[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71CTFZ28760DV8TYWBCP87G":3,"skill-same:01M71CTFZ28760DV8TYWBCP87G":95},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":68,"commitSha":69,"skillDirectory":70,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":71,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":72,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":73,"updatedAt":74,"install":75,"resources":88},"01M71CTFZ28760DV8TYWBCP87G","email-dmarcrollout-exploit",null,"Execute a phased DMARC rollout from p=none monitoring through p=quarantine to p=reject enforcement, ensuring all legitimate email sources are authenticated before blocking unauthorized senders.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcompliance\u002Femail\u002Fdmarcrollout\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000005","邮件与沟通","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"exploit","email","email dmarcrollout exploit","dkim","spf","read","at","co","de","email-authentication","monitoring","anti-spoofing","dns","Bash","rollout","cybersecurity","authentication","cm","t1566","sources","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: email-dmarcrollout-exploit\ndescription: Execute a phased DMARC rollout from p=none monitoring through p=quarantine to p=reject enforcement, ensuring all legitimate email sources are authenticated before blocking unauthorized senders.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: phishing-defense\ntags:\n- dmarc\n- spf\n- dkim\n- email-authentication\n- anti-spoofing\n- phishing\n- dns\n- email-security\nnist_csf:\n- PR.AT-01\n- DE.CM-09\n- RS.CO-02\n- DE.AE-02\nmodel: sonnet\nmaxTurns: 20\ntools: [Read, Bash, Glob, Grep]\nmitre_attack:\n- T1566\ncapec: []\n---\n\n# Performing DMARC Policy Enforcement Rollout\n\n## Overview\nDomain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) is the cornerstone of email anti-spoofing protection. A DMARC rollout progresses through three phases: monitoring (p=none), quarantine (p=quarantine), and full enforcement (p=reject). When configured at p=reject, any email that fails both SPF and DKIM checks is outright rejected. Google and Yahoo now require DMARC for bulk senders (5,000+ emails), driving a 65% reduction in unauthenticated messages. The rollout typically takes 3-6 months for safe deployment.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting security assessments that involve performing dmarc policy enforcement rollout\n- When following incident response procedures for related security events\n- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities\n- When validating security controls through hands-on testing\n\n## Prerequisites\n- Administrative access to DNS management for the domain\n- Understanding of SPF, DKIM, and DMARC protocols (RFC 7208, 6376, 7489)\n- Complete inventory of all legitimate email sending sources\n- DMARC reporting analysis tool (EasyDMARC, DMARCLY, Valimail, or dmarcian)\n- Email gateway with DMARC enforcement capability\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n### DMARC Policy Levels\n| Policy | Behavior | Use Case |\n|---|---|---|\n| p=none | Monitor only, no action on failures | Discovery phase |\n| p=quarantine | Send failing messages to spam\u002Fjunk | Transition phase |\n| p=reject | Block failing messages entirely | Full enforcement |\n\n### DMARC Record Anatomy\n```\nv=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=25; rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@company.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc-forensic@company.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1\n```\n- **p**: Policy for organizational domain\n- **sp**: Policy for subdomains\n- **pct**: Percentage of messages subject to policy (for gradual rollout)\n- **rua**: Aggregate report destination (daily XML reports)\n- **ruf**: Forensic report destination (per-failure reports)\n- **adkim**: DKIM alignment mode (r=relaxed, s=strict)\n- **aspf**: SPF alignment mode (r=relaxed, s=strict)\n- **fo**: Failure reporting options (0=both fail, 1=either fails)\n\n### SPF and DKIM Alignment\n- **SPF Alignment**: The domain in the Return-Path (envelope sender) must match the From header domain\n- **DKIM Alignment**: The d= domain in the DKIM signature must match the From header domain\n- **Relaxed**: Organizational domain match (sub.example.com matches example.com)\n- **Strict**: Exact domain match required\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Inventory All Sending Sources (Week 1-2)\n- Audit all systems sending email as your domain (marketing, CRM, ticketing, transactional)\n- Document third-party services: Salesforce, Mailchimp, SendGrid, Zendesk, etc.\n- Identify internal mail servers, applications, and relay hosts\n- Check for shadow IT email sending (departments using unauthorized services)\n\n### Step 2: Configure SPF and DKIM (Week 2-4)\n- Consolidate SPF record with all legitimate sending IPs and includes\n- Ensure SPF record stays under 10 DNS lookup limit\n- Generate and publish DKIM keys for each sending source\n- Verify DKIM signing works for all outbound mail paths\n- Test with MX Toolbox or dmarcian SPF\u002FDKIM validators\n\n### Step 3: Deploy DMARC in Monitoring Mode (Week 4-6)\n- Publish initial DMARC record: `v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@company.com; fo=1`\n- Wait 1-2 weeks to collect representative aggregate reports\n- Analyze reports to identify unauthorized senders and alignment failures\n- Fix SPF\u002FDKIM for all legitimate sources showing failures\n- Iterate until all legitimate mail passes DMARC\n\n### Step 4: Move to Quarantine with pct Tag (Week 6-12)\n- Update to quarantine at 10%: `v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=10; rua=...