[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71DFGSK4TPZ22J59XBYB3JE":3,"skill-same:01M71DFGSK4TPZ22J59XBYB3JE":55},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":23,"linkOnly":24,"markdownContent":25,"markdownBody":26,"frontMatter":27,"refName":28,"commitSha":29,"skillDirectory":30,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":31,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":32,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":33,"updatedAt":34,"install":35,"resources":48},"01M71DFGSK4TPZ22J59XBYB3JE","identity-insider-insiderindicators",null,"Identity Insider Insiderindicators.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-insider-insiderindicators\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22],"identity","insider","identity insider insiderindicators","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: identity-insider-insiderindicators\ndescription: \"Identity Insider Insiderindicators.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n--|\n| **Insider Threat** | Risk posed by individuals with legitimate access who misuse it for unauthorized purposes |\n| **Data Exfiltration** | Unauthorized transfer of data outside the organization via email, USB, cloud, or other channels |\n| **DLP** | Data Loss Prevention — technology monitoring and blocking unauthorized data transfers based on content policies |\n| **Notice Period Monitoring** | Enhanced surveillance of departing employees during their resignation-to-departure window |\n| **Chain of Custody** | Documented evidence handling procedures ensuring forensic integrity for potential legal proceedings |\n| **Need-to-Know Violation** | Accessing information or systems beyond what is required for an employee's role or current tasks |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Microsoft Purview (formerly DLP)**: Data classification and loss prevention platform monitoring endpoints, email, and cloud storage\n- **Splunk UBA**: User behavior analytics detecting insider threat patterns through ML-based anomaly detection\n- **Forcepoint Insider Threat**: Dedicated insider threat detection platform with behavioral indicators and risk scoring\n- **DTEX InTERCEPT**: Endpoint-based insider threat detection focusing on user activity metadata collection\n- **Code42 Incydr**: Data risk detection platform specializing in file exfiltration monitoring across endpoints and cloud\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Departing Employee**: Bulk download of customer lists and product roadmaps during two-week notice period\n- **Disgruntled Employee**: After negative performance review, employee accesses executive salary data outside their role\n- **Contractor Overreach**: External consultant accessing systems beyond contracted scope, downloading source code\n- **Account Misuse**: Employee sharing credentials with unauthorized third party for competitive intelligence\n- **Sabotage Indicator**: IT admin creating backdoor accounts and modifying system configurations before departure\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nINSIDER THREAT INVESTIGATION REPORT — IT-2024-0089\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nSubject:      jsmith (Financial Analyst, Finance Dept)\nPeriod:       2024-03-01 to 2024-03-15\nStatus:       Employee resigned 2024-03-15, last day 2024-03-29\n\nKey Findings:\n  [HIGH]  3,847 files downloaded from SharePoint (12.4 GB) — 10x peer average\n  [HIGH]  USB device connected 14 times during notice period (0 times prior month)\n  [HIGH]  187 emails with attachments sent to personal Gmail\n  [MEDIUM] After-hours activity increased 340% during notice period\n  [MEDIUM] Accessed HR salary database 3 times (not authorized for role)\n\nTimeline:\n  Mar 01-14:  Normal activity baseline (avg 150 events\u002Fday)\n  Mar 15:     Resignation submitted (activity spike to 890 events)\n  Mar 16-17:  Weekend access — 2,100 SharePoint downloads\n  Mar 18:     USB device first connected, DLP alert triggered\n\nEvidence Collected:   4 items (SHA-256 verified, chain of custody documented)\nRecommendation:       Immediate access revocation recommended\n                      Evidence package prepared for Legal review\n```\n","--|\n| **Insider Threat** | Risk posed by individuals with legitimate access who misuse it for unauthorized purposes |\n| **Data Exfiltration** | Unauthorized transfer of data outside the organization via email, USB, cloud, or other channels |\n| **DLP** | Data Loss Prevention — technology monitoring and blocking unauthorized data transfers based on content policies |\n| **Notice Period Monitoring** | Enhanced surveillance of departing employees during their resignation-to-departure window |\n| **Chain of Custody** | Documented evidence handling procedures ensuring forensic integrity for potential legal proceedings |\n| **Need-to-Know Violation** | Accessing information or systems beyond what is required for an employee's role or current tasks |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Microsoft Purview (formerly DLP)**: Data classification and loss prevention platform monitoring endpoints, email, and