[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71DFW5BB0SRXPE91P4PMCHZ":3,"skill-same:01M71DFW5BB0SRXPE91P4PMCHZ":62},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":30,"linkOnly":31,"markdownContent":32,"markdownBody":33,"frontMatter":34,"refName":35,"commitSha":36,"skillDirectory":37,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":38,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":39,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":40,"updatedAt":41,"install":42,"resources":55},"01M71DFW5BB0SRXPE91P4PMCHZ","identity-kerberos-goldenticket",null,"4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-kerberos-goldenticket\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26,27,28,29],"identity kerberos goldenticket","kerberos","identity","only","cybersecurity","password","valid","tickets","remediation","persistence","golden","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: identity-kerberos-goldenticket\ndescription: \"4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n# Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks in Kerberos Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction\n- When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access\n- After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level\n- When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)\n- During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers\n- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)\n- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations\n- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768)**: Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ\u002FAS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.\n2. **Detect Encryption Type Anomalies**: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.\n3. **Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies**: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.\n4. **Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs**: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.\n5. **Detect TGS Without Prior TGT**: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP\u002Faccount, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.\n6. **Monitor KRBTGT Password Age**: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.\n7. **Validate PAC Signatures**: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- RC4 Encryption in Kerberos TGS\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType=\"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName!=\"krbtgt\"\n| stats count by TargetUserName ServiceName IpAddress TicketEncryptionType Computer\n| where count > 5\n| sort -count\n```\n\n### Splunk -- TGS Without Prior TGT\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\n| stats earliest(_time) as first_tgt by TargetUserName IpAddress EventCode\n| eventstats earliest(eval(if(EventCode=4768, first_tgt, null()))) as tgt_time by TargetUserName IpAddress\n| where EventCode=4769 AND (isnull(tgt_time) OR first_tgt \u003C tgt_time)\n| table TargetUserName IpAddress first_tgt tgt_time\n```\n\n### KQL -- Golden Ticket Indicators\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType == \"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName != \"krbtgt\"\n| summarize Count=count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, ServiceName\n| where Count > 5\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Post-DCSync Golden Ticket**: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.\n2. **RC4 Downgrade**: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.\n3. **Cross-Domain Golden Ticket**: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains\u002Fforests.\n4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-GOLDEN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nSuspected Account: [Account using forged ticket]\nSource IP: [Client IP]\nTarget Service: [SPN accessed]\nEncryption Type: [RC4\u002FAES128\u002FAES256]\nAnomaly: [No prior TGT\u002FRC4 in AES environment\u002FExtended lifetime]\nKRBTGT Last Reset: [Date]\nRisk Level: [Critical]\n```\n","# Detecting Golden Ticket Attacks in Kerberos Logs\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When KRBTGT account hash may have been compromised via DCSync or NTDS.dit extraction\n- When hunting for forged Kerberos tickets used for persistent domain access\n- After incident response reveals credential theft at the domain level\n- When investigating impossible logon patterns (users logging in from multiple locations simultaneously)\n- During post-breach assessment to determine if Golden Tickets are in use\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Windows Security Event IDs 4768, 4769, 4771 on domain controllers\n- Kerberos policy configuration knowledge (max ticket lifetime, encryption types)\n- Domain controller audit policy enabling Kerberos Service Ticket Operations\n- SIEM with ability to correlate Kerberos events across multiple DCs\n\n## Workflow\n\n1. **Monitor TGT Requests (Event 4768)**: Track Kerberos authentication service requests. Golden Tickets bypass the AS-REQ\u002FAS-REP exchange entirely, so the absence of 4768 before 4769 is suspicious.