enterprise | SIEM log analysis with SPL queries |\n| Elastic Security | Detection rules and investigation timeline |\n| Sysmon | Detailed Windows event monitoring |\n| Velociraptor | Endpoint artifact collection and hunting |\n| Sigma Rules | Cross-platform detection rule format |\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Scenario 1**: Service account RDP to domain controller\n2. **Scenario 2**: SQL service accessing file shares outside scope\n3. **Scenario 3**: Backup service lateral movement off-hours\n4. **Scenario 4**: Compromised svc with DA privileges used for DCSync\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DETECT-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nTechnique: T1078.002\nHost: [Hostname]\nUser: [Account context]\nEvidence: [Log entries, process trees, network data]\nRisk Level: [Critical\u002FHigh\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nConfidence: [High\u002FMedium\u002FLow]\nRecommended Action: [Containment, investigation, monitoring]\n```\n",{"cwe":44,"name":5,"tags":46,"capec":49,"model":50,"tools":51,"domain":32,"maxTurns":55,"nist_csf":56,"subdomain":47,"description":7,"mitre_attack":61,"d3fend_techniques":66},[45],"CWE-269",[47,26,23,27,22,48],"threat-hunting","proactive-detection",[],"sonnet",[52,29,53,54],"Read","Glob","Grep",20,[57,58,59,60],"DE.CM-01","DE.AE-02","DE.AE-07","ID.RA-05",[62,63,64,65],"T1021","T1059","T1068","T1070",[67,68,69,70,71],"Restore Access","Password Authentication","Biometric Authentication","Strong Password Policy","Restore User Account Access","main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fidentity\u002Fserviceaccount\u002Fservice\u002Fdetect","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":80,"prompt":90,"zipAvailable":91},[81,84,87],{"tool":82,"command":83},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill 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CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[107,21,108,109,110,111,37,112,113,114,115,116,117,118,119,120,121,32,122],"services","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":124,"name":125,"nameZh":6,"description":126,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":127,"categories":128,"keywords":129,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[130,107,131,109,132,133,134,32,29,135,136,137,138,139,111,140,141,142,143,144],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":146,"name":147,"nameZh":6,"description":148,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":149,"categories":150,"keywords":151,"publishedAt":39},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows 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