cloud storage\n- **Splunk UBA**: User behavior analytics detecting insider threat patterns through ML-based anomaly detection\n- **Forcepoint Insider Threat**: Dedicated insider threat detection platform with behavioral indicators and risk scoring\n- **DTEX InTERCEPT**: Endpoint-based insider threat detection focusing on user activity metadata collection\n- **Code42 Incydr**: Data risk detection platform specializing in file exfiltration monitoring across endpoints and cloud\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n- **Departing Employee**: Bulk download of customer lists and product roadmaps during two-week notice period\n- **Disgruntled Employee**: After negative performance review, employee accesses executive salary data outside their role\n- **Contractor Overreach**: External consultant accessing systems beyond contracted scope, downloading source code\n- **Account Misuse**: Employee sharing credentials with unauthorized third party for competitive intelligence\n- **Sabotage Indicator**: IT admin creating backdoor accounts and modifying system configurations before departure\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nINSIDER THREAT INVESTIGATION REPORT — IT-2024-0089\n━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━\nSubject:      jsmith (Financial Analyst, Finance Dept)\nPeriod:       2024-03-01 to 2024-03-15\nStatus:       Employee resigned 2024-03-15, last day 2024-03-29\n\nKey Findings:\n  [HIGH]  3,847 files downloaded from SharePoint (12.4 GB) — 10x peer average\n  [HIGH]  USB device connected 14 times during notice period (0 times prior month)\n  [HIGH]  187 emails with attachments sent to personal Gmail\n  [MEDIUM] After-hours activity increased 340% during notice period\n  [MEDIUM] Accessed HR salary database 3 times (not authorized for role)\n\nTimeline:\n  Mar 01-14:  Normal activity baseline (avg 150 events\u002Fday)\n  Mar 15:     Resignation submitted (activity spike to 890 events)\n  Mar 16-17:  Weekend access — 2,100 SharePoint downloads\n  Mar 18:     USB device first connected, DLP alert triggered\n\nEvidence Collected:   4 items (SHA-256 verified, chain of custody documented)\nRecommendation:       Immediate access revocation recommended\n                      Evidence package prepared for Legal review\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":22,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fidentity-insider-insiderindicators","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":36,"prompt":46,"zipAvailable":47},[37,40,43],{"tool":38,"command":39},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-insider-insiderindicators",{"tool":41,"command":42},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-insider-insiderindicators",{"tool":44,"command":45},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-insider-insiderindicators","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-insider-insiderindicators\u002FSKILL.md",true,[49],{"path":50,"resourceType":51,"resourceTypeDesc":52,"sizeBytes":53,"sourceHtmlUrl":54},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",536,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-insider-insiderindicators\u002Findex.json",[56,81,104,126,148,164],{"skillNo":57,"name":58,"nameZh":6,"description":59,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":60,"categories":61,"keywords":62,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[63,64,65,66,67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,22,80],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":82,"name":83,"nameZh":6,"description":84,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":85,"categories":86,"keywords":87,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[88,63,89,66,90,91,92,22,93,94,95,96,97,98,68,99,100,101,102,103],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":105,"name":106,"nameZh":6,"description":107,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":108,"categories":109,"keywords":110,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[111,112,113,114,115,116,22,93,117,94,118,119,68,101,120,121,122,123,124,125],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":127,"name":128,"nameZh":6,"description":129,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":130,"categories":131,"keywords":132,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[64,133,134,135,136,137,138,69,139,22,80,140,141,142,143,144,145,146,147,68],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":149,"name":150,"nameZh":6,"description":151,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":152,"categories":153,"keywords":154,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[155,156,64,157,135,137,158,69,159,139,22,80,94,160,161,162,163,147,68,70],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":165,"name":166,"nameZh":6,"description":167,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":168,"categories":169,"keywords":170,"publishedAt":23},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[171,64,135,172,158,69,173,174,22,80,175,176,177,178,179,180,68,70,181,182],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]