\n2. **Detect Encryption Type Anomalies**: Golden Tickets often use RC4 (0x17) encryption. If your domain enforces AES (0x12), any RC4 TGT is a red flag. Monitor TicketEncryptionType in Event 4769.\n3. **Check Ticket Lifetime Anomalies**: Default Kerberos TGT lifetime is 10 hours with 7-day renewal. Golden Tickets can be forged with 10-year lifetimes. Detect tickets with durations exceeding policy.\n4. **Hunt for Non-Existent SIDs**: Golden Tickets can include arbitrary SIDs (including non-existent accounts or groups). Correlate TGS requests against known AD SID inventory.\n5. **Detect TGS Without Prior TGT**: When a service ticket (4769) appears without a preceding TGT request (4768) from the same IP\u002Faccount, this may indicate a pre-existing Golden Ticket.\n6. **Monitor KRBTGT Password Age**: Track when KRBTGT was last reset. If KRBTGT hash hasn't changed since a known compromise, Golden Tickets from that period remain valid.\n7. **Validate PAC Signatures**: With KB5008380+ and PAC validation enforcement, domain controllers reject forged PACs. Monitor for Kerberos failures indicating PAC validation errors.\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- RC4 Encryption in Kerberos TGS\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType=\"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName!=\"krbtgt\"\n| stats count by TargetUserName ServiceName IpAddress TicketEncryptionType Computer\n| where count > 5\n| sort -count\n```\n\n### Splunk -- TGS Without Prior TGT\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog (EventCode=4768 OR EventCode=4769)\n| stats earliest(_time) as first_tgt by TargetUserName IpAddress EventCode\n| eventstats earliest(eval(if(EventCode=4768, first_tgt, null()))) as tgt_time by TargetUserName IpAddress\n| where EventCode=4769 AND (isnull(tgt_time) OR first_tgt \u003C tgt_time)\n| table TargetUserName IpAddress first_tgt tgt_time\n```\n\n### KQL -- Golden Ticket Indicators\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4769\n| where TicketEncryptionType == \"0x17\"\n| where ServiceName != \"krbtgt\"\n| summarize Count=count() by TargetUserName, IpAddress, ServiceName\n| where Count > 5\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Post-DCSync Golden Ticket**: After extracting KRBTGT hash, attacker forges TGT with Domain Admin SID, valid for months until KRBTGT is rotated twice.\n2. **RC4 Downgrade**: Golden Ticket forged with RC4 encryption in an AES-only environment, detectable by encryption type mismatch.\n3. **Cross-Domain Golden Ticket**: Forged inter-realm TGT used to pivot between AD domains\u002Fforests.\n4. **Persistence After Remediation**: Golden Tickets surviving password resets because KRBTGT was only rotated once (both current and previous hashes are valid).\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-GOLDEN-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nSuspected Account: [Account using forged ticket]\nSource IP: [Client IP]\nTarget Service: [SPN accessed]\nEncryption Type: [RC4\u002FAES128\u002FAES256]\nAnomaly: [No prior TGT\u002FRC4 in AES environment\u002FExtended lifetime]\nKRBTGT Last Reset: [Date]\nRisk Level: [Critical]\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":23,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fidentity-kerberos-goldenticket","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":43,"prompt":53,"zipAvailable":54},[44,47,50],{"tool":45,"command":46},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-kerberos-goldenticket",{"tool":48,"command":49},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-kerberos-goldenticket",{"tool":51,"command":52},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill 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in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[70,71,72,73,28,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,84,85,23,86],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":88,"name":89,"nameZh":6,"description":90,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":91,"categories":92,"keywords":93,"publishedAt":30},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[94,70,95,73,96,97,98,23,99,100,101,102,103,104,74,105,106,107,108,109],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":111,"name":112,"nameZh":6,"description":113,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":114,"categories":115,"keywords":116,"publishedAt":30},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[117,118,119,120,121,122,23,99,123,100,124,125,74,107,126,127,128,129,130,131],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":133,"name":134,"nameZh":6,"description":135,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":136,"categories":137,"keywords":138,"publishedAt":30},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and 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memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[177,71,141,178,164,75,179,180,23,86,181,182,183,184,185,186,74,76,187,188],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]