`\n- Monitor for false positives (legitimate mail being quarantined)\n- Increase pct gradually: 10% -> 25% -> 50% -> 75% -> 100%\n- Each increase: wait 1-2 weeks and review reports before advancing\n- Fix any remaining alignment issues discovered at each stage\n\n### Step 5: Advance to Reject Policy (Week 12-20)\n- After stable quarantine at 100%, move to reject at 10%: `v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=10; rua=...`\n- Gradually increase pct: 10% -> 25% -> 50% -> 100%\n- Monitor closely for legitimate mail being rejected\n- Establish emergency rollback procedure (revert to quarantine)\n- Apply subdomain policy: `sp=reject` for subdomains\n\n### Step 6: Ongoing Monitoring and Maintenance\n- Continuously monitor DMARC aggregate reports\n- Add new sending sources before they start sending\n- Review forensic reports for spoofing attempts\n- Maintain SPF record as sending infrastructure changes\n- Rotate DKIM keys annually\n\n## Tools & Resources\n- **EasyDMARC**: DMARC monitoring dashboard with aggregate\u002Fforensic report analysis\n- **DMARCLY**: SPF, DKIM, DMARC monitoring with auto-DNS updates\n- **dmarcian**: DMARC deployment and management platform\n- **Valimail**: Automated DMARC enforcement with hosted authentication\n- **MX Toolbox**: DNS record lookup and DMARC validator\n- **Google Admin Toolbox**: DMARC check and diagnostic tools\n\n## Validation\n- DMARC record published and resolving correctly at _dmarc.domain.com\n- All legitimate sending sources pass SPF and\u002For DKIM alignment\n- Aggregate reports show >99% legitimate mail passing DMARC\n- Spoofed messages from unauthorized senders are rejected\n- No legitimate mail blocked after full p=reject enforcement\n- Subdomain policy (sp=) also set to reject\n","# Performing DMARC Policy Enforcement Rollout\n\n## Overview\nDomain-based Message Authentication, Reporting and Conformance (DMARC) is the cornerstone of email anti-spoofing protection. A DMARC rollout progresses through three phases: monitoring (p=none), quarantine (p=quarantine), and full enforcement (p=reject). When configured at p=reject, any email that fails both SPF and DKIM checks is outright rejected. Google and Yahoo now require DMARC for bulk senders (5,000+ emails), driving a 65% reduction in unauthenticated messages. The rollout typically takes 3-6 months for safe deployment.\n\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting security assessments that involve performing dmarc policy enforcement rollout\n- When following incident response procedures for related security events\n- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities\n- When validating security controls through hands-on testing\n\n## Prerequisites\n- Administrative access to DNS management for the domain\n- Understanding of SPF, DKIM, and DMARC protocols (RFC 7208, 6376, 7489)\n- Complete inventory of all legitimate email sending sources\n- DMARC reporting analysis tool (EasyDMARC, DMARCLY, Valimail, or dmarcian)\n- Email gateway with DMARC enforcement capability\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n### DMARC Policy Levels\n| Policy | Behavior | Use Case |\n|---|---|---|\n| p=none | Monitor only, no action on failures | Discovery phase |\n| p=quarantine | Send failing messages to spam\u002Fjunk | Transition phase |\n| p=reject | Block failing messages entirely | Full enforcement |\n\n### DMARC Record Anatomy\n```\nv=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=25; rua=mailto:dmarc-agg@company.com; ruf=mailto:dmarc-forensic@company.com; adkim=r; aspf=r; fo=1\n```\n- **p**: Policy for organizational domain\n- **sp**: Policy for subdomains\n- **pct**: Percentage of messages subject to policy (for gradual rollout)\n- **rua**: Aggregate report destination (daily XML reports)\n- **ruf**: Forensic report destination (per-failure reports)\n- **adkim**: DKIM alignment mode (r=relaxed, s=strict)\n- **aspf**: SPF alignment mode (r=relaxed, s=strict)\n- **fo**: Failure reporting options (0=both fail, 1=either fails)\n\n### SPF and DKIM Alignment\n- **SPF Alignment**: The domain in the Return-Path (envelope sender) must match the From header domain\n- **DKIM Alignment**: The d= domain in the DKIM signature must match the From header domain\n- **Relaxed**: Organizational domain match (sub.example.com matches example.com)\n- **Strict**: Exact domain match required\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Inventory All Sending Sources (Week 1-2)\n- Audit all systems sending email as your domain (marketing, CRM, ticketing, transactional)\n- Document third-party services: Salesforce, Mailchimp, SendGrid, Zendesk, etc.