[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71DMSGGXV0ZRHSFWMDHBT4Z":3,"skill-same:01M71DMSGGXV0ZRHSFWMDHBT4Z":94},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":39,"linkOnly":40,"markdownContent":41,"markdownBody":42,"frontMatter":43,"refName":67,"commitSha":68,"skillDirectory":69,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":70,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":71,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":72,"updatedAt":73,"install":74,"resources":87},"01M71DMSGGXV0ZRHSFWMDHBT4Z","kerberos-goldenticket-detect",null,"Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory by analyzing Kerberos TGT anomalies including mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures in domain controller event logs.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity\u002Fkerberos\u002Fgoldenticket\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38],"kerberos goldenticket detect","detect","kerberos","read","hunting","types","de","ticket","active","signatures","cm","directory","Bash","t1558","mitre-t1558-001","controller","golden-ticket","encryption","logs","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: kerberos-goldenticket-detect\ndescription: Detect Golden Ticket attacks in Active Directory by analyzing Kerberos TGT anomalies including mismatched encryption types, impossible ticket lifetimes, non-existent accounts, and forged PAC signatures in domain controller event logs.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: threat-hunting\ntags:\n- threat-hunting\n- golden-ticket\n- kerberos\n- active-directory\n- mitre-t1558-001\n- credential-abuse\nnist_csf:\n- DE.CM-01\n- DE.AE-02\n- DE.AE-07\n- ID.RA-05\nmodel: sonnet\nmaxTurns: 20\ntools: [Read, Bash, Glob, Grep]\nmitre_attack:\n- T1003\n- T1003.003\n- T1003.006\n- T1059\n- T1558\n- T1558.001\ncapec: []\n---\n\n# Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks in Kerberos Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction\n- When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access\n- After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level\n- When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)\n- During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers\n- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)\n- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations\n- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768)**: Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ\u002FAS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.\n2. **Detect Encryption Type Anomalies**: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.\n3. **Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies**: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.\n4. **Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs**: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.\n5. **Detect TGS Without Prior TGT**: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP\u002Faccount, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.\n6. **Monitor KRBTGT Password Age**: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.\n7. **Validate PAC Signatures**: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- RC4 Encryption in Kerberos TGS\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType=\"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName!=\"krbtgt\"\n| stats count by TargetUserName ServiceName IpAddress TicketEncryptionType Computer\n| where count > 5\n| sort -count\n```\n\n### Splunk -- TGS Without Prior TGT\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\n| stats earliest(_time) as first_tgt by TargetUserName IpAddress EventCode\n| eventstats earliest(eval(if(EventCode=4768, first_tgt, null()))) as tgt_time by TargetUserName IpAddress\n| where EventCode=4769 AND (isnull(tgt_time) OR first_tgt \u003C tgt_time)\n| table TargetUserName IpAddress first_tgt tgt_time\n```\n\n### KQL -- Golden Ticket Indicators\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType == \"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName != \"krbtgt\"\n| summarize Count=count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, ServiceName\n| where Count > 5\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Post-DCSync Golden Ticket**: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.\n2. **RC4 Downgrade**: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.\n3. **Cross-Domain Golden Ticket**: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains\u002Fforests.\n4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-GOLDEN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nSuspected Account: [Account using forged ticket]\nSource IP: [Client IP]\nTarget Service: [SPN accessed]\nEncryption Type: [RC4\u002FAES128\u002FAES256]\nAnomaly: [No prior TGT\u002FRC4 in AES environment\u002FExtended lifetime]\nKRBTGT Last Reset: [Date]\nRisk Level: [Critical]\n```\n","# Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks in Kerberos Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction\n- When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access\n- After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level\n- When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)\n- During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers\n- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)\n- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations\n- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768)**: Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ\u002FAS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.\n2. **Detect Encryption Type Anomalies**: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.\n3. **Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies**: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.\n4. **Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs**: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.\n5. **Detect TGS Without Prior TGT**: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP\u002Faccount, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.\n6. **Monitor KRBTGT Password Age**: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.\n7. **Validate PAC Signatures**: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- RC4 Encryption in Kerberos TGS\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType=\"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName!=\"krbtgt\"\n| stats count by TargetUserName ServiceName IpAddress TicketEncryptionType Computer\n| where count > 5\n| sort -count\n```\n\n### Splunk -- TGS Without Prior TGT\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\n| stats earliest(_time) as first_tgt by TargetUserName IpAddress EventCode\n| eventstats earliest(eval(if(EventCode=4768, first_tgt, null()))) as tgt_time by TargetUserName IpAddress\n| where EventCode=4769 AND (isnull(tgt_time) OR first_tgt \u003C tgt_time)\n| table TargetUserName IpAddress first_tgt tgt_time\n```\n\n### KQL -- Golden Ticket Indicators\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType == \"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName != \"krbtgt\"\n| summarize Count=count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, ServiceName\n| where Count > 5\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Post-DCSync Golden Ticket**: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.\n2. **RC4 Downgrade**: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.\n3. **Cross-Domain Golden Ticket**: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains\u002Fforests.\n4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-GOLDEN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nSuspected Account: [Account using forged ticket]\nSource IP: [Client IP]\nTarget Service: [SPN accessed]\nEncryption Type: [RC4\u002FAES128\u002FAES256]\nAnomaly: [No prior TGT\u002FRC4 in AES environment\u002FExtended lifetime]\nKRBTGT Last Reset: [Date]\nRisk Level: 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