[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71DG1DPZMZ863XCTD3K26KB":3,"skill-same:01M71DG1DPZMZ863XCTD3K26KB":56},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":24,"linkOnly":25,"markdownContent":26,"markdownBody":27,"frontMatter":28,"refName":29,"commitSha":30,"skillDirectory":31,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":32,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":33,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":34,"updatedAt":35,"install":36,"resources":49},"01M71DG1DPZMZ863XCTD3K26KB","identity-kerberos-impacket",null,"Identity Kerberos Impacket.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-kerberos-impacket\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23],"identity","Impacket","kerberos","identity kerberos impacket","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: identity-kerberos-impacket\ndescription: \"Identity Kerberos Impacket.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| Service accounts in Domain Admins | Direct path to domain compromise | Critical |\n| SQL service accounts (MSSQLSvc) | Often have excessive privileges | High |\n| Exchange service accounts | Access to all email | High |\n| Accounts with AdminCount=1 | Previously\u002Fcurrently privileged | High |\n| Accounts with old passwords | More likely to use weak passwords | Medium |\n\n## Detection\n\n### Windows Event Logs\n\n```\nEvent ID 4769 - Kerberos Service Ticket Request\n- Monitor for: Encryption type 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) when AES is expected\n- Monitor for: Single user requesting many TGS tickets in short period\n- Monitor for: Service ticket requests from unusual source IPs\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule\n\n```yaml\ntitle: Potential Kerberoasting Activity\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4769\n        TicketEncryptionType: '0x17'  # RC4\n        ServiceName|endswith: '$'\n    filter:\n        ServiceName: 'krbtgt'\n    condition: selection and not filter\nlevel: medium\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1558.003\n```\n\n## Defensive Recommendations\n\n1. **Use Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)** - 240-character random passwords, auto-rotated\n2. **Set strong passwords (25+ chars)** on all service accounts\n3. **Enable AES-only encryption** - Disable RC4 via GPO\n4. **Monitor Event ID 4769** for RC4 TGS requests\n5. **Implement Managed Service Accounts** where gMSA is not feasible\n6. **Regular audits** - Run BloodHound to identify Kerberoastable accounts\n7. **Protected Users group** - Add sensitive service accounts\n8. **Honeypot SPNs** - Create decoy accounts with SPNs to detect attacks\n\n## References\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1558\u002F003\u002F\n- Impacket: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffortra\u002Fimpacket\n- Harmj0y's Kerberoasting Revisited: https:\u002F\u002Fposts.specterops.io\u002Fkerberoasting-revisited-d434351bd4d1\n- Detection Strategy DET0157: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fdetectionstrategies\u002FDET0157\u002F\n","|\n| Service accounts in Domain Admins | Direct path to domain compromise | Critical |\n| SQL service accounts (MSSQLSvc) | Often have excessive privileges | High |\n| Exchange service accounts | Access to all email | High |\n| Accounts with AdminCount=1 | Previously\u002Fcurrently privileged | High |\n| Accounts with old passwords | More likely to use weak passwords | Medium |\n\n## Detection\n\n### Windows Event Logs\n\n```\nEvent ID 4769 - Kerberos Service Ticket Request\n- Monitor for: Encryption type 0x17 (RC4-HMAC) when AES is expected\n- Monitor for: Single user requesting many TGS tickets in short period\n- Monitor for: Service ticket requests from unusual source IPs\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule\n\n```yaml\ntitle: Potential Kerberoasting Activity\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4769\n        TicketEncryptionType: '0x17'  # RC4\n        ServiceName|endswith: '$'\n    filter:\n        ServiceName: 'krbtgt'\n    condition: selection and not filter\nlevel: medium\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1558.003\n```\n\n## Defensive Recommendations\n\n1. **Use Group Managed Service Accounts (gMSA)** - 240-character random passwords, auto-rotated\n2. **Set strong passwords (25+ chars)** on all service accounts\n3. **Enable AES-only encryption** - Disable RC4 via GPO\n4. **Monitor Event ID 4769** for RC4 TGS requests\n5. **Implement Managed Service Accounts** where gMSA is not feasible\n6. **Regular audits** - Run BloodHound to identify Kerberoastable accounts\n7. **Protected Users group** - Add sensitive service accounts\n8. **Honeypot SPNs** - Create decoy accounts with SPNs to detect attacks\n\n## References\n\n- MITRE ATT&CK T1558.003: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Ftechniques\u002FT1558\u002F003\u002F\n- Impacket: https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002Ffortra\u002Fimpacket\n- Harmj0y's Kerberoasting Revisited: https:\u002F\u002Fposts.specterops.io\u002Fkerberoasting-revisited-d434351bd4d1\n- Detection Strategy DET0157: https:\u002F\u002Fattack.mitre.org\u002Fdetectionstrategies\u002FDET0157\u002F\n",{"name":5,"domain":23,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fidentity-kerberos-impacket","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":37,"prompt":47,"zipAvailable":48},[38,41,44],{"tool":39,"command":40},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-kerberos-impacket",{"tool":42,"command":43},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-kerberos-impacket",{"tool":45,"command":46},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-kerberos-impacket","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-kerberos-impacket\u002FSKILL.md",true,[50],{"path":51,"resourceType":52,"resourceTypeDesc":53,"sizeBytes":54,"sourceHtmlUrl":55},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",504,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-kerberos-impacket\u002Findex.json",[57,82,104,126,148,164],{"skillNo":58,"name":59,"nameZh":6,"description":60,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":61,"categories":62,"keywords":63,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,23,81],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":83,"name":84,"nameZh":6,"description":85,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":86,"categories":87,"keywords":88,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[89,64,90,67,91,92,93,23,94,95,96,97,98,99,69,100,101,102,103,20],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement",{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[111,112,113,114,115,116,23,94,117,95,118,119,69,102,120,121,122,123,124,125],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":127,"name":128,"nameZh":6,"description":129,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":130,"categories":131,"keywords":132,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[65,133,134,135,136,137,138,70,139,23,81,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,69],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[155,156,65,157,135,137,158,70,159,139,23,81,95,160,161,162,163,147,69,71],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":165,"name":166,"nameZh":6,"description":167,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":168,"categories":169,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":24},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[171,65,135,172,158,70,173,174,23,81,175,176,177,178,179,180,69,71,181,182],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]