\n- Identify internal mail servers, applications, and relay hosts\n- Check for shadow IT email sending (departments using unauthorized services)\n\n### Step 2: Configure SPF and DKIM (Week 2-4)\n- Consolidate SPF record with all legitimate sending IPs and includes\n- Ensure SPF record stays under 10 DNS lookup limit\n- Generate and publish DKIM keys for each sending source\n- Verify DKIM signing works for all outbound mail paths\n- Test with MX Toolbox or dmarcian SPF\u002FDKIM validators\n\n### Step 3: Deploy DMARC in Monitoring Mode (Week 4-6)\n- Publish initial DMARC record: `v=DMARC1; p=none; rua=mailto:dmarc@company.com; fo=1`\n- Wait 1-2 weeks to collect representative aggregate reports\n- Analyze reports to identify unauthorized senders and alignment failures\n- Fix SPF\u002FDKIM for all legitimate sources showing failures\n- Iterate until all legitimate mail passes DMARC\n\n### Step 4: Move to Quarantine with pct Tag (Week 6-12)\n- Update to quarantine at 10%: `v=DMARC1; p=quarantine; pct=10; rua=...`\n- Monitor for false positives (legitimate mail being quarantined)\n- Increase pct gradually: 10% -> 25% -> 50% -> 75% -> 100%\n- Each increase: wait 1-2 weeks and review reports before advancing\n- Fix any remaining alignment issues discovered at each stage\n\n### Step 5: Advance to Reject Policy (Week 12-20)\n- After stable quarantine at 100%, move to reject at 10%: `v=DMARC1; p=reject; pct=10; rua=...`\n- Gradually increase pct: 10% -> 25% -> 50% -> 100%\n- Monitor closely for legitimate mail being rejected\n- Establish emergency rollback procedure (revert to quarantine)\n- Apply subdomain policy: `sp=reject` for subdomains\n\n### Step 6: Ongoing Monitoring and Maintenance\n- Continuously monitor DMARC aggregate reports\n- Add new sending sources before they start sending\n- Review forensic reports for spoofing attempts\n- Maintain SPF record as sending infrastructure changes\n- Rotate DKIM keys annually\n\n## Tools & Resources\n- **EasyDMARC**: DMARC monitoring dashboard with aggregate\u002Fforensic report analysis\n- **DMARCLY**: SPF, DKIM, DMARC monitoring with auto-DNS updates\n- **dmarcian**: DMARC deployment and management platform\n- **Valimail**: Automated DMARC enforcement with hosted authentication\n- **MX Toolbox**: DNS record lookup and DMARC validator\n- **Google Admin Toolbox**: DMARC check and diagnostic tools\n\n## Validation\n- DMARC record published and resolving correctly at _dmarc.domain.com\n- All legitimate sending sources pass SPF and\u002For DKIM alignment\n- Aggregate reports show >99% legitimate mail passing DMARC\n- Spoofed messages from unauthorized senders are rejected\n- No legitimate mail blocked after full p=reject enforcement\n- Subdomain policy (sp=) also set to reject\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"capec":53,"model":54,"tools":55,"domain":39,"maxTurns":59,"nist_csf":60,"subdomain":65,"description":7,"mitre_attack":66},[50,28,27,33,35,51,36,52],"dmarc","phishing","email-security",[],"sonnet",[56,37,57,58],"Read","Glob","Grep",20,[61,62,63,64],"PR.AT-01","DE.CM-09","RS.CO-02","DE.AE-02","phishing-defense",[67],"T1566","main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fcompliance\u002Femail\u002Fdmarcrollout\u002Fexploit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":76,"prompt":86,"zipAvailable":87},[77,80,83],{"tool":78,"command":79},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill email-dmarcrollout-exploit",{"tool":81,"command":82},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill email-dmarcrollout-exploit",{"tool":84,"command":85},"pnpm","pnpm dlx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill email-dmarcrollout-exploit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcompliance\u002Femail\u002Fdmarcrollout\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[89],{"path":90,"resourceType":91,"resourceTypeDesc":92,"sizeBytes":93,"sourceHtmlUrl":94},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",692,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcompliance\u002Femail\u002Fdmarcrollout\u002Fexploit\u002Findex.json",[96,119,139,160,182,198],{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[103,104,105,106,107,32,41,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,39,118],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[24,103,126,106,127,128,129,39,37,130,131,132,133,134,32,135,136,29,137,138],"services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":140,"name":141,"nameZh":6,"description":142,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":143,"categories":144,"keywords":145,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[146,147,148,149,150,151,39,37,152,130,153,154,32,29,155,156,157,158,159,54],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper",{"skillNo":161,"name":162,"nameZh":6,"description":163,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":164,"categories":165,"keywords":166,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[104,167,168,169,170,171,172,41,173,39,118,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181,32],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":183,"name":184,"nameZh":6,"description":185,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":186,"categories":187,"keywords":188,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[189,190,104,191,169,171,192,41,193,173,39,118,130,194,195,196,197,181,32,108],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":199,"name":200,"nameZh":6,"description":201,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":202,"categories":203,"keywords":204,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[205,104,169,206,192,41,207,208,39,118,209,210,211,212,213,214,32,108,215,216],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]