[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71DENWSP4PDJRWA1X6EZHVH":3,"skill-same:01M71DENWSP4PDJRWA1X6EZHVH":59},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":18,"publishedAt":27,"linkOnly":28,"markdownContent":29,"markdownBody":30,"frontMatter":31,"refName":32,"commitSha":33,"skillDirectory":34,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":35,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":36,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":37,"updatedAt":38,"install":39,"resources":52},"01M71DENWSP4PDJRWA1X6EZHVH","identity-ad-dcsyncd",null,"| | Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool | | Impacket secretsdump.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-ad-dcsyncd\u002FSKILL.md",[],[19,20,21,22,23,24,25,26],"ad","identity ad dcsyncd","identity","dcsync","mimikatz","tool","Impacket","cybersecurity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: identity-ad-dcsyncd\ndescription: \"| | Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool | | Impacket secretsdump.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n|\n| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |\n| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |\n| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4662\n| where Properties IN (\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\n| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, \".*\\\\$$\")\n| where NOT SubjectUserName IN (\"known_svc_account1\", \"known_svc_account2\")\n| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer\n| where count > 0\n| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n    or Properties has \"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n| where SubjectUserName !endswith \"$\"\n| where SubjectUserName !in (\"AzureADConnect\", \"MSOL_*\")\n| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity\n```yaml\ntitle: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4662\n        Properties|contains:\n            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n    filter_dc:\n        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'\n    condition: selection and not filter_dc\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.006\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz DCSync**: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync \u002Fuser:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.\n2. **Impacket secretsdump**: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain\u002Fuser:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.\n3. **Delegated Replication Rights**: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.\n4. **Azure AD Connect Abuse**: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.\n5. **DSInternals PowerShell**: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nSource Account: [Account requesting replication]\nSource Machine: [Hostname\u002FIP of requestor]\nTarget DC: [Domain controller receiving request]\nReplication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]\nTimestamp: [Event time]\nLegitimate DC: [Yes\u002FNo]\nKnown Service Account: [Yes\u002FNo]\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]\n```\n","|\n| Mimikatz (lsadump::dcsync) | Primary DCSync attack tool |\n| Impacket secretsdump.py | Python-based DCSync implementation |\n| DSInternals | PowerShell module for AD replication |\n| BloodHound | Map accounts with replication rights |\n| Splunk \u002F Elastic | SIEM correlation of 4662 events |\n| Microsoft Defender for Identity | Native DCSync detection |\n| CrowdStrike Falcon | EDR-based DCSync detection |\n\n## Detection Queries\n\n### Splunk -- DCSync Detection via Event 4662\n```spl\nindex=wineventlog EventCode=4662\n| where Properties IN (\"*1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2*\",\n    \"*89e95b76-444d-4c62-991a-0facbeda640c*\")\n| where NOT match(SubjectUserName, \".*\\\\$$\")\n| where NOT SubjectUserName IN (\"known_svc_account1\", \"known_svc_account2\")\n| stats count values(Properties) as ReplicationRights by SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer\n| where count > 0\n| table SubjectUserName SubjectDomainName Computer count ReplicationRights\n```\n\n### KQL -- Microsoft Sentinel DCSync Detection\n```kql\nSecurityEvent\n| where EventID == 4662\n| where Properties has \"1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n    or Properties has \"1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2\"\n| where SubjectUserName !endswith \"$\"\n| where SubjectUserName !in (\"AzureADConnect\", \"MSOL_*\")\n| project TimeGenerated, SubjectUserName, SubjectDomainName, Computer, Properties\n| sort by TimeGenerated desc\n```\n\n### Sigma Rule -- DCSync Activity\n```yaml\ntitle: DCSync Activity Detected - Non-DC Replication Request\nstatus: stable\nlogsource:\n    product: windows\n    service: security\ndetection:\n    selection:\n        EventID: 4662\n        Properties|contains:\n            - '1131f6aa-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n            - '1131f6ad-9c07-11d1-f79f-00c04fc2dcd2'\n    filter_dc:\n        SubjectUserName|endswith: '$'\n    condition: selection and not filter_dc\nlevel: critical\ntags:\n    - attack.credential_access\n    - attack.t1003.006\n```\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n1. **Mimikatz DCSync**: Attacker with Domain Admin privileges runs `lsadump::dcsync \u002Fuser:krbtgt` to extract KRBTGT hash for Golden Ticket creation.\n2. **Impacket secretsdump**: Remote DCSync via `secretsdump.py domain\u002Fuser:password@dc-ip` extracting all domain hashes.\n3. **Delegated Replication Rights**: Attacker grants themselves Replicating Directory Changes rights via ACL modification before performing DCSync.\n4. **Azure AD Connect Abuse**: Compromising the Azure AD Connect service account which has legitimate replication rights.\n5. **DSInternals PowerShell**: Using `Get-ADReplAccount` cmdlet to replicate specific account credentials.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nHunt ID: TH-DCSYNC-[DATE]-[SEQ]\nAlert Severity: Critical\nSource Account: [Account requesting replication]\nSource Machine: [Hostname\u002FIP of requestor]\nTarget DC: [Domain controller receiving request]\nReplication Rights: [GUIDs accessed]\nTimestamp: [Event time]\nLegitimate DC: [Yes\u002FNo]\nKnown Service Account: [Yes\u002FNo]\nRisk Assessment: [Critical - non-DC replication detected]\n```\n",{"name":5,"domain":26,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fidentity-ad-dcsyncd","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":40,"prompt":50,"zipAvailable":51},[41,44,47],{"tool":42,"command":43},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-ad-dcsyncd",{"tool":45,"command":46},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-ad-dcsyncd",{"tool":48,"command":49},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill identity-ad-dcsyncd","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-ad-dcsyncd\u002FSKILL.md",true,[53],{"path":54,"resourceType":55,"resourceTypeDesc":56,"sizeBytes":57,"sourceHtmlUrl":58},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",541,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fidentity-ad-dcsyncd\u002Findex.json",[60,85,107,129,151,167],{"skillNo":61,"name":62,"nameZh":6,"description":63,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":64,"categories":65,"keywords":66,"publishedAt":27},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[67,68,69,70,71,72,73,74,75,76,77,78,79,80,81,82,83,26,84],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":86,"name":87,"nameZh":6,"description":88,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":89,"categories":90,"keywords":91,"publishedAt":27},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[92,67,93,70,94,95,96,26,97,98,99,100,101,102,72,103,104,105,106,25],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement",{"skillNo":108,"name":109,"nameZh":6,"description":110,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":111,"categories":112,"keywords":113,"publishedAt":27},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[114,115,116,117,118,119,26,97,120,98,121,122,72,105,123,124,125,126,127,128],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":130,"name":131,"nameZh":6,"description":132,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":133,"categories":134,"keywords":135,"publishedAt":27},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[68,136,137,138,139,140,141,73,142,26,84,143,144,145,146,147,148,149,150,72],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":152,"name":153,"nameZh":6,"description":154,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":155,"categories":156,"keywords":157,"publishedAt":27},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[158,159,68,160,138,140,161,73,162,142,26,84,98,163,164,165,166,150,72,74],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":168,"name":169,"nameZh":6,"description":170,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":171,"categories":172,"keywords":173,"publishedAt":27},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[174,68,138,175,161,73,176,177,26,84,178,179,180,181,182,183,72,74,184,185],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]