[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71D9EJCM2GSCNGT87TK59GA":3,"skill-same:01M71D9EJCM2GSCNGT87TK59GA":76},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":49,"commitSha":50,"skillDirectory":51,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":52,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":53,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":54,"updatedAt":55,"install":56,"resources":69},"01M71D9EJCM2GSCNGT87TK59GA","email-incident-response",null,"A JSON report listing compromised or suspicious accounts, malicious inbox rules detected, impossible travel events, suspicious OAuth grants, and recommended containment actions with severity ratings.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Femail-incident-response\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000005","邮件与沟通","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"incident","incident response","email incident response","email","ratings","travel","report","json","grants","suspicious","with","malicious","listing","OAuth","Rules","cybersecurity","containment","inbox","actions","severity","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: email-incident-response\ndescription: \"A JSON report listing compromised or suspicious accounts, malicious inbox rules detected, impossible travel events, suspicious OAuth grants, and recommended containment actions with severity ratings.\"\ndomain: cybersecurity\n---\n\n# Detecting Email Account Compromise\n\n## Overview\n\nEmail account compromise (EAC) is a prevalent attack vector where adversaries gain unauthorized access to mailboxes to exfiltrate sensitive data, conduct business email compromise (BEC), or establish persistence through inbox rule manipulation. Attackers commonly create forwarding rules to siphon emails, delete rules to hide evidence, or use OAuth tokens for persistent access. Detection relies on analyzing Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Logs, Azure AD sign-in logs for impossible travel or suspicious locations, inbox rule creation events (Set-InboxRule, New-InboxRule), and Microsoft Graph API access patterns. Key indicators include forwarding rules to external addresses, rules that delete or move messages matching keywords like \"invoice\" or \"payment\", and sign-ins from unusual user agents such as python-requests.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting email account compromise\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Microsoft 365 with Unified Audit Logging enabled\n- Azure AD P1\u002FP2 for risk detection APIs\n- Python 3.9+ with `requests`, `msal` libraries\n- Microsoft Graph API application registration with Mail.Read, AuditLog.Read.All permissions\n- Understanding of OAuth2 client credential flows\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Export audit logs or connect to Microsoft Graph API using MSAL authentication\n2. Query inbox rules for all monitored mailboxes via `\u002Fusers\u002F{id}\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules`\n3. Analyze rules for external forwarding (ForwardTo, RedirectTo external addresses)\n4. Detect suspicious rule patterns: deletion rules, keyword-matching rules targeting financial terms\n5. Query sign-in logs via `\u002FauditLogs\u002FsignIns` for unusual locations and impossible travel\n6. Check for suspicious user agent strings (python-requests, PowerShell, curl)\n7. Identify OAuth application consent grants for suspicious third-party apps\n8. Correlate findings across users to detect campaign-level compromise\n9. Generate compromise indicators report with severity scores\n\n## Expected Output\n\nA JSON report listing compromised or suspicious accounts, malicious inbox rules detected, impossible travel events, suspicious OAuth grants, and recommended containment actions with severity ratings.\n","# Detecting Email Account Compromise\n\n## Overview\n\nEmail account compromise (EAC) is a prevalent attack vector where adversaries gain unauthorized access to mailboxes to exfiltrate sensitive data, conduct business email compromise (BEC), or establish persistence through inbox rule manipulation. Attackers commonly create forwarding rules to siphon emails, delete rules to hide evidence, or use OAuth tokens for persistent access. Detection relies on analyzing Microsoft 365 Unified Audit Logs, Azure AD sign-in logs for impossible travel or suspicious locations, inbox rule creation events (Set-InboxRule, New-InboxRule), and Microsoft Graph API access patterns. Key indicators include forwarding rules to external addresses, rules that delete or move messages matching keywords like \"invoice\" or \"payment\", and sign-ins from unusual user agents such as python-requests.\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When investigating security incidents that require detecting email account compromise\n- When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain\n- When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type\n- When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Microsoft 365 with Unified Audit Logging enabled\n- Azure AD P1\u002FP2 for risk detection APIs\n- Python 3.9+ with `requests`, `msal` libraries\n- Microsoft Graph API application registration with Mail.Read, AuditLog.Read.All permissions\n- Understanding of OAuth2 client credential flows\n\n## Steps\n\n1. Export audit logs or connect to Microsoft Graph API using MSAL authentication\n2. Query inbox rules for all monitored mailboxes via `\u002Fusers\u002F{id}\u002FmailFolders\u002Finbox\u002FmessageRules`\n3. Analyze rules for external forwarding (ForwardTo, RedirectTo external addresses)\n4. Detect suspicious rule patterns: deletion rules, keyword-matching rules targeting financial terms\n5. Query sign-in logs via `\u002FauditLogs\u002FsignIns` for unusual locations and impossible travel\n6. Check for suspicious user agent strings (python-requests, PowerShell, curl)\n7. Identify OAuth application consent grants for suspicious third-party apps\n8. Correlate findings across users to detect campaign-level compromise\n9. Generate compromise indicators report with severity scores\n\n## Expected Output\n\nA JSON report listing compromised or suspicious accounts, malicious inbox rules detected, impossible travel events, suspicious OAuth grants, and recommended containment actions with severity ratings.\n",{"name":5,"domain":39,"description":7},"main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Femail-incident-response","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":57,"prompt":67,"zipAvailable":68},[58,61,64],{"tool":59,"command":60},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill email-incident-response",{"tool":62,"command":63},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill email-incident-response",{"tool":65,"command":66},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill email-incident-response","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Femail-incident-response\u002FSKILL.md",true,[70],{"path":71,"resourceType":72,"resourceTypeDesc":73,"sizeBytes":74,"sourceHtmlUrl":75},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",667,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Femail-incident-response\u002Findex.json",[77,102,125,147,169,185],{"skillNo":78,"name":79,"nameZh":6,"description":80,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":81,"categories":82,"keywords":83,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[84,85,86,87,88,89,90,91,92,93,94,95,96,97,98,99,100,39,101],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","de","cm","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":103,"name":104,"nameZh":6,"description":105,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":106,"categories":107,"keywords":108,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[109,84,110,87,111,112,113,39,114,115,116,117,118,119,89,120,121,122,123,124],"exploit","services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","Bash","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","read","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":126,"name":127,"nameZh":6,"description":128,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":129,"categories":130,"keywords":131,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[132,133,134,135,136,137,39,114,138,115,139,140,89,122,141,142,143,144,145,146],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper","sonnet",{"skillNo":148,"name":149,"nameZh":6,"description":150,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":151,"categories":152,"keywords":153,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[85,154,155,156,157,158,159,90,160,39,101,161,162,163,164,165,166,167,168,89],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":170,"name":171,"nameZh":6,"description":172,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":173,"categories":174,"keywords":175,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[176,177,85,178,156,158,179,90,180,160,39,101,115,181,182,183,184,168,89,91],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":186,"name":187,"nameZh":6,"description":188,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":189,"categories":190,"keywords":191,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[192,85,156,193,179,90,194,195,39,101,196,197,198,199,200,34,89,91,201,202],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","mismatched","headers"]